Around Abhinavagupta

Aspects of the Intellectual History of Kashmir
from the Ninth to the Eleventh Century

Edited by
Eli Franco and Isabelle Ratié

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Around Abhinavagupta

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Contents

Introduction

ELI FRANCO AND ISABELLE RATIÉ

Abhinavagupta (fl. ca. 975-1025) is arguably the most famous figure among Kashmirian medieval intellectuals, and rightly so: the length, number, diversity and refinement of his works deserve to be qualified as exceptional. The crucial importance of his contributions to Indian aesthetics – which include a treatise on histrionics[1] and another on poetics[2] – has long been acknowledged, but he has also authored, among many theological works, a huge summa on Śaiva rituals and metaphysics[3] that constitutes an unparalleled source for the history of Śaiva religions, as well as two particularly brilliant philosophical works[4] expounding one of the most complex, subtle and original philosophical systems ever produced in India, the Pratyabhijñā ("Recognition") system of Utpaladeva (fl. ca. 925-975).

Some of the contributions to the present volume specifically deal with one or several of Abhinavagupta's works;[5] yet this book is not meant as a collection of studies devoted to the great Śaiva polymath. For however exceptional Abhinavagupta's works may be, they are grounded in a specific historical, social, artistic, religious and philosophical context, and it is this context that we had set out to explore when, in June 2013, we held at the University of Leipzig an international conference entitled *Around Abhinavagupta. Aspects of the Intellectual History of Kashmir from the 9th to the 11th Century*. Our ambition was to highlight the intellectual background against which Abhinavagupta's figure has emerged – a background no less exceptional than Abhinavagupta himself. We

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[1] The *Abhinavabhāratī*, a commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* attributed to Bharata.

[2] The *Dhvanyālokalocana*, a commentary on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*.

[3] The *Tantrāloka*.

[4] The *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* and *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*.

[5] See in particular those by L. BANSAT-BOUDON, E. GANSER, A. GRAHELI, L. MCCREA, D. SHULMAN and J. TÖRZSÖK.

were hoping to show how the works of the great Śaiva author, far from being an isolated phenomenon, can be seen as an accomplished expression of a unique intellectual milieu, that of Kashmir in the 9th, 10th and 11th centuries. The present volume gathers many revised versions of the presentations given during the conference[6] as well as a few additional articles.[7]

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[6]   The conference included the following presentations. 08/06/2013: M. WITZEL, "Kashmiri Brahmins under the Karkota, Utpala and Lohara Dynasties, 625-1101 CE" (9^{30}-10^{15}); L. BANSAT-BOUDON, "The World on Show, or Sensibility in Disguise: Philosophical and Aesthetic Issues in a Stanza by Abhinavagupta (*Tantrāloka* I 332, *Locana* ad I 13)" (10^{15}-11^{00}); R. TORELLA, "A Vaiṣṇava Paramādvaita in Tenth-Century Kashmir? Vāmanadatta and his *Saṃvitprakā-śa*" (11^{30}-12^{15}); J. NEMEC, "*Amūrtatva* and Materiality in Pratyabhijñā Philosophy" (12^{15}-13^{00}); M. KAUL, "Can a Reflected Image Exist Separately Outside the Mirror? An Exploration into Abhinavagupta's Theory of Reflection" (15^{00}-15^{45}); S. VASUDEVA, "*Lakṣaṇam aparyālocitābhidhānam*: The Dispute Between Śobhākara and Ruyyaka" (15^{45}-16^{30}); D. CUNEO, "The Culmination of 'Kashmirian' Sanskrit Aesthetics: Jayaratha's *Vimarśinī* on Ruyyaka's *Alaṃkārasarvasva*" (17^{00}-17^{45}). 09/06/2013: D. SHULMAN, "Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta on the Limits of *Rasadhvani*: A Reading of DhvĀ 3.43" (09^{30}-10^{15}, in absentia); Y. BRONNER, "Udbhaṭa and the Dawn of Kashmiri Poetics" (10^{15}-11^{00}); J. TÖRZSÖK, "Theatre, Acting and the Image of the Actor in Abhinavagupta's Tantric Sources" (11^{30}-12^{15}); E. GANSER, "Elements of Ritual Speculation in the *Abhinavabhāratī*" (12^{15}-13^{00}); L. MCCREA, "Abhinavagupta as an Intellectual Historian of Buddhism" (15^{00}-15^{45}); V. ELTSCHINGER, "Whose Insight did Śaṅkaranandana Provide with Adornment? More light on the *Prajñālaṅkāra*" (15^{45}-16^{30}). 10/06/2013: A. GRAHELI, "Jayanta and Abhinavagupta on the Contextual Principle of *Tātparya*" (09^{30}-10^{15}); S. MORIYAMA, "Utpaladeva and Bhāsarvajña: A Comparison Between their Refutations of the Sāṃkhya Theory of Causation and Soteriology" (10^{15}-11^{00}); E. FRANCO, "Why Isn't Comparison a Means of Knowledge? Bhāsarvajña on *Upamāna*" (11^{30}-12^{15}); V. VERGIANI, "Canonising the *Vākypadīya*: The Sense and Purpose of Helārāja's Commentarial Project" (12^{15}-13^{00}); C. YOSHIMIZU, "The Transmission of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and the *Prasannapadā* to Tibet from Kashmir" (15^{00}-15^{45}); O. ALMOGI, "Tantric Scriptures in the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* Believed to Have Been Transmitted by Kashmirian Paṇḍitas: A Preminary Survey" (15^{45}-16^{30}); D. WANGCHUK, "The *Nine-Dimensional Magical Mirror*: A Philosophical Work Ascribed to the Kashmirian Paṇḍita Vimalamitra" (17^{00}-17^{45}).

[7]   These include the contributions by Y. MUROYA and I. RATIÉ.

Arts and Aesthetics, Grammar, Religion and Philosophy, Historiography in Abhinavagupta's Kashmir

Of course the following pages are not the first to tackle the cultural history of Kashmir, which has long attracted scholarly attention, and there is hardly any need to say that this volume is in countless ways indebted to earlier publications on this topic. Yet so far such studies have either focused on one specific component (Buddhist,[8] Hindu,[9] linguistic,[10] poetic,[11] historiographic,[12] artistic,[13] etc.) of Kashmir's cultural wealth, or they have endeavoured to give a glimpse of the entire history of Kashmiri culture as a whole up to its most recent developments.[14] To the best of our knowledge, however, no attempt has ever been made to study the many-faceted outburst of intellectual creativity that occurred in Kashmir around Abhinavagupta's time; and the goal of this book is to try and map out the extraordinary cultural efferversence that took place then in the little kingdom.

Not only did poetical and theatrical traditions flourish: Kashmiri authors elaborated theories on poetry and theatre that were to spread far beyond the borders of the valley and are widely regarded as an important revolution in the history of Indian aesthetics. Several chapters in this volume are devoted to aesthetics in Kashmir; while reflecting the paramount importance of this discipline in the intellectual landscape of Abhinavagupta's time, they offer fresh insights on its history. Y. BRONNER's contribution focuses on the origins of a distinctly Kashmiri aesthetics and the early figure of Udbhaṭa (fl. ca. 800); L. BANSAT-BOUDON, E. GANSER, D. SHULMAN and J. TÖRZSÖK examine Abhinavagupta's aesthetics and its sources; D. CUNEO and S. VASUDEVA, for their part, have chosen to explore the late developments (12th-13th centuries) of Kashmiri

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[8] See e.g. NAUDOU 1968.

[9] See IKARI ED. 1994; SANDERSON 2007 and 2009.

[10] See KAUL AND AKLUJKAR EDS. 2008.

[11] See MCCREA 2008.

[12] See e.g. SLAJE 2004, COX ED. 2013 and SLAJE 2014.

[13] For recent publications on Kashmiri plastic arts and crafts in particular (and for further bibliography on this vast topic) see e.g. PAL 2007, SIUDMAK 2013 and LINROTHE 2014.

[14] See RAO ED. 2008; see also STEINER ED. 2012, which gathers contributions on various Kashmiri texts.

aesthetics in the works of Ruyyaka, Śobhākara and Jayaratha, the famous commentator of Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka*.

The grammatical science and the philosophical-grammatical tradition also had brilliant representatives such as Helārāja – a commentator on Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* who might have been the son of a master of Abhinavagupta's, and who might even have been himself one of Abhinavagupta's masters. V. VERGIANI shows that Helārāja's work, which has been paid little scholarly attention so far except as a key to understanding Bhartṛhari's philosophy, deserves to be studied for its own merits.

As for Buddhism, it had been present in the valley since ancient times.[15] L. MCCREA discusses the views of various Buddhist philosophers as reported by Abhinavagupta in his commentaries on the Pratyabhijñā treatise – in particular those of two famous Kashmiri Buddhist authors, namely Dharmottara (a prominent thinker of the so-called "logico-epistemological school" who probably died at the very beginning of the 9th century) and Śaṅkaranandana (who seems to have been an older contemporary of Abhinavagupta, and whom the latter often quotes with admiration). Recent scholarship has established that Śaṅkaranandana was a propounder of the Buddhist idealistic current known as the Vijñānavāda,[16] and L. MCCREA's contribution shows that Dharmottara, for his part, must have been the champion of a famous Buddhist theory traditionally ascribed to the Sautrāntikas, according to which we must infer that objects exist outside of consciousness.

Two contributions also focus on the important role played by Kashmiri pandits in the transition of Buddhism from India to Tibet. So far the details of this transition have been known mainly through later Tibetan historiographies and the colophons of canonical texts. O. ALMOGI's contribution to this volume presents a preliminary survey of an extra-canonical collection of texts (the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum*, or the *Collection of Ancient Tantras*), the

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[15] As shown in SANDERSON 2009, pp. 101-104, despite claims by Brahmanical and Śaiva sources to the effect that the presence of their movements in the valley dates back to a greater antiquity than that of Buddhism, textual and archeological evidence of Brahmanical Kashmir "does not take us back as far as our earliest evidence of Kashmirian Buddhism." Besides, the decline of Buddhism happened relatively late in Kashmir (Buddhism was still flourishing in Kalhaṇa's time), and as shown in SLAJE 2007, in the 15th century CE, some Hindu authors at least were still well acquainted with Buddhist terminology.

[16] See ELTSCHINGER 2015.

claimed origin of these works (many of them were allegedly transmitted by Kashmiri pandits or at least with their help), and the figures presumably involved in their transmission. As for C. YOSHIMIZU, she presents newly discovered works by Tibetan witnesses of the transmission of Buddhism from Kashmir to Tibet that shed a particularly interesting light on the influence of Kashmir regarding the formation of the Tibetan monastic and scholastic system.

Brahmanical authors were no less active in the valley, and two brilliant Kashmiri representatives of the Nyāya tradition wrote important works during this period: Bhaṭṭa Jayanta (a 9th-century philosopher as well as a fiercely funny satirist who authored the *Āgamaḍambara*,[17] a play on religious politics set during the reign of king Śaṅkaravarman) and Bhāsarvajña (the author of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, whose originality is pointed out by Abhinavagupta himself).[18] E. FRANCO offers an analysis of one of Bhāsarvajña's most conspicuous departures from his own Naiyāyika tradition, namely his refusal to acknowledge analogy (*upamāna*) as a valid means of knowledge. A. GRAHELI examines the positions held by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta and Abhinavagupta in a debate on verbal signification, and shows that the latter is likely to have been influenced by the former in this controversy. Y. MUROYA, for his part, examines how later Naiyāyikas knew and understood Jayanta's thought by analyzing the way in which the 14th-century Navya-Nyāya philosopher Gaṅgeśa refers to Jayanta in the context of a debate on analogy; his contribution shows that Gaṅgeśa's view of Jayanta's position was certainly mediated by Vācaspatimiśra's and Udayana's interpretations.

The valley also hosted many Hindu heterodox movements, both Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva. Their exegetical and philosophical literature – particularly rich in the case of Śaiva traditions – remains partly unavailable to date, and two of the contributions present some hitherto unpublished material pertaining to that literature: R. TORELLA gives an overview of a Vaiṣṇava text that he is currently editing and translating, the *Saṃvitprakāśa* – a unique 10th-century text by Vāmanadatta; and I. RATIÉ offers an edition and translation of a thus far unknown fragment of the detailed commentary (*Vivṛti*) that the Śaiva nondualist philosopher Utpaladeva wrote on his own *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* treatise. S. MORIYAMA explores another work

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[17]   See DEZSŐ 2005.
[18]   See RATIÉ 2011, pp. 88-91.

by Utpaladeva that remains little studied to date, namely the *Īśvarasiddhi*, and examines in this connection the Śaiva nondualists' criticism of the Sāṅkhya theory of causation. J. NEMEC tackles the evolution of the notion of materiality in the Pratyabhijñā system and endeavours to highlight the different positions adopted by Somānanda, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta in this regard; as for J. TÖRZSÖK, she shows how Abhinavagupta's theatrical notions are in part grounded in his tantric sources.

Finally, this creative ferment also resulted in a remarkable historiographical perspective expressed in the 12th-century *Rājataraṅginī*, a chronicle of the kings of Kashmir written by Kalhaṇa. M. WITZEL's contribution highlights the extraordinary wealth of information contained in this source and largely draws on it to depict the social status and learning of the Brahmins of Kashmir. This historiographical approach is in many respects consonant with Abhinavagupta's tendency, emphasized by L. MCCREA, to replace the abstracted, depersonalized presentation of debates usually found in Indian philosophical literature with a historicized account of his Buddhist opponents' various positions.

UNDERSTANDING THE "KASHMIRI MIRACLE"

Recent studies have pointed out that this period of intense creativity can only be understood as the outcome of a series of dynamic interactions between different communities, and we hope that the present book, which gathers contributions by scholars working on religious, philosophical, literary, social and historical aspects of medieval Kashmir, can help draw an overall picture of these interactions.

In the field of philosophy as well as in that of religious exegesis, the works written in medieval Kashmir cannot be properly understood without taking into account the constant interaction between various competing traditions. It is the case of the Pratyabhijñā system of the Śaiva non-dualist philosophers, which, somewhat paradoxically, is permeated with notions borrowed from the very Buddhist rivals whom these Śaivas claim to refute.[19] This dialectic of criticism and appropriation of Buddhist notions is so pervasive in Śaiva philosophical texts that nowadays this Śaiva corpus constitutes a crucial source for the history of late Indian philosophical

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[19]   See in particular TORELLA 1992, RATIÉ 2010 and 2011b.

Buddhism.[20] In this respect it is certainly no coincidence that the *Vivṛti* fragment studied in I. RATIÉ's contribution happens to deal with a Buddhist thesis (on the nature of memory) and quotes a passage from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*; and L. MCREA's contribution shows that Abhinavagupta's longest commentary on the Pratyabhijñā treatise, the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, affords the historians of Buddhism a complex and precise overview of the relationship between the great Buddhist philosophers of the time. The Buddhists, however, were by no means the Śaivas' sole interlocutors: the Pratyabhijñā system is the result of a constant polemical dialogue with many different schools of thought, and the contributions by S. MORIYAMA and A. GRAHELI examine the reaction of Śaiva authors to ideas elaborated by non-Buddhist trends such as the Sāṅkhya and Nyāya.

As for the close relationship between Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva traditions, it is highlighted here by R. TORELLA, who points out that the teachings of the Pāñcarātrin Vāmanadatta were held in great esteem by Śaiva authors (Abhinavagupta even mentions him reverently as a *guru* – perhaps one of his own masters?). R. TORELLA further shows that the numerous striking similarities between Vāmanadatta's metaphysical views and Utpaladeva's Śaiva nondualistic system are in all probability the result of a strong influence of Utpaladeva's metaphysics on Vāmanadatta's thought.[21]

These fruitful interactions tend to transcend the categories in which the various types of Indian literature are usually compartmentalized: it has recently been argued for instance that the Kashmiri aesthetic revolution is at least in part the result of what John Pocock – following Thomas Kuhn – would call a "paradigm transfer," in the field of aesthetics, of a model first developed in the field of Vedic exegesis by the Mīmāṃsakas.[22] A. GRAHELI's con-

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[20] See e.g. RATIÉ 2014 and 2015, pp. 43-44.

[21] These similarities are briefly mentioned in SANDERSON 2009, p. 108; the latter notes that Vāmanadatta's philosophical position "can barely be distinguished from the dynamic nondualism of consciousness propagated [...] by Utpaladeva [...]." However, A. Sanderson does not pass any judgement on what must have been the direction of influence (ibid.: "It is not at all clear to me, however, that Vāmanadatta's thought was inspired by Utpaladeva's. The reverse may well have been the case.").

[22] See MCCREA 2008. See also, however, Y. BRONNER's contribution to this volume, which places this Kashmiri aesthetic revolution earlier and draws a somewhat more complex picture of it.

tribution to this volume also shows how Abhinavagupta imports in
the field of aesthetics a notion first developed by the Naiyāyika Ja-
yanta in the context of an epistemological debate on verbal testi-
mony and scriptural authority. V. VERGIANI, for his part, points
out that Helārāja was influenced by various trends outside of his
Bhartṛharian grammatical tradition and endeavoured to provide an
interpretation of Bhartṛhari's work compatible with the Nyāya's
theistic views and opposed to the Mīmāṃsakas' epistemological
and metaphysical tenets.

Furthermore, scholars have already pointed out that there are
many points of contact between the aesthetics elaborated by the
Kashmiri poeticians and the metaphysics of Kashmiri Śaiva non-
dualism;[23] but the exact nature of this complex relationship re-
mains to be determined. While E. GANSER offers a fresh analysis
of the elements of ritual speculation found in Abhinavagupta's
work on the aesthetics of theatre, J. TÖRZSÖK studies mentions of
theatre and actors in tantric texts that were familiar to Abhinava-
gupta; her contribution shows that these texts certainly played an
essential role in Abhinavagupta's conception of theatre and that
they constitute an important source for the historians of Indian the-
atre and aesthetics. L. BANSAT-BOUDON, for her part, focuses on
the relationship between Abhinavagupta's philosophy and his aes-
thetics by unravelling the various meanings of a stanza from the
Tantrāloka that Abhinavagupta himself quotes in his work on poe-
tics.

The dynamics of the various interactions that made Kashmir
such a lively intellectual center are also to be understood in view
of the valley's peculiar geographical and geo-political position.
Not only did medieval Kashmir profoundly influence South Indian
Śaivism;[24] the valley also played a crucial role during the so-called
"second wave" of transmission of Buddhism into Tibet (11th-12th
centuries) that was to have far-reaching consequences for the his-
tory of Buddhism throughout Asia – an aspect of Kashmiri creati-
vity explored by O. ALMOGI and C. YOSHIMIZU. The latter shows
how Kashmir, and in particular the Kashmiri scholar Mahāsumati,
had a decisive impact on the history of the Tibetan Madhyamaka

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[23] See e.g. GNOLI 1956, pp. xxxixff.; MASSON AND PATWARDHAN 1969; BAN-
     SAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 341 ff.; and GEROW 1994.

[24] On this still little-studied influence see e.g. SANDERSON 1990, pp. 80-83; TO-
     RELLA 1994, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii; and COX 2006, pp. 173-240.

tradition, by reinstating Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* as the main hermeneutical tool for the study of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyama-kakārikā*. O. ALMOGI, for her part, points out that some of the texts belonging to the extra-canonical collection that she studies only have a doubtful connection to Kashmir, despite claims to the contrary by the editors and compilers of the collection. This suggests that the role of Kashmiri pandits in the transmission of Buddhism from India to Tibet might have been at times imaginary – but it also illustrates the remarkable prestige enjoyed by Kashmiris in Tibet, and it shows how Kashmir, whether real or fantasized, had a significant impact on Tibetan Buddhism.

By enabling specialists of different fields (religious and social studies, history, philosophy, grammar, aesthetics), linguistic domains (Sanskrit, Tibetan) and geographical areas (Tibet) to share the latest results of their research, we have thus tried not only to provide an overview of the Kashmiri "golden age," but also to trace its genesis, dynamics and impact on neighbouring areas. We are of course fully aware that much remains to be done in this respect and we certainly make no claim to exhaustivity; but we hope that however incomplete, our attempt can draw attention to what we see as the main feature of this Kashmiri intellectual and artistic blossoming. It seems to us, in sum, that if the valley around Abhinavagupta's time can be seen as a "Kashmiri miracle" – to paraphrase an expression once coined for Athens in Pericles' time –, this is so primarily thanks to Kashmir's great variety of different communities and their complex interactions, not only in religious matters, but also across secular or semi-secular intellectual disciplines such as poetry, poetics, logic, epistemology, grammar or visual arts. This is not to say – far from that – that Abhinavagupta's Kashmir was a haven of tolerance and that these communities fully accepted each other by embracing a peaceful and universalistic ecumenism: the naïveté of such a view has often been rightfully pointed out.[25] But while fighting each other or at least competing (sometimes fiercely) with each other, these communities learnt a great deal about each other, borrowed from their opponents while claiming to defeat them, transformed their rivals' thought, terminology and traditions while appropriating them, and it seems to us

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[25] See e.g., on Jayanta's so-called tolerance, WEZLER 1976; on that of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* (the earliest nucleus of which, the *Mokṣopāya*, is a Kashmiri text), SLAJE 1993; and on tolerance in Kalhaṇa's *Rājataraṅginī*, TÖRZSÖK forthcoming.

that this constant circulation and metamorphosis of ideas and practices is first and foremost what has made Abhinavagupta's Kashmir such a fascinating place and time.

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Tantric Scriptures
in the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum*
Believed to Have Been Transmitted
to Tibet by Kashmiris:

A Preliminary Survey[*]

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1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The extra-canonical collection known as the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum*, or the *Collection of Ancient Tantras*, contains numerous texts claimed to have been transmitted to Tibet by or with the help of Kashmiri personages. One of the best-known Kashmiri Buddhist masters in the Tibetan tradition, particularly the one associated with the early transmission of Buddhism in Tibet, is no doubt Vimalamitra, who is mostly associated with texts belonging to the Atiyoga (or rDzogs chen) and Mahāyoga classes of rNying ma *tantra*s. And indeed, numerous texts contained in the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* are said to have been transmitted with his help, which mainly took the form of working on their translation into Tibetan, though he also expounded them to Indians and Tibetans and engaged in related activities. Another figure mentioned in the colophons of several Mahāyoga *tantra*s found in the collection is a certain Kashmiri translator named Ānanda. Furthermore, in one case Kashmir is explicitly mentioned as the place of translation, and thus perhaps was the place of origin of the *tantra* or Tantric cycle in question. In the present paper I shall attempt to present a preliminary survey of these *tantra*s, and briefly

refer to the doctrinal cycles they belong to, the individuals presumably involved in their transmission, and the authenticity of these ascribed transmissions.[1]

At first, however, a few words should be perhaps said about the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* itself. The *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* is a collection of Tantric scriptures believed by the followers of the rNying ma school to have been transmitted to Tibet from India – either directly or via other places, including Nepal, China, and Central Asia – mainly during the first period of dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet. Most of these texts have been, however, regarded as spurious by the followers of what is referred to as the New Schools and thus were, apart from a few exceptions, excluded from the Tibetan Buddhist canon, while those that have been included were not put in the Tantra (rGyud) section, but compiled in a separate section called "Ancient Tantras" (rNying rgyud). The by and large exclusion of these *tantra*s from the canon has thus led to the formation of the para-canonical collection known as the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum*. The need to compile this collection had become particularly urgent owing to the constant growth in the number of these "Ancient Tantras" – growth, that is, mainly due to the activities of those persons known as treasure revealers (*gter ston*).

We still do not have a complete picture regarding the formation of this collection and its various versions, but what is quite certain is that small collections of these texts had existed from quite early on – perhaps already as early as the eleventh century – and were later formed into bigger collections. The *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* edition prepared at the behest of the fifteen-century Tibetan master Ratna gling pa (1403-1479, P470)[2] is commonly considered to be the first systematic attempt to compile a *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* edition, and there is no doubt that this edition has had a great influence on the history of the transmission of the collection, including its form and content. However, we have sufficient historical evidence that

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[1] For a discussion of the authenticity of titles and colophons of Tantric texts in the Tibetan canon, see ALMOGI 2008. Authentication strategies relating to rNying ma scriptures pursued in the colophons of the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* will be discussed in a separate article.

[2] The dates of Tibetan figures given in the present paper are based on the TBRC and are followed by the TBRC resource ID number. Likewise, place names are identified by their TBRC resource ID number, when possible.

there were other large-scale compilations of these scriptures even earlier.[3]

A number of editions of the collection are accessible, and for the present study I have consulted selected ones from various lines of transmission, including what I refer to as the "Central Bhutanese Group" (Tb, Gt), "South-Western Tibetan Group" (Tk, Tn), "Tibetan-Nepalese Borderlands Group" (Nu, Na), and the "(Central)-Eastern Tibetan Group" (Dg).[4] In addition, I have also consulted the collection known as the *Bai ro rgyud 'bum* (Bg). (The total number of texts referred to in each of the cases discussed below, however, is based on the editions from the Central Bhutanese Group, which contain the largest number of texts. The text titles and colophons provided are primarily based on the Tb edition.)

2. KASHMIR AS THE PLACE OF TRANSLATION

First I would like to discuss the one case in which Kashmir is explicitly mentioned as the place of translation (and by extension perhaps as the place of origin). The *tantra* is titled *dPal rdo rje gzhon nu thugs rje khros pa rtsa ba'i rgyud kyi bshad pa* ("*The Explanatory* [*Tantra*] *of the Basic Tantra* [*of*] *Vajrakumāra, *the One Endowed with Wrathful Compassion*"), is 13 chapters long, and is found, in all versions consulted, in the Mahāyoga section. The colophon reads as follows:[5]

> The *Explanatory* [*Tantra*] *of the Basic Tantra of the Wrathful Vajra* (*dPal rdo rje khros pa'i rtsa ba'i rgyud kyi bshad pa*) is [herewith] concluded. Near the self-arisen *stūpa* [located at] a cemetery [called] Bi sa ka (=*Viśākha?) in Kashmir, India, the Venerable Lady *Sattvavajrī (rDo rje sems ma), endowed with supernatural powers, and the translator 'Gar Shes [rab?] rang 'byung translated [the *tantra*], and [then] proofread and finalized [the translation]. Later, that Venerable Lady and 'Brom ston rGyal ba['i 'byung gnas?] revised and finalized [the translation once

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[3]   See ALMOGI forthcoming.

[4]   Text catalogue numbers given for Tb are based on the online catalogue found in *The Tibetan & Himalayan Library*. Likewise, existing catalogues for Gt, Tn, Tk, and Dg have also been consulted. For publication details of these catalogues, see the bibliography, under the respective sigla. References to the Tibetan-Nepalese Borderlands Group (Nu and Na) are based on the comparative catalogue prepared in ALMOGI forthcoming.

[5]   For the Tibetan text, see the appendix, § I, no. 1.

again]. If the reading [here in this version] is wrong, may the Venerable
Lady forgive [me]!

The two translators said to have been involved in the initial transla-
tion, the Venerable Lady *Sattvavajrī and the translator 'Gar Shes
[rab?] rang 'byung, seem to be rather unknown figures, and this ap-
pears to be the only time they are mentioned as translators in the
numerous colophons of the various *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* editions.
To be sure, they seem to be mentioned as a translation team in the
colophon of a single text in the Tibetan Buddhist canon, a *dhāraṇī*
titled *'Phags pa spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug seng ge sgra'i gzungs*
(*Ārya-Avalokiteśvarasiṃhanāda-nāma-dhāraṇī*), which is found in
the Tantra section of the *bKa' 'gyur* (P386/T656). There, however,
the Tibetan translator is named Shes rab 'byung gnas (i.e. *'byung
gnas* instead of *rang byung*, which latter has indeed more of a
rNying ma ring to it). It seems, then, that this is the only translation
of a canonical text that our translators were involved in, since nei-
ther of them is mentioned as a translator elsewhere, not even in col-
laboration with other translators.

Interestingly, the *bKa' 'gyur* colophon reads almost identically
with the first part of the colophon of our text in the *rNying ma rgyud
'bum*, the main difference being the slight variation in the name of
the Tibetan translator, and in addition two further minor differences,
one in the spelling of the name of the cemetery and one in the omis-
sion of the word *rgya gar* for India:[6]

> The *Ārya-Avalokiteśvarasiṃhanāda-nāma-dhāraṇī* is [herewith] con-
> cluded. Near the self-arisen *stūpa* [located at] a cemetery [called] 'Bri sa
> ka (=*Viśākha?) in Kashmir the Venerable Lady *Sattvavajrī (rDo rje
> sems ma), endowed with supernatural powers, and the translator 'Gar
> Shes rab 'byung gnas translated [the *tantra*], and [then] proofread and fi-
> nalized [the translation].

One indeed may wonder whether our colophon has been copied
from the canonical *dhāraṇī*, with the addition of a new passage in
which a revision of the translation is reported, perhaps in order to
strengthen the impression of authenticity. The mention of someone

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[6] P386 (55b1-3); T656 (SKORUPSKI 1985, p. 291): *'phags pa spyan ras gzigs
dbang phyug seng ge sgra zhes bya ba'i gzung rdzogs sho ‖ ‖ kha che'i yul dur
khrod 'bri sa ka rang byung gi mchod rten tsar* [T *rtsar*] *dngos grub brnyes* [T
brnyed] *pa'i rje btsun ma rdo rje sems ma dang | sgra bsgyur gyi lo tstsha* [T
tsā] *ba 'gar shes rab 'byung gnas zhes bya bas bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab
pa'o ‖.*

– to all appearances 'Brom ston rGyal ba'i 'byung gnas (1004/05-1064, P2557), the famous student of Atiśa – as having cooperated with *Sattvavajrī (the same Indian female adept stated as having been involved in the initial translation) on the revision and finalization of the Tibetan version clearly places our alleged translator team in the eleventh century. 'Brom ston rGyal ba'i 'byung gnas's involvement in the translation of an Ancient *tantra* is, however, doubtful. The modern anthology of short biographies, the *mKhas grub rim byon*, provides a brief biography of mGar (a variant of ′Gar) Shes rab 'byung gnas. According to this source, he was born around the mid-eleventh century and did his initial studies in Tibet. Then he travelled to Kashmir, other parts of India, Nepal, and other places, where he met numerous accomplished Indian scholars, under whose guidance he deepened his studies of Indian scriptures and treatises, and of Sanskrit as well. He is further said to have merely translated into Tibetan one text (the text is specified as a *bstan bcos*, usually meaning *śāstra*, but this is obviously a reference to the canonical *dhāraṇī* just mentioned).[7] Unfortunately, the *mKhas grub rim byon* does not specify its source for this report. The place in Kashmir named as where the translation was done has so far not been identified.

3. TANTRAS WHOSE TRANSLATION IS ASCRIBED TO THE KASHMIRI ĀNANDA

There are six translation colophons in the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* in which the Kashmiri Ānanda (*kha che a/ā nan ta*) is mentioned as the translator, in all cases in collaboration with Padmasambhava, and in one of these cases (no. 6), in addition, with the famed early Tibetan translator Vairocana (Bai ro tsa na) as a third member. In three of these cases (nos. 2, 5, 6) he is simply referred to as the Kashmiri Ānanda, but in two cases (no. 3, 4) he is given the title *lo tsā ba*, commonly reserved for the Tibetans in translation teams, and in one case (no. 1) he is even explicitly designated as a "Tibetan translator" (*bod kyi lo tsa ba*).

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[7] *Mkhas grub rim byon* (335-336): mGar shes rab 'byung gnas: *khong ni spyi lo'i dus rabs bcu gcig pa'i dus dkyil tsam du sku 'khrungs pa'i lo tsā ba zhig yin | khong gis thog mar bod yul nas slob gnyer mdzad cing | de nas kha che dang | bal yul | rgya gar sogs su phebs te paṇ grub mang po'i zhabs la gtugs shing rgya gzhung dang legs sbyar gyi skad la phul du phyin pa sbyangs nas bstan bcos gcig tsam bod yig tu bskyur ba mdzad | khong gi bsgyur rtsom ni bka' 'gyur las spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug seng ge sgra'i gzungs zhes bya ba bzhungs so ||.*

So who is the Kashmiri Ānanda? In the following, I shall attempt to answer this question in brief. An earlier mention of this translator is found perhaps in the *dBa'/sBa bzhed*, one of the earliest historical documents narrating the early dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet.[8] There it is reported that after the arrival in Tibet of mKhan po Bo dhi sa twa, the son of the Za hor king (i.e. Śāntarakṣita), in response to an invitation by the Tibetan king (*btsan po*), the king sent three of his ministers to meet him in the lHa sa temple where he was residing to find out whether there was any danger of black magic or evil spirits from his side. For this purpose the markets of Lhasa were searched for a translator from either Kashmir or Yang le (i.e. probably Pharphing in Nepal). One of the three Kashmiris found was the Kashmiri Ānanda who was the only one able to serve as a translator of doctrinal matters, thanks to his education, which included Brahmin sacred scriptures, Sanskrit grammar, and medicine. (He is, by the way, said to have been the son of one sKyes bzang, a Brahmin who had been exiled to Tibet for having committed a crime.) Consequently, Ānanda is reported to have become a translator for Śāntarakṣita. However, no translation in the Tibetan canon is ascribed to him, so it seems that his translation activities – if we take this report at face value – were confined to oral teachings. As pointed out by Pasang Wangdu and Hildegard Diemberger in their translation of the *dBa' bzhed*, he is mentioned as a translator in all versions of the work, and also in the *Bu ston chos 'byung* (referred to there as either Paṇḍita Ānanda, the Kashmiri Ānanda, or the Brahmin Ānanda), which considers him an important translator, placing him twelfth in the list of scholars and translators. However, as pointed out by Wangdu and Dimberger, there also exist other, conflicting reports: according to the *lDe'u chos 'byung*, he was invited to Tibet during the last part of the reign of Khri srong lde btsan in order to translate doctrinal texts, and in the *rGyal rabs gsal ba'i me long* he is mentioned in connection with the Bon po–Buddhist controversy.[9] The reference to him as (*bod kyi*) *lo tsā ba* clearly reflects the fact that he – as a translator (or rather interpreter) having knowledge of Sanskrit and at the same time good command of Tibetan – assumed the role commonly reserved to Tibetans in the translator teams.

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[8]   On the *dBa' bzhed*, see WANGDU AND DIEMBERGER 2000. For a brief discussion
      of the dating of the this historical work, see MARTIN 1997, no. 1.

[9]   WANGDU AND DIEMBERGER 2000, pp. 44-45.

All of the six Tantric scriptures included in the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* said to have been translated by him belong to the cycle of the deity Padma dbang chen (a form of Hayagrīva), which is included in the Mahāyoga section. All six translation colophons are short and, except for the names of the translators, do not provide any additional information, for example, regarding the time or place or any other circumstances surrounding the translation. It is thus unclear why the Kashmiri Ānanda should have been the translator of this specific cycle.

4. TANTRAS STATED AS HAVING BEEN TRANSLATED OR TRANSMITTED BY VIMALAMITRA

There seem to be altogether fifty-seven *tantra*s in the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* (i.e. in the larger editions of the Central Bhutanese Group) in whose transmission Vimalamitra (b. 8th cent.) – generally believed to have been born in Kashmir, but according to some historical sources in one of the neighbouring areas – is said to have been involved in one way or another. It is impossible to discuss in detail the role of Vimalamitra in the transmission of Buddhism into Tibet within the framework of this paper, and I shall merely outline here some of the highlights of his activities from the point of view of the rNying ma tradition, mainly in order to provide a general background to my discussion below. According to traditional sources, Vimalamitra was involved in the transmission of various scriptures, mainly of the Atiyoga and Mahāyoga classes. bDud 'joms rin po che 'Jigs bral ye shes rdo rje (1904-1988, P736) – according to whom Vimalamitra was born in Glang po'i tshal (*Hastivana) or Glang po'i sgang (*Hastisthala) in Western India to the householder Sukhacakra and his wife Ātmaprakāśā[10] – outlines his involvement in the transmission of Tantric teachings as follows:

- Of the Sādhana section of the Mahāyoga teachings, he was entrusted with the cycle of Vajrāmṛta, one of the five "pronouncements" of this section.[11]

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[10] NSTB, pp. 481 and 498, respectively (Sanskrit reconstructions are as offered by Gyurme Dorji and Matthew Kapstein, the translators-cum-editors of the NSTB). According to *ibid*, p. 462, s.v. Hastisthala, the place is "probably to be identified with Hastināpura in modern Himachal Pradesh," which shares its northern borders with the modern state of Jammu and Kashmir. Regarding the circumstances of Vimalamitra's invitation to Tibet, see *ibid*, p. 555.

[11] NSTB, p. 480.

- Another part of the Sādhana section, the treasure consisting in the *Mahottara* (*Che mchog*), one of the eight "concealed treasures" of this section, was also entrusted to him.[12]

- All instructions relating to the Aural Lineage (*snyan brgyud*) of the rDzogs chen teachings were given to him by the masters Śrī Siṃha and Jñānasūtra.[13]

- Regarding the Māyājāla cycle of Mahāyoga, the composition of several treatises is attributed to him.[14] In Tibet he is believed to have expounded what is referred to as the Eighteen Māyājāla *tantra*s to rMa Rin chen mchog, in cooperation with whom he then also translated them into Tibetan.[15] He is also said to have taught the Vajrāmṛta cycle to gNyags Jñānakumāra and others.[16] Furthermore, he supposedly translated (with the help of gNyags Jñānakumāra and g.Yu sgra snying po) thirteen texts of the Eighteen Sems sde *tantra*s (*sems sde bco brgyad*) of the Atiyoga class, which are known as the "later translations" (*phyi 'gyur*) – the first five, known as the "early translations," having purportedly been translated by Vairocana. He is also reported to have given the highly esoteric teachings of the *sNying thig* cycle to the king Khri srong lde btsan and to Nyang Ting 'dzin bzang po. Subsequently, believing that there were no other worthy recipients, he concealed the books at dGe gong in mChims pu, the famed retreat centre near bSam yas monastery.[17] These concealed treasures are said to have been later on discovered by the twelfth-century master Zhang ston (1097-1167).[18]

Of the fifty-seven *tantra*s in the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* whose transmission or translation is attributed to Vimalamitra, thirty belong to the Atiyoga (or rDzogs chen) class, one to the Anuyoga class, and,

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[12]   NSTB, pp. 482-483.

[13]   NSTB, pp. 498-499, 501. Vimalamitra is said here to have concealed three copies of the most secret books in as many places, one of them being the district Suvarṇadvīpa of Kashmir.

[14]   NSTB, p. 481 (listing several treatises, mainly related to the Māyājāla cycles, that were composed by Vimalamitra).

[15]   On the Māyājāla *tantra*s, see ALMOGI 2014, passim, where this cluster of *tantra*s is briefly discussed within the framework of the Eighteen Mahāyoga Tantric Cycles.

[16]   NSTB, pp. 534-535.

[17]   NSTB, p. 555.

[18]   NSTB, p. 561.

finally, twenty-six to the Mahāyoga class. In fifty cases Vimalamitra is mentioned as being involved in the translation (*bsgyur pa*, *bsgyur zhing gtan la phab pa*, *zhus shing gtan la phab pa*) as follows (the numbers within brackets are the numbers of the corresponding titles as listed in section III of the appendix):

- twenty-seven texts in collaboration with gNyags Jñānakumāra (nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 19, 24, 29, 30, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55);
- one with gNyags Jñānakumāra, sKa ba dpal brtsegs, and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan (no. 20);
- one with gNyags Jñānakumāra and rMa Rin chen mchog (no. 38);
- three with g.Yu sgra snying po (nos. 2, 3, 4);
- five with Ācārya Dran pa ye shes (nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 15);
- four with sKa ba dpal brtsegs (nos. 16, 26, 27, 28);
- three with sKa ba dpal brtsegs, Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan, and Zhang Ye shes sde (nos. 22, 23, 32);
- one with sNubs Nam mkha'i snying po (no. 31);
- one with Dharmaśrīprabha and Ratna a gra (no. 33);
- one with rMa Rin chen mchog (no. 36);
- two with Vairocana (nos. 18, 45);
- one with mChims mDzid gsal 'bar (no. 46).

In seven cases he is mentioned as being involved in the transmission of the scripture in question in one way or another other than translation: for example, by way of bestowing teachings and empowerments (nos. 13, 17, 21, 25, 40, 56, 57). Four of the *tantra*s in question are connected with what is known as the Aural Lineage of rDzogs chen (nos. 5, 11, 12, 21), and eight of them are said to have been concealed (nos. 10, 14, 15, 21, 22, 25, 40, 56), of which six belong to the Atiyoga (or rDzogs chen) class and two to the Mahāyoga class. While many of the colophons are rather short, some of them are quite long, describing the transmission lineage and at times also the circumstances surrounding the transmission. However, these descriptions appear to be rather legendary. Only in three cases is the place of translation mentioned: once Bre'u dge 'u of 'Chims phu (TBRC: G3528) (no. 8), and twice 'Phan yul (TBRC: G1116), an area north of Lhasa (nos. 42, 43).

Now, bearing in mind the fact that a greater part of the rNying ma *tantra*s are considered revealed treasures (*gter ma*), the first question that arises is how many of the scriptures said to have been transmitted or translated by Vimalamitra are authentic; in other words, how many of them are indeed of Indic origin and how true are the reports of Vimalamitra's involvement. We will of course not be able to provide wholly clear answers to these questions. What we can do is discuss some aspects of the transmission of these *tantra*s that promise to shed some light on their authenticity.

Since we know that the corpus of rNying ma *tantra*s constantly grew due to the activities of the treasure revealers (*gter ston*), we could perhaps attempt in the first place to try to find early evidence of the existence of the texts we are concerned with:

- Of the thirty Atiyoga texts in question, thirteen (nos. 1, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29, 32) seem to have existed already during the twelfth century, inasmuch as they are found in the collection known as the *Bai ro rgyud 'bum*, which is believed to have been compiled sometime in the second half of that century, and which mainly includes texts of the Sems sde section of the Atiyoga class (it is, to be sure, unclear how many texts were included in this early compilation and how many texts were added to it later). Interestingly, further two of the Mahāyoga texts in our list (no. 38, 40) are included in the *Bai ro rgyud 'bum*.

- Furthermore, of the twenty-six Mahāyoga *tantra*s, at least two are explicitly referred to by or cited in texts found in Dunhuang (nos. 35, 36), and there appears to be an indirect reference to one more *tantra* in the same material (no. 34). One *tantra* appears to be mentioned in the famed eleventh-century *bKa' shog* by Zhi ba 'od (no. 55), and two further ones to be implied there (nos. 36, 37). At least two texts (nos. 35, 36) are mentioned in the ninth century by gNubs gSang rgyas ye shes (P2885) in his *bSam gtan mig sgron* and in the eleventh century by Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po (P3816) in various of his works. (These last two sources have not been exhaustively examined in this regard, and it is thus very possible that references to some more of the texts in question are made by them.) Significantly, merely four of the twenty-six *tantra*s under discussion could be confirmed to have been admitted into the widely circulated editions of the *bKa' 'gyur* (nos. 35, 36, 37, 44), while the connection between text nos. 46-53 and P464/D841 is yet to be studied. Two further texts have been admitted into the O rgyan gling *bKa' 'gyur* (nos. 27,

45). (It is very possible that a few more may be found in these editions of the *bKa' 'gyur* under slightly different titles, but further investigation is required. The same applies to some of the other so-called "local *bKa' 'gyur*" editions.)

The sources considered here are of course not exhaustive, and several others should certainly be looked into as well. However, the picture gained so far may give us a general idea of how things stand.

Another point that could be considered is the alleged collaboration of Vimalamitra with the individual Tibetan translators just mentioned. There are altogether twenty-five texts in the Tibetan Buddhist canon with which Vimalamitra is associated:

- Interestingly, merely two *tantra*s whose translation is attributed to Vimalamitra are included in the *bKa' 'gyur* (P456/D833, P464/D841), both of which are found in the rNying rgyud section. As already stated, while P456/D833 is found in our list (no. 44), the identity of P464/ D841 with eight texts in our list (nos. 46-53) is yet to be examined. The colophons of both canonical texts name gNyags Jñānakumāra as the Tibetan translator, in conformity with the corresponding texts in the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum*, except in one case (no. 46), where mChims mDzid gsal 'bar is named as Vimalamitra's Tibetan collaborator.

- The remaining twenty-three canonical texts are found in the *bsTan 'gyur*. In twenty cases Vimalamitra is merely mentioned as the author (rGyud 'grel: P2941/D2092, P3505/D2681, P3506/D2682, P3931/D3112, P4724, P4725, P4732, P4738, P4740, P4746, P4747, P4764, P4772, P4774, P4776, P4780; Sher phyin: P5214/D3814; dBu ma: P5306/D3910, P5334/ D3938, P5367/D3972), in two cases as both author and translator (rGyud 'grel: P4755; Sher phyin: P5217/D3818), and in a further single case only as a translator (Sher phyin: P5215/ D3815). I am not able to go at present into the question of whether all of these cases refer to one and the same Vimalamitra, and would merely like to mention that only seventeen of the twenty-three texts are Tantric treatises (only four of them, significantly, have been admitted into the sDe dge edition of the *bsTan 'gyur*), while the other six are Sūtric – three in the Sher phyin section and a further three in the dBu ma section. Of the three treatises whose translation is attributed to Vimalamitra, only one is Tantric (P4755), in cooperation with rMa Rin chen mchog, and two are classified as Sher phyin (P5215/D3815, P5217/D3818), both in collaboration with Nam mKha'

(skyong), while in the last case the Indian Jñānagarbha is also mentioned as a collaborator.

Thus, of all translators named in the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* as having collaborated with Vimalamitra, only Jñānakumāra is named in the canonical colophons in this capacity.[19] However, one should bear in mind that the doctrinal cycles in question have been excluded altogether from the *bKa' 'gyur*, so that it is not surprising that we find no records or evidence of Vimalamitra's alleged collaboration with the other translators named in the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* colophons or rNying ma historical sources. By contrast, most of the remaining Tibetan translators mentioned as his collaborators are very well known, while only Ratna a gra and mChims mDzid gsal 'bar seem not to be known otherwise.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper I have attempted to present a preliminary survey of texts found in the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* collection stated as having been transmitted to Tibet from Kashmir or via Kashmiri personages. At the same time, however, I have also attempted to demonstrate that many of these claimed transmissions are doubtful. Nonetheless, in some of the cases where a link to Kashmir has been suggested (or imagined) by the "treasure revealers" or the compilers and editors of the collection one can find, at least in rNying ma historical sources, evidence of some connection between the cycle to which the text in question belongs and Kashmir or Kashmiri personages. While in most cases this does not actually reflect the actual state of affairs, the connection to Kashmir having probably been alleged arbitrarily (or else wrongly imagined), in some instances the historicity of the reports is yet to be examined.

APPENDIX

The following sections provide the titles and colophons of the *tantra*s claimed to have a connection with Kashmir or Kashmiri Buddhist masters. The titles and colophons cited here are based on the mTshams brag edition (Tb). No attempt has been made to systematically collate the titles and colophons with other *rNying ma rgyud*

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[19] Dharmaśrīprabha is mentioned in three canonical colophons as a fellow translator (P1035/D6, P5430/D4517 and P5936/D4392), but none of the works are Tantric.

'bum editions and, accordingly, critically edit them. In obviously erroneous cases, however, emendations were suggested (within square brackets). Note, however, that no attempt to emend erroneously transliterated Sanskrit words has been made. Likewise, no editorial glosses have been recorded. Also to be noted is that in some cases the titles given in the various versions slightly vary. Occasionally, the titles and colophons in Tb have been compared with those found in Gt (as recorded in CANTWELL ET AL. 2006) to clarify doubtful readings. In some other cases the number of chapters varies among the various editions of the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* as well. These differences, however, have no relevance to this paper and therefore will not be discussed here.

The catalogue numbers and the location of the texts in the mTshams brag edition of the *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* are provided in the respective footnotes, together with early references to the works when applicable. In most cases the texts listed are included in all *rNying ma rgyud 'bum* editions, from all lines of transmission. In cases where they are not included in one or more of the editions consulted or from an entire line altogether, a remark is made to that effect. Cases in which the texts are included in the *Bai ro rgyud 'bum* are likewise noted. In cases of admission into the *bKa' 'gyur*, the Peking (and if applicable also the sDe dge) catalogue numbers are provided. Similarly, texts that have been admitted only into the O rgyan gling *bKa' 'gyur* are identified as such. Occasionally, early references to individual texts are recorded, including ones in the Dunhuang material, the ninth-century *bSam gtan mig sgron*, and the works of Rong zom Mahāpaṇḍita (eleventh century).

I. Tantras Whose Translation Is Said to Have Been Executed In Kashmir

1) *dPal rdo rje gzhon nu thugs rje khros pa rtsa ba'i rgyud kyi bshad pa*[20]

Colophon: *dpal rdo rje khros pa rtsa ba'i rgyud kyi bshad pa zhes bya ba rdzogs s.ho ‖ ‖ rgya gar kha che'i yul | dur khrod bi sa ka'i rang 'byung mchod rten tsar rtsar | dngos grub brnyes pa'i rje btsun rdo rje sems ma dang ‖ [=|] sgra bsgyur lo tstsha ba 'gar shes [rab?] rang 'byung zhes bya bas bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o ‖ slad nas rje btsun ma de nyid*

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[20] Tb.674, vol. XXXVII (*ji*), pp. 2[l. 1]-102[l. 6]. For an English translation, see above, § 2.

dang 'brom ston rgyal bas bcos te gtan la phab pa'o ‖ *sgra log na rje btsun mas bzod* [=*bzos*] *par mdzod cig* ‖ ‖

II. Tantras Whose Translation Is Ascribed
to the Kashmiri Ānanda

1) *dPal padma dbang chen dregs pa bsrung bzlog yon tan gyi rgyud*[21]

> Colophon: *padma dbang chen dregs pa bsrung bzlog gi rgyud rdzogs so* ‖ ‖ *rgya gar gyi paṇḍi ta padma sam bha wa dang* | *bod kyi lo tsa ba kha che a nan tas bsgyur ba'o* ‖ ‖

2) *dPal padma dbang chen* | *padma gar gyi dbang phyug gi* | *dregs pa can gzan la 'bebs pa 'phrin las kyi rgyud pa'i rgyud*[22]

> Colophon: *padma dbang chen dregs pa gzan 'bebs kyi rgyud rdzogs so* ‖ ‖ *padma 'byung gnas dang* | *kha che a nan tas bsgyur ba'o* ‖ ‖

3) *dPal padma dbang chen dregs pa gnas* [=*gnad*] *'bebs kyi rgyud*[23]

> Colophon: *padma dbang chen dregs pa gnad 'bebs kyi rgyud rdzogs so* ‖ ‖ *paṇ ḍi ta padma sam bha ba dang* | *lo tsa ba kha che a nan tas bsgyur ba'o* ‖ ‖

4) *dPal padma dbang chen dregs pa zil gnon gyi rgyud*[24]

> Colophon: *dbang chen dregs pa zil gnon gyi rgyud rdzogs so* ‖ ‖ *paṇḍi ta padma 'byung gnas dang* | *lo tsa ba kha che a nan tas bsgyur ba'o* ‖ ‖

5) *dPal padma dbang chen dregs pa dbang sdud kyi rgyud*[25]

> Colophon: *dbang chen dregs pa dbang sdud kyi rgyud rdzogs so* ‖ | *gu ru padma dang kha che a nan tas bsgyur ba'o* ‖

6) *De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi dgongs pa'i khro bo 'dus pa* | *bde gshegs spyir dril* | *rta mgrin rngog ma le brgan gyi rgyud*[26]

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[21]   Tb.560, vol. XXXI (*ki*), pp. 74[l. 7]-111[l. 4].

[22]   Tb.561, vol. XXXI (*ki*), pp. 111[l. 4]-149[l. 4].

[23]   Tb.562, vol. XXXI (*ki*), pp. 149[l. 4]-191[l. 2].

[24]   Tb.564, vol. XXXI (*ki*), pp. 245[l. 7]-308[l. 1].

[25]   Tb.565, vol. XXXI (*ki*), pp. 308[l. 1]-356[l. 3].

[26]   Tb.570, vol. XXXI (*ki*), pp. 489[l. 3]-616[l. 7].

Colophon: *padma dbang chen bde gshegs 'dus pa'i rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ slob dpon chen po padma 'byung gnas dang | kha ches a nan ta dang | bai ro tsa na [=nas] bsgyur ba'o ‖ sā mā yā rgya rgya rgya ‖*

III. Tantras Said to Have Been Transmitted or
Translated by Vimalamitra

1) *Byang chub kyi sems rmad du byung ba | byang chub sems rmad du byung ba'i le'u*[27]

> Colophon: *rmad du byung ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | lo tsa ba gnyags dznyā na ku [ma] ras bsgyur nas gtan la phab pa'o ‖ shrī singha dang | bai ro tsa nas sngar yang bsgyur ‖ ‖*

2) *rDzogs pa chen po chos nyid byang chub kyi sems bkra shis mi 'gyur ba gsal bar gnas pa'i rgyud*[28]

> Colophon: *rdzogs pa chen po chos nyid byang chub kyi sems bkra shis mi 'gyur ba gsal bar gnas pa'i rgyud ces bya ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | sgra bsgyur gyi lo tsa ba chen po g.yu sgra snying pos bsgyur ba'i 'grel pa dang bcas par bshad pa'o ‖ ‖*

3) *rDzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun la 'jug pa rnam dag ston pa'i rgyud*[29]

> Colophon: *rdzogs pa chen po chos nyid byang chub kyi sems kun la 'jug pa rnam dag ston pa'i rgyud ces bya ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi sgra bsgyur gyi lo tsa ba g.yu sgra snying pos bsgyur cing gtan la phab pa'o ‖ ‖*

4) *rDzogs pa chen po chos nyid byang chub kyi sems thig le rgya mtsho gnas la 'jug pa zhes bya ba'i rgyud*[30]

> Colophon: *rdzogs pa chen po chos nyid byang chub kyi sems thig le rgya mtsho gnas la 'jug pa'i rgyud ces bya ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | sgra bsgyur gyi lo tsa ba chen po g.yu sgras zhus shing gtan la phab pa'o ‖*

5) *Rin po che snang byed kyi rgyud*[31]

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[27] Tb.56, vol. II (*kha*), pp. 774[l. 1]-856[l. 1]. Found in Bg.

[28] Tb.122, vol. V (*ca*), pp. 2[l. 1]-71[l. 5].

[29] Tb.123, vol. V (*ca*), pp. 71[l. 5]-100[l. 5]. Probably missing in Na.

[30] Tb.124, vol. V (*ca*), pp. 100[l. 5]-127[l. 2].

[31] Tb.128, vol. V (*ca*), pp. 222[l. 1]-257[l. 4]. Not found in Tn, Tk.

Colophon: *rin po che snang byed ces bya ba'i rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ slob dpon bi ma la mi tra dang | lo tsa ba gnyags dznyā na ku mā ras bsgyur zhing gtan la phab pa'o ‖ khri srong lde btsan byang chub sems dpa'i rigs ‖ ting 'dzin bzang po snod dang skal bar ldan ‖ 'khrul rtsad chod nas ldog pa'i thabs dang ldan ‖ lta ba rtogs nas sgro 'dogs chod pa'i tshe ‖ snyan brgyud gdams pa skal ldan dag la brgyud ‖ rtsa rgyud bshad rgyud ma bu la sogs rnams ‖ snang dang mi snang bdag med dbyings su sba ‖ skal ldan las 'phro can gyis rnyed par smon lam gdab ‖ ces gdams so ‖ nam zhig skal ldan gang zag gis ‖ snyan brgyud bshad rgyud 'dzom par shog ‖ ithi | dngos grub dam pa sems la chongs ‖*

6) *Byang chub sems kyi man ngag | rin po che sgron ma 'bar ba'i rgyud*[32]

Colophon: *rin po che sgron ma 'bar ba'i rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | zhu chen gyi lo tsa ba gnyags dznyā nas dbu tshal gser khang du rgyal po yon mchod kyi don du bsgyur cing gtan la phab pa'o ‖*

7) *Rin po che sgron ma zhes bya ba'i rgyud*[33]

Colophon: *rin po che sgron ma zhes bya ba'i rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ slob dpon bi ma la mi tra dang | lo tsa ba gnyags ku mā ras rgyal po yon mchod kyi don du dbu tshal gser khang du bsgyur ba'o ‖ chos skor mda' 'ug 'dod pa dang ‖ rgyal po grong sprang byed pa dang ‖ chos gos 'og tu gri 'dzugs dang ‖ che btsun dug la spyod pa'i tshe | nyi zla'i 'od ltar 'byung bar 'gyur ‖*

8) *rDzogs pa chen po sku gsum ye shes lnga'i don bshad pa nyi zla kha sbyor seng ge sgra yi dgongs pa bshad pa'i rgyud*[34]

Colophon: *paṇḍi ta bi ma la dang lo tsa ba gnyags ku mā ras 'chings [='chims] phu bre'u dge 'ur bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'i rgyud | seng ge sgra'i dgongs pa nyi zla kha sbyor zhes bya ba'i rgyud | yang gsang rmad du byung ba bklags pas go ba'i bshad rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ gsang | gsang | gsang rgya rtags ‖ ‖*

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[32] Tb.130, vol. V (*ca*), pp. 267[l. 1]-338[l. 6]. Not found in Tn, Tk. Whether the texts found in Nu and Na and bear similar titles are identical with our text is yet to be verified.

[33] Tb.131, vol. V (*ca*), pp. 338[l. 6]-365[l. 4]. Not found in Tn, Tk.

[34] Tb.136, vol. V (*ca*), pp. 440[l. 5]-596[l. 2]. Not found in Tn, Tk.

9) *rDzogs pa chen po 'khor ba rtsad nas gcod pa chos sku skye med rig pa'i rgyud*[35]

> Colophon: *rdzogs pa chen po 'khor ba rtsad nas gcod pa chos sku skye med rig pa'i rgyud las | rin po che gter gyi 'byung gnas zhes bya ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | a tsarya dran pa ye shes kyis rang 'gyur byas te gtan la phab pa'o ‖ ‖*

10) *rDzogs pa chen po lta ba'i yang snying | sangs rgyas thams cad kyi dgongs pa | nam mkha' klong yangs kyi rgyud*[36]

> Colophon: *rdzogs pa chen po lta ba'i yang snying rdzogs so ‖ rdzogs pa chen po lta ba'i yang snying | sangs rgyas thams cad kyi dgongs pa | nam mkha' glong [=klong] yangs kyi rgyud ces bya ba | gser gyi dril shing can 'di | dang po ngo bo nyid kyi skus rgyal ba kun tu bzang po la bshad | des rdo rje sems dpa' la bshad | des dga' rab rdo rje la bshad | des bram ze bde mchog snying po la bshad | des shrī sing ha la bshad | des bi ma la mi tra la bshad | des myang ting 'dzin bzang po la bshad | des gter du sbas pa 'brom ye shes bla ma'i bu | 'brom ye shes snying pos bton nas | des myang shes rab mchog gi sras | des shangs kyi ston pa lce chung ba ye shes rgyal mtshan la bshad | des bla ma gnyan chung ba la gnang ba'o | rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsa ba dran pa ye shes kyis bsgyur cing gtan la phab nas | myang ting 'dzin bzang pos lcags sgrom nag po'i nang du bri ze'i rgyud drug gdams pa dang bcas pa bse sgrom smug por bcug nas | dbu ru bzong phug mo'i brag la mkha' 'gro ma rdo rje rgyan gcig ma dang | badzra sā dhu legs pa rtsal la gtad nas sbas pa rdzogs so ‖*

11) *rDzogs pa chen po sangs rgyas thams cad kyi dgongs pa chos sku gcig tu 'dus par bka' bgros pa'i don rin po che 'byung gnas kun 'byung gi rgyud*[37]

> Colophon: *rdzogs pa chen po sangs rgyas thams cad kyi dgongs pa chos sku gcig tu 'dus par bka' bgros pa'i don rin po che yon tan kun 'byung gi rgyud las | dharmma kā ya sadhi pa ya | gu ru te tsu dznyā na ke tu tsitta sa ma ya gu hya ya rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | zhu chen gyi lo tsa ba dran pa ye shes kyis bsgyur cing gtan la phab nas | myang ting nge 'dzin la gdams | des sbas | mo rgyal le 'tsho la gdams| des sbas | blo gros seng ge la gdams | des 'brom ye shes bla ma la gdams | des sras rgyal ba'i shes rab la gdams | des zhang dar ma ye shes la gdams | des shangs pa lce chung ba ye shes rgyal mtshan la gdams so ‖ snyan*

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35 Tb.142, vol. VI (*cha*), pp. 162[l. 1]-194[l. 7].

36 Tb.143, vol. VI (*cha*), pp. 194[l. 7]-307[l. 3]. Found in Bg.

37 Tb.144, vol. VI (*cha*), pp. 307[l. 4]-414[l. 7].

brgyud nges pa gdam [=*gdams*] *ngag gi lde mig | po ti se ru mthing shog can gyi rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖*

12) *Byang chub sems yid skyob pa*[38]

Colophon: *rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | zhu chen gyi lo tsa ba dran pa'i ye shes kyis bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab nas | nyang ting 'dzin la gdams | des sba mo rgya le mtsho la gdams ‖* [=|] *des sba blo gros dbang phyug la gdams | des 'brom ye shes bla ma la gdams | des sras rgyal ba'i shes rab la gdams | des zhang dar ma ye shes la gdams | des shangs pa lce chung ba ye shes rgyal mtshan la gdams | des shud kye ston pa mi' 'jigs la gdams | des sngog* [=*rngog*] *ston rgyal mtshan la gdams | de lce ston rdo rje gzungs la gdams so ‖ snyan rgyud* [=*brgyud*] *nges pa'i lde mig | po ti se ru mthing shog can gyi rgyud rdzogs so ‖*

13) *rDzogs pa chen po don 'dus rig pa'i gsung rang byung bde ba'i 'khor lo*[39]

Colophon: *gser gyis dril | bi ma las a tsarya la | des myang la | des gzod* [=*gzong*] *phug mor gdam* [=*gdams*] *ngag 'di ye shes snying po la | ston kyang des kas ston | des myang dbang phyug rgya mtsho la | des shangs pa la | des gtsang gi bgrod ston la | des ra ston la | des byang chub rgyan la | rdzogs so ‖ ‖*

14) *rDzogs pa chen po rmad byung don gyi snying po rang byung bde ba'i 'khor lo'i rgyud*[40]

Colophon: *rdzogs pa chen po rmad byung don gyi snying po rang byung bde ba'i 'khor lo'i rgyud gser gyi 'khril shing can zhes bya ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsa ba gnyag dznyā na ku ma ras bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o ‖ myang ting 'dzin bzang po la bshad | des gter du man ngag dang bcas pa bcug | mgon po nag po rdo rje legs pa dang | rdo rje rgyan gcig ma la gtad | dbu ru gzong phug mo'i brag la sbas | 'brom ye shes snying pos bton nas | sras dbang phyug rgya mtsho la bshad | des sras ye shes seng ge la gtad | des rngog ston 'od 'bar la gtad | des rong pa snubs chung ba dang | myang rin chen gtsug tor la gtad pa'o ‖*

15) *rDzogs pa chen po ma rig mun pa rab tu sel bar byed pa'i lta ba ye shes gting nas rdzogs pa'i rgyud*[41]

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[38]   Tb.145, vol. VI (*cha*), pp. 415[l. 1]-464[l. 5]. Found in Bg.

[39]   Tb.146, vol. VI (*cha*), pp. 464[l. 5]-520[l. 6].

[40]   Tb.147, vol. VI (*cha*), pp. 520[l. 6]-570[l. 3]. Found in Bg.

[41]   Tb.153, vol. VII (*ja*), pp. 433[l. 5]-497[l. 3].

Colophon: *rdzogs pa chen po ma rig mun pa sel bar byed pa'i lta ba ye shes gting nas rdzogs pa'i rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rin po che dngul gyi dril shing can 'di rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsa ba ā tsarya dran pa'i ye shes kyis skad dang rgyud kyis bsgyur nas gtan la phab nas | myang ting 'dzin bzang pos lcags sgrom nag po'i nang du | bse sgrom smug po'i nang du bcug ste dbu ru gzong phug mo'i brag tu bcug ste | mkha' 'gro ma rdo rje rgyan cig ma dang | badzra sā dhu legs pa rtsal [la] gtad nas sbas pa | 'brom ye shes snying pos bton nas myang dbang phyug rgya mtsho la gtad pa | shangs pa lce chung ba ye shes la gtad pa rdzogs so ‖ ‖*

16) *Rin po che 'khor lo rtsegs pa'i rgyud*[42]

Colophon: *rin po che 'khor lo rtsegs pa'i rgyud ces bya ba thun mong ma yin pa'i rgyud chen po rdzogs so ‖ ‖ bi ma la dang dpal brtsegs kyis bsgyur ‖*

17) *Dur khrod phung po 'bar ba man ngag gi rgyud*[43]

Colophon: *dur khrod phung po 'bar ba'i man ngag gi rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ slob dpon bi ma las mnga' bdag la gdams pa | gzhan la bstan par gyur na sgrol byed chen pos snying khrag 'jib | ces gdams so ‖*

18) *Byang chub kyi sems nya mo bag la nyal*[44]

Colophon: *bi ma la dang bai ro'i 'gyur ‖*

19) *'Phags pa gsang sngags chen po bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i mdo*[45]

Colophon: *byang chub kyi sems ting nge 'dzin drug pa zhes kyang bya | man ngag gi dgongs pa la bzla zhes kyang bya'o ‖ 'phags pa gsang sngags chen po bsam gyis mi khyab pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tstsha ba snyāgs dznyā na ku ma ras bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab | slad kyis a tsarya bai ro tsa na dang | snubs sangs rgyas ye shes kyis bsgyur te gtan la phab | ithi ‖*[46]

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[42] Tb.156, vol. VII (*ja*), pp. 588[l. 1]-624[l. 1]. Found in Bg.

[43] Tb.163, vol. VII (*ja*), pp. 816[l. 5]-839[l. 2]. Found in Bg.

[44] Tb.167, vol. VII (*ja*), pp. 883[l. 6)-919[l. 6]. Found in Bg. Tb does not provide a title, the above title being taken from the phrase following the homage. Tk provides the title *Nya mo bag la nyal gyi rgyud*.

[45] Tb.190, vol. VIII (*nya*), pp. 616[l. 3]-630[l. 1]. Found only in the Central Bhutanese Group.

[46] It seems that we here have two translation colophons, the connection between them being unclear; that is, it is unclear whether the present version is a revised

20) *rDzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems mdzod kyi chos | rtsa ba nam mkha' gnyis pa las | ye shes nam mkha'*[47]

Colophon: *ye shes nam mkha' mdzod kyi rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi paṇḍi ta bi ma la mi tra dang | lo tsa ba snyags dznya na ku mā ra dang | ka cog gis bsgyur ba'o ‖ ‖*

21) *Ye shes bla ma chen po'i rgyud*[48]

Colophon: *'og min gi gnas chos kyi dbyings kyi pho brang du | sangs rgyas 'od srungs chen pos gsungs | zhu ba po lag na rdo rjes zhus | sdud pa po dga' rab rdo rje bsdus nas | sa non pa'i byang chub sems dpa' mi gzhi la lag brgyud de | 'jig rten du ma 'phel lo ‖ rgyud kyi snying po ye shes bla ma'i rgyud ‖ bskal pa thog ma med pa'i sngon rol nas ‖ bskal pa bzang po'i byang chub sems dpa'i thugs nas thugs brgyud | snyan nas snyan du bsgrags ‖ phyag nas phyag tu gtad de rgya yis btab ‖ rgya gar ngan sngags 'bru gsum 'phyod du rtags ‖ ra chod gzu lums byed pa'i slob ma la ‖ sdig la mi 'dzem gnag pa'i las la sbyar ‖ gu lang rin chen gser gyi rtags btsugs kyang ‖ gnag pa'i ngan sngags 'bru gsum shor re skan ‖ bi ma mi tra mkhas pa'i skye [=skyes] mchog khyod ‖ sangs rgyas thugs kyi dgongs pa rgyud bdun po ‖ rdo rje dbyings kyi pho brang dbyings su sbos ‖ | zhes shrī sing has gsungs nas rgya yis btab bo ‖ rdzogs so ‖ ‖ de nas bi ma la mi tra bod du byon nas | dbang bskur chos bshad nas ‖ rje 'bangs gnyis la bka' gdams pa | sangs rgyas thugs kyi dgongs pa nyung rgyud pa ‖ rdo rje gdan gyi 'og nas seng ge ma smad dgu ‖ stobs chung rnams kyis seng ge mi thub kyis ‖ rgyal blon phyag tu gtad kyis shor ra re ‖ rgyal po snyan khung chung ba dang ‖ blon po gdud [=gdug] pa che ba dang ‖ chos pa dam la mi gnas pas | thugs la chongs la gter du sbos ‖ zhes gsungs nas ‖ slar gter du sbas so ‖*

22) *dBang bskur bla ma rin po che'i rgyud*[49]

Colophon: *ā tsarya bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsa ba ska cog zhang gsum gyis bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o ‖ ‖ rdzogs so ‖ ‖ tha ras rgya yis btab bo ‖ sngon du 'gro ba'i bsten pa ste ‖ sta gon cho ga rdzogs pa'o ‖ dang po la ni sgrub pa 'byung ‖ ting 'dzin sngags dang 'phro 'du*

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translation by Vairocana and sNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes of Vimalamitra's and sNyags dznya na ku ma ra's translation, or whether it is a wholly independent translation prepared by the former team.

[47] Tb.203, vol. VIII (*nya*), pp. 905[l. 3]-933[l. 2]. Found in Bg. Found only in the Central Bhutanese Group.

[48] Tb.235, vol. IX (*ta*), pp. 399[l. 2]-415[l. 4]. Found in Bg.

[49] Tb.236, vol. IX (*ta*), pp. 415[l. 5]-437[l. 3]. Found in Bg. Found only in the Central Bhutanese and the Tibetan-Nepalese Borderlands Groups.

bya ‖ gnyis pa tshe dbang bskur bar bya ‖ gsum pa ye shes spyi blugs dang ‖
bzhi pa sangs rgyas rab bdun dang ‖ lnga pa rig pa rtsal gyi dbang ‖ rim
pa bzhin du las la sbyar ‖ rdzogs dang rgyud lung man ngag bshad ‖ nga
yis bstan paʼi tshe dbang ʼdi ‖ ma bskur bar du bshad pa min ‖ ces dgaʼ
rab rdo rjes ʼjam dpal la gdams paʼo | zhes ye shes bla maʼi leʼu lag rdzogs
so ‖ ‖ ithi | gter rgya ‖

23) *Lha mo ʼod zer can gyi rgyud*[50]

Colophon: *rgya gar gyi slob dpon bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsa ba*
ska cog [zhang] gsum gyis bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa | lha mo ʼod
zer can gyi rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖

24) *ʼPhags pa ʼjam dpal gyi bshad rgyud rin po cheʼi ʼphreng ba*[51]

Colophon: *leʼu dgu yis bstan paʼo ‖ mtshan yang dag par brjod paʼi bshad*
rgyud rin po cheʼi ʼphreng ba zhes bya ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ ʼphags pa ʼjam
dpal gyi mtshan yang dag par brjod paʼi bshad rgyud rin po cheʼi ʼphreng
ba zhes pa | khog don gyi bkaʼ tshoms rnam par bshad pa | rgya gar gyi
mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsa ba gnyags dznyā na ku ma
ras bsgyur zhing [=cing] zhus te gtan la phab nas | bod kyi yon bdag rje
rgyal po la gtad paʼo ‖ dpe myang ting ʼdzin la gnang ba lags so ‖

25) *De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi ting nge ʼdzin dngos su bshad pa ye shes ʼdus paʼi mdo | theg pa chen po gsang ba bla na med paʼi rgyud | chos thams cad kyi ʼbyung gnas | sangs rgyas thams cad kyi dgongs pa | gsang sngags gcig paʼi ye shes | rdzogs pa chen po don gsal bar byed paʼi rgyud | rig pa rang shar chen poʼi rgyud |*[52]

Colophon: *ston pa gzhon nu dpaʼ bo stobs ldan gyis | dur khrod me ri ʼbar*
bar ʼkhor rnams kyi rtog pa bsal ba | ye shes lag phrad du bstan paʼi rgyud
rig pa rang shar chen poʼi rgyud ces bya ba | man ngag gi bshad rgyud
chen po rdzogs so ‖ ‖ [...] dpal gsang sngags kyi srung ma lcam dral gyis
bkaʼi bya ra gyis shig | dam tshig nyams pa thams cad kyi snying khrag
ʼjibs la srog chod cig | dpal sngags kyi srung ma smug nag khros paʼi rgyal
mo e ka rtsa [=dza] tis bkaʼi bya ra gyis shig | dpal zhwaʼi mgon po dam
tshig gi bdag po| dam tshig la mi gnas pa rnams la zhags pas chings la
sgrol cig | dam tshig nyams pa rnams la byin na | mkhaʼ ʼgro sde chen bco
brgyad kyis chad pa chod cig | man ngag gi rgyud dam pa ʼdi ni slob dpon
bi ma las sgra mi mthun pa gsum las bsgyur ba lags so ‖ des rje blon gnyis

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50 Tb.237, vol. IX (*ta*): pp. 437[l. 3]-446[l. 1]. Found in Bg. Found only in the
 Central Bhutanese and Tibetan-Nepalese Borderlands Group.

51 Tb.271, vol. X (*tha*), pp. 671[l .6]-709[l. 6].

52 Tb.286, vol. XI (*da*): pp. 323[l. 1]-699[l. 1]. Not found in Tn.

*la snang [=gnang] ste | rgyud chen po 'di nam [=nas] | rje las myang ban
la yang med par | rin po che shel gyi glegs shing du bsdams nas | rin po
che dngul gyi ga'u'i nang du bcug nas | gzer chen po bzhis gdams nas |
myang ban la | rje'i zhal nas 'di bod phung bar byed pa'i ngan sngags yin
gyis | 'dis bod phung nas 'gro bas | 'di yang khyed kyis de tsho'i zla la sbos
shig | ces bsdams nas re [=ras] nag la dril nas | myang ban la'ang cha med
par | rje la snang [=gnang] ba lags so || de nas myang ban chen po des
zhwa'i lha khang du mgon po gres thag can la gnyer du gtad nas sbas pa
lags so || rje'i gsang ba'i thugs dam nyid ma nor ba lags so || de nas gnas
brtan ldan mas | lce btsun seng ge dbang phyug la gnang ba lags so || lha
rjes nyams su blangs pa'i man ngag shin tu zab par bstan pa || [=|] gang
dang yang mi 'dra bar nyams su blangs par bstan pa'i gsang ba'i man
ngag dam pa 'di gud du sbas pa lags so || rgyud kyi rgyal po 'di ni 'dzam
bu'i gling gzhan na med par yid ches so || nyan mi dgos dpe lung thob pas
chog go || man ngag rnams kyi rgyal po 'di || [=|] snod med pa la byin na
gnyis ka 'tshig | las can sbyangs pa'i stobs kyis rnyed par shog | de nas
gsang sngags bstan pa yun rings gnas par shog | ces gsungs so || 'gro
rnams ma rig mun sel 'gyur || bdag 'dra smyon pa lce btsun gyis || yang
dag don gyi man ngag zab mo 'di || rgya gar mkhas pa'i bka' rgyud
[=brgyud] bdag la babs || kun la dkon pa'i man ngag zab mo 'di || kun gyis
ma tshoms sa yi gter du sbas || las kyi 'phro can cig gis rnyed par shog ||
ces smon lam btab nas | lha rjes sa'i gter du sbas so || man ngag zab mo
yang dag pa'o || dad med log lta can dang las 'brel med pa'i spyod yul
min | [...] sang kri ta'i dha ka la | [sang] skri ta'i yi gi [=ge] las bsgyur ba
lags so || [...] spu ta spu ta tra sa yi yis | o rgyan gyi yi ge las bsgyur ba lags
so || [...] bag ta shud dha ri pa ta yan | rgya nag po'i yi ge las bsgyur ba
lags so || slob dpon chen po bhi ma las sgra gsum las bsgyur ba lags so ||
ithi gsang ngo | rgya rgya rgya ||*

26) *Rin po che spungs pa'i yon tan chen po ston pa'i rgyud kyi rgyal po chen po*[53]

Colophon: *rin po che spungs pa zhes bya ba'i rgyud kyi rgyal po | 'bum
phrag drug cu rtsa bzhi'i bcud phyung ba rdzogs so || || rgya gar gyi mkhan
po bi ma la dang| bod kyi lo tsa ba ka ba dpal brtsegs kyis bsgyur ba'o ||*

27) *dPal nam mkha' med pa sku gdung 'bar ba chen po'i rgyud*[54]

Colophon: *zhes dpal nam mkha' med pa'i rgyud rin po che sku gdung 'bar
ba'i rgyud chen po gsang ba yang bsdus kyi snying po | rang bzhin rdzogs*

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53   Tb.288, vol. XI (*da*), pp. 757[l. 3]-788[l. 2]. Not found in Tn.

54   Tb.289, vol. XI (*da*), pp. 788[l. 2]-815[l. 7]. Not found in Tn. Admitted into the
     O rgyan gling *bKa' 'gyur* (O36).

pa chen po'i rgyud | sho lo ka 'bum phrag brgya rtsa bzhi las khyad par du byung ba rdzogs so ‖ ithi ‖ rgya rgya rgya | rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tstsha ba ka ba dpal brtsegs kyis bsgyur cing gtan la phab pa'o ‖

28) *Ngo sprod rin po che spras pa'i zhing khams bstan pa'i rgyud*[55]

Colophon: *gsang ba ngo sprod rin po che spras pa'i rgyud ces bya ba | rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen po 'bum phrag drug cu rtsa bzhi'i bcud rang byung ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la dang | bod kyi lo tsa ba ka ba dpal brtsegs kyis bsgyur ba'o ‖ dpal sngags kyi srung mas srungs shig |*

29) *Thig le gsang ba'i brda rgyud*[56]

Colophon: *rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsha ba snyag [=snyags] dznyā na ku mā ras bsgyur ba'o ‖*

30) *gSang ba rgya mtsho'i rgyud dam pa'i dam pa | rnal 'byor gyi rnal 'byor | gsang ba thams cad kyi tig ka rgyud kyi rgyal po*[57]

Colophon: *de bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi rang bzhin | gsang ba rgya mtsho zhes bya ba | shin tu rnal 'byor dam pa rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi paṇḍi ta bi ma la mi tra dang | lo tshtsa [=tstsha] ba snyags dznyā na ku ma ras bsgyur ‖*

31) *Thugs rje chen po'i gtor ma sha khrag rus pa'i gtor rgyud chen po*[58]

Colophon: *gtor rgyud chen po rdzogs so ‖ ‖ bstan pas mi rtogs pas gter du bcang | bcom ldan 'das kun tu bzang po la phyag 'tshal lo ‖ lung 'di bka' thams cad kyi dam | rgyud thams cad kyi spyod 'grel | man ngag thams cad kyi snying khu | dgongs pa thams cad kyi zhe phugs | rnal 'byor pa thams cad kyi lta phugs su gyur pa 'di ni | kun mkhyen sems kyi ston pa zhes bya ba de yin par shes par bya'o ‖ lta ba mdor bsdus pa zhes de la bgyi'o ‖ man ngag thams cad kyi lta ba mdor bsdus pa zhes bya ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po padma sam bha ba dang | bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsa ba snubs nam mkha'i snying pos bsgyur ba'o ‖ phyis bal po bā su bha ra dang | snubs sangs rgyas ye shes kyis zhus gtugs so ‖ thugs rje chen po'i gtor rgyud rdzogs so ‖*

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[55] Tb.294, vol. XII (*na*), pp. 280[l. 1]-304[l. 7].

[56] Tb.306, vol. XIII (*pa*), pp. 528[l. 2]-540[l. 4]. Found in Bg.

[57] Tb.313, vol. XIII (*pa*), pp. 621[l. 1]-641[l. 2]. Found only in the Central Bhutanese and Tibetan-Nepalese Borderlands Groups.

[58] Tb.380, vol. XVII (*tsa*), pp. 2[l. 1]-176[l. 4].

32) *rDo rje rtse mo 'dus pa'i rgyud*[59]

Colophon: *gsung gi rgyud rdo rje rtse mo 'dus pa zhes bya ba | slob dpon bi ma la dang | lo tsa ba ka cog [zhang] gsum gyis bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa rdzogs so ‖ ‖*

33) *rGyud kyi rgyal po chen po las kyi 'phreng ba*[60]

Colophon: *lung chen bshad pa'i rgyud karma mā le rdzogs so | rgya gar gyi slob dpon dharmma shrī pra bha dang | ārya bi ma la la sogs pa'i paṇḍi ta la | ratna a grags bsgyur cing gtan la phab pa'o ‖ ‖*

34) *Dam tshig thams cad kyi nyams chag skong ba'i lung lnga | bshags pa thams cad kyi rgyud dri ma med pa'i rgyal po*[61]

Colophon: *nyams chag thams cad skong ba'i rgyud kyi rgyal po | bshags pa thams cad kyi rgyud dri ma med pa'i rgyal po zhes bya ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsa ba snyags dznyā na ku ma ras bsgyur zhing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o ‖*

35) *'Phags pa thabs kyi zhags pa padmo 'phreng gi don bsdus pa*[62]

Colophon: *'phags pa thabs kyi zhags pa padmo 'phreng ba las | rtog pa'i rgyal po'i don bsdus pa zhes bya ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi paṇḍi ta bi ma la mi tra dang | lo tsa ba snyags dznyā na ku ma ras dpal gyi bsam yas su bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o ‖*

36) *gSang ba'i snying po de kho na nyid nges pa*[63]

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59 Tb.408, vol. XVIII (*tsha*), pp. 717[l. 7]-752[l. 3]. Found in Bg.

60 Tb.413, vol. XIX (*dza*), pp. 579[l. 6]-785[l. 7].

61 Tb.415, vol. XX (*wa*), pp. 2[l. 1]-123[l. 5]. A prayer linked by Kapstein to this *tantra* is found in the Dunhuang manuscript IOL TIB J 584. Most of the lines of the prayer are found in the *tantra* (chaps. 4, 5 and 6), which forms a part of the *Na rak dong sprugs* cycle of the *bKa' ma*. Kapstein has also linked IOL Tib J 318 to this cycle. See DALTON AND VAN SCHAIK 2006, p. 288.

62 Tb.416, vol. XX (*wa*), pp. 123[l. 6]-152[l. 6]. The basic *tantra* (*mūla*: *rtsa ba*) **Upāyapāśatantra* was found in Dunhuang and has been cited, referred to, and partially transmitted in several other Dunhuang documents. See DALTON AND VAN SCHAIK 2006, pp. 196-197. It is also mentioned by gNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes and Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po. See ALMOGI 2014, p. 73, n. 59. The *tantra* was admitted, too, into the *bKa' 'gyur* (P458/D835).

63 Tb.417, vol. XX (*wa*), pp. 152[l. 6]-218[l. 7]. The *tantra* is cited in documents found in Dunhuang, including IOL TIB J 332/1 and IOL TIB J 437/2; the man- tra for the peaceful *maṇḍala* is found in IOL TIB J 540. See DALTON AND VAN SCHAIK 2006, pp. 61, 183 and 250-251, respectively. The *tantra* is possibly im- plied by the word "etc." (*la sogs pa*) in Zhi ba 'od's *bKa' shog*, in its listing of apparently syncretic (*'dres ma*) Māyājālatantras (*sgyu 'phrul gyi rgyud*). See

Colophon: *rdzogs so ‖ rgya gar gyi paṇḍi ta bi ma la mi tra dang | lo tsa ba rma rin chen mchog gis bsgyur ba'o ‖*

37) gSang ba'i snying po de kho na nyid nges pa sgyu 'phrul dra ba bla ma chen po[64]

Colophon: *rtog pa'i sgyu 'phrul dra ba'i le'u stong phrag brgya pa las | lung gi spyi sangs rgyas thams cad kyi gsang ba | gsang ba'i snying po de kho na nyid nges pa'i bla ma chen po'i le'u las | thams cad ma lus par 'phros pa rdzogs so ‖ rgya gar gyi paṇḍi ta ā tsarya bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsa ba gnyag [=gnyags] dznyā na ku ma ras bsgyur ba'o ‖*

38) rGyas pa chen po'i rgyud phyi ta don 'dzin pa[65]

Colophon: *rgyas pa chen po'i rgyud phyi ta don 'dzin pa rdzogs so ‖ rgya gar gyi paṇṭi [=paṇḍi ta] bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsa ba rma rin chen mchog dang | snyags dznyā na ku ma ras bsgyur cing gtan la phab pa'o ‖*

39) Chos nyid zhi ba'i lha rgyud[66]

Colophon: *rgyud kyi rgyal po chen po chos nyid zhi ba'i lha rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi paṇḍi ta bi ma mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsa ba gnyags dznyā na ku ma ras bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o ‖ ‖*

40) rDo rje srin po rno ba rdo rje mchu can gyi rgyud ces bya ba| rgyud thams cad kyi snying po 'khor ba dong sprugs chen po'i rgyud[67]

Colophon: *mkhas pa'i mkhas pa bla ma dam pa'i gdam ngag la | bka' dang sdod nas [=gnas?] don gyi man ngag btsal ‖ rdo rje gdan nas shri sing ha ngas gnang ‖ rang gi rgyud sbyangs 'gro ba'i don byas nas ‖ sangs rgyas thugs kyi dgongs pas ma nor rgyud ‖ thugs kyi klong nas bcud gsum spros pa ni ‖ byang chub sems dpa' re re'i don du bzhag ‖ rgyud kyi snying po*

KARMAY 1998, p. 31, no. 2. It is also mentioned by gNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes and Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po. See ALMOGI 2014, p. 77, n. 83. It has likewise been admitted into the *bKa' 'gyur* (P455/D832).

[64] Tb.419, vol. XX (*wa*), pp. 337[l. 6]-417[l. 2]. The *tantra* is possibly implied by the word "etc." (*la sogs pa*) in Zhi ba 'od's *bKa' shog*, in its listing of apparently syncretic (*'dres ma*) Māyājālatantras (*sgyu 'phrul gyi rgyud*). See KARMAY 1998, p. 31, no. 2. It is also mentioned by gNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes. See ALMOGI 2014, p. 77, n. 85. The *tantra* has been admitted into the *bKa' 'gyur* (P460/D837).

[65] Tb.427, vol. XXI (*zha*), pp. 476[l. 2]-477[l. 3]. Found in Bg.

[66] Tb.433, vol. XXI (*zha*), pp. 610[l. 3]-622[l. 3].

[67] Tb.436, vol. XXI (*zha*), pp. 697[l. 4]-715[l. 5]. Found in Bg.

man ngag gzer bzhi po ‖ sde dang tshoms bu gcad nas rgya yis btab ‖ 'chi med bdud rtsi thig le nyag gcig go ‖ rdo rje gdan gyi 'og nas bzhengs pa 'di ‖ spu rgyal rtsad po'i don du shri singha ngas gnang ba sku drin che ‖ bod kyi chos lugs ngan pas slar gter du sbos | zhes bi ma la mi tras gdams so rdzogs so ‖ ‖

41) *sGyu 'phrul rgya mtsho zhes bya ba'i rgyud*[68]

   Colophon: *sgyu 'phrul rgya mtsho'i rgyud chen po rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma mi tra dang | snyags dznā na ku ma ras bsgyur ba'o ‖*

42) *sGyu 'phrul thal ba'i rgyud*[69]

   Colophon: *sgyu 'phrul thal ba'i rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | dznā na ku mā ras 'phan yul du bsgyur cing gtan la phab pa'o ‖*

43) *sGyu 'phrul thal ba'i rgyud chen po*[70]

   Colophon: *sgyu 'phrul thal ba'i rgyud chen po zhes bya ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | dznā na ku mā ras 'phan yul du bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o ‖ ‖*

44) *rDo rje sems dpa'i sgyu 'phrul dra ba gsang ba thams cad kyi me long zhes bya ba'i rgyud*[71]

   Colophon: *rdo rje sems dpa' sgyu 'phrul dra ba gsang ba me long gi rgyud chen po rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | ban dhe dznā na ku ma ras bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o ‖*

45) *gSang ba'i snying po de kho na nyid nges pa'i khro bo chen po'i stobs kyi rnal 'byor dbang phyug sgrub pa'i sgyu 'phrul dra ba'i rgyud*[72]

   Colophon: *gsang ba'i snying po de kho na nyid nges pa | khro bo chen po stobs kyi rnal 'byor dbang phyug sgrub pa'i sgyu 'phrul dra ba'i rgyud*

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[68] Tb.437, vol. XXII (*za*), pp. 2[l. 1]-103[l. 1].

[69] Tb.438, vol. XXII (*za*), pp. 103[l. 1]-186[l. 4]. Found only in the Central Bhutanese Group.

[70] Tb.439, vol. XXII (*za*), pp. 186[l. 5]-322[l. 2].

[71] Tb.441, vol. XXII (*za*), pp. 480[l. 6]-692[l. 6]. The *tantra* has been admitted into the *bKa' 'gyur* (P456/D833).

[72] Tb.442, vol. XXII (*za*), pp. 692[l. 7]-699[l. 2]. The *tantra* has been admitted into the O rgyan gling *bKa' 'gyur* (O17).

rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | lo tsa ba slob dpon bai ro tsa nas bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o ‖

46) *bDud rtsi 'khyil ba 'chi med tshe'i rgyud*[73]

Colophon: *bdud rtsi 'khyil ba 'chi med tshe'i rgyud ces bya ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ 'di chig rgyud yin bas spel na | dam can chos skyong dang | mkha' 'gro rnams kyi bka' chad yong bas | lung m thob pa la thos par mi bya ste | mthong ba lya cis smo so ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po paṇḍita bi ma mi tra la | bod kyi lo tstsha ba mchims mdzid gsal 'bar gyis zhus te | bsgyur nas gtan la phab po ‖*

47) *bDud rtsi chen po chos nyid gsang ba'i rgyud*[74]

Colophon: *bdud rtsi chen po chos nyid gsang ba'i rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhas pa bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsha ba gnyags snya [=dznyā] na ku ma ras bsgyur ba'o ‖ ‖*

48) *bDud rtsi las rgya mtsho'i rgyud*[75]

Colophon: *bdud rtsi las rgya mtsho'i rgyud ces bya ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsa snyag dznyā na ku ma ras bsgyur ba'o ‖*

49) *bDud rtsi chen po 'khor lo 'bar ba'i rgyud*[76]

Colophon: *bdud rtsi chen po 'khor lo 'bar ba'i rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lotstsha ba gnyags dznyā na ku ma ras bsgyur ba'o ‖*

50) *Thams cad bdud rtsi lnga'i rang bzhin | rin ba [=po] che 'phreng ba'i rgyud*[77]

Colophon: *bdud rtsi gsung gi rgyud rin po che 'phreng ba rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi paṇḍi ta bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tstsha ba gnyags dznyā na ku ma ras bsgyur ro ‖ ‖*

51) *bDud rtsi bde ba chen po'i rgyud*[78]

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[73]   Tb.627, vol. XXXIV (*ngi*), pp. 98[l. 3]-147[l. 4]. The connection of text nos. 46-53 with the canonical work P464/D841 is yet to be studied.

[74]   Tb.628, vol. XXXIV (*ngi*), pp. 147[l. 4]-206[l. 6]. See above, n. 73.

[75]   Tb.630, vol. XXXIV (*ngi*), pp. 359[l. 3]-476[l. 1]. See above, n. 73.

[76]   Tb.631, vol. XXXIV (*ngi*), pp. 476[l. 1]-528[l. 7]. See above, n. 73.

[77]   Tb.632, vol. XXXIV (*ngi*), pp. 528[l. 7]-593[l. 4]. See above, n. 73.

[78]   Tb.633, vol. XXXIV (*ngi*), pp. 593[l. 4]-647[l. 1]. See above, n. 73.

Colophon: *bdud rtsi bde ba chen po'i rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi paṇ
ḍi ta bi ma la mi tra dang | bod kyi lo tsha ba gnyags dznyā nas bsgyur ro ‖*

52) *bDud rtsi rin po che ye shes gsang ba'i 'khor lo'i rgyud*[79]

Colophon: *ye shes gsang ba 'khor lo'i rgyud rdzogs so ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi
mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | zhu chen gyi lo tstsha ba zhang dznyā nas
gtan la phab pa las | phyis ka ba dpal brtsegs la stsogs pas yongs su gtan
la phab pa'o ‖*

53) *Thams cad bdud rtsi lnga'i rang bzhin du 'khrungs shing skye
bar byed pa'i 'bras bu rin po che'i 'od ltar bstan pa'i rgyud*[80]

Colophon: *'og min du grags pa tshe rdzogs so ‖ ‖ lha yul du grags par yang
'gro'o ‖ mi yul du grags par yang rgyud cig bzhugs so ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan
po bi ma la mi tra dang | snyags dznyā nas bsgyur ba'o ‖ ‖*

54) *'Phrin las phun sum tshogs pa'i rgyud*[81]

Colophon: *rgya gar gyi mkhan po bi ma la mi tra dang | lo tstsha ba ā
tsarya dznyā nas gtan la phab pa las | rtag pa phyogs gcig pa rdzogs so ‖*

55) *Phur ba bcu gnyis 'byung ba'i rgyud chung ngu bstan pa'o*[82]

Colophon: *phur ba bcu gnyis 'byung ba'i rgyud chung ngu | bcom ldan
'das rdo rje gzhon nus gsungs pa rdzogs s.hyo ‖ ‖ rgya gar gyi slob dpon
bi ma la mi tra dang | lo tstsha ba gnyags dznyā na ku mā ras bsgyur cing
zhus te gtan la phab pa'o ‖ ‖*

56) *gNod sbyin nor bdag gsang ba'i rgyud*[83]

Colophon: *gnod sbyin a pa ra tsitta gsang ba'i rgyud ces bya ba rdzogs
so ‖ ‖ gu ru padmas bi ma la bshad | des gnyags dznyā na la bshad | des
rdo rje yang dbang gter la bshad | des gter du sbas so ‖ man ngag la dam
tshig snying po rtsa ba'i sngags kyi dza dza'i gong du gzhug | dngos grub
blang ba yang de ltar shes par bya | gtor ma'i snying po dza dza 'og tu*

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[79] Tb.634, vol. XXXIV (*ngi*), pp. 647[l. 2]-714[l. 1]. See above, n. 73.

[80] Tb.635, vol. XXXIV (*ngi*), pp. 714[l. 1]-808[l. 5]. See above, n. 73.

[81] Tb.672, vol. XXXVI (*chi*): pp. 1008[l. 6]-1052[l. 3].

[82] Tb.684, vol. XXXVII (*ji*), pp. 1003[l. 3]-1030[l. 2]. A text titled *Ki la ya tan tra
chung ngu* is mentioned in Zhi ba 'od's *bKa' shog* as spurious text. See KARMAY
1998, p. 33, no. 19.

[83] Tb.812, vol. XLIII (*pi*), pp. 322[l. 5]-328[l. 2]. Found only in the Central Bhu-
tanese Group.

gdags | kun dka' [=*dga'*] *rtsa ba'i sngags la sbyar zhes gu ru bi ma las gsungs so ‖ ‖*

57) *sNying lung chen po'i rgyud*[84]

Colophon: *bi ma la mi tras sbrang gi btsas su bzhag pa rdzogs so ‖ ‖*

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The World on Show,
or Sensibility in Disguise.

Philosophical and Aesthetic Issues in a Stanza by Abhinavagupta (*Tantrāloka* I 332, *Locana* ad *Dhvanyāloka* I 13)[*]

LYNE BANSAT-BOUDON

The stanza I examine here belongs to two texts by Abhinavagupta: the *Tantrāloka* (henceforth TĀ) and the *Dhvanyālokalocana* (henceforth *Locana*). It is amenable to different interpretations according to the text in which it appears, its context and its exegesis. The stanza must have been famous, since it is quoted again by Bhāskara, commenting on Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* (henceforth ĪPV) ad *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (henceforth ĪPK) I 1, 14.[1]

Jayaratha, the author of the *Viveka* (henceforth TĀV), comments on the stanza in the TĀ. In the *Locana* [ad *Dhvanyāloka* I 13], it is Abhinavagupta who offers a self-exegesis of it. I give here a provisional translation, in conformity with the context in which it is employed as well as with the analysis of the TĀV:[2]

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[1]   *Bhāskarī* ad ĪPV I 1, 4; see Appendix-4.

[2]   See below, § 1, for the detail of Jayaratha's analysis.

bhāvavrāta haṭhāj janasya hṛdayāny ākramya yan nartayan bhaṅgībhir
vividhābhir ātmahṛdayaṃ pracchādya saṃkrīḍase |
yas tvām āha jaḍaṃ jaḍaḥ sahṛdayaṃmanyatvaduḥśikṣito manye 'muṣya
jaḍātmatā stutipadaṃ tvatsāmyasaṃbhāvanāt ‖[3]

O whole of things! Since you play at forcibly[4] grabbing hold of the hearts
of men, as does an actor with his various costumes, and at hiding your
heart that is the Self, he who calls you unconscious is himself uncons-
cious: wrongly believing that he is endowed with a heart (*sahṛdaya*), he
has not completed his education. Nevertheless, his very unconsciousness,
I think,[5] is praiseworthy, since we do imagine him (*saṃbhāvana*) as iden-
tical to you.

The stanza is explicitly organized by the theatrical metaphor. We
will see how remarkable it is in its complex construction and in the
different levels of meaning that inform it.[6]

Being an apostrophe to the *bhāvavrāta*, the "whole of things," or
phenomenal diversity, the stanza appears as a drama with three cha-
racters: the *bhāvavrāta*, the *jana* (the ordinary man whom the TĀV
turns into a *vādin*, an "interlocutor," that is, here an adversary; see
below, p. 38), and the "I" of the main verb, *manye*, through which
Abhinavagupta, exponent of the Trika, makes his voice heard. The
"I" of *manye* thus adresses phenomenal diversity as he would the
deity – this is the interpretation of both the TĀV (below, pp. 40, 45-
47) and the *Locana* (below, p. 60) – and introduces an effect of *mise
en abyme* with the reported speech attributed to the *jana*.

The meter is *śārdūlavikrīḍita*, frequent in lyrical poetry, and such
is indeed the tone of this address to the *bhāvavrāta*, which amounts
to a celebration – a lyricism that again expresses itself through the
"I" of *manye*, in which Abhinavagupta manifests himself as the re-
presentative of the Śaivas.

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[3]   Sanskrit texts are quoted as they appear in the reference edition – I have not
corrected the *sandhi*.

[4]   Note that *haṭhāt* has the double meaning: "by force" and "invincibly."

[5]   Compare D. Shulman's paper in this volume on the use of *jāne*: according to
Abhinavagupta (commenting on a verse quoted in the *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* ad III
43), *jāne* "is often a marker of the figure *utprekṣā*, 'flight of fancy,' but [...] here
[...] its litteral meaning is what matters."

[6]   For examples of Tantric usages of the theatrical analogy, see J. Törzsök's con-
tribution to this volume.

Moreover, as Jayaratha observes as if in passing, the stanza is organized by the *aprastutapraśaṃsā* figure. This is a remark that Jayaratha exploits only partially, focussing on the denoted meaning, which is the *aprastuta*, or non-pertinent topic, whereas the *Locana* gives the *aprastutapraśaṃsā* all its meaning and weight, as we shall see (see below, pp. 48ff.).

Among figures of speech, the *aprastutapraśaṃsā* is one of those in which suggestion is in operation: while something non-pertinent or irrelevant (*aprastuta*) to the speaker and the listener is being described (*praśaṃsā*),[7] what is really meant, that is, the suggested meaning, is something pertinent or relevant (*prastuta*) to them; besides, the relationship between the non-pertinent and the pertinent can be of three types[8] (in the case of our stanza, similarity – *sārūpya*).

That stanza (as well as its commentaries by Abhinavagupta, Jayaratha or Bhāskara) plays, in particular, on the polysemy of the adjective *jaḍa*, since *jaḍa* means, among several equivocations i) insentient, ii) unconscious (Jayaratha glosses it by *acetana*), iii) devoid of reason, that is stupid, or even iv) insane (as we shall see about the *Locana*'s analysis).

In the light of its commentaries, the stanza appears as a remarkable illustration of the way Śaiva thought merges philosophical and aesthetic registers within one another. One can see here a movement, a turn of mind, inherent in that system of thought which offers us the essential lineaments of Indian aesthetic theory.

I would like to show that, in the two occurrences of the stanza, aesthetics and poetics (to which the *Locana* explicitly refers) serve as a speculative paradigm for the doctrine of which Abhinavagupta is one of the foremost exponents.

Jayaratha goes no further than a philosophical interpretation of the stanza, which coincides with the expressed meaning alone: everything is sentient. And in order to establish that fundamental truth of Kashmirian non-dualist Śaivism, Jayaratha develops the dramatic metaphor of the first hemistich.

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7   See GEROW 1971, p. 317: "mention made of a topic irrelevant to the subject" and INGALLS ET AL. 1990, who understands: "praise by means of the extraneous," and identifies it as the allegory.

8   The three types of relationship between *aprastuta* and *prastuta* being that of cause and effect, general and particular and similarity; see *Dhvanyāloka* I 13 and *Locana*.

The *Locana* proposes the same reading of the stanza: everything is sentient, including, first and foremost, the object wrongly said to be insentient, but the *Locana* goes beyond this statement by hinting at a second meaning, more esoteric, and for that very reason only suggested, thus taking the *aprastutapraśaṃsā* as an example of *dhvani*, specially, *vastudhvani* (see below, p. 50).

Nevertheless, since Jayaratha identifies the stanza as an *aprastutapraśaṃsā*, there should be a suggested meaning, which would be the *prastuta*. Although Jayaratha does not emphasize it, I propose to find that suggested meaning in the *avataraṇikā* to the exegetical passage and in its conclusion (see below, p. 37). On the basis of an understanding of that *aprastutapraśaṃsā* as organized by similarity (as shown by the *Locana*, which gives two examples of the figure and refers to our stanza as a case of *aprastutapraśaṃsā* based on similarity; see below, p. 48), the expressed *aprastuta* would be, beyond the apostrophe to the *bhāvavrāta*, the postulation of the equal sentience of the subject (here the *paśu*) and the object (in the form of all the objects, the *bhāvavrāta*). The suggested *prastuta* would be – by means of Jayaratha's rather unexpected identification of the *paśu* with the *vādin*, the "opponent" – the Śaivas' non-dualist attack against all opponents of their doctrine, with the ultimate intention of ridiculing all of them and establishing the Śaiva non-dualism as supreme.

Now, the question remains that, in the TĀ's context and according to Jayaratha's exegesis (who cares little, it seems, for the subtleties of Abhinavagupta's reasonings in the *Locana*), the *aprastutapraśaṃsā* is here to be understood as a mere figure of speech, and not as a case of *vastudhvani*, as claimed by Abhinavagupta in his *Locana* quoting the same verse. If one follows Ānandavardhana's exposition in the *vṛtti* ad I 13[9] and Abhinavagupta's commentary thereon, this means that, in the context of the TĀ, the direct expressed meaning (the apostrophe to the *bhāvavrāta*) is considered predominant (the criterium for such a distinction being that it is the expressed meaning that, in this case, creates *camatkāra*, "wonderment"), whereas the suggested meaning (the ridiculing and defeat of the adversaries) is subordinated. We shall see the whole process in detail further on (pp. 48ff.).

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[9]   I admit, with Ingalls, that Ānandavardhana is as well the author of the *vṛtti*; see INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 25-27.

Thus, in the TĀ, the *aprastutapraśaṃsā* is considered as a mere figure of speech and mainly serves a polemical purpose.

It is in this way that we can understand Jayaratha's *avataraṇikā*:

idānīm asya śāstrasya paraṃ gāmbhīryaṃ manyamāno granthakṛt, etad-arthasatattvam ajānānair api anyair anyathābodhena yatkiṃcid uttānam eva anyathā ucyate, tān prati aprastutapraśaṃsayā upahasitum āha...,

Now, considering the extreme depth of the [preceeding] teaching, [and, also,] that others, though ignorant of its essential meaning, persist in making erroneous and non-sensical pronouncements, as an effect of an understanding itself erroneous, the author of the treatise contradicts them, using the [following] *aprastutapraśaṃsā*, for ridiculing them [...],

as well as the conclusion, in which sarcasm intends to denounce any other system of thought as erroneous, and to reaffirm the infaillibility of the non-dualist Śaiva doctrine:

evaṃ prakṛte 'pi asya granthasya yas tattvaṃ na jānāti mā jñāsīt, pratyuta anyathāpi yatkiṃcana vakti ity asāv eva jaḍo, na punar asya granthasya kaścid doṣaḥ ity arthaḥ |

In order to come back to our subject, such is its meaning: the one who does not know the truth [expounded] in this treatise – let him not know it! And even more if he utters nonsense and falsehood, it is he himself who is the unconscious idiot; this treatise is not at fault in any way. This is the meaning.

1. THE *TANTRĀLOKAVIVEKA* AD *TANTRĀLOKA* I 332

I will limit myself to a synthesis of the analysis of the TĀV, whose text I give in Appendix-1.

The reasoning of the stanza is tightly woven and plays with paradox, as so often in this system of thought:

1.   Everything is sentient. This is why (*yat*)...

2.   ... the one who says phenomenal diversity is insentient and stupid is himself insentient and stupid, blinded by his very ignorance, that is, by his being unable to recognize the identity of the subject and the object;

3.   Nevertheless, since we Śaivas imagine – by virtue of the principle of non-duality – that such an ignorant fool is similar to you, O *bhāvavrāta*, the blame that he puts on you and that we

have just transferred to him (since he is the fool) turns to praise.

The entire philosophical point of the stanza lies in this last statement, the locus of a paradoxical mockery: it is because the *jana* partakes of this consciousness which he wrongly believes to be unconscious that he is really a *sahṛdaya*,[10] not for the reason he thinks (his sentience contrasting with the insentience of the objects).

The TĀV develops this line of thought and makes it clear that the stanza is a formulation of the non-dualism of the doctrine, which is precisely the main issue of the first chapter of the TĀ where our stanza appears.

The novelty of the TĀV's interpretation consists in reading, under the *jana* of the stanza (who appears again in the relative clause: <u>yas tvām āha</u>...), a *vādin*, that is, an "interlocutor" and therefore an opponent of Trika monism (note that the term *vādin* appears three times in the TĀV ad I 332; see Appendix-1, in bold). Jayaratha gives the content of the experience, inner struggles and impotence of that *vādin*, through a rather enigmatic (and unidentified[11]) stanza showing him doing battle with the dualizing thoughts (*vikalpa*s), whatever the school in which they have been theorized:

adyāsmān asataḥ kariṣyati sataḥ kiṃ nu dvidhā vāpy ayaṃ
kiṃ sthāsnūn uta naśvarān uta mithobhinnān abhinnān uta |
itthaṃ sadvadanāvalokanaparair bhāvair jagadvartibhir
manye maunaniruddhyamānahṛdayair duḥkhena taiḥ sthīyate ‖

Now, will it [dialectics (according to the context of the stanza in the ĪPVV)] make us existent or nonexistent, or even both? Will it make us permanent or destructible, different from each other or nondifferent? In my view, thus [confronted with such dilemmas], beings remain in pain: they who live in this world, immersed in contemplating the face of the Being, have their hearts closed by the silence [to which they are reduced,

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[10] On this reasoning, see the *Locana* ad *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* I 13 quoted below, p. 61. On the notion of *sahṛdaya(tā)* in the aesthetic register, see esp. BANSAT-BOUDON 1992a, pp. 148-149, 151; also (for its use in both aesthetic and spiritual registers), 2012a, pp. 225-233; and below, n. 33.

[11] Although Abhinavagupta could well be its author, due to the similarity of structure with TĀ I 332 (stanza organized by "*manye*"), as well as to the presence of the same stanza in another text by Abhinavagupta, namely the *Īśvarapratyabhi-jñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (henceforth ĪPVV); see the following §.

unable as they are to see that the opposition *sat-asat* is meant to dissolve in the awareness of the supreme Self (*paramātman*)[12]].

Let us note that the ĪPVV I 1, 1, Abhinavagupta's commentary on Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti* (most of which has been lost), has already cited this stanza in a condensed form, in an extremely sarcastic passage denying dialectics (*tarka*) the power of attaining supreme Reality.[13] Only "Recognition" (*pratyabhijñā*) of one's identity with the supreme principle or reality can ensure one's access to it, hence to liberation.

Thus every dualist doctrine is reduced to the level of inferior thought, tinged with very ordinary prejudices, characterizing the common man who knows nothing at all (*akiṃcijjña*), says the TĀV, and who can be shown to be a fool of the first order.[14] And yet one

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[12] On this implied meaning, see ĪPVV I 1, 1 (translated below) and *Bhagavadgītā* [BhG] II 16 [= II 17, in the Kaśmīr recension] and Abhinavagupta's commentary thereon (in particular his gloss for *antaḥ*).

[13] ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 9: *evaṃ parameśvarasvarūpe samāviśya granthakāraḥ sūtra-vṛttyarthaṃ pūrvapakṣottarapakṣaiḥ samudghāṭayiṣyan tarko 'pratiṣṭhaḥ iti apratiṣṭhatā,* <u>*adyāsmān asataḥ kariṣyati sataḥ sthāsnūn atho naśvarān iti,*</u> *sva-śaktipradarśanamātrasāratayā gomayapāyasīyanyāyopahāsena paramārthān-upayogitā | aho dhig vyākhyātṛgraham itarahevākabhṛtakam aho tarkasyāntaḥ kvacid api na labhyaś ca vibudhaiḥ |.* "Having thus immersed himself in the nature of *parameśvara* and preparing to reveal the meaning of the verse and its commentary through a series of *prima facie* views and established conclusions, the author [Utpaladeva] says: 'Dialectics has no foundation.' The lack of foundation [of dialectics is explicit in the verse]: 'Now, will it [dialectics] make us existent or nonexistent? [...] Will it make us permanent or destructible?' [Trying to express] the supreme meaning [through logical terms] is pointless, according to [the verse]: 'Alas! The understanding of dialecticians [only] results in another whim [to analyze]! Alas! For scholars, there is no end to dialectics!' [Here the emphasis is on] the derisory nature [of dialectics when employed for the purpose of attaining the supreme meaning; it is as absurd as the reasoning criticized] in the saying that assimilates 'the cowpat and the milk' [on the basis that they both have a bovine origin], given that the essence [of the supreme principle can only be perceived] when one sees its energy [at work behind the products that constitute empiric reality]."

[14] See in particular Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra* (henceforth PS) 27, which presents other systems of thought as mere practical and provisional truths (*vya-vahāramātram etat paramārthena tu na santy eva*, for which Yogarāja glosses *vyavahāramātram* by *saṃvṛtyartham*) and as such inferior to Abhinavagupta's doctrine (see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 152, n. 656). See also the famous analogy used by Kṣemarāja in his PH 8 (BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRI-PATHI 2011, pp. 160-161, n. 689), where the different schools are described as

sees the final pirouette which consists in the reversal of blame into praise.

Already, in the *avataraṇikā*, as we have seen, the TĀV shows how the stanza partakes of the polemic construction of the Traika system. Not only does this polemical tone persist throughout the commentary, but Jayaratha shows a violence which is foreign to the stanza itself and which culminates in the final condemnation, almost an imprecation (see above, p. 37).

Thus there is no way out for the cornered adversary. And if, despite everything, he resists – so what! His position, now ruined, is of no consequence.

I would have liked to show how, in the context of such a general attack on all dualism, one could read at least a partial refutation of the Sāṃkhya. But this it is not the place for such a digression, nor for comparing the way both Trika and Sāṃkhya use the theatrical metaphor. I shall limit myself to reminding the reader of *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* (henceforth SK) 59, 61, 65-66, where *prakṛti*, unconscious yet active, is said to be playing before the *puruṣa*, conscious yet inactive – it is indeed an actress (*nartakī*; SK 59), since the *Gauḍapā-dīyabhāṣya* speaks of the *rasa*s she is enacting.

Intent upon his demonstration of non-dualism, Jayaratha unfolds the dramatic metaphor of the first hemistich, showing how the analogy at work in the stanza poetically condenses the underlying argument of the passage: objects are sentient (*ajaḍa*), but the deity which presides over their manifestation disguises that sentience as make-believe insentience (*jaḍatva*), so much so that it succeeds in deceiving the insensitive man (*ahṛdaya*): the world displays its splendors to the finite being who is its deluded and impotent spectator. Thus Jayaratha unfolds the web of significations associated with the notion of *sahṛdayatā*, "sensibility," understood as an aesthetic notion.

One should observe, however, that Jayaratha forces the meaning of the stanza by making it serve his exegetic project, infringing on its morphology and syntax, and even on its metrics.

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the many "roles" (as well as "levels" of realization of the ultimate truth, *bhū-mikā*) taken on by the Supreme Lord as an actor and are seen as hierarchical levels arranged along the scale of the *tattva*s – culminating with the eleventh and highest *bhūmikā* or *sthiti*, which is that of Trika philosophers.

It seems, for instance, that he understands the present participle *nartayan* not as a causative, but as a sort of denominative (the equivalent of a *nartāyate*), inasmuch as *nartayan* is glossed by *naṭavat*. Similarly, he dislocates the syntax by making *nartayan* govern the group in the instrumental: *vividhābhir bhaṅgībhiḥ*, when one expects that an instrumental accompanying *pracchādya* might more naturally express *means* (unless the instrumental is considered as the complement of means applied to both gerunds and also to *nartayan*); moreover, the expected syntactic order would thus coincide with the metrical organization of the stanza, namely, with the second *pāda*, whereas *nartayan*, at the end of the first *pāda*, would take a direct object: *janasya hṛdayāni*, which is shared with the gerund *ākramya*.[15]

Jayaratha persists in his bold interpretation, since the syntactic segment thus reorganized is again glossed by an equivalent one: *vividhābhir bhaṅgībhiḥ nartayan yat saṃkrīḍase – naṭavat atāttvikena rūpeṇa samullasasi*. Thus, *vividhābhir bhaṅgībhiḥ* is explained as *atāttvikena rūpeṇa* ("taking on a non-real form"), *nartayan* as *naṭavat*, "in the way of an actor," and *saṃkrīḍase* as *samullasasi* ("he plays").[16]

In the same vein, the term *bhaṅgī* is to be understood here more as "costumes" (one of its meanings) than as "twists" or "bends"[17] (or emotional "modes," as understood in the *Locana*; see below, p. 61) – such costumes representing the various roles played by the actor. Let us remember that the *āhāryābhinaya* – costume and make-up – although it has "to be borrowed" (*āhārya*) from the external world before the actor enters the stage, is conceived as a full-fledged register of acting (*abhinaya*).[18]

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[15] This will be the syntactical order of the stanza in Abhinavagupta's self-exegesis of the same verse in the *Locana*; see below, p. 58: *haṭhād eva lokam yathecchaṃ vikārakāraṇābhir nartayati*.

[16] Lit., "Since (*yat*) you play (*saṃkrīḍase = samullasasi*), in the way of an actor (*nartayan = naṭavat*), with various costumes, i.e. with a form that is not real (*vividhābhir bhaṅgībhiḥ = atāttvikena rūpeṇa*)."

[17] Cf. Padoux's translation: "O Totalité des choses! De force, Tu t'empares des cœurs humains et Tu joues, tel un acteur, à *cacher sous de multiples détours* (my emphasis) le cœur du Soi [...]"; transl. SILBURN AND PADOUX 1998, p. 126.

[18] On the four registers of *abhinaya*, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1990; also BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 145-155, 341-387.

The verb itself, *saṃkrīḍase* (glossed as *samullasasi*), is also to be understood in the sense of dramatic acting, when it evokes the divine actor, the *naṭarāja* – or his *śakti*, as we shall see.

We should note with what coherence the stanza and its commentary spin out the metaphor, in conformity with the essential lineaments of the aesthetic theory defended by Abhinavagupta and the Śaiva tradition, including the key notion of *sahṛdayatā* and its antonym, *ahṛdayatā*.

Both texts manifest the tension between the two protagonists of the aesthetic experience as lived out in the theatre, that is, the actor and the spectator. Nothing is left out of the process. On one side, the actor, master of himself and of the universe (if I can borrow from Corneille, *Cinna*, Vth act!), that is, master of the splendors lucidly displayed to the spectator's eyes (since, like the divine actor, he *causes* the objective world *to be* on stage);[19] master also of that spectator's heart, which he moves "forcibly" (*haṭhāt*), that is, "at will" (*yatheccham*, as we shall see in the *Locana* quoted below, p. 61), and who hides his Self in order to assume the variety of his roles. On the other side, the spectator, more specifically the unqualified spectator, the *ahṛdaya*, who sees nothing but the diversity of the world in the variety of those roles.

Such a spectator – who is a figure of the opponent in the interpretation of the TĀV – is, in fact, deceived, unable to discern the reality beneath appearances. And he is all the more deceived since he overestimates himself – wrongy believing, due to his presumptuousness (a way of translating the philosophical notion the Trika inherits from the Sāṃkhya, namely *abhimāna*,[20] the sentiment of the ego, and not of the Self), that he is a *sahṛdaya*.

On the philosophical level, the insensibility (*ahṛdayatā*) of that deceived spectator represents *avidyā* (or *ajñāna*), metaphysical ignorance, as it manifests itself in a double error (*bhrānti*) consisting, in Śaiva reasonings and particularly in Abhinavagupta's PS (30-31 and 39-40), in taking the Self for the non-Self, that is, in forgetting the unity of the Self and in placing before itself the object, namely phenomenal diversity (to which also belong the multiplicity of the

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[19] On Śiva as the unique Agent and Actor and the reasonings on the "beingness" (*astitva*) of the phenomenal world, see BANSAT-BOUDON 2014, pp. 64-73.

[20] See PS 19 in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 138ff.

*paśu*s[21]), before just as wrongly taking the non-Self (the body, the breath, etc.) as the Self – which amounts to being an error heaped upon error, "darkness upon darkness" (*timirād api timiram idam*), or a "great pustule upon a boil" (*gaṇḍasyopari mahān ayaṃ sphoṭaḥ*), as PS 31 says.[22]

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that at some point in the ĪPVV (ad II 4 19, vol. III, p. 244)[23] it is the error itself (*bhrama*)[24] which plays on the stage:

> *sa ca bhramo nāṭyatulyasya aparamārthasato 'tyaktasvarūpāvaṣṭambhananaṭakalpena parameśvaraprakāśena pratītigocarīkṛtasya saṃsārasya nāyakaḥ sūtradhāraḥ pradhānabhūtaḥ pravartayitā itivṛtte nāyako vā, yallagnaṃ viśvetivṛttam ābhāti; tata eva prathamaḥ |*

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[21] On this point, see especially *Spandanirṇaya* I 1 (quoted and translated in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 330-331) which states that Śiva takes on the role of the seven *pramātṛ*s and of the objects which they bring into being.

[22] On the double error, see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 24-25, 161-169, 191-192 and n. 848; also, below, n. 24.

[23] Quoted in RATIÉ 2011, pp. 559; see also J. Törzsök's contribution to this volume.

[24] Here "*bhrama*" must be construed as "*bhrānti*," "error," and refers to the Traika conception of a two-levelled error. According to Abhinavagupta and his commentator in the PS, the first level of error is to mistake the Self for the non-Self, i.e., in forgetting one's own plenitude and in apprehending oneself as a finite subject, defined in relation to an object (see PS 25 and 30 in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011). Thereupon intervenes the second level of error: taking the non-Self (body, *buddhi*, etc.) to be the Self, that is, predicating the Self of the non-Self, so that we assert 'I am fat,' 'I am intelligent,' etc. (see PS 31 in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011). On the interpretation of *bhrama* here, in the ĪPVV, as an error on two levels – of which the first, more fundamental one is to mistake the Self for the non-Self – I somewhat differ from Ratié and Törzsök (see above, n. 23). See, for instance, Yogarāja's *Paramārthasāravivṛti* (henceforth PSV) ad 61: *bhrāntiḥ dvayarūpo bhramaḥ*, "the 'error,' i.e., the illusion formed of duality," and PSV 39, who describes how the dissolution of the second level of error is the condition for the vanishing of the first and main grade of error: *yāvad anātmani dehādāv ātmābhimāno na galitas tāvat svātmaprathārūpe 'pi jagati bhedaprathāmoho na vilīyate*. "As long as the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self – the body, etc. – does not dissipate, so long does the delusion not dissolve that consists in valorizing difference (lit. 'display of difference') in this world, [the things of] which are even so but the display of one's own Self." (Transl. BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 192.) Here that first grade of error is described as *bhedaprathāmohaḥ*, the "delusion that consists in valorizing difference."

> The drama (*nāṭya*) that the world of transmigration is [i.e. the phenomenal world subjected to the cycle of rebirth] (*saṃsāra*),[25] though ultimately deprived of reality, can only be experienced insofar as it is the manifestation of the supreme Lord who, like the actor (*naṭa*), never gives up his own, immutable nature. [Metaphysical] error[26] is the hero (*nāyaka*)[27] of the drama; in other words, it is the *sūtradhāra*, the leader of the company, whose preeminent function is both that of instigator of the plot (*itivṛtta*) and protagonist of the play. It is in its close connection with metaphysical error that the plot of the universe (*viśvetivṛtta*) appears. This is why metaphysical error is "primary."

 Error here is nothing but nescience (*avidyā*), namely the mistaking of the Self for the non-Self which in turn will lead to an even deeper error, that of mistaking the non-Self for the Self. Like the *sūtradhāra*, both the leader and first actor of a theatre group who plays the main role (*nāyaka*), *avidyā* leads the plot of the universe (*viśvetivṛtta*) on the stage of the world of transmigration (*saṃsāra*). Better than *viśva* in the alternative analogy, that of the drama of the universe (*viśvetivṛtta*), *saṃsāra* is able to represent the target in the metaphor of the "world as a theatre": in the endless flow of reincarnations, empirical beings take on one role after another. And although, in Śaiva terms, the play (*nāṭya*) is not ultimately "true" (*aparamārtha-sat*),[28] it has enough power of illusion to fool the spectators, so long as these remain in the condition of *paśu*. At the source of this dramatic illusion is Parameśvara, the Supreme Agent[29] and Supreme

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[25]   Lit. "the world of transmigration comparable to a play."

[26]   "Error" here is in the sense of nescience (*avidyā*); see below.

[27]   With a play on the word *nāyaka*, "the one who leads," which in dramaturgy also refers to the "hero." So error leads the dramatic plot of the universe in the same way as the *sūtradhāra* leads it on the stage: it is both its instigator and main protagonist. For the *sūtradhāra* is the character *de rigueur* in the prologue which introduces the dramatic fiction as well as the first protagonist of the play (see LÉVI 1890, p. 378 and BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 83 et 219). He is also the true incarnation of theatricality in that he appears as the very figure of the Actor in the *pūrvaraṅga*, the half-ritualistic and half-dramatical "preliminaries" to the performance of the dramatic fiction which are described in the fifth chapter of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 74-76).

[28]   Cf. above, p. 41, Jayaratha's notation: *atāttvikena rūpeṇa*, "taking on a non-real form."

[29]   On Śiva as the Agent *par excellence*, see BANSAT-BOUDON 2014, pp. 65-71. See also ĪPV II 4 19 (vol. II, p. 200): *iti cidrūpasyaiva kartṛtvam upapannam abhin-nasya bhedāveśasahiṣṇutvena kriyāśaktyāveśasambhavāt*, "Thus, only what is

actor, who, in disguising himself, plays at being other than himself without ever being affected by it (*atyaktasvarūpāvaṣṭambhanaṭa*).[30] This is possible because such a change of appearance, far from being due to particular circumstances, stems from Parameśvara's power to hide at will. This ability is one of his *śakti*s, his *tirodhānaśakti*, his concealment energy.[31] Thus the disguisement of the Self is a correlate of its sovereign freedom, its *svātantryaśakti*, the first of its energies.[32] The notation "*ātmahṛdayaṃ pracchādya*" (TĀ I 332) is therefore an essential element of the playful process of self-subjugation which can be read between the lines of the stanza.

One can see that the stanza and its commentaries transpose metaphysical ignorance to the aesthetic register: thus the TĀV conceives of *ajñāna* as *ahṛdayatā*, which implies an imperfect education (*duḥśikṣita*), as opposed to the perfect education that characterizes

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undivided consciousness can be an Agent, for, being capable of taking on different forms, it can exercize the power of action."

[30] On the main characteristic of the Lord, i.e. that his essential nature cannot be altered whatever form he takes on, see in particular PSV 1 quoting *Spandakārikā* (henceforth SpK) I 3 (see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 66-67, and n. 253); also PS 34 (and PSV ad loc.) and PS 36. This is also the case with ordinary, empirical, actors who never forget that they themselves are not the characters or at least not fundamentally so. This they never – or should never – ignore, since they would otherwise risk being possessed by the deity whose role they are playing or start doing for real what should remain fiction, for example killing a fellow actor who happens to be playing the part of an enemy (see the anecdotes in TARABOUT 1998, pp. 296ff.). See also ĪPV II 4 19 (quoted above, n. 29) which asserts that, although capable of being many, the Lord (or consciousness, *cit*) remains one and unaffected by the multiplicity he himself creates. It is in this context that the passage of the ĪPVV (vol. III, p. 244) quoted above, p. 43, uses the metaphor of the error a*s sūtradhāra*.

[31] See HULIN 1978, p. 308, n. 5, who translates by "énergie de cèlement." The *tirodhānaśakti* is one of the *pañcakṛtya*, Śiva's five cosmic functions (see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 100, n. 413).

[32] See PSV 5 commenting on "Śiva himself, who takes on the condition of a fettered soul": "Thus, that Lord who has been described above as a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, and whose nature is freedom (*svātantrya*), Śiva himself, whose essence is now the veiling of his own true nature (*svarūpagopana*), takes on the role (*bhūmikā*) of a cognizer endowed with a body, according to his own will, as though he were an actor (*naṭa*) and, since he is [henceforth] to be maintained and treated as a domestic animal [that is, as a tethered beast], he is now distinguished by his existence as a fettered subject (*paśu*)"; on *svarūpagopana*, see also also PS 15 (on *māyāśakti*) and PSV ad loc.: BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 126-129, and n. 529.

the *sahṛdaya*, in aesthetics.[33] The height of ignorance and bewilderment (*moha*) is to think of oneself as sensible and sensitive, as well as perfectly educated.

On the one hand, therefore, we have that deceived spectator; on the other, the sovereign actor. But who is this actor who is the object of comparison for the *bhāvavrāta*? "He" is, in fact, an actress, even if in veiled terms. Abhinavagupta himself gives this interpretative key in his ĪPV ad ĪPK I 1, 4:[34] the actor *par excellence*, that is, the agent of phenomenal manifestation, is the *māyāśakti*, herself an hypostasis of Śiva's Śakti, therefore indissociable from him:[35]

> ... *teṣāṃ "jaḍabhūtānāṃ" cinmayatve 'pi māyākhyayā īśvaraśaktyā jāḍyaṃ prāpitānāṃ jīvantaṃ pramātāram āśritya pratiṣṭhā...* |

> [...] Although made of consciousness, the "insentient entities" are made insentient by the work of the Lord's Śakti named *māyā*. Their foundation depends on the living being, that is, on the cognizing subject [...].

It is that *māyāśakti* (who "measures" out the empirical world) that the Śaiva doctrine presents, with the organization of the thirty-six *tattva*s, as governing the phenomenal manifestation, called *meya* – a derivative of the same root *mā*, "to measure," "to construct."

In this respect, and in this respect only, *māyā* is comparable to the *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya, who shows herself on the stage of the world[36] by assuming, one after the other, those roles that are her "evolutes" or "products," the remaining twenty-three *tattva*s – the difference consisting in that *prakṛti* is unconscious, whereas *māyā*,

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[33] See Abhinavagupta's famous definition of the *sahṛdaya* in *Locana* ad *Dhvanyāloka*, *vṛtti* ad I 1 (CSS ed., pp. 38-39; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 70): *yeṣāṃ kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsavaśād viśadībhūte manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā te svahṛdayasaṃvādabhājaḥ sahṛdayāḥ*; for the use of *sahṛdayatā* in both aesthetic and spiritual registers, see BANSAT-BOUDON 2012a, pp. 225-233.

[34] See the text of the stanza, ĪPK I 1, 4, in Appendix-3.

[35] See, for instance, Abhinavagupta's *maṅgala* to his *Locana* on Ānandavardhana's *avataraṇikā* to III 1 (CSS ed., p. 288; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 369): *smarāmi smarasaṃhāralīlāpāṭavaśālinaḥ | prasahya śambhor dehārdhaṃ harantīṃ parameśvarīm* ||. "I remember the Supreme Goddess who stole half of Śambhu's body after he had shown his effortless skill in playing at annihilating Smara himself."

[36] See SK 59 and above, p. 40; also BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 52-53.

Śiva's hypostasis[37] (in other words, the hypostasis of Consciousness), is conscious throughout.

This is the reason why the stanza is a hymn to the deity which sets in motion the *bhāvavrāta*. Besides, in this non-dualism, it makes little difference whether it is an actor (Śiva) or an actress (*māyā*).[38]

It is worth noting that the passage of the ĪPV I 1, 4 that offers that interpretative key to TĀ I 332 is precisely the one a propos of which Bhāskara, commenting on it, in his turn, several centuries later, finds it appropriate to cite the same stanza, although with a tiny variant (see Appendix-4). Thus the philosophical point of the stanza, in the TĀ, at least, is strengthened by the usage Bhāskara makes of it.

Let us come back to the long-drawn-out metaphor. When it is said of this actor, or this actress, that he/she hides his/her Self, one cannot help seeing here a reference to the notion of *sākṣātkārakalpapratīti* (or *pratyakṣakalpapratīti*) a "quasi direct perception,"[39] essential to the success of the aesthetic process meant to culminate in *rasa*.

In effect, *sākṣātkārakalpapratīti* is a way to condense in one term the complex process that manifests on the stage a person (or a fancy) who, being neither entirely the actor nor entirely the character, allows the spectator to see everything with impunity, in a distanciated rapture. As such, the "quasi direct perception" governs the next step of the aesthetical process when considered from the point of view of the audience, namely *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* or "generalization." *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, the depersonalization of emotions free of any reference to a specific ego (and thus their universalization), enables the audience to enjoy a controlled and purified identification (*tanmayībhāva*), the source of delight and bliss.[40]

As for the influence cast over the hearts of men, it is a way of alluding to *rasa*, the irresistible aesthetic rapture which, when transposed onto the ontological level, merges with the beatific experience

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[37] See PS 15 in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 126-129, where *māyā* is described as *devī māyāśaktiḥ*; also BANSAT-BOUDON 2008, pp. 60-62.

[38] See TĀV VIII 333: *devīti devābhinnatvāt*.

[39] The notion is found at several places in the *Abhinavabhāratī* ad *Nāṭyaśāstra*; see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 150-152; 2012, pp. 224-225.

[40] On the stages of the aesthetic process as analyzed by Abhinavagupta in his *Abhinavabhāratī*, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 152-155, 1992a and 2012, pp. 214-215.

of "repose in the Self" (*ātmaviśrānti*)[41] preliminary to the experience of "liberation in this life" (*jīvanmukti*). I have shown several times how the aesthetic experience works as a propaedeutics to the spiritual.[42] I shall thus not linger on this question, but we will return to it a propos the *Locana* (see below, pp. 50-55).

To conclude this part: phenomenal diversity in the form of the *māyāśakti* plays *before* the spectator, and plays *with* him as well, if he happens not to be a *sahṛdaya*, making him wrongly believe in the dichotomy subject/object.

2. THE *LOCANA*[43] AD *DHVANYĀLOKAVṚTTI* I 13[44]

Let us come to the *Locana*. The broader context is that of the exposition of *dhvani*; the narrower context, that of the definition of the *aprastutapraśaṃsā*, more precisely, of the third category of *aprastutapraśaṃsā*, based on the similarity of the expressed (which is, in this case, *aprastuta* – what is non-pertinent to the speaker and the listener) and the suggested (which is *prastuta* – what is pertinent to them), in order to establish where and when the figure works as such or as a case of *dhvani*.

What Ānandavardhana wants to show is that he has discovered something new, not a new name for categories already recognized, and so he goes through a number of such well-known categories – *alaṃkāra*s that involve an element of suggestion (including the *aprastutapraśaṃsā*) – and shows that they are not at all identical with his new concept of *dhvani*. He is thus led to defend his new theory, namely that the *ālaṃkārika* register is delimited by the predominance of the literal meaning, whereas that of the *dhvani* is defined by the predominance of the suggested meaning. Therefore, taking the *aprastutapraśaṃsā* as an example, he concludes (CSS ed., pp. 126-129; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 159):

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[41] On the notion of *ātmaviśrānti*, see below, p. 72 and n. 100; also BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 56, 71, 321.

[42] See, esp., BANSAT-BOUDON 2004, pp. 280-283; 2012, pp. 231-233.

[43] CSS ed., pp. 127-132; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp.160-163, 165-167.

[44] CSS ed., pp. 125-132; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 158-165.

... yadā tu sārūpyamātravaśenāprastutapraśaṃsāyām aprakṛtaprakṛtayoḥ
saṃbandhas tadāpy aprastutasya sarūpyābhidhīyamānasya prādhānyenā-
vivakṣāyāṃ dhvanāv evāntarbhāvaḥ | itarathā tv alaṃkārāntaratvam eva |
tad ayam atra saṃkṣepaḥ –
vyaṅgyasya yatrāprādhānyaṃ vācyamātrānuyāyinaḥ |
samāsoktyādayas tatra vācyālaṅkṛtayaḥ sphuṭāḥ ||
vyaṅgyasya pratibhāmātre vācārthānugame 'pi vā |
na dhvanir yatra vā tasya prādhānyaṃ na pratīyate ||
tatparāv eva śabdārthau yatra vyaṅgyaṃ prati sthitau |
dhvaneḥ sa eva viṣayo mantavyaḥ saṅkarojjhitaḥ ||

[...]. But when, in an *aprastutapraśaṃsā*, the relation of extraneous and
germane is based only on similarity, then, if the extraneous expressed idea
(*aprastuta*) bearing similarity is not intended to be predominant, the case
falls in the area of *dhvani*. Otherwise,[45] it will just be one of the figures.[46]
Here then is the summary of the matter:
"Wherever the suggested meaning (*vyaṅgya*) does not predominate, but is
merely ancillary to the literal sense (*vācya*), it is clear that such instances
are only figures of the literal sense, such as *samāsokti* and others,"
"In places where there is just a glimmer of the suggested or where the
suggested is just subservient to the expressed, or where its preeminence
is not clearly discernible, there is no *dhvani*,"
"Only those instances wherein word and meaning are solely directed to-
wards the suggested should be regarded as the area of *dhvani* – which
admits no admixture of [any figure of speech]."[47]

In his *Locana*,[48] Abhinavagupta goes further (CSS ed., pp. 127-128;
INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 162-163). For some reason, he considers
that the capacity to arouse wonder (*camatkārakāritva*) in the listener
is the criterion for determining which of the explicit or suggested
meanings prevails. Moreover, he seems to link or even subordinate
the ability to create a sense of wonder in the listener with the plau-
sibility of the meaning, be it literal or suggested.

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[45]   I.e., if it is the *aprastuta* that is intended to be predominant.

[46]   Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 159 (slightly modified).

[47]   My translation; see *Locana* ad loc., where *anupraveśa* comments on *saṅkara*:
saṅkareṇālaṅkārānupraveśasaṃbhāvanayā ujjhita ity arthaḥ. Ānandavardhana
and his exegete will take up the question again, in *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* ad III 40
and *Locana* thereon; see below, § 3.

[48]   *Locana* ad the *vṛtti* (CSS ed., pp. 126ff.): *yadā tu sārūpyamātravaśenāprastuta-*
praśaṃsāyām...

Giving the example of a stanza whose protagonist is a *vetāla*, Abhinavagupta argues that the believability of the literal meaning – which seems to be the source of the listener's sense of wonder – is a factor in the decision to consider it predominant.[49] That first segment of the passage (see complete text in Appendix-2) reads as follows:

> *atra yady api sārūpyavaśena kṛtaghnaḥ kaścid anyaḥ prastuta ākṣipyate, tathāpy aprastutasyaiva vetālavṛttāntasya camatkāra-kāritvam | na hy acetanopālambhavad asaṃbhāvyamāno 'yam artho na ca na hṛdya iti vācyasyātra pradhānatā | ...*

> Here, although some other ingrate is suggested as the pertinent subject (*prastuta*), by the power of similarity, the capacity of causing wonder[50] lies in the story of the *vetāla*, which is extraneous. The sense is not impossible as would be a reproach against an insentient being, and it is not without attraction. So the predominance here lies in the literal sense.[51]

However, says the second segment of the *Locana*, if the literal meaning is entirely implausible, that goes hand in hand with a suggested meaning that is the source of the verse's main charm – which would then make it a *vastudhvani*, namely the "suggestion of some narrative item or 'content.'" This is where (CSS ed., p. 127; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 162) Abhinavagupta makes a self-citation of his own stanza ("*bhāvavrāta haṭhāj...,*" already present in TĀ I 332):

> *... yadi punar acetanādinātyantāsambhāvyamānatadarthaviśeṣaṇenāprastutena varṇitena prastutam ākṣipyamāṇaṃ camatkārakāri tadā vastudhvanir asau | yathā mamaiva – "bhāvavrāta haṭhāj..." |*

> But if the pertinent subject [of the utterance] (*prastuta*) [i.e., the speaker's intention which he wants to convey to the listener, therefore, the suggested meaning he has in his mind] is a source of wonder (*camatkārakārin*), [although] suggested (*ākṣipyamāṇa*) by means of [another] that is non-pertinent (or irrelevant) (*aprastuta*) to the speaker and the listener – insofar as that [other irrelevant subject] is insentient, etc., or described in such a way that its particularities are entirely unimaginable (*atyantāsaṃbhāvyamāna*) for such a result [namely, suggesting the real meaning] – then, we have a

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[49] The point is further discussed below, *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* III 40; see below, p. 67, and n. 91.

[50] Underlined passages are my emphasis.

[51] Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 162 (slightly modified).

case of *vastudhvani*, as in this verse of my own: "O whole of things, forcibly..."[52]

Let us examine these two stanzas, which Abhinavagupta gives as examples of the category of *aprastutapraśaṃsā* based on similarity.[53]

1. The first one, which shows a *vetāla* killing his benefactor, ironically celebrates the former as the Prince of gratitude. That is the expressed/explicit meaning. The suggested meaning aims at some other ingrate, of whom we know nothing in the absence of context, or at any other ingrate.[54] Nevertheless, it is the expressed meaning, the colourful story of the *vetāla*, which is a cause of wonder (*camatkārakārin*), while it is all the more credible (hence convincing) as *vetāla*s' stories are a recurrent motive in narrative literature.

Thus, as one may infer from the next passage of the *Locana*, one can recognize here an instance of *aprastutapraśaṃsā*, since ingratitude is common to the explicit and implicit subjects of the utterance, but it is an *aprastutapraśaṃsā* pertaining to the *ālaṃkārika* register, since there is something striking and convincing in the description of the non-pertinent *vetāla*, which makes that literal meaning predominant (*vācyasyātra pradhānatā*).

2. The second stanza given as an example, which Abhinavagupta says that he composed himself, without giving its source, is the stanza under examination: "*bhāvavrāta haṭhāj*..." Abhinavagupta explains that, the expressed meaning being completely impossible, i.e., implausible (how to address the mass of the objects and to consider them as sentient?),[55] the suggested meaning prevails over it, thus creating wonder and establishing the stanza as a case of *vastudhvani*.

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[52] My translation. See below, p. 57, for an extended translation of the same passage, which applies to the verse itself ("*bhāvavrāta*," etc.) and shows its implications once the suggested meaning has been identified.

[53] Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta will take up the question again in III 40; see below, § 3.

[54] The verse, which addresses the *vetāla* (a *śārdūlavikrīḍita*, with two irregularities: the 8th syllable is long; there is one syllable too many, at the beginning of the second *pāda*; it should read "*kandhe*" instead of "*svakandhe*"), reads as follows: *prāṇā yena samarpitās tatra balād yena tvam utthāpitaḥ svakandhe yasya ciraṃ sthito 'si vidadhe yas te saparyām api | tasyāsya smitamātrakeṇa janayan prāṇāpahārikriyāṃ bhrātaḥ pratyupakāriṇāṃ dhuri paraṃ vetāla līlāyase ||.*

[55] See the passage of the *Locana* quoted immediately above, which emphasizes that the "particularities" ascribed to the *aprastuta* (the *bhāvavrāta*) are "entirely unimaginable" (*atyantāsaṃbhāvyamāṇa*).

Otherwise, it would indeed be a case of *aprastutapraśaṃsā* based on similarity, but this *aprastutapraśaṃsā* would pertain to the rhetorical register alone (as in the stanza of the *vetāla*).

This is what Ānandavardhana teaches (CSS ed., pp. 128-129, quoted above, p. 49). It is, as well, what Abhinavagupta develops (CSS ed., p. 128; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 163):

> *"itharathā tv iti"* │ *itarathaiva punar alaṅkārāntaratvam alaṅkāraviśeṣa-tvaṃ na vyaṅgyasya kathaṃ cid api prādhānya iti bhāvaḥ* │

> "But, otherwise..." – Otherwise, it will just be another figure of speech, that is, the particular figure of speech [named *aprastutapraśaṃsā*]; but this is not the case when the suggested meaning is prevalent in any way whatsoever. Such is the deeper meaning.[56]

Now, what is this suggested meaning? Abhinavagupta reveals it first, immediately after quoting his stanza: under the description of the *bhāvavrāta*, one should read the detailed and very lively evocation of a *mahāpuruṣa*, a "great being" – a "great being" who puzzles Ingalls (see, below, p. 63), and in whom I propose to recognize the figure of the *jīvanmukta*, who is "liberated while living." In effect, all the epithets qualifying that *mahāpuruṣa* might apply to the *jīvan-mukta*.

Here comes the third part of the passage, which deals with the figure of the *jīvanmukta*, i.e., the unfolding of the suggested meaning:

> *... kaścin mahāpuruṣo vītarāgo 'pi sarāgavad iti nyāyena gāḍhavivekālo-katiraskṛtatimirapratāno 'pi lokamadhye svātmānaṃ pracchādayaṃl lo-kaṃ ca vācālayann ātmany apratibhāsam evāṅgīkurvaṃs tenaiva lokena mūrkho 'yam iti yad avajñāyate tadā tadīyaṃ lokottaraṃ caritaṃ prastu-taṃ vyaṅgyatayā prādhānyena prakāśyate...*

I summarize the passage, which is given entirely in the Appendix. The statement that first gives the key to such correspondences is that the *mahāpuruṣa*, "although living in this world" (*lokamadhye*; precisely what makes the *jīvanmukta* a living oxymoron), has dispelled the darkness of metaphysical ignorance (*gāḍhavivekālokatiraskṛta-timirapratāno 'pi*). He nonetheless hides his Self (*svātmānaṃ prac-chādayan*), in conformity with the modes of life of a renunciate: although dispassionnate (*vītarāgo 'pi*), he behaves as if still in the grip

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[56] My translation. Note that the topic will be taken up again by Ānandavardhana and his exegete in III 40, and further clarified (see below, § 3).

of ordinary passions (*sarāgavad*); by so doing he is the object of innumerable comments and gossips (*lokaṃ ca vācālayan*), which he accepts without trying to deny them (*ātmany apratibhāsam evāṅgī-kurvan*). This is why people regard him as a fool or madman (*mūr-kha*) and despise him (*avajñāyate*) for it. Such is, Abhinavagupta concludes, the extraordinary, supra-mundane conduct (*lokottaraṃ caritam*) of so extraordinary (*kaścit*)[57] a man.

This is a remarkable text, probably one of the most complete descriptions of the *jīvanmukta*, whose main feature is that he is *lokotta-ra*. In which way? Although living in this phenomenal world, *he sees through it* and accedes to ultimate reality, as taught by *Bhagavadgītā* (henceforth BHG) II 71 (according to the numbering of the Kashmirian version; see Lakshman Joo's edition), which Anandavardhana quotes as an example for *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* ad III 1 (see below, p. 56):

> *yā niśā sarvabhūtānāṃ tasyāṃ jāgarti saṃyamī* |
> *yasyāṃ jāgrati bhūtāni sā rātriḥ paśyato muneḥ* ||

> That which is night[58] for all beings, in that the self-controlled ascetic is awake. That in which all beings are awake is night for <u>the sage who sees</u>.

In this way, "supramundanity" is associated with supralucidity,[59] with the result that the *jīvanmukta* remains indifferent to the ordinary world, its affects, prescriptions and prohibitions. We observe many ways of referring to the *jīvanmukta*'s *alaukika* or *lokottara* character, besides the use of the term itself, among which are the recourse to paradox, as in the verse of the BHG just quoted, and such exclamations as "*iti citram*," "how wonderful!", by which the *Gītā-rthasaṃgraha* comments on it[60] – another way of expressing that everpresent *camatkāra*, "wonder," "wonderment," which is also a criterion, as we have seen, for determining which of the explicit or

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[57] On this connotation of *kaścit*, see notably D. Shulman's paper in this volume.

[58] "Night" is a metaphor for *māyā*, as explained by the *Gītārthasaṃgraha*. See the entire passage ad loc.

[59] See also *Locana* on *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* ad III 1 (quoted below, p. 56), commenting on BHG II 71.

[60] *Gītārthasaṃgraha* ad BHG II 71: ... *paśyata eva sā rātrir iti citram* | *vidyāyāṃ cāvadhatte yogī yatra sarvo vimūḍhaḥ* | *avidyāyāṃ tv abuddhaḥ yatra janaḥ prabuddhaḥ – ity api citram.*

suggested meanings prevails, hence, whether the verse belongs to the *dhvani* register or to that of the *alaṃkāra*s.[61]

All similar features specific to the *jīvanmukta* are variously emphasized in the texts, especially in Śaiva texts.

The way the *jīvanmukta* makes others talk about him (*lokaṃ ca vācālayan*), without trying to explain himself – so much so that he is, for ordinary men, an object of scandal and contempt – is described in *Gītārthasaṃgraha* ad BHG XIV 26:

> yas tu phalaṃ kiṃcid apy anabhilaṣyan kim etad alīkam anutiṣṭhasi iti paryanuyujyamāno 'pi nirantarabhagavadbhaktivedhavidrutāntaḥkaraṇatayā kaṇṭakitaromavān vepamānatanur visphāritanayanayugaparivartamānasalilasaṃpātaḥ tūṣṇiṃbhavenaivottaraṃ prayacchati |

Harassed by his circle, who cannot bear not to understand him: "Why such an untrue behaviour?" (which is in some way an echo of "hiding his Self" – *svātmānaṃ pracchādayan* – of the *Locana*), the yogin answers through silence to the crowd of the *paśu*s, immersed as he is in the mystical experience of *bhakti*, whose symptoms are thrilling with joy, quivering and an uninterrupted flow of tears from his wide open eyes.

This is of course more than what the common man can understand and tolerate. Therefore the *jīvanmukta* is harassed, mocked and despised for being stupid (*mūrkha*), insensible or insentient (*jaḍa*), or even insane (*unmatta*).[62]

Similarly, *kārikā* 71 (an *āryā*) in the PS, also a work of Abhinavagupta, asserts:

> madaharṣakopamanmathaviṣādabhayalobhamohaparivarjī |
> niḥstotravaṣaṭkāro jaḍa iva vicared avādamatiḥ ||

> Living without self-deception, excitement, anger, infatuation, dejection, fear, greed, or delusion; uttering neither praises [of the gods] nor ritual formulae and having no opinions whatever, he should behave as one insensible (*jaḍa*).

This vision of the *jīvanmukta* is the same as in the *Locana* and the *Gītārthasaṃgraha*. It is worth noting that the "*jaḍa*" of the stanza is glossed by Yogarāja as "*unmatta*" – "insane" in the eyes of the world

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[61] On *camatkāra*, see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 320.

[62] See below.

– which implies that "having effectively conquered himself, considering that all is *brahman*, he should disport himself for purposes of play."[63]

Such a description of the *jīvanmukta*, although marked as Śaiva, is nonetheless shared by other schools, as the Vedāntic *Āgamaśāstra* (II 36b-37) clearly shows.[64]

In the same vein, the *Bālapriyā* subcommentary of the *Locana* cites a stanza, probably a proverb, which describes the way the world (or the common man) and the *jīvanmukta* (here the "one who knows the reality" – *jñātatattva*) consider each other as a *piśāca*, conventionally perceived as insentient (*jaḍa*) and insane (*unmatta*):

> *jñātatattvasya loko 'yaṃ jaḍonmattapiśācavat |*
> *jñātatattvo 'pi lokasya jaḍonmattapiśācavat ||*

> For the one who knows the reality, this world is like an insentient and insane *piśāca*, but, for this world, it is the one who knows the reality who is like an insentient and insane *piśāca*.[65]

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[63] Commenting on PS 71: *jaḍa iva vicared avādamatiḥ*, "He should just behave as one insensible, having no opinions whatever," Yogarāja observes: *pūrṇatvād ākāṅkṣāvirahāc conmatta ivetikartavyatārūpe śāstrīye karmaṇi pramāṇopapanne vā prameyasatattve pramātṛbhiḥ sahedam upapannam idaṃ neti vicārabahiṣkṛtabuddhir... iti dāntaprāyo bhūtvā sarvaṃ brahmāvalokayan krīḍārthaṃ vihared eveti jaḍatvena nirūpitaḥ |*. "Since he is himself replete, due to the absence of all expectations, he is like one at a loss (*unmatta*); his mind has banished considerations having to do with actions taught in the injunctive treatises, such as those that specify the manner of accomplishing [rituals, etc.] or [those that involve] the existence of something to be apprehended in conformity with some mode of correct apprehension (*pramāṇa*) and requiring an accompanying apprehender (*pramātṛ*), such as 'this [conclusion] is proven, this [one] is not' [...]. Thus, having effectively conquered himself, considering that all is *brahman*, he should disport himself for purposes of play. For this reason, he has been described here as insensible (or insane)." On the ascetic seen as *unmatta* in Tantric texts, see J. Törzsök's contribution to this volume.

[64] *Āgamaśāstra* II 36cd-37: *... advaitaṃ samanuprāpya jaḍaval lokam ācaret || nistutir nirnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca | calācalaniketaś ca yatir yādṛcchiko bhavet ||*. "Having realized nonduality, one should behave as a fool among people. Giving no praise, paying no homage, nor pronouncing *svadhā* [i.e., not offering libations to the Manes/Ancestors], with an unfixed home, and acting spontaneously [without willing anything] (*yādṛcchika*), one should become an ascetic." (Transl. BHATTACHARYA 1989, modified as to the meaning of *yādṛcchika*.)

[65] Same quote in *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali*, *pariccheda* 3, p. 419.

Nevertheless, that so-called insentience and stupidity of the *jīvan-mukta*, as he appears in the eyes of the uncomprehending common man, is but the corollary of the "supramundanity" (*lokottaratva/alaukikatva*) that is the very mark of the accomplished yogin, the *jīvanmukta*. This runs like a red thread in Abhinavagupta's works. In his *Gītārthasaṃgraha*, he interprets BHG II 66-70 (according to the numbering of the Kashmirian version) as referring to the *sthita-prajña*, himself portrayed as the *jīvanmukta*, as made obvious by the quotation (from an unidentified source): "*yogī ca sarvavyavahārān kurvāṇo 'pi lokottaraḥ*" – "Extraordinary is the yogin, even when he attends to worldly transactions" –, which qualifies such a yogin as *lokottara*, as is the case in the passage of the *Locana* we are dealing with.[66]

That "supramundanity" (*lokottaratva/alaukikatva*) appears again in the *Locana* commenting on *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* ad III 1. In his *vṛtti*, Ānandavardhana deals with the type of *dhvani* where the literal sense is not intended (*avivakṣitavācya*) – that is, where it is entirely set aside,[67] and cites precisely the same BHG II 71 which Abhinava-gupta comments upon in his *Gītārthasaṃgraha* (see above, p. 53, and n. 60). Ānandavardhana's *vṛtti* (CSS ed., p. 294; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 376) reads as follows:

> *anena hi vākyena niśārtho na ca jāgaraṇārthaḥ kaścid vivakṣitaḥ | kiṃ tar-hi? tattvajñānāvahitatvam atattvaparāṅmukhatvaṃ ca muneḥ pratipādya-ta iti tiraskṛtavācyasyāsya vyañjakatvam |*

> For in this sentence the meanings "night" and "waking" are not at all in-tended. What then? What is communicated is rather the attention of the sage to the knowledge of ultimate reality and his disregard for what is not

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66 *Gītārthasaṃgraha* ad BHG II 66-70: [*rāgadveṣetyādi pratiṣṭhitety antam*] *yas tu manaso niyāmakaḥ sa viṣayān sevamāno 'pi na krodhādikallolair abhibhūyate iti sa eva sthitaprajño yogīti tātparyam | "yogī ca sarvavyavahārān kurvāṇo 'pi lokottaraḥ" – iti nirūpayatā parameśvareṇa saṃkṣipyāsya svarūpaṃ kathyate.* "He who controls his mind is not thrown about by the waves of wrath, etc., even when he perceives the sense-objects; hence he alone is a yogin, a man-of-stabi-lized-intellect; such is the intended meaning. As has been said: 'Extraordinary is the yogin, even when he attends to worldly transactions.'"

67 See also, in this volume, D. Shulman's paper, examining *Dhvanyāloka* III 40 and III 43.

that reality. Thus the subjective force is of [the sub-type where] the literal meaning is entirely set aside.[68]

Here is another opportunity for Abhinavagupta to comment again on BHG II 71, this time in the context of the *dhvani* exposition, and to focus on the same *lokottaratā* to which he refers in his *Gītārtha-saṃgraha* on this verse. His *Locana* on *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* ad III 1 thus reads (CSS ed., p. 294; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 376):

> *tasmād bādhitasvārtham etad vākyaṃ saṃyamino lokottaratālakṣaṇena nimittena tattvadṛṣṭāv avadhānaṃ mithyādṛṣṭau ca parāṅmukhatvaṃ dhvanati |*

> Therefore this sentence, its primary meaning being obstructed,[69] suggests that the self-controlled ascetic, because of his extraordinary nature, is attentive to the perception [lit. "vision"] of ultimate reality and disregards false perception.[70]

Let us come back to *Locana* ad I 13, which cites our stanza: "*bhā-vavrāta*, etc." It is that extraordinary conduct of the yogin which is a source of wonder (see also the use of *kaścit* qualifying *mahāpuru-ṣa*), and it is why the suggested meaning (the *jīvanmukta*) prevails over the expressed one (the *bhāvavrāta*), thus making the *aprastu-tapraśaṃsā* a case of *dhvani*. Such is the meaning of Abhinava-gupta's *avataraṇikā* to his exegesis of his own stanza ("*bhāvavrāta*, etc."), as we have seen.[71]

Although the passage has already been quoted (above, p. 50), I come back to its interpretation, whose implications may be further developed now that the suggested meaning has been identified:

> But if the true subject [of the utterance] (*prastuta*) [i.e., the speaker's intention which he wants to convey to the listener, therefore, the suggested meaning he has in his mind, namely, the evocation of the *jīvanmukta*] is a source of wonder, [although] suggested (*ākṣipyamāṇa*) by means of [another subject] that is non-pertinent or irrelevant (*aprastuta*) [to the speaker

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[68] Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 376 (slightly modified). A similar eviction of the litteral meaning, in order to establish a suggestion based on metaphoric usage, is found in *Meghadūta* 31, quoted by the *vṛtti* ad III 43, in which the word *maitrī*, "friendship," applied to the breeze, must be taken metaphorically, since no breeze is ever literally "friendly" (see, in the volume, D. Shulman's analysis of the verse).

[69] Since "night" and "waking" must not be taken literally here.

[70] Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 376 (slightly modified).

[71] Note a variant, *pāda* c: <u>sa</u> tvām āha jaḍaṃ <u>tataḥ</u>...

and the listener, namely, the *bhāvavrāta*] – that other subject being insentient, etc., or described in such a way that its particularities are entirely unimaginable for such a result [namely, suggesting the real meaning and thus arousing a sense of wonder, as does the *prastuta*, i.e., the portrayal of the *jīvanmukta*] – then, we have a case of *vastudhvani*.

Now that the *mahāpuruṣa* is identified as a *jīvanmukta*, let us come to the functioning of the figure, based on the similarity of the "suggested" meaning, pertinent or relevant (*prastuta*) to the speaker and listener, and the "suggesting" (or "expressed") meaning that is not pertinent to them (*aprastuta*), and to the examination of the expressed meaning, which consists in the description of the *bhāvavrāta*.

The next segment of the *Locana* reads as follows:

> ... *jaḍo 'yam iti hy udyānendūdayādir bhāvo lokenāvajñāyate, sa ca pratyuta kasyacid virahiṇa autsukyacintādūyamānamānasatām anyasya praharṣaparavaśatāṃ karotīti haṭhād eva lokaṃ yathecchaṃ vikārakāraṇābhir nartayati | ...*

In Jayaratha's TĀV (and in Abhinavagupta's ĪPV ad I 1, 4, as we have seen, p. 46), the *bhāva*s of the *bhāvavrāta* denote the objects of experience (apparently external and internal) that are "blue" (and "pleasure," according to the pan-Indian definition).[72] Hence, the so-called materiality of the empirical world is at stake – which is the point of departure for Jayaratha's demonstration of what is, in Śaiva doctrine, the ultimate reality: the non-duality of the subject and the object.

For its part (see the Sanskrit text quoted immediately above), the *Locana* limits the notion of *bhāva*(s) to the class of entities, apparently insentient, which are called *vibhāva*s, "determinants" or "stimulants" in aesthetic theory. The examples given by Abhinavagupta, the garden (*udyāna*) or moonrise (*indūdaya*), belong to the subcategory named *uddīpanavibhāva*s, "inflaming causes." The *uddīpanavibhāva*s arouse such and such *vyabhicāribhāva*s, "transitory

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72   See (Appendix-1) TĀV I 332: *he bhāvavrāta nīlādyartha*[*ḥ*]. "Blue" [or "yellow" (*pīta*), etc.] is the standard example of the external form grasped by the sense-organs, whereas *sukha*, "pleasure," is that of the internal, grasped by the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Therefore, the syntagm *nīlasukhādi* represents the "knowable" (*vedya*), or "objectivity" insofar as it is an object of consciousness, whether external or internal. Such reasonings are common to Buddhist idealists and to the Trika, even though the latter (see SpK I 4) reaches the opposite conclusion: the existence of a permanent Subject, a substratum for the impermanent, incidental experiences of pleasure and pain, etc.

affects." In other words, as taught in the *rasasūtra* (*Nāṭyaśāstra* VI),[73] a given combination of *vibhāva*s (or "determinants"), *anubhāva*s (or "consequents") and *vyabhicāribhāva*s ("transitory affects"), constitutive of a given *sthāyibhāva*, "permanent affect" (although the *sthāyibhāva* is not mentioned in the *rasasūtra*), culminates in the advent of a given *rasa*.[74]

For this very reason, not all *vibhāva*s are a source of delight, as Abhinavagupta underlines it (here and at other places),[75] since the same garden and the same moonrise are capable of arousing two opposite emotions, nostalgia or exultation, according to the condition of the lover who contemplates them, that is, according to the emotional status of the *ālambanavibhāva*, the "substantial cause" that is the hero himself – whether he is sepatated from (*virahin*) his

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[73] *Nāṭyaśāstra* VI, *rasasūtra,* vol. I, pp. 271ff.: *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ*, "*rasa* is the result of the combination of 'determinants,' 'consequents' and 'transitory affects.'"

[74] On all these categories and the way they contribute to the whole of the aesthetic process, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 109-117; 1992a, pp. 141-145. On *ālambanavibhāva*s and *uddīpanavibhāva*s, see below, n. 75; also BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 113, 1992a, pp. 141-142; and, in this volume, D. Shulman's paper.

[75] *Abhinavabhāratī* ad *Nāṭyaśāstra* VI, *rasasūtra*, vol. I, p. 282 (including the corrections made by GNOLI 1968, p. 20): *tatrānubhāvānāṃ vibhāvānāṃ vyabhicārināṃ ca pṛthak sthāyini niyamo nāsti | bāṣpāder ānandākṣirogādijatvadarśanāt | vyāghrādeś ca krodhabhayādihetutvāt śramacintāder utsāhabhayādyanekasahacaratvāvalokanāt | sāmagrī tu na vyabhicāriṇī | tathā hi bandhuvināśo yatra vibhāvaḥ paridevitāśrupātādis tv anubhāvaś cintādainyādiś ca vyabhicārī so 'vaśyaṃ śoka eveti*. "The *anubhāva*s, *vibhāva*s, *vyabhicārin*s, taken separately, are not restricted to a particular *sthāyin*, as one sees, for instance, tears caused by happiness or an eye disease; since, for instance, a tiger may create anger or fear; since one notices that fatigue and restlessness can accompany more than one *sthāyin*, such as ardour or fear. However, any given combination [of these three factors] is necessarily associated to one specific *sthāyin* [lit. "does not deviate from the *sthāyin*."] Thus, when the death of a relative is the "determinant," when lamentations and tears are the "consequents," when anxiety and despondency are the "transitory affects," it is necessarily the [*sthāyin* that is] sorrow which is at stake." Such psychological considerations are so widespread as to be almost conventions, or *topoi*, as shown, for instance, by Gauḍapāda's commentary ad SK 12: a beautiful and virtuous woman (here an *ālambanavibhāva*) is a source of joy to all, but a source of sorrow to her co-wives and of stupefaction to passionate beings; a dharmic king (also an *ālambanavibhāva*) inspires happiness in the good and unhappiness in the wicked; clouds (an *uddīpanavibhāva*), although inanimate, generate joy in the world, when they bring rain and thus urge the ploughman to plough, but they produce stupefaction in separated lovers (... *meghāḥ... jagataḥ sukham utpādayanti te vṛṣṭyā karṣakāṇāṃ karṣaṇodyogaṃ janayanti virahiṇāṃ moham*).

beloved or not (CSS ed., p. 128: ... *sa ca pratyuta kasyacid virahiṇa autsukyacintādūyamānamānasatām anyasya praharṣaparavaśatāṃ karotīti...*).[76]

This is how the essential features of Indian aesthetic and dramatic theory come through in the exegesis Abhinavagupta proposes for the expressed meaning of his own stanza.

The *Locana* thus presents the same scheme of interpretation as does the TĀV, namely, the exploitation of the dramatic analogy, but at the cost of a slight shift from the evocation of Śakti, the divine actress, to that of the *vibhāva*s and their "powers."

It is nonetheless possible to recognize the figure of the deity as an actor/actress, in a more subtle way, under the web of meanings that implies, in a Śaiva context, the metaphoric notion of *hṛdaya*, the Heart – in other words the supreme and unique principle of phenomenal manifestation. I shall come back to this.

For this is not all. Such an aesthetic interpretation of the *bhāvavrāta* is subordinated to a superior ambition, of a philosophical order.

As is the case in the TĀV, the *Locana* wants to show that it is wrong to ascribe the status of an insentient, therefore stupid, entity to phenomenal diversity. This is demonstrated by the fact that those *bhāva*s, understood as apparently insentient *vibhāva*s (here *uddīpanavibhāva*s), have a complete and irresistible (*haṭhāt*) hold over the ordinary man. Thus the dramatic metaphor is again entirely applicable here. These all-powerful *vibhāva*s cause men (the hearts of men) to play as they wish, as does an actor (*haṭhād eva lokaṃ yathecchaṃ vikārakāraṇābhir nartayati*). They are the source of men's emotions. They move them. One thinks of Zola's statement in *La faute de l'Abbé Mouret* : "Ils cédèrent aux exigences du jardin" – "They gave in to the demands of the garden." There is nothing more sentient, more sensible and more intelligent than these *vibhāva*s.

Here, Abhinavagupta introduces an amazing development, in the form of a digression, about the "heart" (*hṛdaya*) of the *bhāva*s, which, in his first comment of the text, he had described as the "wordly objects" of the *bhāvavrāta*, the "totality" of them; here however *bhāva* is understood in the limited sense of the *vibhāva*s of the *uddīpana* category, i.e. gardens, moonrises and so on.

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[76] Compare Ingalls' analysis, below, p. 64.

> *... na ca tasya hṛdayaṃ kenāpi jñāyate kīdṛg ayam iti, pratyuta mahāgam-*
> *bhīro 'tividagdhaḥ suṣṭhugarvahīno 'tiśayena krīḍācaturaḥ...*

The ordinary man does not know anything about their hearts, since he is still unaware that they have one, whereas he allows himself a heart, convinced that he is a *sahṛdaya*, "endowed with a heart." However, the Śaiva thinker and mystic knows well that the object also is "endowed with a heart."

The passage in which Abhinavagupta describes that heart, which he has the privilege to know, is of great beauty, perhaps also by virtue of its paradoxical character. That heart is "most deep" (*mahā-gambhīra*), "very intelligent" (*atividagdha*), "entirely devoid of conceit" (*suṣṭhugarvahīna*) – the conceit, *abhimāna*, that characterizes the common man who claims to be a *sahṛdaya* – and "skillful at play" (*krīḍācatura*). In the final analysis, it means that the object is not different from consciousness, hence, not different from Śiva, himself "most deep," etc., and "skillful at play," just like an actor. We have come full circle.

Let us observe also that Abhinavagupta undoubtedly understands the present participle *nartayan* as a fullfledged causative that governs *janasya hṛdayāni* in the stanza[77] – he comments on "*haṭhāj janasya hṛdayāni nartayan*" of his verse as: "*haṭhād eva lokaṃ yathe-cchaṃ vikārakāraṇābhir nartayati*."

The "whole of things" (here understood as the totality of the *vi-bhāva*s) *causes* the hearts of men *to play*, just as it deceives or dupes them, making them feel the entire range of emotions. This is the reason why I propose, in this context, a slightly different translation of the stanza, of which I give only the first hemistich here:

> O whole of things [such as the "determinants" that are gardens or moon-rise]! Since, hiding your heart that is the Self [as does an actor], you play, while you forcibly grab hold of the hearts of men, by causing them to enact (*nartayan*) the variety of [emotional] modes,[78] he who calls you unconscious is himself unconscious, etc. [...]"

The preeminence of suggestion (the evocation of the *jīvanmukta*) does not prevent the expressed meaning from being tightly coherent

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[77] Contrary to Jayaratha, who understands it as a kind of denominative; see above, p. 41.

[78] Lit., "by causing them to enact (*nartayan*) through the variety of [emotional] modes...", unless one considers the instrumental as being the complement of means applying to the gerund *ākramya*.

and articulated. It is even a *sine qua non* condition for establishing a term-by-term correspondence between what suggests and what is suggested. The stanza is indeed built on an *aprastutapraśaṃsā* of the third category, that of the relationship of similarity between the non-pertinent and the pertinent; yet, if one follows Ānandavardhana and his exegete, since the aesthetic balance is tilted towards the suggested meaning, it is not the mere figure of speech known as "*aprastutapraśaṃsā*," but a case of *vastudhvani*. The following chart shows the symetry of the two meanings (denoted and suggested; non-pertinent and pertinent):

BHĀVAVRĀTA: THE *APRASTUTA*	*JĪVANMUKTA*: THE *PRASTUTA*
ātmahṛdayaṃ pracchādya (in the verse)	*svātmānaṃ pracchādayan*
The series of epithets qualifying the heart of the *bhāvavrāta*: "very deep," "very intelligent"... (in the exegesis of the verse)	*gāḍhavivekāloka°*...
"skillful at play" (*krīḍācatura*) in the exegesis of the verse + *haṭhāj janasya hṛdayāni... nartayan* (in the verse) and *haṭhād eva lokaṃ yathecchaṃ vikārakāraṇābhir nartayati* (in the exegesis of the verse)	*lokaṃ vācālayan*
The consequence being that such *bhāva*s are regarded as insentient and foolish, and despised for it: *jaḍo 'yam iti... bhāvo lokenāvajñāyate...* (in the exegesis of the verse)	With the same consequence: *tenaiva lokena mūrkho 'yam iti yad avajñāyate*

I leave aside the rest of the exegesis (see complete text in Appendix-2) that focusses on the paradoxical mockery, already emphasized in the TĀV, by means of which the accusation of insentience made

against phenomenal diversity discredits the accuser, who is in his turn accused of being more than stupid:

> ... *sa yadi lokena jaḍa iti tata eva kāraṇāt pratyuta vaidagdhyasambhāva-nanimittāt sambhāvitaḥ | ātmā ca yata eva kāraṇāt pratyuta jāḍyena sam-bhāvyas tata eva sahṛdayaḥ sambhāvitas tad asya lokasya jaḍo 'sīti yad ucyate tadā jāḍyam* [*jāḍyam* corr. : *jaḍyam* CSS ed.] *evaṃvidhasya bhā-vavrātasyāvidagdhasya prasiddham iti sā pratyuta stutir iti | jaḍād api pā-pīyān ayaṃ loka iti dhvanyate |*

Moreover, in the reversal of blame into praise, the dichotomy of subject and object dissolves.

Indeed, I am tempted to say, distancing myself from Ānandavar-dhana's theory and Abhinavagupta's exegesis, that in the *Locana* it is not only the suggested meaning which is *camatkārakārin*, but the articulation of both the suggested and expressed meanings. By means of this articulation, the deceived spectator – namely, the com-mon man who is the subject of the directly expressed meaning (as also analyzed in the TĀV) – and the emancipated spectator[79] – namely, the *jīvanmukta* evoked through the suggested meaning un-veiled in the *Locana* – are turned into symmetrical figures, actually mirroring one another.[80]

Thus my interpretation differs from that of Ingalls, who does not seem to have understood who that *mahāpuruṣa* really is, except when, almost without realizing it, he identifies the *mahāpuruṣa* as a Pāśupata, basing himself on the sole evidence of the syntagm *lokaṃ vācālayan* ("making people speak") which qualifies the *mahāpuru-ṣa*. According to Ingalls, this *mahāpuruṣa* deliberately makes ordi-nary men talk about him, seeking to arouse their disapproval, as a provocative Pāśupata will do.[81]

Ingalls shows his uneasiness, or even his irritation, in his note (n. 4, pp. 163-164), which seems to miss the point, if only for the reason that he refers to a "second meaning" without identifying it explicitly:

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[79] Phrase borrowed from the title of RANCIÈRE 2008, although Rancière's pers-pective is different.

[80] See BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 55-56.

[81] INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 164: "But the great man does conceal his thoughts. His causing the tongues of men to wag, in the case of the Pāśupatas and I dare say of any Tantrics, was a premeditated instigation of reproach" – and, for that, Ingalls refers to INGALLS 1962. See also J. Törzsök's contribution to this vol-ume.

What is one to make of Abhinava's account of his own verse ? The literal meaning of the stanza is not difficult. "Men who decry, as do the non-Tantric philosophers, the delights of love and of the senses, calling them brute pleasures, are really stupider than the pleasure they run down. So I will not copy them by calling names. To call them stupid would be to compliment them." Now it is true that the literal meaning is impossible from the realistic point of view [...]. Neither garden nor moonrise, being insentient, actually makes the heart dance, nor do they conceal their own heart, for they have none. So one is forced to look for a second meaning. To pass to that second meaning is more difficult. Abhinavagupta has thrown what seems to me a needless stumbling block in our way by the discrepancy between the plurality of delights (or stimulants, *bhāvavrāta*) and the singularity of the great man (*mahāpuruṣa*).[82]

I would object to Ingalls' observations that i) the *Locana* asserts that those insentient objects do have a heart and ii) there is no discrepancy between a plural and a singular, since the term *bhāvavrāta* is a neuter singular, working as a collective name.

In any case, it seems to me that one can give credit to Abhinavagupta. Exegete of the *Dhvanyāloka* and author of several fundamental texts of his school, he knows what he wants to say, and his exegesis is perfectly articulated. Needless to say, one is free not to always agree with Abhinavagupta's position. Nevertheless, in my view, the question is not whether we agree or not with Abhinavagupta's interpretation, but how to understand and convey it as that of an important witness, testifying, not only to a given current of thought at a given time, but also to the way that thought results from previous debates. Hence it seems necessary to try to understand Abhinavagupta's sometimes intricate thought.

Moreover – would it be an irrefutable argument?[83] – he, *as author of the stanza*, certainly knows best what he speaks of. He is surely the most authorized to know the *tātparya*, the author's intention.

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[82] My emphasis.

[83] For there is scope as well for an antagonist position, as hold by the Telugu *cāṭu* verse mentioned to me by David Shulman in a private correspondence – a very contemporary position, indeed, quite in tune with the theory of literature: 'The beauties of a poem,/ are best known by a critic./ What does the author knows ?/ The beauties of a woman are known/ only to her husband./ What does a father know?/'. Yet such emphasis on the preeminent role of the reader (a *sahṛdaya* compared to a husband), the Telugu verse is less radical than the view expressed by Mallarmé (*Quant au livre*), who goes so far as to deny any hermeneutic authority to both author and reader: "Impersonnifié, le volume, autant qu'on s'en

As to Ingalls' interpretation of our stanza, I would add that it is a bit hasty to liken those *bhāva*s that are *vibhāva*s to "delights" alone – which contradicts both the theory expounded in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and the *Locana* itself: not all *vibhāva*s are a source of delight, as we have seen (see above, p. 59).

Thus it seems to me that Ingalls goes astray when he suggests that the stanza refers to a liberation to be obtained by the path of *bhoga,* "enjoyment." Rather, in my view, and in the light of Abhinavagupta's self-exegesis, the stanza implicitly refers to the kind of *mukti* which is *jīvanmukti*, a central notion in Kashmirian non-dualist Śaivism.[84] After all, Abhinavagupta's point of view is that of the Trika, not of the Pāśupata doctrine.

At the end, let us reconsider a question of chronology. Pandey asserted that Abhinavagupta's philosophical works predated his aesthetic texts, his main reason being a reference to the TĀ in the *Locana.* Ingalls (p. 32) refutes Pandey's opinion by showing that this so-called reference to the TĀ is in fact a corrupt reading: the correct reading, according to Ingalls, is *Tattvāloka* instead of *Tantrāloka*. In any case, however we resolve the question of the reading, the stanza under examination ("*bhāvavrāta*, etc.") proves that Abhinavagupta cites his own TĀ, which thus must be prior to his *Locana*. For it would be difficult to reverse the reasoning, namely, that a stanza, composed ad hoc by Abhinavagupta for his commentary on *Dhvanyāloka*, would have been reused in the TĀ, in such a manner as to fit so perfectly into it.[85]

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sépare comme auteur, ne réclame approche de lecteur. Tel, sache, entre les accessoires humains, il a lieu tout seul : fait, étant. Le sens enseveli se meut et dispose, en chœur, des feuillets." ("Disembodied, the book, inasmuch as the author detaches himself from it, does not require a reader's approach. Thus of all human accessories, it happens by itself: once made, there it is. Know: the buried meaning is moving and altogether arranges the pages.").

[84]   On *jīvanmukti* as the main goal and concern of the non-dualist Śaiva doctrine, see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 32-37.

[85]   Isabelle Ratié has suggested (personal communication) that the huge TĀ might not have been composed in one go but that here and there Abhinavagupta might have incorporated parts of his early works, possibly including one that contained the *bhāvavrāta* stanza; see, for instance, RATIÉ 2011, p. 329, about the existence of an early *Bhedavādavidāraṇa*, now lost, of which a segment of Chapter 10 of the TĀ seems to be a paraphrasis. Obviously one cannot be categorical on this.

3. *DHVANYĀLOKAVṚTTI* III 40[86] AND *LOCANA* THERE-ON,[87] OR FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF THE *DHVANI*

Allow me a last point: the text which David Shulman has given to this volume mainly deals with the *Dhvanyāloka* theory of subordinate suggestion and considers as well the symmetrical case of subordinate denotation and enhanced suggestion. In a post-script, the paper refers, apropos *Dhvanyālokavṛtti* III 40, to Dharmakīrti's two stanzas cited and commented by Ānandavardhana (CSS ed., pp. 487-490; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 625-626) – which announce the autobiographical verse he gives in his *vṛtti* ad III 43: *yā vyāpā-ravatī...* (CSS ed., pp. 507-510; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 653; see D. Shulman's contribution to this volume).

In effect, *Dhvanyāloka* III 40[88] and its *vṛtti* give Ānandavardhana an opportunity to come back to the *aprastutapraśaṃsā*, in this case the *aprastutapraśaṃsā* belonging to the same category as the one which characterizes our stanza, that is, an *aprastutapraśaṃsā* based on the similarity of *prastuta* and *aprastuta* (CSS ed., pp. 487-489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 625-626).

Here is the first stanza (a *śārdūlavikrīḍita*) ascribed to Dharma-kīrti,[89] which Ānandavardhana quotes in support of his demonstration:

> *lāvaṇyadraviṇavyayo na gaṇitaḥ kleśo mahān arjitaḥ*
> *svacchandaṃ carato janasya hṛdaye cintājvaro nirmitaḥ* |
> *eṣāpi svayam eva tulyaramanābhāvād varākī hatā*

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[86] CSS ed., pp. 483-494; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 624-634.

[87] CSS ed., pp. 483-494; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 628-631, 634-635.

[88] The text of the *kārikā* is given below, p. 68.

[89] As pointed out by Isabelle Ratié (personal communication), modern philology considers that the first stanza is only "hypothetically ascribed to Dharmakīrti" (see STCHERBATSKY 1930-1932, vol. I, pp. 35-36), since it is nowhere to be found in any of Dharmakīrti's known works, whereas the second stanza, which has long been well-known, appears in the reference edition of the *Pramāṇa-vārttika* by Miyasaka (see PV, *Parārthānumāna* 286). That the first stanza should only be "hypothetically ascribed to Dharmakīrti" seems to have been a point of contention at the time of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta: in his *vṛtti*, Ānanda describes it as "commonly ascribed to Dharmakīrti" (see below) whereas for Abhinavagupta it is "indubitably (*nirvivāda*) [the work of Dharma-kīrti]". However, it is obvious that for both the two stanzas are by Dharmakīrti, since this is the key argument in their demonstration that the second stanza is a direct expression of the first, itself a case of *dhvani*.

ko 'rthaś cetasi vedhasā vinihitas tanvyās tanuṃ tanvatā ‖

Since David Shulman has translated this intricate (and somewhat enigmatic) stanza,[90] I will only summarize its meaning: what was the creator's/Brahman's goal when he formed such a matchless girl? For, not only have such perfections created a feverish anxiety in the hearts of men, but the girl herself, not having found a lover worthy of her, is left to languish, unrecognized and unattended.

Ānandavardhana, in his *vṛtti* (*loc. cit.*, CSS ed., pp. 487-488), reveals the suggested meaning to be read beneath the expressed one, which is described as highly implausible: such words can neither be those of a lover (*rāgin* – since a lover could not regard himself as inferior to his beloved) nor of the symmetrical figure of the ascetic (*nīrāga* – since love and beauty are none of his concerns).[91]

And Ānandavardhana concludes (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 625):

> ... *tasmād aprastutapraśaṃseyam | yasmād anena vācyena guṇībhūtātmanā nissāmānyaguṇāvalepādhmātasya nijamahimotkarṣajanitasamatsarajanajvarasya viśeṣajñam ātmano na kañcid evāparaṃ paśyataḥ paridevitam etad iti prakāśyate |*

> Therefore, it must be an *aprastutapraśaṃsā*, for by the subordination of the literal sense there appears [the suggestion] of a lament (*paridevita*) by a man puffed up with pride in his uncommon talents (*nissāmānyaguṇa°*), on seeing that others fail to recognize his qualities (*viśeṣajñam ātmano na kañcid evāparaṃ paśyataḥ*) because he has fired their jealousy by the degree of his brilliance (*nijamahimotkarṣa°*).[92]

Thus is the *aprastutapraśaṃsā* clearly established. Moreover, according to the theorization and examplification at work in the *vṛtti* ad *Dhvanyāloka* I 13, that particular use of the *aprastutapraśaṃsā*

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[90] See his contribution to this volume: "It was a huge effort, and he spared no expense./ A hungry fire now burns in the hearts of men/ who were happy before./ And as for her, poor girl, she's left to languish/ because no lover could ever/ be her equal. So what was God thinking/ when he turned his mind/ to fashioning her body?"

[91] On this important factor of the plausibility of the *aprastuta*, see above, p. 50. Nevertheless, Abhinavagupta ad loc. (CSS ed., p. 488; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 630-631) – *nanu ca rāgino 'pi...* – raises possible objections to this line of argument, but only to explain the reason why Ānandavardhana in his *vṛtti* unveils the implicit meaning of Dharmakīrti's verse.

[92] Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 626, with my suppletions.

in Dharmakīrti's first stanza should constitute a case of *dhvani*, in the manner of the stanza "*bhāvavrāta*, etc.": in both cases, the suggested meaning prevails over the literal sense.

Nevertheless, here (*Dhvanyāloka* III 40, with its *vṛtti*), Ānandavardhana's point about the status of the *aprastutapraśaṃsā* is not explicitly stated, for *Dhvanyāloka* III 40 adopts a somewhat different perspective, which is that of subordinate suggestion, and refers to *dhvani* in this context alone:

> *prakāro 'yaṃ guṇībhūtavyaṅgyo 'pi dhvanirūpatām* |
> *dhatte rasāditātparyaparyalocanayā punaḥ* ‖

> This type of poetry also, where the suggestion is subordinated, may take on the nature of *dhvani* when regarded from the viewpoint of its final meaning, if that meaning is *rasa*, etc.[93]

Yet, in the course of his demonstration (CSS ed., pp. 486-487; IN-GALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 625), Ānandavardhana comes to deal with a more general statement, which invites the *sahṛdaya* to distinguish between the three areas of i) mere rhetoric, namely, the figures of speech, ii) *dhvani* and iii) subordinate suggestion (*guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*):

> *vācyavyaṅgyayoḥ prādhānyāprādhānyaviveke paraḥ prayatno vidhāta-vyaḥ, yena dhvaniguṇībhūtavyaṅgyayor* [*dhvaniguṇībhūtavyaṅgyayor* corr. : *dhvanir guṇībhūtavyaṅgyayor* CSS ed.] *alaṅkārāṇāṃ cāsaṅkīrṇo viṣayaḥ sujāto bhavati* |

It is in that general context that Ānandavardhana cites Dharmakīrti's first verse as a case of *dhvani* (although the term *dhvani* is not mentioned, it is undoubtedly what Ānandavardhana means, since he shows that the literal sense is subordinated to the suggested one), and not as a case of a mere ("pure" – *śuddha* – as stated by Abhinavagupta thereon) *alaṃkāra*.[94] Moreover, the force of the previous definitions (*vṛtti* ad *Dhvanyāloka* I 13; see CSS ed., pp. 125-132; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 158-165 and above, pp. 49ff.) allows the

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[93] *Dhvanyāloka* III 40 (transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 624).

[94] *Locana* ad *vṛtti* on III 40 (CSS ed., p. 486; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 629): *yatra vyaṅgyaṃ nāsty eva tatra teṣāṃ śuddhānāṃ prādhānyam* |. "Where there is no suggested element at all, the predominance is of pure figures of speech." (Transl. Ingalls et al.)

reader of the *Dhvanyāloka* to come to the conclusion that Dharma-kīrti's stanza, as an *aprastutapraśaṃsā*, is indeed a case of *vastu-dhvani*.

This is confirmed by Abhinavagupta who, in his turn, goes even farther in demonstrating the soundness of Ānandavardhana's exege-sis: Dharmakīrti's first stanza, being an example of *aprastutapra-śaṃsā* in which the suggested meaning is made predominant, is to be seen as a case of *dhvani* (as in the stanza "*bhāvavrāta*, etc."). Commenting on *kārikā* 40, he observes in the first place (CSS ed., p. 483; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 628):

etad eva nirvāhayan kāvyātmatvaṃ dhvaner eva paridīpayati |

Carrying this line of argument to its conclusion, he [Ānanda] brings into full light the doctrine that *dhvani* is the soul of poetry. (Transl. Ingalls et al.)

For, as emphasized by Abhinavagupta, Ānandavardhana's *vṛtti* makes clear that the accomplished yet neglected girl is none other than the metaphoric transposition of a man immensely talented yet entirely misunderstood as such. Methodically, Abhinavagupta re-lates each of the four notions forged by Ānandavardhana with each of the four *pāda*s of the verse in order to show a term-by-term cor-respondence between the denoted meaning (which is anyway *apra-stuta*) and the suggested meaning (which is *prastuta*).

Thus, the four *pāda*s hint respectively at i) the uncommon per-fection (*nissāmānya*) of that great man, *for which the creator has spared no effort, nor expenses* (*pāda* 1); ii) his extreme brilliance (*nijamahimā*), *of which other men are jealous* (= *pāda* 2); iii) there-fore, due to this very jealousy, the non-recognition of his merits (*vi-śeṣajñam* [*ātmano na kañcid evāparaṃ paśyataḥ*]), which turns his glory into *a miserable fate* (= *pāda* 3: *vārakī hatā*, with the necessary transposition of the expressed feminine to the suggested masculine); iv) the bitter lament (*paridevita*) of such a man, *who rebels against the Creator himself* (= *pāda* 4: *ko 'rthaś cetasi vedhasā...*).[95] This shows that the suggested meaning is to be considered as prevalent.

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[95] *Locana* (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 630): *nissāmānyeti nijamahi-meti viśeṣajñam iti paridevitam ity etaiś caturbhir vākyakhaṇḍaiḥ krameṇa pā-dacatuṣṭayasya tātparyaṃ vyākhyātam |*. "By the four sentence-elements *niḥsā-mānya* (uncommon), *nijamahimā* (his brilliance), *viśeṣajñam* [*na paśyataḥ*] ([seeing that others fail] to recognize his qualities), and *paridevitam* (a lament), our author explains the [suggested] meaning of each successive line in the stan-za." (Transl. Ingalls et al.) Compare Ānandavardhana's analysis, above, p. 67.

Let us come back to the *vṛtti*. Ānandavardhana (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 625-626) immediately validates his interpretation by means of a second stanza by Dharmakīrti, which, according to him, directly expresses the suggested meaning of the first, namely the bitter and candid complaint of a man considering himself a misunderstood genius – and, what is more, that complaint is that of Dharmakīrti himself, speaking in the first person:

> *tathā cāyaṃ dharmakīrteḥ śloka iti prasiddhiḥ | sambhāvyate ca tasyaiva |*
> *yasmāt –*
> *anadhyavasitāvagāhanam analpadhīśaktināpy adṛṣṭaparamārthatattvam*
> *adhikābhiyogair api |*
> *mataṃ mama jagaty alabdhasadṛśapratigrāhakaṃ prayāsyati payonidheḥ*
> *paya iva svadehe jarām ||*
> *ity anenāpi ślokenaivaṃvidho 'bhiprāyaḥ prakāśita eva |*

> Moreover, the [first] verse is commonly ascribed to Dharmakīrti and this is just as one might expect, for in the [following] other verse he reveals the same (*evaṃvidha*) intention (*abhiprāya*):[96]
> No one in this world
> has fathomed my thought.
> Even the best minds that engaged with it
> with all their strength
> failed to see my truth.
> Not even one worthy reader
> really got it.
> Like water in the ocean,
> my ideas will grow old
> inside my body.[97]

Therefore, not only does the second stanza work as an exegesis of the first, but it is a self-exegesis, hence unquestionable (*nirvivāda°*), as says Abhinavagupta in his *Locana* thereon.

For Abhinavagupta again supports Ānandavardhana's demonstration (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 630). It is in order to contradict a fancied objector asking: "what proof is there of this interpretation?", and again: "what if the stanza *is* [commonly ascribed to Dharmakīrti]?", that "with this in mind, he [Ānanda] shows the meaning of *this* stanza [the first one] by means of the meaning

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[96]   Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 625.

[97]   The meter is *pṛthivī*. Transl. D. Shulman (see his contribution to this volume).

furnished by *that* [other] verse [the second one], which is indubitably [the work of Dharmakīrti]."[98]

By quoting the two stanzas of Dharmakīrti, Ānandavardhana thus gives, so to speak, the "proof by author," even though here the exegete and the author called in to help are two – himself and Dharmakīrti. So does Abhinavagupta with the "*bhāvavrāta*" stanza, in his *Locana* ad I 13, and all the more convincingly so since the author of the commentary and that of the stanza are one and the same person.

Then, commenting on the *evaṃvidho 'bhiprāyaḥ* of the *vṛtti* on the second stanza, Abhinavagupta (CSS ed., p. 490; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 631) offers a very lucid interpretation of the respective ultimate issues of the two stanzas, showing that the first stanza belongs to the *dhvani* register, the second to that of the *alaṃkāra*s. Moreover he gives a stunning description of the *dhvani* process that makes us fully grasp in which way the *aprastutapraśaṃsā* he quoted in I 13 ("*bhāvavrāta*, etc.") is a case of *vastudhvani* – in other words, how *dhvani* is at work there, as it is at work here:

"evaṃvidha" iti | paridevitaṃ viṣaya ity arthaḥ | iyati cārthe aprastuta-praśaṃsopamālakṣaṇam alaṅkāradvayam | anantaraṃ tu svātmani visma-yadhāmatayādbhute viśrāntiḥ | parasya ca... svātmani kuśalakāritāpra-darśanayā dharmavīrasparśena vīrarase viśrāntir iti mantavyam |

By "the same [intention]," he means that the object [of the second stanza] is [explicitly] a "lament" [which gives the clue to the first one]. The literal sense so far [in Dharmakīrti's two stanzas] is a couple of figures, namely *aprastutapraśaṃsā* [in the first] and simile (*upamā*) [in the second]. But [in the case of the first stanza], immediately after [apprehending the figure of speech as an *aprastutapraśaṃsā*], there is [for the listener] repose in one's own self (*svātmani viśrāntiḥ*), that is, in the *adbhuta* [*rasa*], the "Marvelous," for he is filled with wonder (*vismaya*) [at the advent of the suggested meaning, which prevails on the literal]. As for the other [stanza], one should understand that there occurs [the listener's] repose in one's own self (*svātmani viśrāntiḥ*), that is, in the *vīrarasa*, the "Heroic," for [the stanza] is concerned with [lit., "is touched by"] the [subcategory of *vīrarasa* which is the] *dharmavīra*[*rasa*],[99] the heroic sentiment arising

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[98] *Locana* (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 630) – following): *nanv atrāpi kiṃ pramāṇam ity āśaṅkyāha – "tathā ceti" | nanu kiṃ iyatety āśaṅkya tadādā-yena nirvivādatadīyaślokārpitenāsyāśāyaṃ saṃvadati – "saṃbhāvyata iti" |.* (My translation.)

[99] Note the implicit play on words: Dharmakīrti is by his very name destined to incarnate the *dharmavīrarasa*, the heroic *rasa* based on observing *dharma*.

from *dharma*, by showing [Dharmakīrti's] benevolence [towards men to be instructed in the ultimate reality].[100]

However, it is noteworthy that the statement remains somewhat elliptical since, in this passage, Abhinavagupta does not explain (contrary to his exegesis of "*bhāvavrāta*, etc.") that, if the listener of Dharmakīrti's first stanza experiences the *adbhutarasa*, and thus *ātmaviśrānti*, it is due to that capacity of "creating wonderment" (*camatkārakāritva*) in the listener which characterizes the suggested meaning of the verse. For this very reason, the statement also implies that the suggested meaning prevails over the literal – a scheme that we have seen at play in the "*bhāvavrāta*" verse quoted in the *Locana* ad I 13, in which the emphasis was, however, put on the *dhvani* process rather than on the *rasa* process, as is the case here. Moreover, such an ellipsis is quite appropriate in connection with a commentary (ad III 40) that refers to *rasa*s (see the text above, p. 68).

Symmetrically, the second stanza is to be read as a mere figure of speech (an *upamā*, in which the *target* is Dharmakīrti himself, the *ground* the ocean, where the same water flows through water, endlessly and in vain), in which no suggested meaning is to be found and therefore, neither any predominance of a suggested meaning, nor any *dhvani*, but only a candidly direct expression of a lament. It nevertheless leads to the experience of a given *rasa*, here the *vīrarasa*.

Thus, my investigation has taken the paths of intertextuality and intratextuality. On the one hand, Abhinagagupta's *bhāvavrāta* stanza is reproduced by Bhāskara, several centuries later, whereas Jayaratha's TĀV quotes the full text of a stanza of which Abhinavagupta's ĪPVV gives only the first hemistich in a condensed form (see above, p. 39 and n. 13). On the other hand, the *bhāvavrāta* stanza, originally a part of the TĀ, is later on quoted by Abhinavagupta in

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Indeed Dharmakīrti, although he is in despair at being underestimated, does not swerve from his dharmic duty which is to enlighten men.

[100] My translation. It seems that Ingalls misses the point by failing to recognize the key notion of *ātmaviśrānti* in *svātmani... viśrāntiḥ*. Moreover the process of aestheticization which turns the *sthāyibhāva* named *vismaya* into the corresponding *rasa* called *adbhuta* is misunderstood; this is apparent in the awkwardness of Ingall's translation which seems to omit *svātmani*: "one becomes filled with amazement at the speaker himself, and so the aesthetic sense [of the reader] comes to rest in the *rasa* of wonder" (unless *svātmani* is rendered as "... with amazement *at the speaker himself*," which is not acceptable).

his *Locana* ad I 13, that too, with a self-exegesis rather different from that offered by Jayaratha. Thus a web of analogies, characteristic of all Sanskrit literature, and of Sanskrit exegetical literature in particular, has taken shape. In this respect, it is a happy coincidence that David Shulman's contribution to this volume and mine should enter into consonance with one another.

In conclusion, I would say that the question of *sahṛdayatā*, to be taken in its aesthetic as well as philosophical acceptation, has proved to be central in the whole discussion. It follows from comparing the TĀV with the *Locana* on the same stanza that the difference of interpretation has something to do with the "taste" of the listener, that is, with his degree of *sahṛdayatā* – itself, in Śaiva reasonings, the expression of one's sovereign freedom, *svātantrya*. Thus, one is free to consider the literal meaning as preeminent, like Jayaratha in support of the doctrinal (and polemical) point which he is making, or on the contrary, like Abhinavagupta, to regard the implicit sense as prevalent over the literal, thereby taking the reader into the ever-resounding domain of the *dhvani* and giving him access to an even deeper philosophical and spiritual meaning.

APPENDIX

1. TĀV ad I 332 (KSTS 23, pp. 305-307)

idānīm asya śāstrasya paraṃ gāmbhīryaṃ manyamāno granthakṛt, etadarthasatattvam ajānānair apy anyair anyathābodhena yatkiṃcit uttānam eva anyathā ucyate, tān prati aprastutapraśaṃsayā upahasitum āha –

> *bhāvavrāta haṭhāj janasya hṛdayāny ākramya yan nartayan bhaṅgībhir vividhābhir ātmahṛdayaṃ pracchādya saṃkrīḍase ǀ*
> *yas tvām āha jaḍaṃ jaḍaḥ sahṛdayaṃmanyatvaduḥśikṣito manye 'muṣya jaḍātmatā stutipadaṃ tvatsāmyasambhāvanāt ǁ*

*he bhāvavrāta nīlādyartha ǀ ātmano hṛdayaṃ tena ātmatathyaṃ rū-paṃ gopayitvā janasya **sarvasyaiva vādino** hṛdayāni āśayān balāt-kāreṇa ākramya –*

> *adyāsmān asataḥ kariṣyati sataḥ kiṃ nu dvidhā vāpy ayaṃ kiṃ sthāsnūn uta naśvarān uta mithobhinnān abhinnān uta ǀ*
> *itthaṃ sadvadanāvalokanaparair bhāvair jagadvartibhir manye maunani-ruddhyamānahṛdayair duḥkhena taiḥ sthīyate ǁ*

ityādisthityā vividhābhir bhaṅgībhiḥ nartayan yat saṃkrīḍase – na-
*ṭavat atāttvikena rūpeṇa samullasasi, ataḥ sa **sarvo vādī** asahṛda-*
yam api ātmānaṃ sahṛdayatvena manyamāno 'ta eva duḥśikṣito mi-
thyābhimānāt akiṃciñjñaḥ, tvāṃ bhāvavrātam, jaḍam – acetanam
*āha, ato 'smābhir utprekṣyate – yat **amuṣya vādino** vastutaś caita-*
nyasvabhāvena bhavatā yat sāmyaṃ tasya sambhāvanāt bhāvavatt-
tvam eva jaḍātmā iti yady ucyate sā asya nindāsthāne stutiḥ | bhāvā-
nāṃ hi vastutaś caitanyam eva rūpam acetyamānatve hi teṣāṃ na
kiṃcidrūpaṃ syāt, atas tad eva ye na jānate te jaḍebhyo 'pi jaḍāḥ iti
kathaṃ ca teṣāṃ cetanātmakair bhāvaiḥ nindāparyavasāyi sāmyaṃ
syāt iti bhāvaḥ | evaṃ prakṛte 'pi asya granthasya yas tattvaṃ na
jānāti mā jñāsīt, pratyuta anyathāpi yatkiṃcana vakti ity asāv eva
jaḍo, na punar asya granthasya kaścid doṣaḥ ity arthaḥ ||

2. Locana ad Dhvanyālokavṛtti I 13

(CSS ed., pp. 127-128)

atra yady api sārūpyavaśena kṛtaghnaḥ kaścid anyaḥ prastuta ākṣi-
pyate, tathāpy aprastutasyaiva vetālavṛttāntasya camatkārakāri-
tvam | na hy acetanopālambhavad asambhāvyamāno 'yam artho na
ca na hṛdya iti vācyasyātra pradhānatā | yadi punar acetanādināty-
antāsambhāvyamānatadarthaviśeṣaṇenāprastutena varṇitena pra-
stutam ākṣipyamāṇaṃ camatkārakāri tadā vastudhvanir asau | yathā
mamaiva –

> *bhāvavrāta haṭhāj janasya hṛdayāny ākramya yan nartayan bhaṅgībhir*
> *vividhābhir ātmahṛdayaṃ pracchādya saṃkrīḍase |*
> *sa tvām āha jaḍaṃ tataḥ sahṛdayaṃmanyatvaduḥśikṣito manye 'muṣya ja-*
> *ḍātmatā stutipadaṃ tvatsāmyasambhāvanāt ||*

kaścin mahāpuruṣo vītarāgo 'pi sarāgavad iti nyāyena gāḍhavive-
kālokatiraskṛtatimirapratāno 'pi lokamadhye svātmānaṃ pracchā-
dayaṃl lokaṃ ca vācālayann ātmany apratibhāsam evāṅgīkurvaṃs
tenaiva lokena mūrkho 'yam iti yad avajñāyate tadā tadīyaṃ lokot-
taraṃ caritaṃ prastutaṃ vyaṅgyatayā prādhānyena prakāśyate | ja-
ḍo 'yam iti hy udyānendūdayādir bhāvo lokenāvajñāyate, sa ca pra-
tyuta kasyacid virahiṇa autsukyacintādūyamānamānasatām anyasya
praharṣaparavaśatāṃ karotīti haṭhād eva lokaṃ yathecchaṃ vikā-
rakāraṇābhir nartayati | na ca tasya hṛdayaṃ kenāpi jñāyate kīdṛg
ayam iti, pratyuta mahāgambhīro 'tividagdhaḥ suṣṭhugarvahīno 'ti-
śayena krīḍācaturaḥ sa yadi lokena jaḍa iti tata eva kāraṇāt pratyuta

vaidagdhyasambhāvananimittāt sambhāvitaḥ | ātmā ca yata eva kā-
raṇāt pratyuta jāḍyena sambhāvyas tata eva sahṛdayaḥ sambhāvitas
tad asya lokasya jaḍo 'sīti yad ucyate tadā jāḍyam[101] *evaṃvidhasya*
bhāvavrātasyāvidagdhasya prasiddham iti sā pratyuta stutir iti | ja-
ḍād api pāpīyān ayaṃ loka iti dhvanyate | tad āhā − "yadā tv" iti |
"itarathā tv" iti | itarathaiva punar alaṃkārāntaratvam alaṃkāravi-
śeṣatvaṃ na vyaṅgyasya kathaṃcid api prādhānya iti bhāvaḥ ||

3. ĪPK I 1, 4

tathā hi jaḍabhūtānāṃ pratiṣṭhā jīvadāśrayā |
jñānaṃ kriyā ca bhūtānāṃ jīvatāṃ jīvanaṃ matam ||

4. Bhāskarī ad ĪPV I 1, 4

antaryāmiśuddhacittattvavaśenendriyāṇāṃ sā śaktir astīti cet sa-
tyam, sarvatra tadvaśenaiva sāstīti sarvaṃ jaḍam evocyatām, aja-
ḍam eva veti kiṃ viśeṣakalpanābhiḥ | paramārthavicāre tu,

> *bhāvavrāta haṭhāj janasya hṛdayāny ākramya yan nartayan bhaṅgībhir*
> *vividhābhir ātmahṛdayaṃ pracchādya saṃkrīḍase |*
> *yas tvām āha jaḍaṃ svayaṃ sahṛdayaṃmanyatvaduḥśikṣito manye 'muṣya*
> *jaḍātmatā stutipadaṃ tvatsāmyasambhāvanāt ||*

iti nītyā sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ svarūpam api cinmayam eveti ekapra-
kāśavād eva sarvatra supratiṣṭhitaḥ | yas tu granthakṛtā viśeṣa uktaḥ
sasphuṭatvāsphuṭatvakṛtaḥ, athavā jaḍānām upadeśānahatvam ape-
kṣyaivam uktam iti na virodha ity alam |

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[101] Typo in CSS ed.: *jaḍyam.*

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Understanding Udbhaṭa:

The Invention of Kashmiri Poetics in the Jayāpīḍa Moment[*]

YIGAL BRONNER

According to the standard account of the Kashmiri school of literary theory and of the history of Sanskrit poetics more generally, the work of Ānandavardhana (c. 850), typically read together with that of his important commentator Abhinavagupta (c. 1000), is the tradition's only watershed. Whatever preceded it was primitive in comparison to Ānanda's sophisticated theory of suggestion and the nondualist inflection it received at Abhinava's hands, and everything that followed was a secondary formulation at best. This account is problematic even aside from its strong bias in favor of Kashmiri theorists, who never enjoyed the almost sacred aura that some Indologists grant them. Indeed, various misconceptions that mire our understanding of the evolution of literary thinking within Kashmir itself hinder a more accurate appreciation of its legacy. The purpose of this essay is to correct one such misconception and to show that, contrary to the prevailing view, the big breakthrough of Kashmiri poetics took place, or at the very least decisively began, a generation or two before Ānanda. This breakthrough was led by Udbhaṭa (c. 800) and, to a lesser extent, Vāmana, his colleague at the court of Jayāpīḍa (r. 776-807), and Rudraṭa, who must have followed them by no more than a couple of decades. It was during this important phase that all the building blocks of Ānanda's theory were introduced and Sanskrit poetics dramatically changed its course, as voices within the tradition testify. The genius of Ānanda's *Dhvanyāloka* (*Light on Suggestion*, henceforth DhvĀ), I argue, was in his perfect

combination of his predecessors' building blocks in a uniquely coherent and hence uniquely powerful – some would say too powerful – package or framework.

I should note that scholars have already realized several significant aspects of this thesis, even if strangely in isolation from one another, and I will highlight their insights in the course of my discussion. In this sense, this article may be read as a review essay that pieces together evidence from earlier works. From these and other evidentiary pieces, however, a new picture emerges, namely, that Sanskrit poetics underwent its pivotal turning point during Jayāpīḍa's reign and under Udbhaṭa's lead. It is this thinker whom Indologists have most misunderstood and neglected, partly, of course, because of the loss of the bulk of his corpus. But enough has been preserved or quoted to at least begin to understand his true impact.

1. THE JAYĀPĪḌA MOMENT AND THE ACADEMIZATION OF SANSKRIT POETICS

In an earlier essay I argued that from the vantage point of Kalhaṇa, Kashmir's towering twelfth-century chronicler, Jayāpīḍa's reign was seen as a defining moment in the kingdom's attitude to learning and the arts. Kalhaṇa describes Jayāpīḍa as inaugurating and personally overseeing a great intellectual renaissance and suggests that in doing so, he was trying to emulate the vast but short-lived political hegemony of Kashmir of his grandfather, Lalitāditya, with a cultural hegemony that was just as impressive and far more enduring. Moreover, I argued that central to this king's intellectual makeover was his investment in poetry and poetic theory. According to Kalhaṇa's account, which is unique in its wealth of details, the king appointed numerous poets laureate and even assigned some of them to high government posts. Indeed, the two highest offices went to the literary theorists who are the focus of this essay: Vāmana, who was made a minister or councilor to the king (*mantrin*), and Udbhaṭa, who was installed as the chief scholar in his assembly (*sabhāpati*), the highest academic placement in the kingdom. Kalhaṇa even mentions Udbhaṭa's astronomical remuneration in the only report in his chronicle of the wages paid to an academic: the extraordinary sum of 100,000 dinars per diem.[1]

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[1]   The description of Jayāpīḍa's cultural makeover is found in Kalhaṇa, *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (henceforth RT) 4.486-499, where 4.495 and 4.497 mention Udbhaṭa and Vāmana, respectively. For a discussion of this passage and its significance,

I do not think that I am reading too much into the text by suggesting that Kalhaṇa was consciously evoking here a dramatic change in the prestige and institutional support enjoyed by the study of poetry. In this connection, a comparison with his account of the relevant record of King Avantivarman (r. 855-883), under whose auspices Ānanda worked, is revealing. In three short verses Kalhaṇa reports that Śūra, Avantivarman's minister, made new appointments to the assembly, thereby causing the sciences to reappear in the country after a period of neglect; that these scholars received wealth and honor and were carried around in royal palanquins; and that four poets gained fame during Avantivarman's reign, one of whom was Ānanda.[2] There is no mention of poets being appointed to high cabinet posts, no word of the king's direct involvement in the project (or, indeed, of actually sponsoring Ānanda and his colleagues), and nothing to suggest that literary theory was the target of special attention. To judge from a comparison of Kalhaṇa's two passages, then, the Jayāpīḍa era plausibly represents a major turning point for Sanskrit poetics in Kashmir, while Avantivarman's reign marked a secondary and partial revival.

To realize why Kalhaṇa may have held this view, compare the state of Sanskrit poetics when it was entering the Jayāpīḍa moment with that of contemporary knowledge systems. By the close of the eighth century, many of Sanskrit's scientific disciplines and philosophical schools boasted long-standing and prestigious textual traditions. These traditions were usually well defined and well structured, so that new contributions were easily contextualized vis-à-vis an ancient core text and its established interpretations and in contrast to rival disciplines. In grammar, for instance, the triad of a core text by Pāṇini, a supplement by Vātsyāyana, and an authoritative, vast exposition by Patañjali had been in place since the beginning of the Common Era. In the field of Vedic hermeneutics (Mīmāṃsā), the seventh century CE witnessed a major rift between Kumārilabhaṭṭa, whose influence on poetics in the Jayāpīḍa moment I address later, and Prabhākara, both of whom expressed their views in expositions of Śabara's authoritative commentary (c. 400) on the foundational

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Sūtra by Jaimini (second century BCE). In the field of logic, the sixth century saw Uddyotakara's elucidation of Vātsyāyana's commentary (c. 450) on Akṣapada Gotama's core dicta (second century CE? The text's final redaction must have taken place later). The logicians and the Mīmāṃsakas often argued with one another (and occasionally with the grammarians), as well as with an equally long line of Buddhist thinkers. Thus, when Dharmakīrti in the seventh century presented his ideas on the nature of valid knowledge, he contrasted them with those of the logicians of Gotama's line while at the same time placing himself in a parallel Buddhist textual tradition by composing a commentary on the earlier work of Diṅnāga, naturally inviting later Buddhist thinkers to comment on his works.[3] Even discourses on more mundane and practical topics, such as statecraft, archery, architecture, and lovemaking, all had a claim by 750 CE to a core *sūtra* text, written in elliptical style and archaic language and often claiming a divine origin.[4] And although this cannot be documented in every case, it can be assumed that these academic disciplines came to enjoy regular support from royal courts throughout South Asia.[5]

Literature, by contrast, could lay claim to no comparable scholarly tradition. Despite centuries of composing and appreciating poems in literary gatherings, and despite a long-standing agreement about the nature of a core of poetic devices, by 750 CE this tradition possessed no more than a handful of manuals for aspiring poets. Two such works, Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṃkāra* (early or mid-seventh century, henceforth KAl) and Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa* (c. 700, henceforth KĀ), have survived, and we know of a handful of other such texts that are no longer extant.[6] But there was no foundational, au-

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[3]   Obviously, the organization of these discourses was not always so neat. Bhartṛhari's fifth-century treatise on the philosophy of language had close ties with grammar, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta but is not easily defined as belonging to any of these lines. Likewise, in grammar there were texts that competed with Pāṇini's for authority, and in Mīmāṃsā, Śabara "worked in a field where there were many rival interpreters of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*" (MCCREA 2013, p. 128). But such competition only serves to highlight the prestige of these academic disciplines.

[4]   On the ideology and structure of such *śāstra*s, see POLLOCK 1985. For a good discussion of the different kinds of *sūtra* texts, see HOUBEN 1997.

[5]   For a detailed discussion of royal investment in grammar, for instance, see POLLOCK 2006, pp. 162-184.

[6]   For the relative chronology of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, see BRONNER 2012.

thoritative text for this tradition, let alone a single learned commentary. The bulk of the discussion must have been oral, and the discussants were not professional *ālaṃkārika*s but poets and lay connoisseurs of the verbal art.[7] In short, this tradition was not a full-fledged academic discourse carried out by scholiasts, and it had nothing like the shelf space, patronage, respectability, and court visibility of its sibling disciplines.

All this changed rapidly and dramatically during the three decades of Jayāpīḍa's reign. First, note the marked shift in the pattern of institutional support enjoyed by literary experts, which, as we have seen, Kalhaṇa recorded; it is clear from his account that poetics is treated on a par with such senior and far more prestigious scholarly disciplines as grammar and logic. Second, there is the volume of production. The corpus of Vāmana's and Udbhaṭa's works alone is as large as all earlier works on poetics combined. This is primarily the result of the productivity of Udbhaṭa, who authored four works in the field.[8] Third, there is the change in the nature of the works produced. What these leading theorists of Jayāpīḍa's court were actively seeking to create was precisely a well-defined starting point necessary for an aspiring academic discipline, namely, a core text followed by a succession of commentaries. In fact, they produced two alternative and hence competing such beginnings. Udbhaṭa identified an existing text, Bhāmaha's KAl, as a worthy starting point and presented his work as expanding and continuing it. He thus composed an extensive scholastic commentary on Bhāmaha, the first such learned treatise in this tradition. Vāmana, by contrast, composed a *sūtra* text in clear imitation of Pāṇini's aphorisms and supplied them with a self-written commentary, surely hoping that additional subcommentaries would follow.

Even before I address the main innovations of these works, it is important to notice what immediately changed with the shift in

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[7] Bhāmaha's text, with its implied and at times expressed hostility to kings, does not give the impression of a work sponsored by a court (BRONNER 2009, pp. 182-184). Daṇḍin's work, however, was almost certainly produced at the Pallava court in Kanchipuram (BRONNER 2012, pp. 70-78).

[8] These are his short textbook, the KAlSS; his accompanying *Kumārasambhava*, a poem on the theme of the marriage of Śiva and Pārvatī that exemplifies the ornaments discussed in the textbook; his mostly lost *Vivaraṇa* on Bhāmaha; and his commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, now lost but amply quoted and unambiguously cited in later literature. It is arguable that the second of these is not an entirely independent work, but even so, the volume of production is entirely unprecedented in the earlier history of Sanskrit poetics.

genre and style. Udbhaṭa and Vāmana no longer presented their
works as meant for poets in the making, as Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin
had done before them.[9] Rather, they were writing for, and thereby
cultivating, a readership of fellow literary scholars. This meant,
among other things, a move from a writer-oriented perspective to a
reader-oriented one. Such a move is usually associated with Ānanda
or Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka,[10] but in fact, it originated in the Jayāpīḍa moment.

Think, in this context, of the question of illustrations. Bhāmaha
and Daṇḍin were, for the most part, content to make up their own
examples, which lent their manuals a consistent and easy style in the
simple *anuṣṭubh* meter and helped impart the art of poesy to aspiring
poets. Of course, educated readers could detect in these examples
echoes of famous couplets and art-prose passages, and some of the
illustrations were not without charm, Daṇḍin's in particular. Occa-
sionally, a real verse from the praxis also made its way into these
books.[11] But on the whole, the works of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin had,
by design, a textbookish texture. Things could not have been more
different in Jayāpīḍa's court. True, to accompany his *Kāvyālaṃkā-
rasārasaṃgraha* (henceforth KAlSS), a simpler work that presents
the gist of his worldview, Udbhaṭa produced a *Kumārasambhava*,
an entire poem made of illustrations in *anuṣṭubh* (although now with
their own narrative integrity). But his extensive *Vivaraṇa* was sim-
ply packed with examples that demonstrated how the theory applied
to actual poetic praxis. As K. Krishnamoorthy has shown, cited ex-
cerpts from the *Vivaraṇa* show that Udbhaṭa was engaged in close
reading and criticism of the very sort we find later in Ānanda and
Abhinava.[12] This new orientation toward the practice is, moreover,
clearly demonstrable even in the work's few surviving fragments,
as Biswanath Bhattacharya has shown in a series of short publica-
tions. Indeed, this was no secret in the tradition, as Ānanda and

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[9]   See, for example, Bhāmaha, KAl 6.3-4; Daṇḍin, KĀ 1.12.

[10]   See MCCREA 2008, pp. 220-259; and POLLOCK 2010.

[11]   These rare instances include Bhāmaha's example of *paryāyokta* (KAl 3.9; ori-
       ginally from the now-lost *Ratnāharaṇa*) and Daṇḍin's example of *utprekṣā* (KĀ
       2.224; the verse is found in both the *Mṛcchakaṭika* and the *Cārudatta*), both of
       which were originally in *anuṣṭubh*. Some illustrations, such as Daṇḍin's exam-
       ples of *yamaka*s, are in more complex meters and were possibly, even if unlike-
       ly, the work of another hand.

[12]   KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979b, pp. 310-311.

Abhinava were the first to acknowledge.[13] And Udbhaṭa was not alone. In his commentary on his own aphorisms, Vāmana made a point of giving extensive examples from a large variety of works with which his readers were familiar, called explicit attention to this feature of his work,[14] and clearly tried, like many subsequent writers, to choose examples that were popular or striking.

One result of this new textual practice was that, almost overnight, Sanskrit poetics produced its first official canon, showcasing luminaries such as Kālidāsa, Māgha, and Bhavabhūti, to mention only a few, and a sizable corpus of beautiful and memorable stanzas, many of which continued to be cited and anthologized time and again.[15] Even more significant is the change in the treatment that these verses received. The emphasis was no longer on the way poetry could be composed, as in the works of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, but on the processes through which it was cognized and appreciated, analyses that are crucial, as we shall see, to the attempts of Udbhaṭa and his colleagues to systematize their tradition and turn it into a respectable knowledge system. As Daniel Ingalls has aptly put it, "It was under King Jayāpīḍa that the school of literary criticism in Kashmir originated."[16]

2. STRIVING FOR SYSTEMATIZATION

The intellectual heritage of the early poetic tradition, that is, before the Jayāpīḍa moment, has nothing like a coherent conceptual system. The main analytic categories of flaws (*doṣa*), virtues (*guṇa*), and ornaments (*alaṃkāra*) were loosely connected through the metaphor of a poem's body, which they served to ornament, flaw, or be virtues of, but, as Edwin Gerow has noted, they seemed to require

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[13] See, for example, BHATTACHARYA 1978, for Udbhaṭa's supplementing of one of Bhāmaha's made-up examples for *yamaka* with one penned by Māgha (for more such studies, see n. 15). As for Ānanda, he refers to the fact that Udbhaṭa – the citation is anonymous, but Abhinava supplies the identification in his commentary on the passage – showed how *guṇavṛtti* operates in poetic practice (*amukhyavṛttyā kāvyeṣu vyavahāraṃ darśayatā*, [Abhinava:] *darśayatā bhaṭṭo-dbhaṭavāmanādinā*; Ānandavardhana, DhvĀ, pp. 31-32). I will come back to the implications of this quote.

[14] Vāmana, *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtrāṇi* (henceforth KAlSū) ad 4.3.33: *ebhir nidarśa-naiḥ svīyaiḥ parakīyaiś ca puṣkalaiḥ.*

[15] See BHATTACHARYA 1973 and BHATTACHARYA 1977, where at least fifteen later repetitions of an example cited by Udbhaṭa are recorded.

[16] INGALLS 1990, p. 5.

no universal theory.[17] Thus it was never entirely clear how these categories worked in relation to one another. What, for example, was the division of labor between ornaments and virtues, and how were virtues related to flaws? It was likewise not a priority rigorously to differentiate one category from another even within the discussion of ornaments, the topic that received the bulk of attention. Thus, Daṇḍin seems undisturbed by the fact that some of his examples for "dismissal" (*ākṣepa*) are remarkably similar to those he provides for "denial" (*apahnuti*).[18] Finally, the order in which ornaments were addressed was rather haphazard, so that similar devices were often grouped and discussed separately, without any apparent analytic criterion.

We should be careful not to overstate this seeming anarchy, both in absolute and relative terms. It is not as if Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin lacked aesthetic tenets altogether. Bhāmaha strongly believed that counterfactual speech (*vakrokti*), which he further modified as entailing intensification (*atiśaya*), is a criterion to which one should hold every ornament and every poem, and this sometimes led him to negate the aesthetic value of ornamental devices recognized by other thinkers if not entire poetic genres, whereas Daṇḍin had a more complex and holistic understanding of ornaments as disguising and revealing one another, even if this vision was never fully spelled out.[19] Likewise, the prestigious sciences, and especially the triad of grammar, Mīmāṃsā, and logic, had their own fair share of ad hoc procedures that resisted theorization, and the order in which topics were addressed in the core texts of these disciplines was also not always thematic. Pāṇini's *sūtra*s, where economy overrides other organizing criteria, are a particular case in point.

Still, the senior knowledge systems always possessed sets of guidelines, stipulations that operated in tandem and, very often, hierarchically. These disciplines offered elaborate operations to create a word from morphemes, to realize the meaning of a sentence, or to come to possess valid knowledge: there were procedures that had to be activated before others could take place, and these often governed

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[17] GEROW 1977, p. 235.

[18] Compare Daṇḍin, KĀ 2.121, 123, and 127 (*ākṣepa*), with 2.203, 205, and 207 (*apahnuti*).

[19] On Bhāmaha, see BRONNER 2012, p. 111; on Daṇḍin, see Bronner 2010, pp. 214-230.

additional, subordinate procedures. Thus arriving at the correct declension of a noun, for example, required an intricate flowchart that was theorized as such, with metarules governing the application of ordinary rules, the relationship between general cases and exceptions, and the hierarchy between subordinate and superordinate cases. True, not every outcome was arrived at through such detailed flowcharts, not all the sequences were necessarily structured or theorized hierarchically, and there was not always a consensus about the nature of the sequence in question, as in the Mīmāṃsā debate about the production of sentence meaning as either a top-down or bottom-up process, or in the argument about the relative importance and even the validity of certain means of valid knowledge in logic. But we can say with confidence that the senior South Asian academic disciplines were used to thinking about their procedures as interrelated and hierarchical structures.

Nothing of the sort existed for the early tradition of poetics. Not only were the different types of aesthetic elements and ornamental devices often based on entirely independent principles, sometimes ironically because they were originally modeled after tools from a diversity of other disciplines,[20] but also there was hardly any attempt to theorize the way in which they could be combined. A case in point is Daṇḍin's approach to the interaction among ornaments as a modular and hence endlessly open system, in which each device could interact with any other to create a new subtype.[21] Other examples are Bhāmaha's mixture (*saṃsṛṣṭi*) of ornaments and Daṇḍin's idea about the combination of virtues; as Lawrence McCrea has shown, such amalgamations often came with no guidelines other than "the more, the merrier."[22]

Let me clarify that there is no necessity to think of such elasticity as a problem in discussing poetry. In fact, I believe that the open-endedness and modularity of Daṇḍin's approach were key to his work's breathtaking success in the southern peninsula and then far beyond the confines of the Indian subcontinent, in Sri Lanka, Southeast Asia, Tibet, Mongolia, and possibly China, beginning in the

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[20] For example, simile varieties of doubt (*saṃśaya*) and its resolution (*nirṇaya*) were modeled after steps in the logician's syllogism (Daṇḍin, KĀ 2.26-27), and the *rasa*-related ornaments, as is well known, reflected insights from dramaturgy.

[21] I intend to write about this feature of Daṇḍin's work elsewhere.

[22] MᴄCʀᴇᴀ 2008, p. 39.

ninth century, that is, shortly after the Jayāpīḍa moment.[23] My argument is rather that from the vantage point of thinkers working within the Jayāpīḍa moment, this state of affairs was seen as one of the reasons that barred Sanskrit poetics from the coveted status of a respected academic discipline, and hence they sought to transform it radically.

It is hard to miss some of these efforts, and even scholars who were not very appreciative of the work of Udbhaṭa and Vāmana grudgingly recognized them.[24] Udbhaṭa sought to create a coherent model for the different aesthetic elements in poetry and, at the very least, to explain how virtues (*guṇa*) and ornaments related to and differed from one another. K. Krishnamoorthy offers a very useful elucidation of this attempt. He shows, on the basis of explicit references from the works of Ānanda, Abhinava, Ruyyaka, and Hemacandra, that while the job of virtues and ornaments is basically identical in Udbhaṭa's vision, they are distinct in their scope: the former are grounded in the arrangement (*saṃghaṭanā*) of materials rather than the materials themselves, which are the scope of the latter.[25] Vāmana, too, clearly took the seeming disarray of poetic categories as a priority and tried to rectify it on several levels. First, he envisioned virtues, flaws, and ornaments as part of a hierarchical universe, at the top of which stood the soul (*ātman*) of a poem, an organizing principle that he identified with *rīti*, poetic diction or style. This allowed him to turn the rather vague metaphor of a poem's body into an ordered one, at least in theory, and as is well known, Ānanda followed exactly the same basic scheme. Second, he tried to clarify the relationship between flaws and virtues as opposites and, somewhat more subtly, like Udbhaṭa he strove to differentiate between virtues and ornaments.[26] Third, he tried to show that ornaments are not as unruly as they seem and that, in fact, they are all

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[23] This vast and hardly studied phenomenon is the topic of *A Lasting Vision: Daṇḍin's Mirror in the World of Asian Letters*, a research group held at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Jerusalem between September 2015 and January 2016.

[24] "In different ways Udbhaṭa and Vāmana present the first efforts that have survived to encompass or organize the theory of poetic diction under a principle. Both authors, however, continue the major thrust of the *alaṃkāra* or *kāvya*-oriented tradition of speculation" (GEROW 1977, p. 234).

[25] KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979b, pp. 308-309.

[26] For discussions of Vāmana's overall system, see LAHIRI 1933. For his theorization of *guṇa* and its distinction from and hierarchical relation to *alaṃkāra*, see RAGHAVAN 1978, pp. 278-284 and 289-291, respectively.

analyzable as permutations of one device: the simile. Possibly as a reaction to this last move, which many must have viewed as too extreme, Rudraṭa suggested a fourfold categorization of ornaments into those based on factuality (*vāstava*), similitude (*aupamya*), intensification (*atiśaya*), and textual embrace (*śleṣa*), which is one reason that Edwin Gerow dubbed him "the first successful systematist."[27]

But the elegant superstructures suggested by these thinkers are in some sense incidental to their efforts. Their main thrust for systematization is located elsewhere, namely, in their effort to explain poetry's aesthetic effects as deriving from the semantic and cognitive processes that underlie them, with the help of a massive importation of tools and procedures from the senior academic disciplines, particularly Mīmāṃsā. This has been one of Lawrence McCrea's major insights into the nature of Ānanda's work as a paradigm shift, but here, too, the shift happened or at least began earlier.[28] As we shall see, both Vāmana and Rudraṭa were fascinated by such semantic-cognitive theoretical possibilities, and in doing so they were following Udbhaṭa, supposedly "the least theoretical *ālaṃkārika*."[29]

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[27]   For a discussion of Rudraṭa's efforts, see GEROW 1977, pp. 238-245. The quote is from page 239.

[28]   Although McCrea acknowledges that Udbhaṭa and Vāmana "on a few occasions drew on the concepts and terminology of linguistic philosophy (chiefly grammar and Mīmāṃsā) in explaining the non-literal meaning in various *alaṃkāra*s," he believes that "these forays into the theory of non-literary language are for the most part incidental and do not play a major role in the aesthetic theory of these authors" (McCREA 2008, p. 118).

[29]   GEROW 1977, p. 235. To be fair, it should be noted that Gerow said this "on the basis of [Udbhaṭa's] extant work," that is, the KAlSS, at a time when the authenticity of the fragments of the *Vivaraṇa* was still being debated. As I will show, however, even Udbhaṭa's extant work is filled with theoretical innovations. Let me note, by the way, that my working assumption here is that Udbhaṭa was Vāmana's senior, on four grounds. First, a verse from his commentary on Bhāmaha praising King Lalitāditya, Jayāpīḍa's grandfather and predecessor, suggests that Udbhaṭa may have begun his career under Lalitāditya and was already a veteran and renowned scholar by Jayāpīḍa's time (Udbhaṭa, *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 97, ll. 1-5; see BHATTACHARYA 1979). Second, his appointment as the president of Jayāpīḍa's academy also points to his seniority, especially when compared with Kalhaṇa's less detailed reference to Vāmana (RT 4.495, 497). Third, later references to these two scholars typically discuss Udbhaṭa before Vāmana (e.g., Abhinavagupta, *Locana*, p. 32; Ruyyaka, *Alaṃkārasarvasva*, pp. 6-11; I come back to these citations later). Fourth, a comparison of their works on certain points (for example, *rūpaka*, discussed in section 3 of this essay) makes it likelier that Vāmana was familiar with Udbhaṭa's ideas rather than the other

3. RETHINKING *RŪPAKA*:
THE FIRST THEORY OF METAPHOR IN SANSKRIT POETICS

Consider, in this context, *rūpaka*, the first meaning-based ornament (*arthālaṃkāra*) listed in the oldest texts on poetics and clearly one of the most important devices throughout the history of this tradition.[30] In its original conception, *rūpaka* was understood as a statement of identity between a pair of entities, in which one (e.g., the moon) lends its shape or form (*rūpa*) to another (e.g., a face). The analysis of *rūpaka* was accordingly focused on the relationship of sameness between the equated pair, in contrast to mere resemblance in simile (*upamā*), and on the propositional structure of equating rather than of comparing them. Bhāmaha's definition of *rūpaka* uses the simile's pair of basic building blocks, the subject and the standard of comparison (*upameya*, *upamāna*), and he clearly thought of the two ornaments in close relation to each other. *Rūpaka*, he said, is the identity (*tattva*) with which the standard shapes (*rūpyate*) the subject, "based on an observed sameness in attributes" (*guṇānāṃ samatāṃ dṛṣṭvā*), whereas in simile the standard remains distinct (*viruddhenopamānena*) because the relationship is based on a partial set of attributes (*guṇaleśena*).[31] Or, to follow Daṇḍin's succinct formulation, *rūpaka* is "nothing but a simile wherein difference is obscured."[32]

Note that there is also a grammatical undercurrent to this discussion. The grammarians analyzed simile in the context of two types of nominal compounds, where either the entities themselves, as in the tiger-man (noun-noun) variety, or their attributes, as in compounds of the snow-white (noun-adjective) type, are likened.[33] The early discussion of *rūpaka* drew on this analysis, even though Pāṇini never sanctioned a *rūpaka*-specific compound (*rūpakasamāsa*). This created a problem for those who wanted to analyze *rūpaka* as a variation on simile while remaining faithful to Pāṇini, and it led to a

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way around. None of this, of course, is conclusive proof, but I will follow this relative chronology as a working assumption.

[30]	It is listed as the first ornament of sense in Bhāmaha, KAl 2.4 (after *yamaka* and *anuprāsa*).

[31]	Bhāmaha, KAl 2.21, 2.30.

[32]	Daṇḍin, KĀ 2.66: *upamaiva tirobhūtabhedā rūpakam ucyate.*

[33]	See *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 2.1.56 and 2.1.55, respectively.

spectrum of unhappy solutions. Bhāmaha treated *rūpaka* as if it existed solely within the confines of nominal compounds that were identical in form to the tiger-man variety discussed by Pāṇini apropos of simile, presumably in order to lend the analysis a Pāṇinian authority, although the poetic praxis offered many examples outside compounds.[34] But Vāmana, already in the Jayāpīḍa moment, denied outright that *rūpaka* could even exist inside compounds, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, presumably precisely for the same reason: the absence of an explicit Pāṇinian decree.[35]

This makes it even clearer that whatever the linguistic environment in which early ornamentalists spotted *rūpaka*s, they were modeling their analysis on that of simile and were basically defining the two devices in tandem: stating a resemblance between X and Y was a simile; equating or identifying them was a *rūpaka*. Likening and equating were understood as closely related propositions, even if each had its distinct aesthetic charm. What is entirely absent from this early phase is any attempt to understand *rūpaka* in terms of its special mode of signification, in which a *word* Y applies to the meaning of a *signified* X. This analysis, integral to the Western understanding of metaphor, was not part of the early study of *rūpaka* (or, for that matter, of any of its sister ornaments, like *utprekṣā*), despite the fact that it was available and even prominent in all the senior disciplines. Indeed, it can be stated more generally that although different strands of Sanskrit thought had produced highly sophisticated theories of semantics and had paid much attention to the role of figurative language (*lakṣaṇā*, *guṇavṛtti*, *upacāra*) in the process, the early texts on poetics happily ignored these as irrelevant for their purposes. All this was to change with Udbhaṭa, so it is perhaps not a coincidence that it was also he who decisively cut the Gordian grammatical knot that tied *rūpaka* to compounds express-

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[34] See Bhāmaha, KĀl 2.23-24, where all the examples are of compounds. Bhāmaha famously identified himself as a staunch follower of Pāṇini (see, for example, KĀl 4.22, 6.36-37).

[35] Vāmana, KĀlSū ad 4.3.6: *mukhacandrādīnāṃ tūpamā. samāsān na candrādīnāṃ rūpatvaṃ yuktam iti*. Another possible explanation is that Vāmana, like Udbhaṭa, was already silently moving away from the simile paradigm for analyzing *rūpaka*. Note that Daṇḍin, eyeing practice more than any readymade grammatical category, had no problem in identifying *rūpaka*s either outside, inside, or partly inside and partly outside the confines of compounds in the context of his astonishingly detailed formal analysis of this ornament (Daṇḍin, KĀ 2.68).

ing similitude by identifying a different Pāṇinian noun-noun compound type, the *mayūra-vyaṃsaka* or "picaroon-peacock" variety, as its locus.[36] This certainly helped him move away from the question of *rūpaka*'s syntactic environment and concentrate, instead, on its mode of signification.

Here, then, is Udbhaṭa's definition of *rūpaka*:

> *śrutyā saṃbandhavirahād yat padena padāntaram* |
> *guṇavṛtti pradhānena yujyate rūpakaṃ tu tat* ‖[37]

> *Rūpaka* is a word that is connected to a predominant word in its secondary-attributive capacity because a connection based on its explicit meaning is impossible.

Udbhaṭa, we will see later, has more to say about *rūpaka*, but even this brief statement in and of itself is a revolution in the discourse on ornaments. Indeed, it does not bear even the slightest resemblance to Bhāmaha's definition. Recall that by virtue of composing a vast commentary on Bhāmaha's work, Udbhaṭa basically installed his predecessor as the tradition's founding father and tried, if possible, to retain his language. But when true innovation was called for, as was often the case, he signaled this by scrapping the older language altogether and introducing an entirely different statement. What, then, is the nature of the innovation in this case? First, note that Udbhaṭa no longer refers to the entities in *rūpaka* but to the words that denote them. Second, *rūpaka* is no longer seen as a relationship of identity (or heightened resemblance, or simile in disguise) but as a specific semantic process called *guṇavṛtti*, or the secondary-attributive capacity. Third, and this is something that is not entirely apparent from the definition itself but can be demonstrated with the help of other sources, this semantic operation is understood in terms of its relatively recent analysis by the seminal scholar Kumārilabhaṭṭa, who redefined *guṇavṛtti* in his *Tantravārttika*

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[36] Udbhaṭa, *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 22b, l. 8. Sahadeva attacks this position (*Kāvyālaṃkārasūtraṭippana*, henceforth KAlSūṬ, folios 65-66), and later thinkers, such as Hemacandra, know it to be based on the *Vivaraṇa* (BHATTACHARYYA 1962, pp. 80-81). Judging from Udbhaṭa's discussion of *upamā* in his KAlSS (1.15-21) and Indurāja's elucidation thereof, the introduction of *mayūra-vyaṃsaka* as the category of compound underlying *rūpaka* was part of a systematic analysis of the use of compounds in such statements. Pāṇini mentions this compound in *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.1.72 as the first of a larger list of miscellanea compounds that he does not further discuss and is, hence, very useful for Udbhaṭa's purposes.

[37] KAlSS 1.11.

(henceforth TV), a subcommentary on Śabara's exegesis on the *Mī-māṃsāsūtra* of Jaimini.

Before I address Kumārila's specific understanding of this term, let us appreciate the profound innovation in stating that *rūpaka* means the semantic process of *guṇavṛtti*. Authors of earlier texts on ornaments were obviously well versed in semantics. Bhāmaha even dedicated one full chapter out of six in his book to various aspects of language, where, among other topics, he directly discussed the relationship between words and the knowledge they produce. Here he endorsed the theory that words signify abstract universals (the word "cow" signifies cowness) and rejected the Buddhist theory of *apoha*, according to which a word communicates its referent through the elimination of everything other than it ("cow" eliminates everything that is noncow).[38] But nowhere in this earliest extant work on Sanskrit poetics is there even a mention of figurative language, let alone an explanation of its aesthetic potential or its being operative in the ornamental devices to which much of the remaining text is devoted. For Bhāmaha, it seems, the semantic and the aesthetic were mutually exclusive ways of approaching language: the former had to do with the movement from signifier to signified; the latter hinged on the counterfactual expressivity (*vakratā*) of poetry. The situation is only slightly different in Daṇḍin, who mentions the term *gauṇavṛtti*, a synonym of *guṇavṛtti*, twice in his book. The first is when he defines the poetic virtue of *samādhi*, which consists, for him, of the artful attribution of traits that really belong in one entity (X) to another (Y).[39] Although *samādhi* is defined in terms of the logical (or propositional) relationship between the entities rather than its underlying semantic operations, Daṇḍin's examples and analysis actually imply an emphasis on figurative speech, and he concludes his short discussion by recommending, in this context, the use of words such as "vomit," ordinarily vulgar, "if employed figuratively" (*gauṇavṛttivyapāśraya*).[40] The second instance is the only mention of figurative language in the entire chapter on poetic ornaments, the main and longest chapter in the book. Here Daṇḍin notes that some of the more colorful (*citra*) varieties

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[38] Bhāmaha, KAl 6. 17-19. See also Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṃgraha* 912-914 (quote) and 1019-1021 (refutation); BRONNER 2012, pp. 89-90.

[39] KĀ 1.93: *anyadharmas tato 'nyatra lokasīmānurodhinā | samyag ādhīyate yatra sa samādhiḥ smṛto yathā ||*.

[40] Ibid., 1.95.

of causation (*hetu*), where the effect is far removed from, is simultaneous with, or even precedes the cause, "are based on figurative usage" (*gauṇavṛttivyapāśraya*).[41] This should be seen primarily in the context of his attack on Bhāmaha's refusal to accept *hetu* as an ornament precisely on the ground that, according to Bhāmaha, stating a relationship of cause and effect is prosaic.[42] Other than this, Daṇḍin has nothing to say about figurative language in his long primer on poetics, and it seems that for him, the role of figurative language in producing aesthetic enjoyment is, at best, incidental.[43]

It is against this background that Udbhaṭa's move is so dramatic. With no known precedent, he defines *rūpaka* as a word used in its specific semantic process of figuration, on the charm of which this all-important ornament now rests. Moreover, his reliance on the discipline of Mīmāṃsā in this analysis is unmistakable and, indeed, outspoken. As noted, Kumārila had influentially redefined *guṇavṛtti* in his TV, a move that, for the first time in the history of Sanskrit thinking, sought to clarify the difference between the two main terms for the figurative function, *lakṣaṇā* and *guṇavṛtti*, which up to that time had been used rather indistinguishably. For Kumārila, *lakṣaṇā* is a nonmetaphorical transference of meaning, as in a metonym or synecdoche ("the podiums are yelling"; *mañcāḥ krośanti*), whereas *guṇavṛtti* is a metaphorical transference based on a two-phase process. First, a word Y, for example, "fire," when applied to a predominant word X, for example, "boy," is blocked from conveying its normal referent and signifies, instead, its attributes (*guṇa*), such as being vibrant and quick to flare up. Second, this word Y (fire) comes to signify attributes similar to those that exist in X (boy), so that we come to realize that the boy is vibrant and fiery.[44] This is

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[41] Ibid., 2.252.

[42] Compare Bhāmaha, KAl 2.86-87, with Daṇḍin KĀ 2.233-242; see BRONNER 2012, pp. 102-104.

[43] Note that the term *gauṇa* appears in Daṇḍin's definition of a pair of subtypes of *rūpaka*, *upamārūpaka* and *vyatirekarūpaka*, which runs as follows: *iṣṭaṃ sādharmyavaidharmyadarśanād gauṇamukhyayoḥ ǀ upamāvyatirekākhyaṃ rūpakadvitayaṃ yathā ǁ* (KĀ 2.88). However, as the commentator Ratnaśrījñāna explains (and as Daṇḍin's following examples demonstrate), the pair of *mukhya* and *gauṇa* refers here not to semantic operations but to the primary element (the beloved's face-moon) and a secondary one (the moon) in a proposition that depicts them as either similar or dissimilar.

[44] TV 354: *abhidheyāvinābhūte pravṛttir lakṣaṇeṣyate ǀ lakṣyamāṇaguṇair yogād vṛtter iṣṭā tu gauṇatā ǁ*. "The use [of a word] in a meaning necessarily connected with its literal meaning is called "figurative expression"; but usage arising from

exactly how Udbhaṭa understood *guṇavṛtti* in his brief definition of *rūpaka* in the KAlSS and precisely the manner in which his commentator Indurāja further explained the process in detail. Even more important, Udbhaṭa deliberately cites a key phrase from Kumārila's new definition in a surviving fragment of his *Vivaraṇa*, just at the point when he is discussing *rūpaka*.[45]

Udbhaṭa, in other words, used a cutting-edge analysis of figurative semantics from Mīmāṃsā to rethink *rūpaka* and define it, for the first time in the tradition's history, more like what we would call a metaphor. Several scholars have already identified key aspects of this move and have appreciated its innovativeness. Sivaprasad Bhattacharyya has noted that "the term *guṇavṛtti* at least in this form of the word as in Udbhaṭa (and in Ānandavardhana who criticises his view) was not in vogue in earlier literature" and was newly imported from other disciplines.[46] Chitta Ranjan Basistha dubbed Udbhaṭa's definition of *rūpaka* a "complete departure" from the work of all his predecessors.[47] Daniel Ingalls argued that the early tradition lacked a concept parallel to the Greek metaphor,[48] and that Udbhaṭa's definition of *rūpaka* introduced "a distinction that was new to Sanskrit poetics and that was destined ultimately to transform the analysis of all the figures. This is a distinction between the furnishing of a meaning *śrutyā*, that is, explicitly, and furnishing it *arthena*, that is, by the power of the contextual facts, or implicitly."[49] Similarly, Gnoli maintained that "Udbhaṭa, by introducing into poetry the secondary function of words... let open the door to the conception of a third potency of language, the *vyañjanāvṛtti*," thus implying that this definition eventually led the way to Ānanda's theory of suggestion.[50]

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attributes that are figuratively indicated is defined "secondary-attributive." See also the surrounding discussion. See MCCREA 2008, p. 91, n. 61, from where the translation is borrowed with slight modifications.

[45] *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 22b, l. 5, *svābhidheyāvinā(bhūtagu)ṇavṛtti(tām)*; see GNOLI 1962, p. xxxiv, where the reminiscence of Kumārila is noted.

[46] BHATTACHARYYA 1962, p. 75.

[47] BASISTHA 2003, p. 139.

[48] INGALLS 1990, p. 8, n. 10: "*Rūpaka* is not what a Greek would have called a metaphor, but that translation has come to be used by every Sanskritist. *Rūpaka* is actually a simile in which the particle of assimilation has been omitted, e.g., 'her moon face, her cherry lip.' In a Greek metaphor the object as well as the particle is missing: 'her stars shone upon my face,' meaning that her eyes looked at me. The distinction is noted by Gero Jenner."

[49] Ibid., p. 8.

[50] GNOLI 1962, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

But what scholars have not fully appreciated is how pervasive this trend was already in Udbhaṭa's thinking and in the Jayāpīḍa moment at large.[51] It is not so much that the figures were about to be transformed, but that the whole analytic paradigm was already radically altered, as I will try to demonstrate with several case studies later. Note, by the way, that Udbhaṭa was not alone in this move. Vāmana, too, defined *rūpaka* using the semantic capacity of *guṇa-vṛtti*, a fact that has been entirely overlooked. This neglect may be due to the fact that Vāmana's actual definition of *rūpaka* does not highlight this move and, in fact, is worded in a way that is closely reminiscent of older and more traditional definitions.[52] However, two *sūtra*s later, in introducing his newly minted ornament, *vakrokti*, Vāmana notes: "The following *sūtra* shows that just as *gauṇa* [a synonym of *guṇavṛtti*] is its own ornament, so is the case with *lākṣa-ṇika* [= *lakṣaṇā*]."[53] In other words, Vāmana advances the discussion a step further. If Udbhaṭa identified *rūpaka* with *guṇavṛtti* as distinct from *lakṣaṇā*, Vāmana concurs and adds, as if completing an imaginary grid, an ornament that is based on this other main mode of figurative speech. It should be noted that, unlike Udbhaṭa, Vāmana does not seem to follow Kumārila's distinction between the two modes. Although his notion of *guṇavṛtti*, like Udbhaṭa's, clearly implies the transference of attributes, his concept of *lakṣaṇā* accommodates resemblance (*sādṛśya*) as well as metonymy – here he perhaps takes a cue from Bhartṛmitra[54] – and the new ornament of *vakrokti* is, in fact, based on *lakṣaṇā* involving resemblance (like all of Vāmana's figures). This new classification, moreover, allowed Vāmana to further tidy up the distinction between ornaments and virtues (*guṇa*) in

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[51] Ingalls did point in this direction, though, at least in the case of Udbhaṭa: "To follow the concern for the implied or suggested sense through the whole of Udbhaṭa's book would require a much more detailed exposition than is justified in this Introduction. It appears in his definition of *paryāyokta*, *aprastutapraśaṃsā*, *sandeha*, and elsewhere" (INGALLS 1990, p. 8).

[52] KAlSū 4.3.6: *upamānopameyasya guṇasāmyāt tattvāropo rūpakam.*

[53] Ibid., before 4.3.8: *yathā ca gauṇasyārthālaṃkāratvaṃ tathā lākṣaṇikasyāpīti darśayitum āha.* As the Kashmiri commentator Sahadeva observes, Vāmana refers here to *rūpaka* and its kin ornaments: *yathā ca gauṇasyeti, rūpakādisthita-sya rūpakādiṣu guṇāt puraskṛtya pravṛttaḥ* (KAlSūṬ, f. 68).

[54] Sahadeva quotes a classical list of the five types of relationships in *lakṣaṇā*, and the verse he cites (*abhidheyena sambandhāt sādṛśyāt samavāyataḥ | vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāl lakṣaṇā pañcadhā smṛtā ‖*; KAlSūṬ, f. 68) is attributed by Mukula-bhaṭṭa to Bhartṛmitra (*Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā*, p. 17). For more on this list of five, see KUNJUNNI RAJA 1977, pp. 238-239.

that it helped him incorporate Daṇḍin's aforementioned virtue of *samādhi*, which had figurative language built into it, into ornament land. It is no coincidence that he begins his long list of examples for his new *vakrokti*, which includes citations from canonical works such as the *Meghadūta* and the *Śiśupālavadha*, with a slight reworking of Daṇḍin's example for the virtue of *samādhi*: "The pond's day lotus opened his eyes just as the night lotus shut his."[55]

In all of this discussion, it is important not to lose sight of the forest for the trees. Whatever the exact analyses of figurative processes they followed, the crucial thing about Udbhaṭa and Vāmana's relevant discussions is that they both equated *rūpaka* (and in Vāmana's case, also *vakrokti*) with what they identified as their underlying semantic processes, which so far had had no place whatsoever in the analysis of ornaments, and that for this purpose they were borrowing their terminology and analyses from other disciplines. For these theoreticians, what was charming or ornamental about such poetic ornaments was precisely their underlying semantics, and Vāmana even added, apropos of *vakrokti*, that the special cognitive process that was unique to this ornament was essential to its aesthetic experience: "The secret here is the swiftness with which such metaphors convey their meanings."[56] As we shall see, such attempts to ground ornaments in specific semantic operations and cognitive scenarios pervade and define the Jayāpīḍa moment.

4. *ŚLIṢṬA* AND ITS COMPLEX SEMANTIC-COGNITIVE SCENARIOS

Take, for example, *śliṣṭa* (later known as *śleṣa*), another case where Udbhaṭa discarded Bhāmaha's definition altogether and came up with a radically new one. Bhāmaha saw *śliṣṭa* as a footnote to *rūpaka*, and he used the same analytic tools to define both. *Śliṣṭa*, too, he

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55 Compare *unmimīla kamalaṃ sarasīnāṃ kairavaṃ ca nimimīla muhūrtāt* (Vāmana, KālSū ad 4.3.8) with: *kumudāni nimīlanti kamalāny unmiṣanti ca* (Daṇḍin, KĀ 1.94). These examples state only that the respective flowers "opened" and "shut," but in doing so they use verbs that apply to the eyes only (no comparable verbs exist in English). In the translation, however, the noun "eye" had to be added. To get a better sense of the metaphor Vāmana has in mind, read instead "The day lotus woke up just as the night lotus fell asleep." But the problem with this translation is that it lacks the similarity between flowers and eyes that is key for him.

56 KālSū ad 4.3.8: *ity evamādiṣu lakṣaṇārtho nirūpyata iti lakṣaṇāyāṃ jhaṭity arthapratipattikṣamatvaṃ rahasyam ācakṣata iti.*

said, is a case of identity between a subject and a standard of comparison but not as a result of a genuine, empirically observed sameness between them; rather, the identity in *śliṣṭa* is manufactured (*sādhyate*) by adjectives, verbs, and nouns that apply simultaneously (*yugapad*, *samam*) to both. Even this characterization, he conceded, may be true of *rūpaka* as well, so he made a further stipulation: what ultimately sets *śliṣṭa* apart from *rūpaka* is its "embrace" (*śleṣa*) of either meaning(s) or sound(s) (*arthavacasoḥ*).[57] Thus Bhāmaha acknowledged that the ornament involves a linguistic manipulation, namely, simultaneity, and makes a reference, vague though it may be, to "sense and sound." But his definition is still phrased primarily as the logical relationship (an identity, manufactured though it may be) between two entities and has nothing to say about the semantic-cognitive processes that underlie it. This is why it had to go.

Here, instead, is Udbhaṭa's alternative definition:

> *ekaprayatnoccāryāṇāṃ tacchāyāṃ caiva bibhratām* |
> *svaritādiguṇair bhinnair bandhaḥ śliṣṭam ihocyate* ||
> *alaṃkārāntaragatāṃ pratibhāṃ janayat padaiḥ* |
> *dvividhair arthaśabdoktiviśiṣṭaṃ tat pratīyatām* ||[58]

> An arrangement of [words] that could be pronounced in the same articulatory effort, as well as of those that merely appear like them but differ in their phonetic aspects from the level of the accent on, is called *śliṣṭa*. It is labeled as either "sound" or "sense" depending on [its employment of such] twofold words, and it produces the impression that falls under the scope of some other ornament.

We are clearly in a very different world than Bhāmaha's, one that is dense and complex and requires considerable unpacking, which is why we are lucky to have Indurāja's detailed commentary. But even before we turn to his illuminating exposition – and this is another case where a close affinity between Indurāja's commentary and a fragment that survived from Udbhaṭa's *Vivaraṇa* can be demonstrated – what is absent from Udbhaṭa's definition is immediately clear:

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[57] KA1 3.14-17b: *upamānena yat tattvam upameyasya sādhyate* | *guṇakriyābhyāṃ nāmnā ca śliṣṭaṃ tad abhidhīyate* || *lakṣaṇaṃ rūpake 'pīdam lakṣyate kāmam atra tu* | *iṣṭaḥ prayogo yugapad upamānopameyayoḥ* || *śīkarāmbhomadasrjas tuṅgā jaladadantinaḥ* | *ity atra meghakariṇāṃ nirdeśaḥ kriyate samam* || *śleṣād evārthavacasor asya ca kriyate bhidā* |.

[58] KA1SS 4.9-10.

there is no mention of a subject and a standard of comparison. Udbhaṭa frees *śliṣṭa* from the confines of *rūpaka* (or, for that matter, simile), in which Bhāmaha (and Vāmana after him) toiled to keep it, and on this issue he is closer to Daṇḍin's understanding of this device as freely associating with any ornament in the book.[59] But unlike any literary thinker before him, Udbhaṭa is first and foremost concerned with understanding how *śliṣṭa*'s special verbal arrangement (*bandha*) leads from two sets of signifiers to two sets of signifieds and then to the cognition of some other ornament.

Here is where we ought to follow the lead of Indurāja, a keen reader of Udbhaṭa who also had in front of him his voluminous *Vivaraṇa*. Indurāja first makes clear that Udbhaṭa subscribes to the one-word, one-meaning axiom. According to this worldview, which originated in Mīmāṃsā, the multivalence of language is not the result of true polysemy of any single word because signifiers, by definition, each have one signified. Rather, it is a special combination of two sets of entirely monosemic signifiers that creates semantic proliferation.[60] If the two sets consist of words that are entirely identical in form, then they can be uttered concurrently, and presumably their meanings are simultaneously activated; Indurāja, perhaps in agreement with the *Vivaraṇa*, explains this using the Mīmāṃsā term *tantra*, which applies to cases where one ritual act serves two ritual goals simultaneously. Here, it would seem, a single articulatory effort serves two simultaneous semantic goals. But if the words differ in any audible way, beginning with accent, and are made to sound alike only through the poet's crafty way of embracing them together, then only one set of signifiers is uttered, and its signified is initially grasped (meaning 1), leading to an activation through resemblance of a second set of signfieds (meaning 2), whose signifiers are nonetheless not pronounced. The first semantic-cognitive scenario, which consists of true homophony even outside the context of a *śliṣṭa* arrangement, is labeled "sense based," while the second, consisting of manufactured homophony, is the ornament's "sound-based" variety.[61]

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[59]   KĀ 2.360ab: *śleṣaḥ sarvāsu puṣṇāti prāyo vakroktiṣu śriyam* |; see BRONNER 2010, pp. 214-230.

[60]   Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 58: *arthabhedena tāvac chabdā bhidyanta iti bhaṭṭodbhaṭasya siddhāntaḥ.* For a discussion of the Mīmāṃsā view on this and of Udbhaṭa as adhering to it, see KUNJUNNI RAJA, pp. 42-45.

[61]   Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, pp. 58-59: *tatrārthabhedena bhidyamānāḥ śabdāḥ kecit*

And this is not all. What, one may ask, is this second meaning, and how does it relate to the first? Udbhaṭa is very clear about this point in his *Vivaraṇa*. The second meaning can be either another sentence or another ornament (*vākyāntare alaṃkārāntare vā prati-bhotpadyate*).[62] This paves the way to another semantic phase where the relationship between meaning 1 and meaning 2 is itself the scope of reflection and comprehension (meaning 3), and as Udbhaṭa indi-cates in the *Vivaraṇa*, this further reflection takes into account which of the first two meanings was contextual and which was not rooted in the context.[63] Moreover, Udbhaṭa indicates (and Indurāja explains when discussing his examples) that the content of this fur-ther reflection (meaning 3) belongs not in *śliṣṭa* per se but in some other ornament, be it simile, *rūpaka*, or *virodha* (antithesis), to give the examples that Udbhaṭa himself supplies in the KAlSS. Udbhaṭa is nonetheless very explicit, both here and in the surviving fragments

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tantreṇa prayoktuṃ śakyāḥ kecin na. yeṣāṃ halsvarasthānaprayatnādīnāṃ sā-myaṃ te tantreṇa prayoktuṃ śakyante. yatra tu halāṃ ekatvānekatvarūpatvāt...bhedas teṣāṃ tantreṇa prayogaḥ kartum aśakyaḥ sādhāraṇarūpatvāt tantrasya. tad uktaṃ sādhāraṇaṃ bhavet tat tantram iti. evaṃ cāvasthite ye tantreṇocca-rayituṃ śakyante ta ekaprayatnoccāryāḥ. tadbandhe saty arthaśleṣo bhavati. tad uktam ekaprayatnoccāryāṇām iti. tathā ye teṣām evaikaprayatnoccāryāṇāṃ śabdānāṃ chāyāṃ sādṛśyaṃ bibhrati tadupanibandhe ca śabdaśliṣṭam, śabdān-tara uccāryamāṇe sādṛśyavaśenānuccāritasyāpi śabdāntarasya śliṣṭatvāt. Note that Vāmana, too, uses the Mīmāṃsā term *tantra* in his discussion of *śliṣṭa*, and that his language is closely reminiscent of what we find in Indurāja: *tantrapra-yoge tantreṇoccāraṇe sati śleṣa* (KAlSū ad 4.3.7). All this suggests that Udbha-ṭa's *Vivaraṇa* included a longer discussion of *tantra* in this context. For close similarities between Indurāja's comments on *śliṣṭa* and the relevant surviving fragment of the *Vivaraṇa*, see BASISTHA 2003, pp. 182-184.

[62] *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 39b, ll. 7-8. For a useful reconstruction of this passage based on its citation in later works, see KULKARNI 1983, p. 131. If one compares this reconstructed *Vivaraṇa* citation with Indurāja's exposition on the KAlSS, it is palpably clear that the latter is based on the former. Compare, for example, *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 39b, l. 6: *dantyauṣṭhyalaghupra[yatnatarālaghuprayatnatara-kṛte ca bhede]* (reconstruction based on Hemacandra), to Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 58: *sthānānāṃ cauṣṭhyadantauṣṭhyatvādinā prayatnānāṃ ca laghutvālaghu-tvādinā bhedaḥ*.

[63] *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 39b, l. 5: *... pratipādakabhāvaḥ kintu tābhyāṃ prākaraṇikāprā-karaṇika...* (see also frag. 39b, l. 2, and frag. 40a, l. 3). Udbhaṭa is generally interested in the semantic consequences of context relatedness when two mean-ings are involved. See, for example, his new definition of *samāsokti* (*prakṛtār-thena vākyena...*; KAlSS 2.10).

of the *Vivaraṇa*, that this further ornamental relationship is not another full-blown ornament but rather the "impression" (*pratibhā*) thereof.[64]

All this is quite confusing and complicated, and to better appreciate the detailed theorization of the semantic-cognitive scenario in question, let us examine more closely one of Udbhaṭa's illustrations:

> *indukāntamukhī snigdhamahānīlaśiroruhā |*
> *muktāśrīs trijagadratnaṃ padmarāgāṅghripallavā ||*[65]

> Her face is dear to the moon,
> her tresses, shiny black sapphires,
> and her delicate toes, crimson rubies –
> she's our mother of pearl,
> the one gem
> of the three worlds.

This is part of a longer description of Pārvatī, whom Śiva will eventually marry. My translation tries to re-create at least something of the simultaneity of the original, although in following Indurāja's analysis, we will have to stay closer to the Sanskrit and its language-specific puns. As Indurāja explains, the verse has several semantic layers. In the first, the modifications of Pārvatī enhance the beauty of her various body parts: her face is dear to the moon in the sense that it is moon-like; her tresses are long and shiny black; her toes (or, more accurately, her feet) are like red lotuses (the compound word for ruby, *padma-rāga*, can also mean "lotus-red"); and finally – and this is absent from my translation – she is free of anything that is nonradiant (*mukta-aśrīḥ*). All this substantiates her supreme beauty as "the one gem / of the three worlds." A second layer of meaning stems from an added set of signifiers that are embraced into the verse: her face is a moonstone (the stone that is "dear to the moon"), her tresses are black sapphires, her toes are rubies, and her radiance is that of a pearl, or "mother of pearl," in my translation (now reading *muktā-śrīḥ*). This level of signification, with its identification of the body parts with various precious stones, further explains why Pārvatī is in the end *identified* with a unique, marvelous jewel, "the one gem / of the three worlds." So the final, third meaning is *rūpaka*,

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[64] Udbhaṭa, *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 39b, l. 7: *... āntarapratibhā. tayālaṅkārāntare vākyāntare vā pratibhotpadyate*; Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 59: *alaṃkārāntarāṇām atra pratibhāmātraṃ na tu padabandha ity arthaḥ.*

[65] KAlSS, example 4.16.

an identification of the wholes (Pārvatī and this gem of the three worlds) that is based on that of the parts. Yet presumably because it is based on this unique linguistic embrace, this is not a full-blown instance of *rūpaka* but merely an impression thereof.[66] Note, by the way, that this is mostly a sound-based embrace, because most pairs of signifiers are for various reasons not homo-articulable.[67]

I should say that this semantic-cognitive scenario is not without problems. It is not always easy to understand why its different phases should follow this sequence: why, for example, context alone should determine which meaning gets to be articulated and cognized first, and why *śliṣṭa* is more present in our mind than *rūpaka* and not the other way around. Indeed, these issues were the focus of criticism by later thinkers such as Mammaṭa in a debate that received significant scholarly attention.[68] For the purpose of this essay, however, we can ignore most aspects of this dispute and focus on the important pattern it embodies, namely, that thinkers like Udbhaṭa and his followers are suddenly focusing, like their colleagues from the senior disciplines, on explaining the different aesthetic elements (*śliṣṭa*, *rūpaka*, *virodha*, *upamā*) as constituting flowcharts and hierarchies: a system that is now organized and analyzable thanks to the multilayered semantic-cognitive processes underlying it. In the case of the *śliṣṭa* scenario, what Udbhaṭa is doing is mapping a series of meaning moments, cataloging them, and explaining the way earlier meaning moments lead the way to later ones.

This is even more manifest in Rudraṭa's discussion of *śleṣa* (his name for *śliṣṭa*). Rudraṭa differs from Udbhaṭa in several key aspects in defining this ornament. He accepts the possibility of homonymy in language (thus rejecting the one-word, one-meaning axiom), and he thus identifies sound-based embraces with cases of manufactured homophony but sense-based embraces with true homonymy. But

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[66] Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 60: *indukāntamukhīty atra bhagavatī candravatsundaraṃ mukhaṃ yasyāḥ sā tathāvidhā. tathā snigdhadīrghakṛṣṇakeśī. muktā parityaktāśrīr aśobhā yayā sā tathāvidhā. trailokyotkṛṣṭā ca. tathā padmavat kamalavat rāgo lauhityaṃ yayos tathāvidhau pādapallavau yasyās tadrūpā. yadā tv asau bhagavatī rūpakapratibhotpattinibandhanena śleṣeṇa trailokyādaravartimāṇikyasaṃbhārarūpatayā rūpyate tadā prakṛto 'rthaś candrakāntendranīlamauktikaśobhāpadmarāgair avacchāditarūpatayā pratīyate sākṣād evaṃvidharatnamayāvayavayogitvāt tribhuvanodarāntargataratnasamṛddhirūpeti.*

[67] Ibid., p. 60, ll. 22-27.

[68] Mammaṭa, *Kāvyaprakāśa*, pp. 520-529. See AGRAWAL 1975; and ROODBERGEN 1984.

just like Udbhaṭa's and, indeed, more so, his discussion is focused on the way one meaning can lead to the cognition (*gamayet*, *avaga-mayet*, and so on) of another, and it is this movement from one sense layer to another that he views as the defining characteristic of a sense-based "embrace."[69] Rudraṭa goes on to list ten scenarios in which one meaning (meaning 1) can produce another (meaning 2) and a relationship between the two (meaning 3). Meaning 2 can be an unrelated piece of information, in which case, as the commentator Namisādhu explains, what readers cherish is precisely their unrelatedness, as in the speech of a madman.[70] But this is only a rather generic (*aviśeṣa*) version, a first step, and from here on things become considerably more complicated. A second meaning may be the ornament of antithesis (*viruddhaśleṣa*) that adds to the power of the verse; it may enhance the first, as when a description of an ideal king is amplified by a second reading that modifies Śiva (Rudraṭa calls this type *adhika*); it may supply a proverb (*ukti*) that complements the first sense; it may sum in toto (*tattva*) what is first stated in parts (*avayava*); it may supplement the emotional flavor (*rasa*) of the first with another, appropriate one, as when a verse refers to both a king's military and his erotic conquests; or it may ironically contradict and thus supplant the first, as when we understand that a woman's praise for her go-between's selfless dedication really amounts to blaming her for betraying her and jumping into bed with her beloved (*vyāja*).[71] In such and similar cases, meaning 2 can be either a mere statement, an ornament, or an emotional flavor, and the different aesthetic effects involved are the results of distinct cognitive scenarios in which the second meaning either supplements or supplants the first. Those familiar with Ānanda's analyses of suggestion by content (*vastu*, *alaṃkāra*, *rasa*) and by cognitive scenario will at once see that these analytic tools are already all present in Rudraṭa's extensive analysis of *śleṣa*, and to some extent also in Udbhaṭa's analysis of the same ornament.

There is much more that could be said about this discussion, but for my purposes it suffices to say that at the hands of Udbhaṭa and

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[69] KAl 10.1: *yatraikam anekārthair vākyaṃ racitaṃ padair anekasmin | arthe kurute niścayam arthaśleṣaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ ‖*. For his definition of *śabdaśleṣa*, see ibid., 4.1.

[70] *Ṭippaṇaka* ad 10.3: *nanu prakṛtānupayogyarthāntaram unmattavākyavad asaṃbaddham avagatam api kvopayujyate. satyam. etad evāsyālaṃkāratvam. evaṃ hi sahṛdayāvarjakatvam asya.*

[71] KAl 10.1-23.

his followers the analysis of *śliṣṭa/śleṣa* changed dramatically. From an ornament Bhāmaha analyzed very much like an identification (*rūpaka*), involving a manufactured identity between the subject and the standard of comparison, it became a locus for startlingly complex analyses of semantic and cognitive scenarios, where a series of additional statements and ornaments (for Udbhaṭa) and also emotional flavors (for Vāmana[72] and Rudraṭa), appeared in layered structures, each with a distinct aesthetic feel. One could argue that such cognitive-aesthetic layered structures are unique to the special effects of *śleṣa* and are not found elsewhere in the works produced in the Jayāpīḍa moment. But nothing can be further from the truth. To realize this, let us first return to Udbhaṭa's discussion of *rūpaka*, which I have only very briefly sampled.

5. *RŪPAKA*'S MULTILAYERED ORNAMENTAL PROCESSES

Here is Udbhaṭa's first example of *rūpaka* in the KAlSS:

> *jyotsnāmbunendukumbhena tārākusumaśāritam |*
> *kramaśo rātrikanyābhir vyomodyānam asicyata ‖*[73]

> Pouring moonlight-spray
> from their Luna-jar,
> the night-maidens gradually
> watered the sky-garden,
> whose blossoms are stars.

This is a description of nightfall, wherein the night's gradual overtaking of the sky is described as an act of irrigating a garden, bit by bit. According to Indurāja's explanation, the comprehension of such a poem involves two distinct stages. The first takes place within compounds such as "moonlight-spray" (*jyotsnāmbu*), where the word "spray" is applied to "moonlight." Here we see the semantic process of *guṇavṛtti* in operation: "moonlight," which is the predominant word insofar as it is contextual (this, after all, is part of a longer description of nightfall), blocks "spray" (the subordinate word)

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72 This is not a topic Vāmana discusses, but his example beautifully "embraces" the fearsomeness of veteran soldiers and the charms of skilled courtesans – the heroic and the erotic – who both fail to disturb the Buddha's calm (KAlSū ad 4.3.7).

73 KAlSS, example 1.11.

from conveying its literal meaning. "Spray" thus comes to denote not some liquid but "brightness," "delightfulness," "shimmer," and so on, attributes that belong in it but also in "moonlight." In the second stage, the word "spray," now figuratively signifying (and thus consisting of) "moonlight," becomes an implement in an act of irrigation insofar as it is construed with the overall syntax. Indurāja's crucial point is that these two semantic-cognitive stages correspond, just as we have seen in the case of *śliṣṭa*, to two different ornaments and hence two distinct aesthetic experiences: only the first, which involves the figurative capacity (*guṇavṛtti*) of words like "spray," is considered *rūpaka* because, as we have seen, *rūpaka* is now by definition identified with this semantic process. Yet in the second stage, the "spray" – now made of moonlight and used for irrigation – involves no *rūpaka* but rather a "touch of intensification" (*atiśayokticchāyāṃ bhajate*).[74]

A certain pattern begins to emerge: different ornaments are identified with distinct semantic operations and are understood to occupy analytically distinguishable moments in a multilayered but interconnected cognitive-aesthetic sequence. The one possible problem in applying this pattern to the example just discussed is that our understanding of it is based entirely on Indurāja, writing more than a century after the Jayāpīḍa moment: unlike the previous examples discussed, here we have no direct way of knowing whether his explanation replicates Udbhaṭa's extremely fragmented *Vivaraṇa*. I am not particularly troubled by this problem. Indurāja was a very keen observer with an excellent grasp of Udbhaṭa's stance, and both he and his intended readers had the full *Vivaraṇa* in front of them. Moreover, I find support for Indurāja's take on the first example of

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[74] *Laghuvṛtti*, pp. 11-12: *atra khalu dve 'vasthe vidyete. ekā tāvaj jyotsnāyā ambūkaraṇāvasthā. aparā tv ambutvam āpāditāyā jyotsnāyāḥ sekasaṃbandharūpā. tatra yadā tāvaj jyotsnāmburūpatvam āpadyate tadā prākaraṇikatvāj jyotsnā pradhānam ambu ca tadviparyayād guṇas tadānīṃ cāmbuśabdo jyotsnāśabdānurodhenāmbugataśauklyādiguṇasadṛśaguṇayogāl lakṣaṇayā jyotsnāyāṃ vṛttim anubhavati. tadā ca tasya pradhānārthānurodhād guṇavṛttitvena rūpakatvam uktam. yadā tv asau ambuśabda āpāditāmbubhāvajyotsnābhidhāyī san sekakriyayā samanvayam āpadyamāno yad etad atra sekasādhanatvenāmbūpayujyate taj jyotsnaiveti jyotsnayā viśiṣyate tadā tasya na rūpakāvasthā, pūrvāvasthāyām evānubhūtaguṇavṛttitvāt. atas tasyām avasthāyām asau atiśayokticchāyāṃ bhajate. pūrvāvasthāpekṣayā tv etad rūpakam uktam. pradhānānurodhena tatra guṇeṣu vartamānatvāt. rūpakatvaṃ cātrādhyāropyamāṇagatena rūpeṇādhyāropaviṣayasya vastuno rūpavataḥ kriyamāṇatvād anvarthaṃ draṣṭavyam.*

rūpaka from his discussion of the fourth, where a quote from the *Vivaraṇa* is found.

Udbhaṭa lists four types of *rūpaka* in the KAlSS. The first two, the complete-set (*samastavastuviṣaya*) and the partial (*ekadeśavivartin*) *rūpaka*, are borrowed from Bhāmaha, but the third and the fourth are Udbhaṭa's own invention, and he relates each of the new pair to one of Bhāmaha's original duo. This is easy enough in the case of his *mālārūpaka*, where a string of standards is serially identified with a single subject (Bhāmaha's complete-set identification restated repeatedly).[75] More mysterious is the category of *ekadeśavṛtti*, whose name is intentionally similar to Bhāmaha's *ekadeśavivartin* and whose definition is opaque.[76] Udbhaṭa's example clarifies things at least somewhat:

> *āsāradhārāviśikhair nabhobhāgaprabhāsibhiḥ* |
> *prasādhyate sma dhavalair āśārājyaṃ balāhakaiḥ* ‖[77]

> Then the white clouds
> illuminating the horizon
> poured a rain of arrows
> to redeem
> the kingdom of the sky.

The sky's turn to autumn is described with a martial metaphor. It is easy to see that this is not a complete-set *rūpaka*: while the rain pour (*āsāradhārā*) is equated with arrows (*viśikha*) and the sky (*āśā*) with a kingdom (*rājya*), the white clouds (*balāhaka*) and the horizon (*nabhobhāga*) are not matched with an explicit standard of identification, such as warriors and the front line, respectively. But what sets this *ekadeśavṛtti* apart from the older and similarly named *ekadeśavivartin*? The explanation must lie in the "embrace" (*śliṣṭa*) in the verb *prasādhyate*, which refers both to the clouds' act of beautifying the sky in this season and to a forceful "seizing" of the heavenly "kingdom" (my translation tries to capture this duality with the verb "redeem"). This verb, too, thus supports the martial metaphor, although in a different and more tangible way than, say, the warriors, who are implied as the standard of the clouds but are never explicitly mentioned. The verb *prasādhyate* presumably allows the contextual operation of beautifying the sky to take place first, in connection

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[75] KAlSS 1.13ab: *samastavastuviṣayaṃ mālārūpakam ucyate* |.

[76] KAlSS 1.13cd: *yad vaikadeśavṛtti syāt pararūpeṇa rūpaṇāt* |.

[77] KAlSS, example 1.14.

with all the other beautifying aspects that are mentioned, and then, thanks to its polysemy (or, as Udbhaṭa would probably explain this, the perfect "embrace" of two verbs, one meaning "beautifying" and another "conquering"), it fits in with the military metaphor for capturing the kingdom, along with its other necessary implements, agents, and loci, some of which are only implied. It is the partial (*ekadeśa*) semantic operation (*vṛtti*, as in *guṇavṛtti*) – partial in the sense that it is limited to one cognitive moment resulting from this verb – that explains why Udbhaṭa's *ekadeśavṛtti* variety of *rūpaka* supplements Bhāmaha's *ekadeśavivartin*.

This, indeed, is what Indurāja maintains, and he caps his explanation with a surprising gloss on the word *ekadeśa* in the variety's name. He understands this seemingly straightforward nominal combination of the words *eka* (one) and *deśa* (place) as instead consisting of *ekadā* (at one point in time) and *īśa* (powerful), which *sandhi* resolution also allows and which supports his reading of the second semantic-cognitive operation here as a matter of temporal sequence: initially, the meaning that agrees with the verb *prasādhyate* is the one that fits with the contextual description of the beautiful autumnal sky, but then a second realization of the various semantic elements as construing with the verb in its martial sense becomes powerful. The first moment, Indurāja maintains, leads to *rūpaka* (of the partial-set type, with its explicit and implied identifications), but the second, if I understand him correctly, brings in a touch or shadow of *śliṣṭa* (*śleṣacchāyā*). So here, too, we have a multiphase semantic-cognitive sequence, and again each phase in this sequence seems responsible for a different aesthetic effect. But in an exact reversal of what we have seen in the previous section, here *rūpaka* comes in first, as the main ornament, and *śliṣṭa* dovetails in a partial, shadowy form. The reader may be right to be skeptical about Indurāja's unusual gloss on *ekadeśa*, and he, too, felt a need to cite a precedent from a particularly relevant and authoritative source to substantiate his gloss: Udbhaṭa's own *Vivaraṇa*. It is taken, of course, not from Udbhaṭa's commentary on the category of *ekadeśavṛtti*, because such a category did not yet exist in Bhāmaha, but from his gloss on Bhāmaha's definition of *viśeṣokti*, where Udbhaṭa analyzed Bhāmaha's *ekadeśa* as made of *ekadā* and *īśa*, and where he was clearly interested in precisely this same sort of cognitive alternation between two different meaning moments.[78] It is worth noting that the

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[78] *Laghuvṛtti*, pp. 14-15: *atra prasādhyata ity ayaṃ śabdaḥ śleṣacchāyayā dvayor arthayor vartate bhūṣaṇa upārjane ca. tatra bhūṣaṇaṃ prakṛtam. śaratsamayo*

other Kashmiri commentator on Udbhaṭa, Tilaka, also follows this ingenious gloss,[79] and I believe that both have correctly captured Udbhaṭa's understanding of *ekadeśavṛttirūpaka* as a *rūpaka* that is in control in the first meaning moment.

To summarize what we have seen so far: Udbhaṭa silently rejects Bhāmaha's approach to both *śliṣṭa* and *rūpaka* as logical relationships between an X (*upameya*) and a Y (*upamāna*) and instead adopts a radically different analysis that is rooted in a nuanced attention to the context-governed semantic processes that each is now understood to entail, and which he borrows from other disciplines, particularly Mīmāṃsā. Moreover, in both *śliṣṭa* (as Udbhaṭa explained it) and *rūpaka* (as explained by his trustworthy commentator Indurāja), the semantic-cognitive operation is multiphase, so that each phase is responsible for a different aesthetic effect or ornament. Put differently, *śliṣṭa* and *rūpaka*, as they are now understood, each correspond to one semantic-cognitive step in a chain of reactions, wherein they can be either the trigger or the triggered, and which involves aesthetic hierarchy: the initial impression is a full-blown ornament, while the later one, which also seems necessarily to involve a reflection on the former, tends to have a more shadowy presence (*pratibhā*, *chāyā*). Nothing of this has any precedent in older discussions of ornaments, and we begin to realize the dramatic theoretical breakthrough in the Jayāpīḍa moment.

6. MULTIPHASE MIXTURES AND THE AESTHETICS OF COGNITIVE MISSTEPS

Many more examples of this trend could be supplied. There is, for instance, the entire rethinking of mixtures in this period along the

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hy atra prastutaḥ. tatra ca śuklair balāhakair diśo bhūṣyante. yad upārjanaṃ tad aprakṛtatvād atra param anyat. tasya ca parasyāprakṛtasyopārjanasya yat tadrūpaṃ kārakakadambakaṃ yena tad rūpavat kriyate nṛpaviśikharājyasaṅgrāmabhūmyātmakaṃ tenātra yathākramaṃ balāhakāsāradhārādiṅnabhobhāgānāṃ rūpyatvenābhimatānāṃ rūpaṇā vihitā. tenātraikadeśavṛttitvam. ekadeśavṛttīty atra hy ekadānyadeśaḥ prabhaviṣṇur yo 'sau vākyārthas tadvṛttitvaṃ rūpakasyābhimatam. viśeṣoktilakṣaṇe ca bhāmahavivaraṇe bhaṭṭodbhaṭena ekadeśaśabda evaṃ vyākhyāto yathehāsmābhir nirūpitaḥ. tatra viśeṣoktilakṣaṇam "ekadeśasya vigame yā guṇāntarasaṃstutiḥ | viśeṣaprathanāyāsau viśeṣoktir matā yathā ǁ." iti tenātra viśeṣoktilakṣaṇavad ekadeśaśabdena anyadā prabhaviṣṇur vākyārtha ucyate. anyatra cānyadā prabhaviṣṇūpārjanam aprakṛtaṃ hi tac chleṣavaśenātra nītam. tenātraikadeśavṛttitā.

[79]   *Vivṛti*, p. 10.

lines we have just seen. The mixture (*saṃsṛṣṭi*) of ornaments is traditionally thought of as an ornamental variety in its own right. Bhāmaha defined it as the mere coexistence of several ornaments, regardless of possible interrelations.[80] This must have troubled Daṇḍin, because he insisted in his corresponding discussion on the possibility of hierarchy among the ornamental devices involved. Mixtures, he said, can be of two kinds, "depending on whether one component is deemed primary (*aṅgin*) and the other supportive (*aṅga*), or whether they are seen as equivalent in terms of their relative importance."[81] This stipulation, however, has more to do with the logical or aesthetic relations between the ornaments than with the semantic operations and temporal cognitive scenarios they entail, and in any case Daṇḍin had his reasons not to expand on the topic of mixtures more than was absolutely necessary.[82]

All this changed quite dramatically during the Jayāpīḍa moment, in which mixtures and their cognition become a major topic of attention. Udbhaṭa has no less than four categories of what he calls "fusion" (*saṃkara*) on top of Bhāmaha's mixture (*saṃsṛṣṭi*), and his analysis is all about semantic and mental scenarios. Take, for example, the first subcategory of fusion, where the charm is in the fact that the reader is left in some kind of aesthetic limbo about the operating ornament in a given passage. This sort of fusion, which Indurāja dubbed "doubt," is defined as "the impression of a plurality of ornaments, when they cannot operate simultaneously, and when the grasping of any one of them involves neither a decisive reason in its

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[80] KAl 3.49: *varā vibhūṣā saṃsṛṣṭir bahvalaṃkārayogataḥ | racitā ratnamāleva sā caivam uditā yathā ||*.

[81] KĀ 2.357cd-358: *nānālaṃkārasaṃsṛṣṭiḥ saṃsṛṣṭis tu nigadyate || aṅgāṅgibhā-vāvasthānaṃ sarveṣāṃ samakakṣatā | ity alaṃkārasaṃsṛṣṭer lakṣaṇīyā dvayī gatiḥ ||*.

[82] Consistent with his emphasis on ornaments' subtypes as the main arena for creative variation, Daṇḍin begins this discussion by reminding his readers that he has already dealt with the devices that are appended to Bhāmaha's list, where they are seen as either independent ornaments (e.g., *ananvaya*) or mixtures thereof (e.g., *upamārūpaka*), as subtypes of their respective parent ornaments, where, he believes, they truly belong. He then proceeds to curtail the importance of Bhāmaha's "best embellishment," so that where Bhāmaha gave a pair of examples of his one type of "mixture," Daṇḍin uncharacteristically supplies only a single example even though he insists that there are two methods for mixing ornaments (KĀ 2.356-359). In addition, Daṇḍin silently appropriates at least one of Bhāmaha's "mixtures" into the fold of his ornamental subtypes. Compare, for example, KAl 3.50 with KĀ 2.179 f.

favor nor any counterreason against it."[83] Indurāja explains in some detail how this is a case where several ornaments vie for our attention at successive cognitive moments without allowing us to reach a conclusive decision.[84] We need not follow every particular of Indurāja's fascinating discussion to realize that all the aspects we have been examining are prominently manifested in it and also in Udbhaṭa's own words: the focus on semantic operations (*vṛtti*); the importance of sequence (*samam... asaṃbhave*); the close attention to what goes on in the mind of the listener, where various inferential signs are sought in order to corroborate or eliminate the individual ornaments (*ekasya ca grahe nyāyadoṣābhāve*); and the regard for the more shadowy impressions (*ullekha*) ornaments may leave in the mind.

Vāmana was perhaps trying to take the discussion one step further by ignoring amalgamations of independent ornaments in the way Bhāmaha understood them and most of Udbhaṭa's varieties of fusion and by arguing, instead, that mixtures should be understood purely as hierarchical relations among aesthetic devices, each embodying a separate cognitive moment. Thus he was trying to limit mixture to just one semantic-cognitive scenario of succession and subordination, as his definition succinctly states: "Mixture is an ornament that begets an ornament."[85] Indeed, Sahadeva, in a lengthy miniessay that he appends to his commentary on Vāmana's section on ornaments, systematically refutes all of Udbhaṭa's categories of mixture and fusion but one and concludes by stating that it is only Udbhaṭa's last type of fusion, dubbed the "assisted-assistant" type by Indurāja (*anugrāhyānugrāhaka*), that Vāmana accepted when speaking of "mixtures."[86] Rudraṭa, for his part, was less restrictive and may have been leaning more toward Udbhaṭa, if we are to judge by the terminology he uses (*saṃkara* rather than *saṃsṛṣṭi*). But it is palpably clear that he, too, like the other thinkers in the Jayāpīḍa moment, was interested in mixtures from the listener's cognitive-

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[83] KAlSS 5.11: *anekālaṃkriyollekhe samaṃ tadvṛttyasaṃbhave | ekasya ca grahe nyāyadoṣābhāve ca saṃkaraḥ ||*.

[84] *Laghuvṛtti*, pp. 68-69.

[85] KAlSū 4.3.30: *alaṃkārasyālaṃkārayonitvaṃ saṃsṛṣṭiḥ*. Vāmana goes on to show that ornaments found in Bhāmaha, such as *upamārūpaka* and *utprekṣāvayava*, are really instances or subtypes of mixture thus defined, thereby using his new definition of mixtures to lend the ornamental tools in his box added coherence.

[86] KAlSūṬ, f. 89: *anugrāhyānugrāhakasaṃkaras tu gṛhīta eva.*

aesthetic perspective. Thus he divided fusions into two types, based on whether the components of the blending remain distinct in our mind, as in mixtures of rice and sesame, or become indistinguishable from one another, as in the water-and-milk variety.[87]

Udbhaṭa's assigning a unique aesthetic pleasure to a reflection on ambiguous ornamental cocktails and Rudraṭa's water-and-milk metaphor for a similar sense of inconclusiveness call to mind a related mode of analysis that is particularly prominent in the Jayāpīḍa moment: the grounding of ornaments in scenarios that entail, first, a cognitive misstep and, second, a subsequent realization of it as such. Consider Udbhaṭa's ornament of apparent redundancy, *punaruktavadābhāsa*. It has already been recognized that Udbhaṭa's removal of Bhāmaha's *yamaka* (twinning) and placing, in its stead, this newly coined ornament at the very beginning of his KAlSS, where he generally follows Bhāmaha's list and its arbitrary order very closely, was a bold and deliberate statement that was meant to call attention to its innovativeness.[88] The boldness did not end there: Udbhaṭa also used his commentary on Bhāmaha's text for a lengthy discussion and a tripartite illustration of *punaruktavadābhāsa*, despite the fact that Bhāmaha knew nothing of this ornament.[89] But what was the reason for this move, which does not seem to be motivated solely (if at all) by observation of the poetic praxis and cannot be reduced to some aversion to *yamaka*?[90] Could it be that Udbhaṭa wanted to signal the importance of aesthetic pleasure as rooted in semantic-cognitive scenarios of the sort discussed earlier? After all, the charm of *punaruktavadābhāsa* rests undeniably in the fact that the reader, at first blush (*upakramāvasthā*), misjudges words such as *nāga* and *kuñjara* as both denoting "elephant" (*gajavācitvenaikārthatvaṃ pratibhāti*), and then this initial impression is blocked by further consideration of the way the signifieds are construed together (*padārthā-*

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[87] *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 10.25: *yogavaśād eteṣāṃ tilataṇḍulavac ca dugdhajalavac ca | vyaktāvyaktāṃśatvāt saṃkara utpadyate dvedhā ‖*.

[88] Basistha perceptively compared this move to Daṇḍin's topping of the traditional set of devices with *svabhāvokti*, an ornament the aesthetic merit of which Bhāmaha had explicitly denied (BASISTHA 2003, p. 116).

[89] *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 19. For a good discussion of this passage, see KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979a. See also BASISTHA 2003, pp. 116-120.

[90] Krishnamoorthy maintains that this figure was nonexistent in pre-Udbhaṭa poetry, and that one of the first poets to actually use it after Udbhaṭa was Ānandavardhana himself (KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979a, pp. 31-32).

nvayaparyālocanayā tu tad bādhyate) – a very Kumārila-like scenario.[91] And surely, this second cognitive moment, when the reader realizes that the word *kuñjara* here modifies the elephant (*nāga*) as "fabulous" or "preeminent," is followed by a third, where the falseness of the initial impression is realized as such and the craftiness of the poet is cherished. This further realization is the key to the charm of the new ornament and the reason for the presence of the word "apparent" (*ābhāsa*) in its name. The pages of the KAlSS are full of cases where such appearances (*ābhāsa*), impressions (*ullekha*), and shadowy presences or mental impression (*chāyā, pratibhā*) are recorded in the mind, are recognized as such, and cause aesthetic pleasure, and it may well be that to call attention to this new notion of the aesthetic Udbhaṭa began his book with *punaruktavadābhāsa* instead of *yamaka*, or, in fact, as a new framework within which to explain *yamaka*, hitherto analyzed only in formal-structural terms, as an ornament whose charm is based on exactly this sort of cognitive scenario.[92] And as we shall see in the next section, *ābhāsa*s and other misconceptions are a trademark of poetics in the Jayāpīḍa moment.

7. *UTPREKṢĀ, ADHYAVASĀNA*, AND VĀMANA'S THEORIZATION OF ORNAMENTS

The clearest example of this tendency is Vāmana's crucial and entirely overlooked redefinition of *utprekṣā*, for which the common translation is "poetic fancy," but which I prefer to call "seeing as." *Utprekṣā* has always been understood as entailing an act of fictive-creative imagination, as in seeing darkness as rubbing the body with a thick black ointment.[93] As in other instances I have examined, ear-

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91 This is the explanation given in Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 3, apropos of Udbhaṭa's example.

92 In his *Vivaraṇa*, Udbhaṭa suggests that *yamaka* should be seen as just one instance of the more expansive and hitherto unknown *punaruktavadābhāsa* (see frag. 1, l. 5, where he considers and rejects an objection arguing for a categorical distinction between the two). If this is correct, the reanalysis of *yamaka*, too, is entirely based on the cognitive sequence it entails: how it looks to us redundant at first, and how we go on to resolve the evident redundancy it contains. I am grateful to Lawrence McCrea for calling my attention to this line in the *Vivaraṇa* and its significance.

93 The example, which is cited and discussed in KĀ 2.224-232, is actually far more complex, and it is not simple to decide what is imagined as what, as is

ly writers felt no need to relate such imaginative moments to theories of erroneous perceptions and cognitive blunders that were abundantly available in other *śāstra*s. But this theoretical freedom was precisely what literary thinkers in the Jayāpīḍa moment were willing to sacrifice in order to make Sanskrit poetics an academic discipline. It is in this context that we must understand Vāmana's identification of *utprekṣā* with *adhyavasāna* or its close synonym *adhyavasāya*,[94] which, as in the case of Udbhaṭa's rethinking of *rūpaka*, is an innovation that is closely modeled on a recent development in another field.

This field is logic, and more precisely Buddhist epistemology. As McCrea and Patil explain in an excellent essay, the meaning of *adhyavasāna* underwent important developments in the line of thinkers following Dharmakīrti. For Dharmakīrti, they show, it was an inferential determination – useful and indeed necessary from a pragmatic point of view, but nonetheless erroneous – that our mental concepts and images are identical with external objects. The usefulness of such a misidentification is evident in the successful equation of the particulars with our mental universals for them, or in inferring fire from smoke. As McCrea and Patil demonstrate, for Dharmakīrti, this was but one cognitive misstep in a whole palette of inferential and perceptual misjudgments, leading to "the misidentification of our own conceptual images with objects that are not perceptually available to us at all."[95] McCrea and Patil also show that Dharmakīrti's notion of *adhyavasāna* was significantly expanded by his commentator Dharmottara, who took it to be a necessary feature in every act of perceptual awareness: "For Dharmottara, an episode of valid awareness, whether perceptual or inferential, is not a single event, but a process made up of two stages. In the first stage, an object is grasped – that is, its image is directly presented to awareness. In the second stage, we determine a second and distinct object

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shown in a pair of excellent forthcoming essays by Gary Tubb (TUBB forthcoming a and b).

[94] KAlSū 4.3.9: *atadrūpasyānyathādhyavasānam atiśayārtham utprekṣā*. That the two terms are synonyms for Vāmana is made clear in his immediate glossing of one with the other: *adhyavasānam adhyavasāyaḥ*.

[95] McCREA AND PATIL 2006, p. 313.

that can be attained – that is, an object upon which we may act." This second step is *adhyavasāna*.[96]

There are several features of Dharmottara's rethinking of *adhyavasāna* that make it particularly handy and attractive for Vāmana's purposes. First, there is the immediate availability of his innovation: Dharmottara was Vāmana's colleague at Jayāpīḍa's court, another stellar intellectual in this king's galaxy of scholars, as Kalhaṇa reports in the passage with which this essay began.[97] Second, Dharmottara's two-phase understanding of perception and the role of *adhyavasāna* therein fit the new general interest in Jayāpīḍa-moment poetics in the aesthetics of multiphase cognitive sequences, not unlike Kumārila's two-phase notion of *guṇavṛtti*, which became the basis of Udbhaṭa's *rūpaka*. Third, and more specifically, applying *adhyavasāna* to the *perception* of one object as another, which has long been the understanding of *utprekṣā*, or seeing as, allowed Vāmana to explain this ornament accurately while using cutting-edge theories from the highly respected discipline of logic. Note, by the way, that Vāmana's quick adoption of the revised *adhyavasāna*, if I am right in making this link, indicates that the innovation that McCrea and Patil identified in Dharmottara was immediately noticed in wider intellectual circles, beyond the epistemological discourse per se.

Even more important, *adhyavasāna* helped Vāmana organize ornaments as occupying a spectrum of increasing imaginative-cognitive fictitiousness. First, as Vāmana explains, *utprekṣā* goes beyond *rūpaka*, which is based on the superimposition (*adhyāropa*) of the traits of one entity on another, and *vakrokti*, based as it is on *lakṣaṇā*, in that it alone involves the further step of perceptual misidentification (*adhyavasāna*). Second, the long-recognized ornaments of "doubt" (*sandeha*, which is different from the doubt type of fusion discussed earlier) and "antithesis" (*virodha*) are now seen as part of the same spectrum: doubt (*sandeha*), says Vāmana, is an inconclusive knowledge, whereas seeing-as (*utprekṣā*) entails an erroneous knowledge, and antithesis (*virodha*) is for the first time defined as the false impression of something as antithetical (*viruddhābhāsatva*)

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[96] Ibid., p. 326. See also RATIÉ 2010 for further analysis of Dharmottara's notion of *adhyavasāna* in ordinary perception and imagination and the fascinating legacy of *utprekṣā* in later Kashmiri thinking. See also Somdev Vasudeva's contribution in this volume.

[97] RT 4.498.

– another of Vāmana's key innovations and a further example of the growing interest in the Jayāpīḍa moment in the aesthetic value of apparent cognitive certainties and the realization of them as such.[98] In other words, the importation of concepts from logic, and in particular the new notion of *adhyavasāna*, allowed Vāmana to turn a bunch of ornaments that tradition had handed to him as unrelated devices into a far more coherent set of aesthetic tools that were based on a series of interrelated fictive or fictitious cognitive moments; it also allowed him, for the first time in the history of the tradition, to reorder the hitherto rather random list of ornaments in a way that reflected his new theoretical understanding of them.[99]

Take, for example, Vāmana's fascinating insight into the key distinction between *utprekṣā* (seeing as) and *atiśayokti* (intensification).[100] For him, the first of this newly conceived pair involves only one fictitious determination (*adhyavasāna*), while the second is a more layered imaginative act: "Intensification is the imagining of a conceived attribute [followed by] the imagining of its eminence."[101] In other words, Vāmana was reinterpreting the traditional *atiśayokti* as an even more complex cognitive scenario – an act consisting of multiple imaginative moments. Think, in this context, of Daṇḍin's illustration of this ornament: a verse that depicts women who set out at night to meet their lovers and, given the whiteness of their clothes, become invisible in the moonlight.[102] Vāmana replaces Daṇḍin's illustration, in the simple *anuṣṭubh* meter, with one that expands on the same theme in the far more complex, rare *pādākulaka* meter – it is hard to say whether this verse is inspired by Daṇḍin or is the original on which Daṇḍin's textbook example was based – and the verse is now understood as entailing a twofold act of imagination: first,

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[98] KAlSū, before 4.3.11: *yathā bhrāntijñānasvarūpotprekṣā tathā saṃśayajñāna-svarūpo sandeho 'pīti darśayitum āha*. On antithesis, see 4.3.12 and its introduction: *sandehavad virodho 'pi prāptāvasara ity āha: viruddhābhāsatvaṃ virodhaḥ*.

[99] Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa, while occasionally highlighting their differences from Bhāmaha in a pinpointed change in the list of devices and its order, nonetheless adhered to its otherwise mostly arbitrary order. But after Vāmana's radical revision and attempt to organize the list in a way that was theory-based, there was no looking back.

[100] KAlSū, introduction to 4.3.10: *utprekṣaivātiśayoktir iti kecit. tannirāsārtham āha*.

[101] Ibid., 4.3.10: *sambhāvyadharmatadutkarṣakalpanātiśayoktiḥ*.

[102] KĀ 2.293. The verse itself is an echo of Bhāmaha's example of the excessive whiteness of the *saptacchada* blossom, also invisible in moonlight (KAl 2.82).

of the extraordinary whiteness of the women's apparel and complexion, and second, based on it, of their disappearance in broad moonlight.[103]

The verse depicting the women at night is Vāmana's second example of *atiśayokti*. Before this he supplies an illustration from Māgha that involves imagining, first, the Gaṅgā falling in two streams from heaven rather than in one, and second, that heaven, now supplied with its imagined two-pronged Gaṅgā, is comparable to Kṛṣṇa's Tamāla-dark chest with its bright, pearl strings.[104] One interesting thing about this illustration of *atiśayokti* is that it is already cited in Udbhaṭa's *Vivaraṇa*, also while discussing *atiśayokti*, even though Udbhaṭa's understanding of this figure may well have been different.[105] Thus Vāmana's short discussion, with its brief definition and two illustrations, is carefully tied to a coherent spectrum of ornaments, is rich in echoes and citations from the praxis, and engages other treatises in the discipline of poetics. In all of this it clearly led the way for later discussions of ornaments. Indeed, although I do not have the space here to discuss the full implications of Vāmana's rethinking of *utprekṣā* and its related devices, let me briefly note that this move was the basis of the subsequent theoretical revolution in thinking about ornaments in Kashmir. Ruyyaka, the great twelfth-century Kashmiri theoretician, identified *utprekṣā* with *adhyvasāna* and understood *atiśayokti* as a further step in the same fictitious determination of things as they are not, a part of his even more thoroughgoing rethinking of ornaments as imaginatively engaging with the real.[106] It has been said that "Ruyyaka is the first author to introduce *adhyavasāya* in *utprekṣā*," but in fact he is deeply and openly indebted to Vāmana in this and in his larger attempt to theorize ornaments.[107]

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[103] KAlSū, second example after 4.3.10.

[104] KAlSū, after 4.3.10; cf. Māgha, *Śiśupālavadha* 3.8.

[105] *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 37b, ll. 6-7.

[106] For Ruyyaka, *utprekṣā* is *adhyvasāya* with an emphasis on the process (*adhyavasāye vyāpāraprādhānye*), and *atiśayokti* is an *adhyvasāya* with an emphasis on the product (*adhyavāsitaprādhānye*; *Alaṃkārasarvasva* 22-23). For a fascinating essay on Ruyyaka's understanding of *utprekṣā*, see SHULMAN 2012, pp. 55-62.

[107] It is thus not a coincidence that Ruyyaka's first example for *utprekṣā* (*sa vaḥ pāyād induḥ*; *Alaṃkārasarvasva*, p. 71) is the same one given by Vāmana and becomes a standard example in later discourse. The quote is from JANAKI 1965,

8. UDBHAṬA'S RETHINKING OF *PARYĀYOKTA*

Although Vāmana's reformulation of *utprekṣā* fits well with the attempts to rethink ornaments along the lines of semantic-cognitive theories from other fields, it is a detour for us in that it came to full fruition not in Ānanda's essay on suggestion but with Ruyyaka in a much later moment in the discourse on ornaments. Given my interest in the more immediate impact of the Jayāpīḍa moment, let us return to Udbhaṭa and to one final example from his work, that of *paryāyokta*, or "speaking around," a device that he rethought in a way that importantly prefigured Ānanda's notion of *dhvani*.

Both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin understood *paryāyokta* as a case in which a speaker indirectly refers to something the direct mention of which is better avoided. The examples of both authors make it clear that what is spoken around in *paryāyokta* is some truth, presumably known to both speaker and listener, that is replaced with some obvious pretext because of considerations of decorum. Bhāmaha cites the now-lost *Ratnāharaṇa*, where Kṛṣṇa refuses Śiśupāla's offering of food he knows is poisoned by citing the custom of eating only what was first offered to Brahmins.[108] Daṇḍin's example, wherein a speaker has arranged a rendezvous of two lovers and dismisses herself by a transparent pretext, has a similar logic, albeit in a very different context and mood: what the friend wants to convey to the pair of lovers is that this is the time to consummate their love (*tadrasotsavaṃ nirvartayitum*), but she does so by telling them to wait while she tends to an urgent and entirely bogus gardening activity. As Daṇḍin explains in his definition, speaking around is "when one avoids stating one's desired goal directly and, instead, comes up with a speech in a different fashion that accomplishes this very goal."[109] This is probably meant to elaborate on Bhāmaha's definition, which is little more than a tautological gloss on the ornament's name ("*paryāyokta* is that which is said in a different fashion"; *paryāyoktaṃ yad anyena prakāreṇābhidhīyate*).[110] Clearly, both au-

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p. 107, although the misperception is widespread and although Janaki's introduction is an outstanding piece of scholarship.

[108] KAl 3.8cd-9: *uvāca ratnāharaṇe caidyaṃ śārṅgadhanur yathā ‖ gṛheṣv adhvasu vā nānnaṃ bhuñjmahe yad adhītinaḥ | na bhuñjate dvijās tac ca rasadānanivṛttaye ‖.*

[109] KĀ 2.293: *artham iṣṭam anākhyāya sākṣāt tasyaiva siddhaye | yat prakārāntarākhyānaṃ paryāyoktaṃ tad īdṛśam ‖.*

[110] KAl 3.8.

thors understood this ornament as a relationship between two meanings, one expressed and another intended, but neither was particularly interested in exploring the process leading from one to the other.

Turning to Udbhaṭa we immediately realize that he does not see *paryāyokta* as confined merely to cases of white lies. His example depicts Śiva as having the wives of the demon Gajāsura wear their hair disheveled, cry, pound their breasts, and break their bangles. In this way, Śiva's slaying of Gajāsura is insinuated or "spoken around."[111] Udbhaṭa thus vastly expands *paryāyokta* into a more general mode of indirect speech. And as we have come to expect, the aesthetic effect of this device is grounded in a specific, multi-phase semantic-cognitive scenario:

> *paryāyoktaṃ yad anyena prakāreṇābhidhīyate |*
> *vācyavācakavṛttibhyāṃ śūnyenāvagamātmanā ‖*[112]

> *Paryāyokta* is what is said in a different fashion, namely, in a way that is cognized in a process that is different from the operations of the signifiers and signifieds.

This definition, which reshaped the discussion of this ornament in later centuries,[113] consists of two distinct halves: in the first, Udbhaṭa repeats Bhāmaha's words verbatim, a point I will return to later, but the second is entirely new and signature Udbhaṭa. *Paryāyokta*, we learn, entails three stages. First, there is the operation of the individual signifiers (*vācaka*), each of which signifies its own signified.[114] This is followed by the operation of the signifieds (*vācya*) themselves when they are construed with one another. For Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa school, this is a straightforward explanation of meaning production along the lines of the "from signified to syntax" theorem (*abhihitānvaya*), and indeed, Indurāja, in explaining the passage,

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[111] KAlSS, example 4.6: *yena lambālakaḥ sāsraḥ karaghātāruṇastanaḥ | akāri bhagnavalayo gajāsuravadhūjanaḥ ‖*.

[112] KAlSS 4.6.

[113] It is repeated by Abhinavagupta as the ornament's definition (see *Locana*, p. 117) and then used as the basis for some rewording by both Mammaṭa (*paryāyoktaṃ vinā vācyavācakatvena yad vacaḥ*; *Kāvyaprakāśa*, p. 680) and Ruyyaka (*gamyasyāpi bhaṅgyantareṇābhidhānaṃ paryāyoktam*; *Alaṃkārasarvasva*, p. 141).

[114] As Indurāja explains: *vācakasyābhidhāyakasya svaśabdasya vṛttir vyāpāro vācyārthapratyāyanam* (*Laghuvṛtti*, p. 55).

echoes the words of Kumārila, Udbhaṭa's likely inspiration here as well.[115] From the point of view of Sanskrit poetics, this Mīmāṃsā speak is radically new. But what may have come as news to literary specialists and Mīmāṃsakas alike was Udbhaṭa's introduction of a third and independent semantic-cognitive phase, when the intended meaning is finally cognized or, indeed, suggested (*avagamātmanā*), which is how Abhinava himself glossed the term.[116] It is this phase alone that Udbhaṭa identified with the aesthetic effect of *paryāyokta*.

What exactly happens in this phase? In his KAlSS, Udbhaṭa characterizes it only negatively, as separate from the first two phases, and the relevant portion of his *Vivaraṇa*, where he might have explained this in more detail, is now lost. Indurāja, in his commentary on this passage, adds only that this phase's different expressivity is a cognition or insinuation (*avagamanasvabhāvena*) that comes about through (overall?) semantic implication (*arthasāmarthyātmanā*), and that, at least in the illustration, the cause (Gajāsura's death) is insinuated by its effect (his wives' intense lamentation).[117] But Indurāja returns to this topic in an epilogue to his commentary in which he tries to convince his readers that every aesthetic effect that Ānandavardhana attributed to suggestion could be explained as the doing of ornaments as analyzed by Udbhaṭa. *Paryāyokta* figures prominently in this discussion (as does *śliṣṭa*). Indeed, Indurāja begins his epilogue by quoting a very similar verse to the one Udbhaṭa has given, which clearly involves *paryāyokta* in the way Udbhaṭa defined and illustrated it, but which was explained by Ānanda as involving suggestion as well. In this verse Viṣṇu's beheading of Rāhu, which did away with this demon's body but still left him with his head (the cause), is intimated by stating that from the elaborate love life of this demon's wives, kissing alone remained (the effect).[118] For Ānanda, this is a case where the intended suggested

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[115] *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 55: *vāc[yas]ya tv abhidheyasya vyāpāro vācyāntareṇa sahākāṅkṣāsaṃnidhiyogyatāmāhātmyāt saṃsargagamanam.* Cf. Kumārilabhaṭṭa, TV 455: *ākāṅkṣā saṃnidhānaṃ ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam | sambandhakāraṇatvena kḷptaṃ nāntaraśrutiḥ ‖.*

[116] *Locana*, p. 118: *avagamātmanā vyaṅgyena.* I come back to Abhinava's discussion of this definition in n. 133 below.

[117] *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 55: *atra lambālakatvādayaḥ kāryarūpatvāt kāraṇabhūtaṃ gajāsuravadhaṃ vācyavācakavyāpārāspṛṣṭam api gamayanti.*

[118] *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 86: *cakrābhighātaprasabhājñayaiva cakāra yo rāhuvadhūjanasya | āliṅganoddāmavilāsavandhyaṃ ratotsavaṃ cumbanamātraśeṣam ‖.* Cf. Ānandavardhana, DhvĀ, p. 225.

meaning is the emotional flavor (*rasa*) of Viṣṇu's heroism, and *pa-ryāyokta* is a humble sidekick (although, as has been pointed out, Ānanda seemed concerned that the sidekick outshone the hero here).[119] Indurāja, however, points out that what is suggested in this case, as in Udbhaṭa's very similar example, is neither an ornament nor a *rasa* but merely a piece of narrative content (*vastumātra*): the fact that Rāhu was beheaded and his head lived on. Indurāja reminds his readers that Ānanda himself divided suggestion according to the suggested content: a bare narrative fact (*vastumātra*), an ornament, or an emotional component (*rasādi*). And the suggestion of bare narrative facts, he maintains, requires no new theorization of the sort Ānanda proposed, since it is exactly what Udbhaṭa called *paryāyokta*.[120]

In this manner Indurāja systematically shows that all the other categories Ānanda devised for suggestion are nothing but the workings of the different ornaments in Udbhaṭa's book.[121] Indurāja, of course, had an axe to grind. But it is clear that thinkers in the Jayā-pīḍa moment prefigured Ānanda's ideas and analyses of suggestion in speaking, for example, of what "is cognized in a process that is different from the operations of the signifiers and signifieds" (as in Udbhaṭa's definition of *paryāyokta*),[122] or of one meaning as enabling the understanding of another (as in Rudraṭa's thorough analysis

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[119] DhvĀ, p. 225: *atra hi paryāyoktasyāṅgitvena vivakṣā rasāditātparye saty apīti.* For a discussion of this passage and the problem of the sidekick, see INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 276-277.

[120] For a comprehensive discussion of this passage in Indurāja, see MCCREA 2008, pp. 312-316.

[121] Later in the passage Indurāja also argues that a further ornament, such as *rūpa-ka*, could also be insinuated through either *paryāyokta* or *śliṣṭa*, in the way Ud-bhaṭa understood them, and *rasādi* through a variety of other ornaments, and he goes through Ānanda's other subtypes for suggestion, showing that all of them can be found in Udbhaṭa's ornaments. For more, see MCCREA 2008, pp. 311-330.

[122] Thus, although Ingalls believes that Indurāja's conclusion is exaggerated, he concedes that Udbhaṭa "speaks of a meaning being understood (*pratīyamāna*), or implied (*gamyate*), or of its being included (*antargata*) in another meaning," even though "he avoids using the more technical terms *vyajyate* or *dhvanyate* for 'is suggested.'" Ingalls, moreover, believes on the basis of Ānanda's quote of Manoratha's criticism of those who understood *dhvani* but failed to explain it, that Udbhaṭa was already familiar with this terminology. Indeed, he says, "Indurāja's remark is justified to this extent: Udbhaṭa was fully aware of the

of *śleṣa*), and, more generally, in grounding the discussion on poetics in semantic-cognitive scenarios. It is no wonder that Ānanda often had to bend over backward to distinguish between his notion of suggestion and ornaments such as *paryāyokta* and *śliṣṭa*.[123]

9. *ABHIDHĀ* AND *RASA*: UDBHAṬA'S THEORY?

More examples can be easily provided,[124] but I think that the picture is clear enough. Thinkers of the Jayāpīḍa moment were hard at work revolutionizing the discourse on ornaments and making it academic. They each sought to produce a foundational text for the nascent discipline and a scholastic-commentarial tradition in the pattern of the senior *śāstra*s; they turned their attention from textbook examples to actual praxis and from the writer to the reader; they grounded aesthetic effects in semantic capacities (*vṛtti*s) and complex and often reflexive cognitive scenarios, with hierarchies that regularly culminated in implied meanings of various sorts (narrative contents, ornaments, and emotional flavors); and, precisely for this purpose, they extensively borrowed models, terminology, and analytic modes

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type of semantic operation that Ānanda was later to call suggestiveness (*vyañjakatva, dhvani*) and of the importance to poetry of the suggestions which it could bring about." INGALLS 1990, p. 9.

123   "In *paryāyokta* (statement of periphrasis), if the suggestion is predominant we may include it in *dhvani*. But by no means may we include *dhvani* in it, for as we shall demonstrate, *dhvani* is of much wider range and is always the predominant element. Furthermore, in the examples such as adduced by Bhāmaha, the suggestion is *not* predominant, because there is no intention there of subordinating the literal sense" (*paryāyokte 'pi yadi prādhānyena vyaṅgyatvaṃ tad bhavatu nāma tasya dhvanāv antarbhāvaḥ. na tu dhvanes tatrāntarbhāvaḥ. tasya mahāviṣayatvenāṅgitvena ca pratipādayiṣyamāṇatvāt. na punaḥ paryāyokte bhāmahodāhṛtasadṛśe vyaṅgyasyaiva prādhānyam, vākyasya tatropasarjanābhāvenāvivakṣitatvāt*; DhvĀ, pp. 118-119; transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 149-150). Note that Ānanda finds it more convenient here to mention Bhāmaha's example and gloss over Udbhaṭa's.

124   I will briefly mention only two additional and particularly understudied examples from a much longer list of candidates. The first is Udbhaṭa's *kāvyaliṅga*, a new ornament defined as the understanding that X is a cause for recollection or direct experience of Y (KAlSS 6.7: *śrutam ekaṃ yad anyatra smṛter anubhavasya vā | hetutāṃ pratipadyeta kāvyaliṅgaṃ tad ucyate ‖*). I mention this ornament briefly later. The second is Vāmana's *ākṣepa*, which he defined as two ways of suggesting a simile: negatively, by dismissing the standard as useless, but also through a more positive route of suggestion that is strongly reminiscent of Ānanda's *dhvani* (*upamānasyākṣepataḥ pratipattiḥ... upamānāni gamyante*; KAlSū ad 4.3.27).

from other disciplines, particularly Mīmāṃsā (e.g., *guṇavṛtti*, *lakṣa-ṇā*, *tantra*, *abhihitānvaya*, and the one-word, one-meaning axiom), but also epistemology (*adhyavasāna*) and grammar (*mayūravyaṃ-saka*). All these developments shaped the discussion on poetics in the coming centuries, and all are highly visible in Ānanda's seminal essay on suggestion, with its Mīmāṃsā-based semantic-hierarchical model and the various cognitive scenarios it identifies with different aesthetic responses. In trying to evaluate Ānanda's innovativeness more accurately in the context of these earlier changes, two crucial questions merit further examination: did thinkers like Udbhaṭa have a comprehensive and coherent semantic-aesthetic theory of which the preceding instances were part, and, if so, what place did *rasa* play in it?

These questions were already raised and given surprising an-swers several decades ago, but with little or no following. The most important and largely ignored attempt to answer the first is an essay by Sivaprasad Bhattacharyya, "Abhidhāvṛtti in Udbhaṭa," which ap-peared in 1962, the same year in which Raniero Gnoli published the surviving fragments from the *Vivaraṇa*. Bhattacharyya pieced toge-ther some of the just-published fragments with a vast number of ci-tations of or allusions to Udbhaṭa's work in later tradition and made several bold arguments about his vision (although it is easy to lose sight of some of them in his dense prose style): (1) Udbhaṭa did have a comprehensive semantic theory of poetry. (2) This theory was bas-ed on a layered notion of *abhidhā*, a broad semantic capacity that included literal (*śruti* or *mukhyavṛtti*), figurative (*guṇavṛtti*), and suggestive operations. (3) Later thinkers were well aware of and strongly indebted to Udbhaṭa's theory of *abhidhā* and, in the case of Ānanda and Abhinava, struggled to show how *dhvani* differed from it. (4) Udbhaṭa also had a complete and related aesthetic theory that, like Ānanda's model, included all known poetic elements: orna-ments, virtues (*guṇa*s), and emotional factors, such as *bhāva* and *rasa*.[125]

It is not easy to assess Bhattacharyya's arguments, but it is clear that *abhidhā* and its synonym *abhidhāna* were extremely important to Udbhaṭa, and that his notion of these terms was far broader than what we typically tend to associate with them today. Consider, in this context, a partially preserved discussion from an early passage

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[125] BHATTACHARYYA 1962.

in the *Vivaraṇa* apropos of a verse wherein Bhāmaha, when introducing poetry, provides a seemingly straightforward list of the fields of knowledge it presupposes. The third in this list – after grammar and prosody and before historical narratives, worldly wisdom, logic, and the arts – is *abhidhānārthāḥ*, a compound that consists of *abhidhāna*, probably in the sense of "words," and *artha*, "meanings," thus referring quite naturally in the context of this list to words and their meanings, word meanings, or perhaps lexicography.[126] Interestingly, however, Udbhaṭa seizes on this compound to introduce a notion of semantics that has no precedent in the actual text of Bhāmaha or, indeed, in any early text on poetics. For him, the compound refers to the literal and figurative capacities of *abhidhāna* as a unified semantic model (*śabdānām abhidhānam abhidhāvyāpāro mukhyo guṇavṛttiś ca*), for which he immediately provides a detailed discussion.[127] He goes on to demonstrate this broad notion of *abhidhā* by showing, for example, how the verb "goes" (*eti*) may be used literally, in a sentence such as "Devadatta goes to the mountain," but also figuratively, in a *Rāmāyaṇa* verse describing how happiness "goes" to a man.[128] The idea is that both instances fall under the same semantic theory of *abhidhāna* that poetry presupposes. All this, moreover, comes on the heels of an earlier discussion of *abhidhāvyāpāra* in fragment 9, the context and contents of which are not fully clear, but which is rather lengthy and involves citations of famous verses from the poetic praxis.[129]

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[126] KAl 1.9: *śabdaś chando 'bhidhānārthā itihāsāśrayāḥ kathāḥ | loko yuktiḥ kalāś ceti mantavyāḥ kāvyahetavaḥ ‖* (I emend the last word on the basis of Gnoli's suggestion; *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 10a, l. 2). For different ways of understanding *abhidhānārthāḥ*, see MASSON 1972, pp. 252-253.

[127] The quoted clause is not preserved in Gnoli's fragments but is cited in Abhinavagupta and elsewhere (*Locana*, p. 32; see n. 131). Gnoli believes that its place was in l. 4 of fragment 10a of his manuscript (GNOLI 1962, p. xviii).

[128] *Vivaraṇa*, frags. 10a-b. This passage is discussed in MASSON 1972, p. 253, but Masson is mainly interested in arguing that the attribution of the fragments to Udbhaṭa is inconclusive, a view that no longer seems plausible. The *Rāmāyaṇa* verse (*eti jīvantam ānando*; 6.114.2) is cited in the grammatical literature (e.g., Patañjali, *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya* 3.1.67), but probably in different contexts, as noted in BHATTACHARYYA 1962, p. 76, n. 11.

[129] *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 9. The verses are *na dānena na mānena*, which appears in the *Hitopadeśa* and elsewhere (see GNOLI 1962, p. 6, n. 21), and *namas tuṅgaśiraścumbi*, the famous opening verse of Bāṇa's *Harṣacarita* and one of the most popular *kāvya* stanzas ever (on this verse, see TUBB 2014, pp. 311-314). At the presumed end of this passage (frag. 10, l. 1), Udbhaṭa says *alaṃ vistareṇa*, indicating that the preceding discussion was not short.

So at the very least we can say that Udbhaṭa was eager to intro-
duce his innovative agenda about the relevance of semantics to poe-
tics in general and, more specifically, to showcase a notion of *abhi-
dhāna* or *abhidhā* and its various layers as underpinning poetry,
even if this meant hijacking an innocent item in Bhāmaha's list of
poetry's presupposed fields of knowledge. It is also clear that this
notion of *abhidhā* and similar semantic insights of the Jayāpīḍa mo-
ment are the context in which Ānanda formulated his theory of
dhvani and from which he wished to differentiate it. Indeed, in quot-
ing the relevant passage from Udbhaṭa's *Vivaraṇa*, Abhinava was
primarily concerned with explaining and defending Ānanda's nuan-
ced claim that, on the one hand, others had already equated the soul
of poetry, which he identified with *dhvani*, with figurative language
and, in doing so, had tangentially touched (*manākspṛṣṭa*) on *dhvani*,
but that, on the other, they had failed to name, let alone define, *dhva-
ni*.[130] Abhinava identified those "others" as the main theoreticians of
the Jayāpīḍa moment, Udbhaṭa and Vāmana; credited each of them
with his distinctive innovation in this area (*guṇavṛtti* and *lakṣaṇā*,
respectively); and provided a short quote from each of their main
texts. For Vāmana he cited the identification of *vakrokti* with *lakṣa-
ṇā*, and for Udbhaṭa, the just-mentioned line on *abhidhāna* that ap-
pears as a gloss on Bhāmaha's list of presupposed areas of knowl-
edge.[131]

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[130] DhvĀ, pp. 28-32: *bhāktam āhus tam anye. anye taṃ dhvanisaṃjñitaṃ kāvyāt-
mānaṃ guṇavṛttir ity āhuḥ. yady api ca dhvaniśabdasaṃkīrtanena kāvyalakṣa-
ṇavidhāyibhir guṇavṛttir anyo vā na kaścit prakāraḥ prakāśitaḥ, tathāpy amu-
khyavṛttyā kāvyeṣu vyavahāraṃ darśayatā dhvanimārgo manākspṛṣṭo 'pi na la-
kṣita iti parikalpyaivam uktam bhāktam āhus tam anye 'ti.* "'Others say that it is
an associated meaning (*bhākta*).' Others say that this soul of poetry which we
call *dhvani* is [merely] secondary usage (*guṇavṛtti*). And although the authors
for definitions for poetry have not given the specific name *dhvani* to secondary
usage nor to any other sort of thing, still, in showing how secondary usage is
employed in poetry, they have at least touched on the process of *dhvani* even if
they have not actually defined it." (Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 64.)

[131] *Locana*, p. 32: *darśayateti bhaṭṭodbhaṭavāmanādinā. bhāmahenoktaṃ śabdāś
chando 'bhidhānārthāḥ, ity abhidhānasya śabdād bhedaṃ vyākhyātuṃ bhaṭṭod-
bhaṭo babhāṣe 'śabdānām abhidhānam abhidhāvyāpāro mukhyo guṇavṛttiś ca'
iti. vāmano 'pi 'sādṛśyāl lakṣaṇā vakrokti' iti.* "He is referring to such authors
as Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa and Vāmana. For where Bhāmaha says, 'Words, meters, de-
signations (*abhidhāna*), meanings,' Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa explains the difference be-
tween words and designations as follows: 'Designation means the denotative
function of words, which may be either primary or secondary (*guṇavṛtti*).' And
Vāmana has said, '*Vakrokti* is secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*) based on similarity.'"

So in the eyes of thinkers like Ānanda and Abhinava, at least, *abhidhā/abhidhāna* was elevated to soul-like importance in the eyes of Udbhaṭa, it included both denotation and figurative language, and it "touched on" *dhvani* without calling it so. Indeed, I believe that Udbhaṭa's *abhidhā* also included, in addition to the primary and secondary functions, a third operation of suggestion of the sort we have seen in the case of *paryāyokta*. I find support for this argument in the fact that Udbhaṭa supplemented Bhāmaha's definition of this ornament rather than supplanted it, even though he had no qualms about discarding a characterization of his enshrined predecessor when he was revising its accepted understanding, as we have seen with *rūpaka* and *śliṣṭa*. I believe that he nonetheless embedded Bhāmaha's original language in his definition of *paryāyokta*, however opaque and tautological the original was, because it allowed him to get added mileage from the verb *abhidhīyate*, which Bhāmaha used and which is derived from the same verbal root and prefix as *abhidhā/abhidhāna*. Note that derivations from *abhi* and *dhā* appear frequently in Bhāmaha's text, although in a nontechnical sense of "communicating," "stating," "naming," or "describing."[132] In the case of *paryāyokta*, for example, Bhāmaha must have had in mind not the particular semantic capacity though which Kṛṣṇa conveyed his message to Śiśupāla, but merely the fact that it was "communicated" (*abhidhīyate*) in some other way (*anyena prakāreṇa*). For Udbhaṭa, by contrast, *abhidhā* was a technical term that was key to his project of semanticizing poetics, and thus there was added value

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(Transl. Ingalls et al. 1990, p. 66.) Abhinava explains Udbhaṭa's commentarial move as motivated by the need to differentiate two items on the list, *śabdaḥ* and *abhidhāna*, but I wonder whether he is not also gently insinuating that Udbhaṭa hijacked Bhāmaha's text to introduce notions that were really his own. See also Bhattacharyya 1962, p. 73.

[132] I have counted thirty-two occurrences of various derivations from *abhi+dhā* in Bhāmaha: *abhidhā*, in the sense of "name" or "statement" (3.21, 3.25); *abhidhāna*, in the sense of "word," "utterance," "communication," or "mention" (1.9, 1.21, 1.37, 1.41, 1.59, 2.18, 2.34, 2.86, 3.25, 5.56); *abhidhāyin*, in the sense of "expressing" (6.13); *abhidhāsyate*, in the sense of "saying" (4.13); *abhidhitsā*, "the intention to say" or "the intention to communicate" (1.22, 2.2, 2.68); *abhidhīyate*, in the sense of what is "said," "named," or "labeled," (2.33, 2.37, 2.42, 2.65, 3.8, 3.14, 4.12, 6.8); and *abhidheya*, in the sense of "signified," "sense," or a meaning that is distinct from the word signifying it (1.10, 1.15, 1.36, 2.17, 2.86, 4.34, 6.8). In none of these occurrences, as far as I can see, did Bhāmaha use the verb in its technical sense of direct, nonfigurative denotation, let alone in the expanded sense it had for Udbhaṭa.

in retaining it despite everything else that had changed in *paryāyok-ta*: it helped driving the point home that this third *vṛtti*, beyond those of the signifiers and the signifieds, was still part of *abhidhā/abhi-dhāna*, now seen as the underlying semantic function of poetry as such, and it allowed him to imply, as we have seen that he did in his gloss on *abhidhānārthāḥ* in the *Vivaraṇa*, that this was really Bhā-maha's position.[133]

So I am inclined to agree with Bhattacharyya that Udbhaṭa had a sweeping notion of *abhidhā* that included a variety of semantic-cog-nitive scenarios and was responsible for a diversity of aesthetic ef-fects in poetry. It is also clear that later writers, both inside and out-side Kashmir, gave Udbhaṭa due credit for this vision and were in-fluenced by it. A case in point is the late ninth-century *Hṛdayadar-paṇa* of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, another lost masterpiece of Sanskrit poetics. In an excellent essay that pieces together the views of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka from quotations of his work that survived in other works, Sheldon Pollock shows, among other things, that "for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, *abhi-dhā* does not have its usual sense of direct denotation" and is "cons-tantly essential" to the aesthetic process, leading the way to the com-plex process of *bhāvanā* (which Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka creatively borrowed from Mīmāṃsā). In fact, "*abhidhā* in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's usage is best understood or even translated as 'literary language,' something 'completely different' from the language of scripture and everyday discourse, as Abhinavagupta describes it."[134] It seems more than li-kely that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, like Mukulabhaṭṭa and others who shared

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[133] Abhinavagupta later argued, somewhat heavy-handedly, that this retained verb proves that *paryāyokta* and *dhvani* are distinct phenomena: *ata eva paryāyeṇa prakārāntareṇāvagamanātmanā vyaṅgyenopalakṣitaṃ sad yad abhidhīyate tad abhidhīyamānam uktam eva sat paryāyoktam ity abhidhīyata iti lakṣaṇapadam, paryāyoktam iti lakṣyapadam, arthālaṃkāratvaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ ceti sar-vaṃ yujyate* (*Locana*, p. 118). "When what is said is distinguished by a *paryāya* (periphrasis), that is, speaking in a different manner, which consists in giving to understand, [that is, when it is distinguished] by a suggestion, then the lite-rally used words themselves form a *paryāyokta* (statement of periphrasis). Here 'when something is said' forms the definition, 'statement of periphrasis' is the thing to be defined, and the general characteristic of this thing is as a figure of speech based on meaning (*arthālaṃkāra*). And so everything here is in order." (Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 150.)

[134] POLLOCK 2010, pp. 147, 153; for his discussion of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's date, see p. 144. It was Bhattacharyya who dubbed the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* and the *Vivaraṇa*, together with the *Kāvyakautuka* of Bhaṭṭa Tota, as "lost masterpieces" of the discipline (BHATTACHARYYA 1981).

this view, was following Udbhaṭa in this approach, as already suggested by Bhattacharyya, and that Udbhaṭa's theory of *abhidhā* preceded, led the way to, and for a long time continued to compete with Ānanda's theory of *dhvani*.[135]

What is less clear is how detailed and systematic this *abhidhā* theory was, both in its analysis of language and in its application to ornaments. First, did Udbhaṭa have a complete linguistic model of *abhidhā* that explained how words are analyzed from the level of word bases and case endings up (as Bhattacharyya takes a quote of Udbhaṭa's *Vivaraṇa* from Rājaśekhara to imply),[136] and did he provide a detailed description of the various meaning moments, from the literal and the figurative to the suggested, or was he merely content with seeing *abhidhā* as coterminous with poetic language and its various semantic-cognitive effects? Second, how consistent was Udbhaṭa in applying *abhidhā* to every ornament in the book? Did he keep coming back to this notion in his *Vivaraṇa*, explaining the semantic path of every aesthetic device, or did he do so only in cases that involved some sort of indirection, as in the cases I discussed earlier? To answer these questions, we would require a far better copy of the *Vivaraṇa* than we now have.

Let us now turn to the second query, regarding the role of *rasa* in Udbhaṭa's thinking. It should be stated at the outset that Udbhaṭa was a groundbreaking and influential *rasa* theorist. Udbhaṭa was the author of the earliest known commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, the root text on dramaturgy ascribed to Bharata, and in this now-lost commentary he introduced key *rasa*-related innovations. For example, as V. Raghavan showed long ago, Udbhaṭa was the first author in this tradition to expand the list of eight emotional flavors by introducing peace (*śānta*), a ninth *rasa*, possibly emending the *Nāṭyaśāstra*'s text in the process. This most likely meant that Udbhaṭa also theorized the emotional basis (*bhāva*) and other psychoaesthetic factors that give rise to peace, and that this theorization served as the basis for later discussions of the topic.[137] Udbhaṭa was also the first to coin and conceptualize *rasābhāsa*, a scenario of *rasa* production that cannot be completed because of social impropriety and is hence

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[135] BHATTACHARYYA 1962, pp. 73-74.

[136] BHATTACHARYYA 1962, pp. 77-78.

[137] RAGHAVAN 1975, 13, 47, 71.

a mere "semblance of *rasa*."[138] This, again, is a mode of analysis that played an important role in later *rasa* theory.

Moreover, Udbhaṭa was, as far as we know, "the first person to write on both Alaṃkāraśāstra and Nāṭyaśāstra,"[139] and in doing so he began to think the two together. More specifically, Udbhaṭa was the first to account for the fact that poetic language, and not just dramatic action, can convey *rasa* and its associated elements. There are two main steps in Udbhaṭa's groundbreaking theorization of *rasa* in poetry. The first is his understanding that poetry can bring about the entire range of *rasa* experience, from its nascent state to maturation and then to cessation. To demonstrate this, Udbhaṭa kept the names of the five content-related ornaments that he inherited from his predecessors (with the unrelated *paryāyokta* inexplicably inserted in their midst), but he used them as empty bottles into which he poured new *rasa* wine. The old ornaments were now defined not according to the randomly chosen emotional and narrative contents after which they were still named – joy in "joyous" (*preyas*), emotional flavor in "flavored" (*rasavat*), pride in "prideful" (*ūrjasvin*), a lucky coincidence in "coincidence" (*samāhita*), and opulence in "magnificence" (*udātta*)[140] – but as different stages in the evolution of emotional flavors as understood in dramaturgy or, more precisely, in dramaturgy as Udbhaṭa theorized it. *Preyasvat* (his name for *preyas*) was now taken to express basic emotions (*bhāva*) that did not evolve to full-blown *rasa*; *rasavat* was fully evolved *rasa*; *ūrjasvin* became a case of *rasa* whose production was hampered by a socially inappropriate excess of emotions; *samāhita* was the cessation of emotion, *rasa*, or their incomplete imitations; and *udātta* (or at least one variety thereof) was a case of emotional description that played a supportive aesthetic role but did not dominate the poem.[141] Second, Udbhaṭa explained that these emotional-aesthetic states are poetically communicated by up to five types of indicators: "the proper term, as well as the [depiction of] stable emotions, transitory emotions, stimulant factors, and gestures."[142] Udbhaṭa's view that

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[138] POLLOCK 2016, p. 11.

[139] MCCREA 2008, p. 44.

[140] My translation of the original ornaments reflects my understanding of them as used in Daṇḍin, as I intend to explain elsewhere.

[141] KAlSS 4.2-5, 7-8; see MCCREA 2008, pp. 44-50.

[142] KAlSS 4.3: *svaśabdasthāyisaṃcārivibhāvābhinayāspadam*. Or, as Indurāja points out, likely quoting one of Udbhaṭa's lost texts, "For Udbhaṭa, *rasa* was

the mere mention of the name of a certain *rasa* ("proper term") could give rise to its experience has often been criticized, but what the critics have overlooked is the big picture: Udbhaṭa was the first to theorize, under the heading of ornaments such as *rasavat*, a spectrum of linguistic means for evoking *rasa*, from the literal to the suggested, as Indurāja explains in detail.[143]

Thus Udbhaṭa found a clever way to import the dramatic theory of *rasa* evocation into poetics. It has been said time and again that his solution, involving the analysis of *rasa* as an ornament (or, rather, a set of ornaments), is unsatisfactory, but the problem with this criticism is, first, that it overlooks Udbhaṭa's vastly expanded understanding of ornaments. As we have seen, he no longer viewed ornaments as isolated devices defined by formal structures or the contents they conveyed, but as grounded, instead, in the poetic language of *abhidhā*, which covered everything from the literal to the suggested semantic-cognitive operations. Consistent with this analysis of ornaments, Udbhaṭa understood *rasa* as the result of the effect, or perhaps the cumulative effect, of all these capacities; this is also consistent with the way dramaturgy understood *rasa* production as the combination of all its underlying indicators.[144] Then there is the argument that viewing *rasa* as an ornament contradicts its status as the very soul (*ātman*) of poetry, because the soul is not an ornamental device but the very essence of the poetic body that ornaments are supposed to ornament. The problem with this criticism is that it is based anachronistically on Ānanda's later formulation of *rasa* as poetry's soul, its sole telos and the one element to which all others must be subordinated, and on the assumption that Udbhaṭa must have shared this model.

I will return shortly to Indurāja's struggle to harmonize the worldviews of these two thinkers, also quite anachronistically. But note that for all the criticism, the majority of later thinkers accepted Udbhaṭa's radically new and highly sophisticated understanding of the *rasa* ornaments. This is true even of Ānanda and Abhinava, although they were hard at work to differentiate these ornaments from what they saw as *rasa* as manifested through *dhvani*. And the irony is that even the basis for this differentiation was likely borrowed

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brought about in five ways" (*yad uktaṃ bhaṭṭodbhaṭena pañcarūpāḥ rasā iti*, followed by a detailed exposition of each of the five; *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 53).

[143] *Laghuvṛtti*, pp. 51-55. See the repeated use of the verb *gamayati*, "causes to understand" or "suggests," in this exposition.

[144] As suggested by KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979b, p. 307.

from Udbhaṭa himself. As Krishnamoorthy has pointed out, Udbha-
ṭa's distinction between predominant *rasa* in *rasavat* and subordi-
nate *rasa* (*upalakṣaṇatāṃ prāptam*) in *udātta* was understood at
least by the anonymous author of the *Kalpalatāviveka* (henceforth
KLV) to have paved the way for Ānanda's differentiation between
guṇībhūtavyaṅgya, where the element (whether *rasa* or not) is aes-
thetically subordinate, and *dhvani* poetry, where suggestion is pre-
dominant.[145]

It is thus clear that Udbhaṭa gave a great deal of thought to *rasa*,
a topic that was central to his work as both a dramatist and a poeti-
cian, and that he was concerned with newly theorizing the role of
rasa, originally theorized in the context of drama, in nondramatic
poetry. His answer was to make *rasa* part of his overall semantic-
aesthetic model now standing at the base of his new notion of orna-
ments, and to maintain, in all likelihood, that as with *rūpaka*, *śliṣṭa*,
and *paryāyokta*, *rasa* was based on several layers of semantic ope-
rations (from the explicit mention of the proper term to various in-
direct indicators) and a whole spectrum of cognitive scenarios in the
reader's mind (from rising to cessation). If we examine this solution
on its own terms, without viewing it through the eyes of posterity,
we must admit its elegance and parsimony precisely because it re-
quires no new semantic theorization beyond what Udbhaṭa took to
be the linguistic basis of aesthetics. Yet it is also true that this was
not the view of many of his junior contemporaries and immediate

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[145] "Udbhaṭa and his followers maintained that when *rasa* becomes the meaning of
the passage, it is a case of the ornament *rasavat*. The proponent who taught [the
distinction between] *dhvani* and *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* [Mammaṭa] responded to
this by saying: 'This [*rasa* etc. as a primary suggested meaning] is different
than the ornament for conveying *rasa* etc.,' and 'These are ornaments such as
rasavat.' And to support his opinion, he spoke about the criterion of an exis-
tence that is meant for the support of another. But this is what was meant by
[Udbhaṭa's definition of *udātta*] as secondary, that is, as *rasa* that has not be-
come the meaning of the passage in the sense that it is not predominant. So the
ornament of *udātta* is based only on the literal meaning, and, as such, it is not
an exception to the rule of *rasavat*. So much was the opinion of Udbhaṭa and
his followers" (KLV, p. 280: *rasasya vākyārthībhāve ye rasavadalaṃkāram ud-
bhaṭādayaḥ pratipannās tān prati dhvaniguṇībhūtavyaṅgyavādinācāryeṇa
'bhinno rasādyalaṃkārād' ity 'ete ca rasavadādyalaṃkārā' iti ca vadatā svā-
bhiprāyapratipādanaṃ yad vihitaṃ tad upajīvyaparasyeyam uktiḥ. upalakṣaṇī-
bhūtam iti. vākyārthībhāvam anāpannam aṅgabhūtam apradhānam iti yāvat. te-
na mukhyavṛttyaivodāttam etat, na rasavadalaṃkārāpavādatvenety arthaḥ.
anyatra tu rasavad iti. etatparyantā bhaṭṭodbhaṭādīnām uktiḥ*). For a discussion
of this passage, see KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979b, pp. 304–305.

successors. Vāmana, for example, removed *rasa* from the domain of ornaments altogether and viewed its evocation as the doing of poetic virtues; Rudraṭa discussed it in a way that was simply unrelated to either ornaments or virtues; and Ānanda postulated it as a distinct goal of poetry that virtues and ornaments both enhance, but that necessitates the separate and hitherto-unknown semantic model of suggestion in order to be realized.[146]

What we cannot say on the basis of the available textual evidence is whether Udbhaṭa privileged *rasa* in relation to other aesthetic factors (as Lala Ramayadupala Simha and Krishnamoorthy maintain, but without sufficiently conclusive evidence),[147] or at least explained how *rasa* and other literary devices work in tandem, and Indurāja's contradictory attempts to deal with this question suggest that he, too, found it difficult. The topic comes up three times in his commentary. First, apropos of *rasavat*, Indurāja raises the objection that the status of *rasa* and *bhāva* as ornaments of poetry (*kāvyālaṃkāratva*) contradicts their nature as its very life breath (*kāvyajīvitatva*). His response is that Udbhaṭa did not address this question because this would have forced him into a lengthy digression, suggesting, at the very least, that he believed this question was not germane to Udbhaṭa's efforts in this book.[148]

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[146] For a discussion of this evolution, see MᶜCREA 2008, pp. 50-54. For a later direct attack on the notion that *rasavat* and its sister devices can even be considered ornaments, see Kuntaka, *Vakroktijīvita* 3.11-15.

[147] This argument has a long and twisted history. It begins with a mistaken transliteration of Udbhaṭa's KAlSS by Jacob, where a verse that Indurāja cites about *rasa* as the soul of poetry (*Laghuvṛtti*, p. 83: *rasādyadhiṣṭhitaṃ kāvyaṃ jīvad-rūpatayā yataḥ | kathyate tad rasādīnāṃ kāvyātmatvaṃ vyavasthitam ||*) appears as part of the root text (JACOB 1897, p. 847; cf. JACOBI 1902-1903, p. 396). P.V. Kane and others have pointed out this mistake and argued that the entire argument is anachronistic (KANE 1951, p. 137; INGALLS 1990, p. 7). But Simha nonetheless believed that the verse, although clearly part of the commentary, could have been a citation from one of Udbhaṭa's lost texts and concluded that "Udbhaṭa is to be regarded as one of the great pioneers of Rasavāda holding Rasa to be the soul of poetry in the most unequivocal, unambiguous and unfeigned terminology," and Krishnamoorthy thought that Simha "rightly holds these verses are from the pen of Udbhaṭa himself" (SIMHA 1958, p. 126; KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979b, p. 307). But although Simha is right that there is nothing in the citational practices of Indurāja to prevent this from being the case, the positive evidence he marshals in favor of this strong argument is far from conclusive.

[148] *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 54: *rasānāṃ bhāvānāṃ ca kāvyaśobhātiśayahetutvāt kiṃ kāvyā-laṃkāratvam uta kāvyajīvitatvam iti na tāvad vicāryate granthagauravabhayāt. rasabhāvasvarūpaṃ cātra na vivecitam aprakṛtatvād bahuvaktavyatvāc ca.* See

Indurāja returns to this issue later in two independent essays that are found at the end of his commentary, and in which he propagates views that seem contradictory. The first of these is in the context of Udbhaṭa's innovative *kāvyahetu* ornament (also named *kāvyaliṅga*). This ornament involves reasoning that is poetic rather than logical, and for Indurāja this is an excuse to probe at length the nature of poetry and ask whether it even requires ornaments in order to be poetic. Here he approvingly quotes Vāmana's position that poetry necessitates only virtues and not ornaments because it is the former that (according to Vāmana) evoke *rasa*, the very soul of poetry. To support this view, he cites a verse by Amaru that involves the following scenario: a woman has accepted her lover after suffering long in his absence; they begin to make love; he mistakenly calls her by the name of another, but after quickly ascertaining that this slip was not overheard by anyone, she ignores it and resumes lovemaking. The point of the example is that it involves no ornament whatsoever (*na khalv atrārthālaṃkāraḥ kaścit paridṛśyate*), and that what makes it poetic is the virtue (*guṇa*) of clarity, amplified by those of sweetness and forcefulness (*atha mādhuryaujobhyāṃ paribṛṃhitasya prasādasya vidyamānatvāt kāvyarūpatā*). Indurāja then raises a lengthy objection that this verse lends itself to being cataloged as an instance of the ornament of *rasavat*, and it seems that this would likely have been Udbhaṭa's position. But Indurāja flatly rejects this objection in favor of a combination of the views of Vāmana and Ānanda: *rasa*, being the soul of poetry, cannot ornament it (*na khalu kāvyasya rasānāṃ cālaṃkāryālaṃkārabhāvaḥ, kiṃ tv ātmaśarīrabhāvaḥ*), and hence the verse proves that a poem needs virtues but can do without ornaments (*yuktam idam uktaṃ niralaṃkāram api kāvyaṃ saguṇaṃ dṛśyate*).[149] The logical implication of this discussion is that Indurāja rejected Udbhaṭa's analysis of *rasa* through *rasavat* and similar ornaments precisely because it contradicted Vāmana's and Ānanda's.

However, in the concluding passages of his book, Indurāja revisits this issue in the process of arguing that all of Ānanda's categories of suggestion are compatible with ornaments the way Udbhaṭa

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also MCCREA 2008, pp. 323-324.

[149] *Laghuvṛtti*, pp. 82-84. Abhinava later quotes the same Amaru verse as an example of *rasa* in short, single-stanza poems (*Locana*, p. 325).

analyzed them.[150] Interestingly, his example involving the suggestion of *rasa* through an ornament is very similar to the one just cited: a woman is making love to a man, he calls her by the name of another, and yet she cannot bring herself to draw away from him. Here Indurāja analyzes the verse in a way that is closely reminiscent of the view of the objector he just refuted, and he concludes that since *rasa* is suggested here through the ornament of *rasavat*, this, too, is a case where Ānanda's notion of suggestion is in agreement with Udbhaṭa's analysis of ornaments (*ato 'tra saṃbhogaśṛṅgārasyer-syāvipralambhaśṛṅgāratirodhānahetoḥ pratīyamānatā. tatra ca pūrvaṃ rasavattvalakṣaṇo 'laṃkāraḥ pratipādito rasavaddarśitety-ādinā. evaṃ rasāntareṣv api vācyam*).[151] This implies that for Indurāja, Ānanda's notion of *rasadhvani* was not entirely incompatible with Udbhaṭa's *rasavat*. It is possible, perhaps, to make sense of Indurāja's apparently contradictory views if we understand that what he was trying to do here was to harmonize the views of all the leading voices of the field, Udbhaṭa, Vāmana, and Ānanda (perhaps with a special inclination to Vāmana, a favorite of his teacher Mukula Bhaṭṭa),[152] although what is sacrificed in this effort is precisely how these scholars differed. In short, here Indurāja does not prove particularly helpful for the attempt to uncover Udbhaṭa's precise position on *rasa* in relation to other aesthetic factors, even if the very fact that he struggled to harmonize this position with those of Udbhaṭa's successors strongly suggests that they were not identical.

To conclude, my discussion so far leaves some questions unanswered but also leads to some surprising realizations. It turns out that Udbhaṭa, in pioneering the semanticization of poetics, offered what may have been a comprehensive linguistic model for poetry that was based on a broad vision of *abhidhāna* or *abhidhāvyāpāra* as he understood it. Taking inspiration from Mīmāṃsā models in general and Kumārila in particular, he explained how poetry worked on the basis of the various semantic capacities of this expanded

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[150] *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 85: *nanu yatra kāvye sahṛdayahṛdayāhlādinaḥ pradhānabhūtasya svaśabdavyāpārāspṛṣṭatvena pratīyamānaikarūpasyārthasya sadbhāvas tatra tathāvidhārthābhivyaktihetuḥ kāvyajīvitabhūtaḥ kaiścit sahṛdayair dhvanir nāma vyañjakatvabhedātmā kāvyadharmo 'bhihitaḥ sa kasmād iha nopadiṣṭaḥ? ucyate. eṣv evālaṃkāreṣv antarbhāvāt.*

[151] *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 88.

[152] McCrea 2008, pp. 265-266, n. 11. I am grateful to Lawrence McCrea for sharing with me his insights about Indurāja's possible Vāmana inclinations.

abhidhā, from the literal to the metaphoric and the implied, in a layered process that necessitated the description and analysis of various cognitive phases. And he was keenly interested in grounding the aesthetic effects of many, if not all, ornaments in their specific semantic processes and cognitive scenarios. It is this new analysis – the reconceptualization of ornaments as grounded in a spectrum of semantic-cognitive scenarios – that enabled him to take account, for the first time in the history of Sanskrit poetics, of the way *rasa*, up to then seriously dealt with only in dramaturgy, was realized in poetry as well. *Rasa* and its related factors were now seen as aesthetic responses that poetry could partly evoke, fully evoke, evoke in a way that might be mitigated by socioaesthetic considerations, evoke and then put to rest, and evoke in a way that supported but did not dominate the main action of the poem. All this was done through a set of literal and suggested semantic capacities and under the heading of a radically new subset of ornaments or, more precisely, old ornaments of which only the name remained. We know that *rasa* was an important topic in Udbhaṭa's thinking, both as a drama theorist and as a literary theorist, and thus his revolution of the *rasa* ornaments must have been central to his work as he saw it. And although we do not know whether Udbhaṭa also privileged *rasa* in relation to other ornaments, there is no reason to think that his analysis of it was in any way inconsistent or contradictory. True, his successors moved to extricate *rasa* from the realm of ornaments and eventually to make it altogether independent from ornamental processes, borrowing a great deal from him in the process. But when his model is evaluated in its own right and not through later prisms, it is easy to see why Udbhaṭa believed that he had the problem solved.

10. CONCLUDING REMARKS

What, we may now ask, was the precise nature of Ānandavardhana's innovation? He was not the first to turn the attention of Sanskrit literati from the poet to the reader. He was not the first to semanticize literary theory and connect poetry's aesthetic effects, on the one hand, and the layered modes of signification and cognition it necessitated, on the other. He was not the first to suggest sweeping aesthetic models that had hierarchy built into them and to import rather massively from Mīmāṃsā in the process. He was not the first to rethink the roles of *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra* in a single coherent theory. And he was not the first to turn his attention to *rasa* and *rasa*-related elements within such a model and to discuss how poetry can convey

them in ways that are distinct from drama. All these innovations belong, as I hope I have shown, in a short period of great creativity and investment in poetics as an academic discipline under the auspices of Jayāpīḍa or shortly after his reign. Ānanda's distinct innovation was to take these ideas and tendencies, all introduced a generation or two before him, and push them further, arguably to their logical conclusion, thereby creating a semantic-aesthetic model that was even more sweeping, even more hierarchical, and even more indebted to Mīmāṃsā.

Ānanda's key move was to postulate the existence of suggestion, an autonomous capacity of language that was distinct from *abhidhā*, and to argue that although it was operative in ornaments as well, it was also to be understood as separate and aesthetically superior. It was in suggestion, he famously asserted, that connoisseurs found the highest pleasures of poetry and, most important, the savoring of *rasa*, which he dubbed the soul of poetry, a process that happened independently of ornaments. Ānanda maintained, moreover, that his new, thoroughgoing model explained what poets had done all along, despite the fact that it had escaped the attention of theorists, even as under the various types of *dhvani* he often appropriated what his predecessors from the Jayāpīḍa moment had analyzed as ornaments or explained through their own semantic models.[153] And it was this last claim, as McCrea has convincingly demonstrated, that Ānanda's critics heatedly challenged in a debate that flared for two centuries. What the critics of Ānanda objected to – and this is criticism that he anticipated or perhaps had already faced – was his insistence that poetry's aesthetic effect necessitated the theorization of a new semantic-cognitive process outside the existing models of *alaṃkāra*, *abhidhā*, *guṇavṛtti*, *lakṣaṇā*, *adhyavasāna*, or even *anumāna*.[154]

I take this later criticism of Ānanda to further substantiate my claim that the first main breakthrough of Sanskrit poetics took place before him, and that it was on the heels of it that he proposed his important secondary breakthrough. For it was during the Jayāpīḍa moment that all these semantic-cognitive models – from which Ānanda tried to distance himself and to which his critics tried to hold him – were first applied to the analysis of poetry, and unlike that of Ānanda, this earlier paradigm shift was not at all heralded by any

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[153] For an example of this in the case of *śleṣa*, see BRONNER 2010, pp. 211-212.

[154] For an excellent study of this controversy, see MCCREA 2008, pp. 260-448.

prior development in the field. Moreover, against the standard deterministic approach to the history of Sanskrit poetics, it is important to stress that this initial breakthrough was not a natural event, somehow necessitated by an inherent potential or trajectory within the tradition, as the continued popularity of the alternative text of Daṇḍin throughout the Indian subcontinent and south, east, and far north of its borders can attest: the discourse on poetry did not have to be semanticized, and a dominant branch of it continued to thrive without this added theoretical burden. The same hindsight determinism also requires us to believe that the efforts of Ānanda and Abhinava were somehow bound to happen, and to ignore the opponents of Ānanda from within the tradition as petty critics who presumably failed to recognize this historical inevitability. It is high time that we move away from this partisan and deterministic view of Sanskrit poetics and approach its intellectual history with new questions and fresh eyes.

For example, we can try to historicize the dramatic changes that took place in Kashmiri poetics during the ninth century and the great influence literary thinkers from this small Himalayan valley later came to exercise far and wide. We may ask, for instance, what was so unusual about the court of Jayāpīḍa that it fueled a sudden investment in poetics, and what propelled it along a path modeled after other academic disciplines? These are questions that require more research, but I would like to point attention to one aspect of Jayāpīḍa's investments in the arts and the learning that seems particularly relevant. His court, as we learn from Kalhaṇa's report, actively recruited intellectuals who belonged to a vast range of disciplines and philosophical schools in a way that may have encouraged an interdisciplinary approach. Indeed, the court was highly tolerant of these scholars' denominations, if not actively encouraging diversity in this area. Remember, for example, that the list of pandits of this king ends, or culminates, with the rising sun of the Buddhist scholar Dharmottara, whom we have seen directly influenced Vāmana's rethinking of ornaments. It is perhaps not a coincidence that it was here, in this fertile setting that invited thinking across schools and theologies, that the erosion of boundaries between poetics and dramaturgy began, and that models from Mīmāṃsā, Buddhist epistemology, and other disciplines began to be applied to the study of poetry.

In this context it is particularly tempting to postulate that the various Udbhaṭas who worked in Kashmir at the turn of the ninth century – the grammarian, the logician, the Cārvāka scholar, the drama specialist, and the literary theorist – were a single person with multiple scholarly identities. There are three aspects of the preceding discussion that make this hypothesis particularly attractive. First, even if installing him as the president of the royal academy and making him the highest paid-academic in Kashmir's history were primarily tied to his literary activities, as the immediate context of the list provided by Kalhaṇa suggests, the sectarian-theological identity of "this partisan of this-wordliness alone who considers himself the world's greatest Cārvāka" as Vādi Devasūri has called him, did not stand in the way.[155] Thus this identity, if it is indeed confirmed, could validate the particularly open and tolerant atmosphere of Jayāpīḍa's intellectual assembly. Second, as a writer on an astonishingly broad spectrum of disciplines who constantly strove to merge them – we know that he tried to combine logic with Cārvāka philosophy[156] – Udbhaṭa would have been the very epitome of the interdisciplinary ideal of the Jayāpīḍa moment, perhaps supplying us with yet another reason for his status as *sabhāpati*. Finally, and perhaps most intriguing, from the little we know about the works of the various Udbhaṭas from later citations, a surprisingly similar intellectual profile emerges of a bold innovator cloaked in the rather thin guise of a traditionalist. Udbhaṭa the grammarian, for example, was a "non-orthodox" Pāṇinian who suggested derivations that "strike us through their audacity": he "does not hesitate to split a rule," "reckless changes in some rules do not deter him," and "he felt almost completely free from the traditional interpretations of Pāṇini's grammar, most notably Patañjali and the author of the *Kāśikā*."[157] As a Cārvāka, he "deserted the traditional explanation" and "had given a different interpretation altogether" for the first two aphorisms of the *Bṛhaspatisūtra*, then turned the long-accepted interpretation of another key dictum about the relationship between material objects and consciousness on its head (arguing that *bhūtebhyaḥ* in *bhūtebhyaś caitanyam* is in the dative rather than in the ablative case), and even went as far as propagating an unseen property of the material elements that underlies the human experiences of pleasure

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[155] *paramalokāyatamanyena lokavyavahāraikapakṣapatinā*. This is from Vādi Devasūri's *Syādvādaratnākara*, quoted in SOLOMON 1977-1978, p. 987.

[156] SOLOMON 1977-1978, p. 992; BHATTACHARYA 2010, p. 421.

[157] BRONKHORST 2008, pp. 293-296.

and pain – positions that have earned him the nickname "cunning/
fraudulent Cārvāka" (*cārvākadhūrta*).[158] Indeed, R. Bhattacharya
even doubts Udbhaṭa's Cārvāka leanings altogether, saying that
"there is every reason to believe that he had hammered out a philo-
sophical system of his own but instead of writing a new *sūtra* work...
he had manipulated the Cārvāka aphorisms to present his singularly
distinct point of view."[159] In his commentary on Bharata's *Nāṭya-
śāstra*, Udbhaṭa may have taken the license to emend the root text
so as to introduce, for the first time in the history of this discourse,
a new *rasa* on top of the original group of eight.[160] And in the field
of poetics, as this essay demonstrates, he wore the mantle of a con-
servative who sought to enshrine Bhāmaha's KAl as the tradition's
foundational text but had no qualms about radically and repeatedly
redefining his predecessor's concepts. Thus, while limiting himself
to the basic set of ornaments supplied by Bhāmaha and following
rather faithfully their original, unsystematic order in his KAlSS, Ud-
bhaṭa unceremoniously nixed the very first device in Bhāmaha's list
(*yamaka*) and replaced it with a different ornament of his own in-
vention (*punaruktavadābhāsa*), dramatically changed the under-
standing of the remaining ornaments (as we have seen in every case
I have looked at), added others that directly contradicted his prede-
cessor's view (*kāvyahetu* is the most blatant example, given Bhāma-
ha's stark opposition to the ornament *hetu*), and he had no problem,
in his *Vivaraṇa*, with hijacking Bhāmaha's root text to have it serve
his own purposes and support his notions of semantic models (*abhi-
dhāna*) and cognitive scenarios (*ekadeśa*). Many of these moves
have been noted by later commentators from within the respective
traditions.

In fact, it may not be entirely a coincidence that none of the prose
treatises that had an Udbhaṭa as their author have survived: some of
them may have seemed simply too provocative in later generations.
After all, as Bronkhorst has noted, "Udbhaṭa united in his person
two intellectual traditions which were both destined to disappear

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[158] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa uses the term anonymously in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, but the com-
mentator Cakradhara makes the identification (*cārvākadhūrtas tv iti udbhaṭa*).
For more, see SOLOMON 1977-1978, pp. 988-989 and FRANCO 2011, p. 638. As
Franco notes, Udbhaṭa, "the most innovative Cārvāka," was also ironically re-
ferred to in this text as "the well-instructed Cārvāka" (ibid., the quote is from
p. 637).

[159] BHATTACHARYA 2010, pp. 421-422.

[160] RAGHAVAN 1975, p. 13.

from Indian soil during the following centuries," namely, the Cār-vāka philosophy and "freethinking" grammar that did not accept Pa-tañjali as an authority.[161] Whatever the truth of this may be, and re-gardless of the still-open question of the identity of the various Ud-bhaṭas, it is clear that history has not been particularly kind to the literary theorist of this name, whose seminal contribution was eclip-sed by that of followers who were heavily influenced by him and the bulk of whose corpus was lost. Further understanding of this proli-fic, original, and influential thinker depends to a large extent on the prospects of its recovery in the future. But it is important to remem-ber that his now-lost works remained available for centuries to scho-lars inside and well beyond Kashmir, and their massive reliance on his works on poetics and dramaturgy, together with the information provided by Kalhaṇa, supports the main argument of this essay. Kashmiri thinkers like Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta, Mukula Bhaṭṭa, Mahima Bhaṭṭa, Mammaṭa, Tilaka, Ruyyaka, Indurāja, and Sahadeva and non-Kashmirians such as Hemacandra, Rājaśekhara, Bhoja, the author of the KLV, and many others all quoted Udbhaṭa extensively, and many of them credited him for his discoveries and explicitly viewed his contribution as a turning point in the tradition's thinking. It is hard to imagine the further evolution of Sanskrit poe-tics, including but by no means limited to the DhvĀ of Ānanda, who was also influenced by Udbhaṭa even in his *Devīśataka*, without un-derstanding the seminal contribution of Udbhaṭa and the Jayāpīḍa moment more generally.

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[161] BRONKHORST 2008, p. 297.

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The Culmination
of Sanskrit Aesthetics in Kashmir:

A Hypothesis on Ruyyaka's
Alaṃkārasarvasva
in the Light of Jayaratha's *Vimarśinī**

DANIELE CUNEO

INTRODUCTION

The present paper is an attempt at provisionally fleshing out a working hypothesis on the historical and cultural position of Ruyyaka (first half of the 12th century) and his *Alaṃkārasarvasva* (henceforth AS) – especially in the light of its earliest commentary, Jayaratha's 13th-century *Vimarśinī* – within both the knowledge system of *alaṃkāraśāstra* in Kashmir and the history of *alaṃkāraśāstra tout court*.[1] The hypothesis consists in considering Ruyyaka as the culmination, both historical and theoretical, of the great period of cultural revolutions that Kashmir witnessed in Sanskrit literary studies and as the harbinger of a renovated way of "practicing the profession" of an

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[1] On Ruyyaka, beside the classical histories of Sanskrit poetics (DE 1960, KANE 1961, GEROW 1977), it is worth mentioning the study and the outstanding German translation of the *Alaṃkārasarvasva* by Jacobi (JACOBI 1908a and 1908b). Ruyyaka is the author of numerous other works, some extant and some yet untraced. In order to complete the research started with the present paper, an exhaustive analysis of the whole material by Ruyyaka is an obvious *desideratum*. In particular, one should focus first on the *Kāvyaprakāśasaṅketa*, Ruyyaka's commentary on Mammaṭa's *magnum opus*, and the *Vyaktivivekavicāra*, Ruyyaka's commentary on Mahimabhaṭṭa's 11th-century polemical masterpiece against the already established mainstream of Sanskrit poetics, Ānandavardhana's *dhvani* theory (see below, n. 33).

ālaṃkārika, namely a rekindled interest in the classification, defini-
tion and analysis of the ever-increasing multitude of figures of
speech (*alaṃkāra*s). This postulated position of culmination, as I
will argue, allowed Ruyyaka to see the development of his discipline
from a historically and theoretically privileged perspective and
therefore enabled him to implicitly identify the theoretical issues
and turning points that had been the object of the most heated debate
in the previous centuries in Kashmir, but that could now be consi-
dered settled and agreed upon. Only after this self-aware meta-theo-
retical move could he confidently move on to more pressing, con-
temporary issues. The once debated and then agreed upon topics I
am referring to are the objects of two veritable Kuhnian paradigm
shifts that the valley of Kashmir witnessed from the end of the 9th to
the beginning of the 11th century, which gave rise to a hornets' nest
of more or less indignant oppositions.

As compellingly argued in MCCREA 2008, the "first revolution"
consisted in the change from the formalist theory of poetics pro-
pounded by the earlier authors (Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Udbha-
ṭa and Rudraṭa) to the essentialist and functionalist theory of poetics
centred on *dhvani* "implicature" as the true essence of poetry (Ānan-
davardhana and his followers), especially under the influence of Mī-
māṃsā-like hermeneutics. As I have argued elsewhere (CUNEO
2013), a second paradigm shift occurred by the hand of Abhinava-
gupta (and possibly of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka [POLLOCK 2010], before
him): a transition from a conception of aesthetic experience (*rasa*)
that does not account for the ontological difference between the uni-
verse experienced in ordinary reality and the universe created by
and experienced in art, to a conception of aesthetic experience (*rasa*,
again) that does account for such a difference and makes it the cru-
cial speculative argument justifying and legitimizing the intrinsical-
ly pleasurable nature of the emotions aroused by an artwork. Ruy-
yaka takes stock of the changed theoretical scenario of his system of
knowledge and takes it then from there to a direction that will be
followed by most *ālaṃkārika*s in the following centuries.

In order to flesh out this working hypothesis, three pieces of evi-
dence, or sets of clues, so to say, will be assessed. First, the intro-
ductory section[2] of the AS will be scrutinised in the attempt to inter-
pret it as the first detailed account and value-laden emic narrative of
Kaśmīri *alaṃkāraśāstra*, which is actively being spun by Ruyyaka

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2   In Jayaratha's words, that portion is indeed called *avataraṇikā* (AS, p. 7).

and his first commentator Jayaratha – the same author of the massive
Tantrālokaviveka on Abhinavagupta's religio-philosophical master-
piece –, especially in their position as the last heirs of the *dhvani*
poetics that was started by Ānandavardhana, perfected by Abhina-
vagupta and normalized by Mammaṭa.[3] Second, two theoretical is-
sues (the existence of *tātparyaśakti* and the sub-classifications of *la-
kṣaṇā*) will be dealt with, especially insofar as Ruyyaka positions
himself in a dialogue with, and sometimes in a constructive opposi-
tion to, his immediate predecessors, Mammaṭa and Abhinavagupta.
Thirdly, a passage that among many others Jayaratha's commentary
borrows from Abhinavagupta's main work on poetics, the *Dhvany-
ālokalocana* (henceforth *Locana*), will be analysed as a clever at-
tempt at redirecting a traditional argument to fit a new context, that
is, the justification of the renovated interest in poetical figuration,
now that the issues concerning the conveyance of poetic meaning
(*dhvani*) and the import and epistemology of the emotional compo-
nent in poetry (*rasa*) have been settled and have therefore lost some
of their theoretical appeal.

THE TELEOLOGICAL NARRATIVE

The "first" doxographical account of Sanskrit poetics, the introduc-
tory portion of Ruyyaka's AS, has a well-known antecedent in the
most celebrated passage of Abhinavagupta's *Abhinavabhāratī*
(henceforth ABH), i.e., his commentary on the *rasasūtra* of Bhara-
ta's *Nāṭyaśāstra* (henceforth NŚ). The succession of authors arguing
about the essence of *rasa* and progressively refuting each other in a
ever-ascending ladder of discrimination provides Ruyyaka with a
concrete instance of a multi-doctrinal narrative in which – in parti-
cular – the opinions of various *ālaṃkārika*s on the ontology of *rasa*
are strung together in order to give an account of the topic in a full-
fledged way that is both historical and teleological, as it culminates
in the *siddhānta*, the final view upheld by Abhinavagupta.[4] How-
ever, unlike the characters in Abhinavagupta's narrative, whose
works are now lost to us, the protagonists of Ruyyaka's account are

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3   It is noteworthy that such a doxographical account has been and partly still is
    one of the models – I do not know whether explicitly or implicitly – for the
    historical and theoretical subdivision of the schools of poetics used in the stan-
    dard works on the history of Sanskrit Poetics.

4   In a previous paper (CUNEO forthcoming), I have analyzed the passage in some
    detail especially with regard to Abhinavagupta's attitude towards history, tra-
    dition, novelty and narrative.

well known, as their works survived the ravages of time. The contemporary reader is thus allowed to assume a critical viewpoint on the rhetorical strategies by which Ruyyaka constructs his own version of the story, which is the history of *alaṃkāraśāstra*.

After the *maṅgala* verse to Vāk, the goddess of speech,[5] the AS starts off *in medias res* by stating that:

> *iha hi tāvad bhāmahodbhaṭaprabhṛtayaś cirantanālaṅkārakārāḥ pratīyamānam arthaṃ vācyopaskārakatayālaṅkārapakṣanikṣiptaṃ manyante |* (AS, p. 3.)

> To start with, in fact, Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and the other ancient authors of *alaṃkāraśāstra* maintain that the implied meaning is apportioned to the sphere of the figures of speech by being a supporting element of the expressed meaning.[6]

Since the very first sentence of his work, Ruyyaka posits the existence of a *pratīyamānārtha*, an "implied meaning," otherwise known as the *vyaṅgyārtha*, the "manifested" or "suggested" meaning, first introduced in the revolutionary, essentialistic and functionalistic theory propounded by Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* (henceforth DhvĀ) in order to account for all the poetical meanings that could not be explained – so it was claimed and argued for – by the preceding linguistic and poetical theories. By the very insertion of the suggested meaning within the theory of the authors who long

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[5]   It is interesting to note that in commenting on the *maṅgala* Jayaratha refers *en passant* to the metaphysics of so-called Kashmir Śaivism, without the need of any explanation, especially relying on the doctrine of the levels of the word as expounded in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (for instance, 1. 1 and 1. 167 are quoted) as well as quoting analogous verses of a clear Bhartṛharian or *śaivādvaita* flavor that I could not identify, such as this one: *yeyaṃ vimarśarūpaiva paramārthacamatkṛtiḥ | saiva sāraṃ padārthānāṃ parā vāg abhidhīyate ||* (p. 1). Along the lines of the connection between *alaṃkāraśāstra* and *śaivādvaita*, an interesting issue is the relative paucity of hard-core *śaiva* theological and metaphysical speculations on the part of the renowned *śaivādvaitin* Jayaratha in his exposition of the AS. Reasons for absences are often doomed to remain speculative. My current hypothesis, however, is that Ruyyaka followed Abhinavagupta also in what I have tentatively called his ecumenical attitude, i.e. a conscious attempt to underplay the "sectarian" aspects of his thought while commenting on works of a "trans-sectarian" discipline such as *alaṃkāraśāstra* (CUNEO 2016).

[6]   The striking absence of Daṇḍin here as well as in the worldview of Kashmirian *alaṃkāraśāstra*, if we exclude a handful of quotations, has been often noted. For the most recent and complete remarks, see Bronner (2012, 71).

predated Ānandavardhana's system, Ruyyaka is rigging the game from the start and is thereby spinning a teleological narrative that already contains its final outcome in its very premises. As already hinted at before, such a teleological account of the schools predating the revolution of *dhvani* is precisely the one that has been recounted by most of the 20th-century scholars on Sanskrit poetics and that has been heavily criticized in recent scholarship, already starting with Gerow's work and culminating with the "Chicago school of *alaṃkāraśāstra*," if I can gather under a single label the pioneering works of Pollock, McCrea and Bronner, among others. According to such a teleological account, the *dhvani*-theory and its "discovery" of the suggested meaning as the soul of true poetry is "the highest point reached by Sanskrit literary criticism (KRISHNAMOORTHY 1964, p. 62 [quoted in MCCREA 2008, p. 2])" and all the thinkers that predated Ānandavardhana are just an imperfect version of it or rungs of a speculative ladder, to use Abhinavagupta's metaphor, that cannot but climax in the perfection of the poetics of suggestion (*dhvani*).

With this framework in mind, Ruyyaka's narrative can be even more revealing. After the general statement that the manifested meaning is subsumed under the label of the figures of speech, Ruyyaka elaborates further by stating which specific figures of speech can subsume the three well-known possible varieties of *vyaṅgyārtha* (the *vastudhvani*, the manifestation of a narrative element, the *alaṃkāradhvani*, the manifestation of a figure of speech and the *rasadhvani*, the manifestation of an aesthetic emotion).

Without delving into the details of this passage, for our present purpose it is crucial to note that, although all the varieties of *dhvani* were treated by the ancient school within the purview of some or other figure of speech – so argues Ruyyaka –, they were always considered as a secondary element, an *upaskāraka*, a supporting element, an ornament, that is exactly an *alaṃkāra*. Consequently, the passage finishes with these words:

> Therefore, in this way, the threefold implied meaning in its totality has been so declared as an ornament [on the part of the ancient authors of *alaṃkārśāstra*].[7]

Then, the text continues and mentions Vāmana and then again Udbhaṭa, in order to highlight their differences within the general scope

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[7]   *tad itthaṃ trividham api pratīyamānam alaṅkāratayā khyāpitam eva* (AS, p. 6).

of the theory of the ancients. However, a decisive clue in this tentative reconstruction of Ruyyaka's teleological narrative is a mere *tuśabda*, a "but" in the text, which follows the name of Vāmana. Jayaratha takes the hint given by this particle to reveal the direction of a theoretical improvement in the progression towards *dhvani*-theory, a progression that Vāmana is made to embody by Ruyyaka's text. Jayaratha affirms:

> Even though Vāmana declares the implied meaning to be included in the figures of speech, he has stated that there exists some sort of soul [of poetry] that is supported by those [figures of speech].[8]

The soul of poetry for Vāmana is *rīti*, "style," qualified as *viśiṣṭā padaracanā*, "a specific composition of words."[9] So, in Jayaratha's understanding of Ruyyaka's reconstruction, Vāmana does fail to recognize the existence of *dhvani*, "suggestion," but he is accorded the merit of focusing the discourse on an *ātman*, a soul, an enlivening entity that inheres in the body of poetry and is different from the mere ornaments, the figures of speech. With a fully teleological move, his work is therefore implicitly portrayed as a closer prefiguration of Ānandavardhana's forthcoming innovation. Anyways, in order to summarise the first part of his account, Ruyyaka concludes:

> Therefore, such is the opinion of the ancients: it is the figures of speech that are the main thing in poetry.[10]

As further proof of the teleological nature of Ruyyaka's reconstruction of the "history" of his discipline, the continuation of the narrative is not at all chronological. His attention is now turned towards the opponents of *dhvani*, Kuntaka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. Whereas, showing a fair degree of historical awareness and scrupulousness, Jayaratha feels the need to justify their anachronistic treatment before the actual exposition of *dhvani* by stating:

> Although the authors of the *Vakroktijīvita* and of the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* also indeed predate Ānandavardhana, their opinion has been stated first because they follow the opinion of the ancients.[11]

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[8] *vāmanena pratīyamānasyālaṅkārāntarbhāvam abhidadhatāpi tadupaskārya ātmā kaścid uktaḥ* (*Alaṃkārasarvasvavimarśinī*, p. 7).

[9] Cf. Vāmana, *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra* 1.2.6: *rītir ātmā kāvyasya* and 1. 2. 7: *viśiṣṭā padaracanā rītiḥ*.

[10] *tad evam alaṅkārā eva kāvye pradhānam iti prācyānāṃ matam* (AS, p. 7).

[11] *yady api vakroktijīvitahṛdayadarpaṇakārāv api dhvanikārānantarabhāvāv eva,*

So, with regard to Kuntaka, Ruyyaka explains:

> As to the author of the *Vakroktijīvita*, he stated that, on account of its predominance, the life of poetry is the multifarious obliqueness of speech, whose essence is the curved expression of [the poet's] dexterity.[12]

After this general statement, Ruyyaka explains further that according to Kuntaka the most important factor is nothing but the activity of the poet and that all kinds of *dhvani* are included in *vakrokti* as the result of such activity.[13]

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is also treated in some brief lines and portrayed as the exponent of the centrality of *rasa*-enjoyment, again with a *vyāpāra*, an "activity" or a "function" being at the centre. It is not, however, the activity of the poet, but a function of poetry itself, an enjoyment-capacity (*bhoga*) that characterizes poetry as the entity that triggers an enjoyment, similar to the enjoyment of the absolute, as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka famously stated.[14]

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tathāpi tau cirantanamatānuyāyināv eveti tanmataṃ pūrvam evoddiṣṭam (*Alaṃkārasarvasvavimarśinī*, p. 12).

[12] *vakroktijīvitakāraḥ punar vaidagdhyabhaṅgībhaṇitisvabhāvāṃ bahuvidhāṃ vakroktim eva prādhānyāt kāvyajīvitam uktavān* (AS, p. 8).

[13] Considering the importance of the concept of *pratibhā*, "poetic genius," in Kuntaka's work, Jayaratha quite appropriately comments that this activity is an act shaped by the genius of the poet (*vyāparasyeti kavipratibhollikhitasya karmaṇaḥ* [*Alaṃkārasarvasvavimarśinī*, p. 8]).

[14] As an interesting aside, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was probably one of the first authors in the history of *alaṃkāraśastra* to formulate the comparison between the aesthetic and the mystical experience. For Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's own words, see *Locana* ad DhvĀ 1. 6, pp. 91-92: *vāgdhenur dugdha etaṃ hi rasaṃ yad bālatṛṣṇayā | tena nāsya samaḥ sa syād duhyate yogibhir hi yaḥ ||*. In Ingalls' translation (INGALLS 1990, p. 120), "Prompted by the thirst of these children, the cow of speech gives forth this *rasa* as milk; to which the experience milked by yogis bears no comparison." On Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, in general, see POLLOCK 2010. Abhinavagupta often lingers on the comparison between the aesthetic and mystical experience both in his *Locana* on Ānandavardhana's DhvĀ (for instance, see *Locana* ad DhvĀ 1. 18, p. 160; ad DhvĀ 2. 4, p. 183; ad DhvĀ 2. 4, p. 190; ad DhvĀ 3. 43; p. 510; translated in INGALLS 1990, pp. 194, 222, 226 and 655, respectively) and in his commentary on Bharata's NŚ (for instance, see ABH ad NŚ 6, prose after 31, *rasasūtra*, vol. I, p. 277; p. 285; p. 290; translated in GNOLI 1968, pp. 45-48, 82-85 and 83, n. 4, respectively). Along very similar lines, the standard reformulation of the comparison between aesthetic and mystical experience is probably the very late one by Viśvanātha, in his *Sāhityadarpaṇa* 3.2, namely that the savouring of *rasa* is "*brahmāsvādasahodaraḥ*." Among the abundant secondary literature, see LARSON 1976, PATNAKAR 1993, BÄUMER 1997, KUNJUNNI RAJA 2000 and FERNÀNDEZ 2001.

The narrative ends with the ascertainment of suggestion (*asti tā-vad vyaṅgyaniṣṭho vyañjanāvyāpāraḥ*) and the detailed exposition of all its subcategories.[15] The details of the theory of *dhvani* have been retold again and again so many times that there is no need to linger on them in the present context. However, as a conclusion of the narration of Ruyyaka's narrative, it might be useful to try and make better sense of it with the help of another commentator of the AS, the southerner Samudrabandha.[16] At the end of this introductory section, he summarises and typologizes the different opinions about *kāvya* that Ruyyaka states. Samudrabandha writes:

> *iha viśiṣṭau śabdārthau kāvyam – tayoś ca vaiśiṣṭyaṃ dharmamukhena vyāpāramukhena vyaṅgyamukhena veti trayaḥ pakṣāḥ | ādyo 'py alaṅkā-rato guṇato veti dvaividhyam | dvitīyo 'pi bhaṇitivaicitryeṇa bhogakṛttve-na veti dvaividhyam |* (*Alaṃkārasarvasvavyākhyā*, p. 11.)

> Here [in Ruyyaka's account], poetry is word and meaning made distinctive [or qualified]. And their distinctiveness is with regard to a property, with regard to a function or with regard to the manifested meaning. These are the three opinions. The first one is further twofold, with respect to the figures of speech and with respect to the qualities. The second is twofold as well, with respect to the multifariousness of expression and the capacity of enjoyment.

Therefore, according to Samudrabandha there are five theoretical views regarding *kāvya* as Ruyyaka has exposed them. Accordingly, the specificity of poetry lies in 1) the figures of speech (*alaṃkāra*), according to the old school of Bhāmaha and so forth, in 2) the qualities (*guṇa*), the position of Vāmana and its style as fundamentally consisting of qualities,[17] in 3) the multifariousness of expression, i.e. the obliqueness (*vakrokti*) propounded by Kuntaka, in 4) the capacity of enjoyment (*bhokṛttva*), i.e. the centrality of the apperception of *rasa* advocated by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, and in 5) the suggested meaning (*vyaṅgya*) as maintained by Ānandavardhana and accepted by Ruyyaka himself.

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[15] The quick dismissal-cum-refutation of Mahima Bhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka* that pre-cedes the final remark on the establishment of suggestion is not of present con-cern.

[16] On Samudrabandha, see NARAYANAN 2002.

[17] Cf. Vāmana, *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra* 1. 2. 7: *viśiṣṭā padaracanā rītiḥ* and 1. 2. 8: *viśeṣo guṇātmā*.

Now, coming back to the text of Ruyyaka from our own perspective, it is striking but maybe understandable that the two greatest exponents of *dhvani* before him, i.e. Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa, are not mentioned in the narrative. One might argue that they have not been included because they do not maintain any new theory of their own and they just improve the *dhvani*-theory laid out by Ānandavardhana. However, one might reasonably speculate that they are not mentioned exactly because they were Ruyyaka's immediate predecessors and thus his writing could be interpreted as a form of confrontation with them and, possibly, a summation of their own contributions. The rest of the paper runs along the lines of these speculations.

THE ECLECTICISM

Arguably, an additional reason for considering Ruyyaka's contribution as a culmination in the history of Kashmiri aesthetics is his way of combining the views of his two major predecessors, Mammaṭa and Abhinavagupta. In particular, my focus will be turned towards the inclusion of *tātparyaśakti* as part of the epistemological understanding of linguistic signification, a case in point where Ruyyaka follows Abhinavagupta against Mammaṭa, and Ruyyaka's understanding of the subdivisions of secondary signification (*lakṣaṇā*), a clear instance where Mammaṭa's elaborations are preferred over Abhinavagupta's.

The concept of *tātparyaśakti* itself is in all likelihood an innovation by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the famous 9th-century Kashmirian logician.[18] For the time being and our present purpose, suffice it to say that Ānandavardhana never mentions the concept of *tātparyaśakti*, while Abhinavagupta includes it in a fourfold subdivision of the process of linguistic signification that is thoroughly treated in his *Locana*, a commentary to the DhvĀ.[19] The four phases (*kākṣyas*) are *abhidhā*, *tātparya*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā*. On hearing any sentence, we at first understand the separate meanings, as the single words can only signify the respective universals (*sāmānya*), in accordance with the early Mīmāṃsaka understanding of the issue.[20] This is where the

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[18] For a detailed treatment of the concept of *tātparyaśakti* in both Jayanta and Abhinavagupta, see the article by Graheli in the present volume.

[19] See, in particular, the long discussion in *Locana* ad DhvĀ 1. 4.

[20] *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1. 1. 24, p. 112: *sāmānye hi padaṃ pravartate*.

functioning of *abhidhā*, "denotation," ends.[21] Then, a unified sentence meaning is obtained thanks to *tātparyaśakti*, which communicates the individual meanings connected in a particularized sentence meaning. Then, only in the case of some obstacle in signification such as the famous impossibility of having a village right upon the Ganges (*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*), one resorts to *lakṣaṇā*, "indication," and a related meaning is understood to account for the difficulty in a literal interpretation: in the famous example, it is the bank of the Ganges that is actually to be understood as the substratum for the village (*gaṅgātīre ghoṣaḥ*). Finally, the fourth phase: it is only through *vyañjanā*, the "suggestive capacity," that one comes to understand, if present at all, the implied meanings – often, but not always poetic meanings –, among which we find for instance any possible reason and purpose (*prayojana*) for the particular use of secondary signification, *lakṣaṇā*: in the case of the example, one says "the village is on the Ganges," and so uses a figurative expression, in order to implicitly convey that the settlement possesses some of the good qualities associated with the sacred river, such as its coolness and holiness.

This bird's eye view on Abhinavagupta's philosophy of linguistic signification is of present concern, because Mammaṭa – who follows Abhinava in multiple respects, most famously in the analysis of the ontology of *rasa* – does not seem to accept the principle of *tātparyaśakti*, as he mentions it only once in the *kārikā*s as the opinion of others,[22] and only *en passant* in a couple of passages of his *svavṛtti*.[23]

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[21] Again, in accordance with (at least one interpretation of) Śabara, *padāni hi svaṃ svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi* (*Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1. 1. 25, p.116).

[22] In *Kāvyaprakāśa* (henceforth KP) 6: *syād vācako lākṣaṇikaḥ śabdo 'tra vyañjakas tridhā | vācyādayas tadarthāḥ syus tātparyārtho 'pi keṣucit ॥*. "Language here is threefold: denotative, indicative and suggestive. Its meaning is respectively denoted and so forth. According to some, there is also the meaning of *tātparya*." The *vṛtti* by Mammaṭa himself attributes *tātparyaśakti* to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. For an understanding of this attribution, most probably unwarranted, see again Graheli's contribution to the present volume.

[23] *Svavṛtti* ad KP 6, p. 9, the passage related to the *kārikā* treated in the previous note; *Svavṛtti* ad KP 18, p. 34: *taṭādau viśeṣāḥ pāvanatvādayas te cābhidhātātparyalakṣaṇābhyo vyāpārāntareṇa gamyāḥ |*. "In the case of the 'bank' and the like [understood in cases such as 'the village on the Ganges' (*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*) and the like], qualifications such as 'holiness' and the like are understood by means of a function that is different from denotation, *tātparya* and indica-

Ruyyaka, on the other hand, clearly states –anachronistically – that it was accepted by the *dhvanikāra*, i.e., by Ānandavardhana. He writes: ... *abhidhātātparyalakṣaṇākhyavyāpāratrayottīrṇasya... vyañjanāvyāparasya*... Therefore, in this case, Ruyyaka sides with Abhinavagupta and against Mammaṭa.

However, in other cases such as in his understanding of "secondary signification," *lakṣaṇā*, or – as he calls it in this case – *bhaṅgī*, he follows the system followed by Mammaṭa as opposed to Abhinavagupta's theories. More specifically, in the opening of the AS, as Ruyyaka is explaining that in the view of the "ancients" the *pratīyamānārtha*, the "implied meaning," is considered to fall under the purview of *alaṃkāra*s, he specifies that this happens by way of a "twofold indirection" (*dvividhayā bhaṅgyā*) in accordance with the tenth *kārikā* of Mammaṭa's KP that is partially quoted in that very junction: *svasiddhaye parākṣepaḥ parārthe svasamarpaṇam*, "a further [meaning] is supplied in order to account for the realization of its own [primary meaning]. Its [primary meaning] is abandoned for the sake of a further meaning." Accordingly, as amply illustrated in Jayaratha's commentary, the various *alaṃkāra*s (*paryāyokta*, *aprastutapraśaṃsā*, etc.) are understood to convey an indirect meaning along these two modalities of signification (the suppletion of a further meaning or the complete abandonment of the primary meaning). In its non-poetic embodiment, the first modality is exemplified by the example *kuntāḥ praviśanti* "the spears are entering," in which the meaning can be accounted for only if one implies that the soldiers that carry the spears are entering as well. The second is exemplified by the time-honoured *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*, in which the meaning "Ganges" has to be abandoned to leave the room for the meaning

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tion"; *Svavṛtti* ad KP 47, p. 155: *ity abhidhātātparyalakṣaṇātmakavyāpāratrayātivartī dhvananādiparyāyo vyāpāro 'napahnavanīya eva* |. "Consequently, it is surely not possible to reject the function called 'suggesting' and so forth [i.e., called with other names] as exceeding the three functions of denotation, *tātparya* and indication." My contention is that, on the evidence of the previously quoted *kārikā*, Mammaṭa does not seem to accept *tātparyaśakti*, although he does mention it twice in his *vṛtti* together with the other functions, but only in order to stress that suggestion is a different, further function of linguistic signification. From this unfortunately scanty evidence, it is also possible to argue that Mammaṭa had a noncommittal attitude toward the existence of *tātparyaśakti*. It is worth noting that the order in which he mentions the three functions of *abhidhā*, *tātparya* and *lakṣaṇā* is in accordance with Abhinavagupta's understanding of *tātparyaśakti* as the second phase of linguistic signification, and therefore it seems most probable, if not certain, that it is his theory that Mammaṭa has in mind.

"bank."[24] What is of present concern is the fact that this subdivision of *lakṣaṇā* is not at all found in Abhinavagupta's works.[25]

To wrap up the import of this second twofold clue, Ruyyaka's eclecticism within the purview of the *dhvani*-theory with regard to his two immediate predecessors could well be regarded as one more aspect of his work that hints at his liminality, his borderline role, as one of the last exponents of Kashmirian *alaṃkāraśāstra*.

SERVANT OF TWO MASTERS?

By focusing on the first few pages of Ruyyaka's AS, the teleological narrative of the discipline, and the minor points of its understanding of the functions of language, the central feature of the work has so far remained untouched: its being for the most part a comprehensive treatment of figures of speech. Ruyyaka's best efforts, in other words, cannot but be in his sophisticated analysis of poetic figuration in all its varieties and his at least implicit attempt to logically categorize the various figures of speech and the principles that inform them. Ruyyaka's system of classification is followed by GEROW 1971 in his own masterful attempt to find a *ratio* in both the history and the system(s) of *alaṃkāra*s. In Gerow's words (ibid., p. 21):

> Not until the close of the early figurative period [in the history of *alaṃkāraśāstra*], in the works of certain of the encyclopedists, is there any

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[24] It is interesting to note that Mammaṭa borrowed this subdivision of *lakṣaṇā* and in general his understanding of secondary signification at large – including in contemporary parlance both metaphorical and metonymical meanings – from the relatively understudied *Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā* of Mukula (first half of the 10th century, Kashmir), arguably the first author to challenge Ānandavardhana's *dhvani* theory. See, for instance, Mukula's formulation of the first modality, i.e., the suppletion of a further meaning (*Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā* 3ab): *svasiddhy-arthatayākṣepo yatra vastvantarasya tat*. On Mukula, see VENUGOPALAN 1977, MCCREA 2008, pp. 260-310, AGRAWAL 2008, KEATING 2013a and 2013b. Moreover, Mammaṭa devoted an entire short work to the functions of language, the *Śabdavyāpāravicāra*, in which he quotes even more extensively from Mukula's work. I am presently working on an article focused on an in-depth investigation of the relation between Mukula and Mammaṭa.

[25] The reason why Abhinavagupta does not seem to be aware of – or does not seem to care about – the theory of secondary signification devised by Mukula, then adopted by Mammaṭa, and subsequently well attested in many authors of *alaṃkāraśāstra*, is a really difficult question to answer and lies way beyond the scope of the present article.

really serious attempt to make the outward presentation of the figures con-
form to their inner logic. Ruyyaka must be mentioned as the writer who
has gone the farthest in this direction. Much of our argument is based on
his system.

Therefore, the aspects treated so far in the present essay might be
indeed regarded as somewhat marginal. However, the link between
the marginality to Ruyyaka's work of aspects that were central to a
couple of centuries of speculation in Kashmir and the main topic of
the AS, i.e. *alaṃkāra*s, is the very last clue that I tried to identify (or
maybe to conjecture, if one can conjecture a clue) in order to inter-
pret the figure of Ruyyaka as the hinge between two worlds, the mo-
mentous character that sets a before and an after.

My hypothesis is that this link can be found in the reply that Ja-
yaratha gives to an implicit question on the part of Ruyyaka's to the
*ālaṃkārika*s who came after the speculative earthquakes that Kash-
mir witnessed in the period between Ānandavardhana and Mahima-
bhaṭṭa, so to say. The query would be something like: "why should
we *ālaṃkārika*s now keep bothering to catalogue the various figures
of speech and to fine-tune their individual definitions, if it has been
now long proved and established that the soul of poetry is *dhvani*,
the suggested meaning, and even more so in Abhinavagupta's extre-
mization of the theory, according to which the real soul of poetry is
only *rasa*, an aesthetic emotion that seems to have little to do with
tropes and figuration?" The centrality of this question is supported
by the definition of poetry given in the standard textbook of *alaṃ-
kāraśāstra*, the already mentioned KP. There Mammaṭa affirms:

> *tad adoṣau śabdārthau saguṇāv analaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi* | (KP 4ab.)

> It [i.e. poetry] consists of word and meaning, without defects and with
> qualities, and sometimes without figures of speech.

It is clear from this definition that *alaṃkāra*s are not an essential
element of poetry. This marginality of poetic figuration is perfectly
in tune with the essentialistic and functionalistic revolution pro-
pounded by Ānandavardhana, for which every element should be
aiming at the revelation of a manifested meaning, and no formal ele-
ment is essential for this to occur. Thus, the change of focus of the
AS – not *dhvani* but the figures of speech, although *dhvani* is clearly
advocated in the beginning and somewhat taken for granted now –
might indeed be interpreted as an attempt of reconciliation between
the view of the "ancients" and the view of the "contemporary" *ālaṃ-*

*kārika*s. The AS itself does not seem to offer more than that. However, a definition of the central concept of *alaṃkāra* found in the *Vyaktivivekavicāra* by the same Ruyyaka could provide important clues in this direction. He writes:

> *tathā ca śabdārthayor vicchittir alaṃkāraḥ ǀ vicchittiś ca kavipratibhollā-sarūpatvāt kavipratibhollāsasya ānantyād anantatvaṃ bhajamāno na pa-ricchettuṃ śakyate ǀ*

> And, in this way, ornamentation is the charm of word and meaning. Moreover, it is not possible to accurately define charm, because it is infinite, as it consists of the play of the poet's imagination, which is in its turn infinite in scope.[26]

In the words of a famous article by Jacobi (JACOBI 1908a), *vicchitti* becomes the test of poetic figurativeness. The use of the term *vicchitti* directly refers to the poetological discourse advocated by Kuntaka regarding the centrality of *vakrokti*, also called *bhaṅgī*, *bhaṇiti*, *vaicitrya* or, indeed, *vicchitti*. This stress on figuration betrays once more Ruyyaka's closeness to the theoretical position of the "ancients," although through the doorway of Kuntaka's reformulation of it, as well as its emphasis on the importance of poetic imagination. Once more, one might feel the need for a justification of Ruyyaka's being a servant of two masters, of his being both an exponent of the *dhvani*-school and yet so close to the position and the interests of the school of the "ancients." It is Jayaratha who comes to the rescue by providing the text with a clear theoretical reason for the essentiality of figuration and, in general, of the formal, "physical" aspects of poetry. Jayaratha argues:

> *nanu yady evaṃ tarhi "gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ" ity atrāpi vyaṅgyasya sadbhā-vāt kāvyatvaṃ prasajyate ǀ naitat ǀ iha yadvad ātmano vyāpakatvāc charīre ghaṭādau (ca) vartamānatve 'pi karaṇādiviśiṣṭe śarīra eva jīvavyavahāro na ghaṭādau tadvad asyāpi vividhaguṇālaṃkāraucityacārutvaśabdārtha-śarīragatvenaivātmatvavyavahāro nānyatreti na kaścid doṣaḥ ǀ*

> Someone might object: if this were the case [the objector has in mind the presence of *dhvani* in common, worldly expressions], then the very notion of poetry would be unwarrantedly applicable also to cases such as "the village is on the Ganges," because of the presence of a suggested meaning. It is not like that. In this regard, although the soul is present in both a body and a pot [or any other insentient object], as it is omni-pervasive, we can

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[26]   *Vyaktivivekavicāra*, p. 44.

only talk of a living being in the case of a body qualified by sense organs and the like and not in the case of pots and so on. In the very same way, even that [suggested meaning] can be said to be the soul [of poetry] only insofar as it is found in a body of word and meaning [endowed with] beauty, propriety and various qualities and figures of speech, and in no other case. Therefore, there is no defect [in the definition].[27]

Along the lines of this powerful argument, the *alaṃkāra*s (and *guṇa*s) are indeed a *condition sine qua non* of *kāvya*, just as much as *dhvani* is. As a soul can only vivify a body endowed with the characteristics of a living body, in the very same way *dhvani* can only vivify a linguistic body endowed with the time-honoured characteristics described by the ancient authors since the very beginning of the tradition of *alaṃkāraśāstra*. We can only talk of poetry if both *dhvani* and some degree of beauty and figuration are present at the same time. Such an argument based on the long-established master-metaphor of the body-soul image can very well be regarded as an implicit answer to the question "why should we still be bothered by tropology and figuration in a poetic culture where suggestiveness is the only soul of poetry?" What is even more striking is that Jayaratha is here actually just re-using an argument that Abhinavagupta levied in his *Locana*,[28] but my contention is that this reasoning is repurposed in Jayaratha's text in order to meet the new needs of a time when the existence of *dhvani* is commonly accepted, but the importance of *alaṃkāra*s is under theoretical threat at the very least.

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[27] *Alaṃkārasarvasvavimarśinī*, p. 11.

[28] *Locana* ad DhvĀ 1.4, p. 59: *nanv evaṃ "siṃho vaṭuḥ" ity atrāpi kāvyarūpatā syāt, dhvananalakṣaṇasyātmano 'trāpi samanantaraṃ vakṣyamāṇatayā bhāvāt | nanu ghaṭe 'pi jīvavyavahāraḥ syāt, ātmano vibhutvena tatrāpi bhāvāt | śarīrasya khalu viśiṣṭādhiṣṭānayuktasya saty ātmani jīvavyavahāraḥ, na yasya kasyacid iti cet – guṇālaṅkāraucityasundaraśabdārthaśarīrasya sati dhvananākhyātmani kāvyarūpatāvyavahāraḥ | na cātmano 'sāratā kācid iti ca samānam |*. IN-GALLS 1990 translates (p. 86): "Our opponent might object: 'If this were so, such examples as 'The boy is a lion' would be poetry, because, as you will shortly say, the soul of poetry, which you define as suggestion, is found in such examples as well [as in poems which exhibit *rasa*].' To which we answer no; one might as readily say that a clay pot is alive, because, as the soul is omnipresent, it must be in the pot as well. Should you try to reply to this answer by saying that it is only when the soul is present in a body that serves as basis for particular [sense faculties and the like], and not when the soul is present in any other sort of locus, that we speak of life, very well, we will employ the title 'poetry' only when *dhvani* is embodied in a composition containing *guṇa*s, figures of speech, propriety, and beautiful words and meanings. But in neither case does the soul [or *dhvani*] lose its precious nature."

In fact, Jayaratha is here commenting the portion of the AS, in which Ruyyaka explains how the *dhvanikāraḥ*, i.e. Ānandavardhana, accepted the function of suggestion as the soul of poetry, "because [– among other reasons –] only the meaning of the sentence that is suggested is its main element, *insofar as qualities and figures of speech are its supporting elements* (emphasis mine)."[29] Figuration has now outspokenly become part and parcel of the justification of poetry as a mode of signification sui generis, in a way that might have been implicitly understood in Abhinavagupta's poetological synthesis, for instance,[30] but surely did not come to the surface of his theoretical discourse, focused as it was on the wide-ranging defence and rationalization of a *dhvani*-centered epistemology[31] and on his understanding of the psychology and ontology of *rasa*.[32]

On account of my avowedly interpretive reading of Ruyyaka and Jayaratha, it might not seem implausible to state that Ruyyaka is indeed trying to combine and to an extent reconcile the views of Ānandavardhana and his followers with the view of the ancients. *Vicchitti* and *vyaṅgya*, just to use the terms he prefers, are body and soul of poetry and one cannot seem to live without the other. To sum up, one might say that Jayaratha, borrowing Abhinavagupta's words, offers a sound legitimisation for Ruyyaka's enterprise and also for "the mainstay of Sanskrit Literary theory throughout its history," as it was happily put in MCCREA 2008 (p. 6), that is, a justification for the endless, minute and hair-splitting treatment, classification and exemplification of figures of speech.

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[29] *vākyārthasyaiva ca vyaṅgyarūpasya guṇālaṃkāropaskartavyatvena prādhā-nyād* (AS, p. 10).

[30] One might well argue that the centrality of figuration is apparent in Mammaṭa's work too, as a good portion of it is devoted to the analysis of *alaṃkāra*s and other formal aspects of poetry, but the KP is a manual that attempts to deal with all the aspects of the poetic event, while in the case of Ruyyaka's AS the figures of speech retake centre stage by becoming *the* topic of an independent work, which had not happened in Kashmir for more than two centuries, if one excludes the purposively backward-looking efforts of Pratihārendurāja's *Kāvyālaṃ-kārasārasaṃgrahalaghuvṛtti* (first half of the 10th century), Sahadeva's *Kāvyā-laṃkārasūtravṛttiṭippaṇa* (first half of the 10th century) – anyway, commentaries to older, "classical" works – and Kuntaka's *Vakroktijīvita* (second half of the 10th century).

[31] For the most recent treatment of Abhinavagupta's repurposing of *dhvani* epistemology, see POLLOCK 2012.

[32] For an analysis of the specificity of Abhinavagupta's understanding of *rasa* as opposed to his predecessors, see CUNEO 2013.

CONCLUSIONS

As a way of a tentative conclusion, it is worth recapitulating my points regarding Ruyyaka and Jayaratha as the possible culmination of Kashmirian Sanskrit aesthetics. First of all, in the introductory portion of the AS, by postulating since the very beginning the existence of the implied meaning, the *pratīyamānārtha*, within the theories of authors who could have no knowledge of it, Ruyyaka spins a narrative that is already in itself a conscious teleology of speculative positions and an a priori and ad hoc legitimisation of his final viewpoint. The recounting of such a teleological doxography is only possible in an extremely self-aware scholarly tradition that is thereby giving an account of itself, so to say. The second reason is Ruyyaka's theoretical blend of the positions of Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa, the two greatest exponents of *dhvani*-poetics before him. In particular, I mentioned the issue of *tātparyaśakti* along with Ruyyaka's appropriation of Abhinavagupta's fourfold model of linguistic signification in opposition to Mammaṭa's seeming non-acceptance of it and the internal subdivisions of the function of *lakṣaṇā* that Ruyyaka borrows from Mammaṭa in opposition to Abhinavagupta's silence on the matter. The third reason is the implicit justification he gives – and the explicit justification that Jayaratha gives – for continuing to deal with *alaṃkāra*s and for writing a whole work dedicated to them, although the soul of poetry is firmly established as suggestion and the focus on *alaṃkāra*s might not strike one as warranted anymore. His and Jayaratha's solution of the co-dependence of suggestion and figuration, already found in Abhinavagupta's re-functionalization of the great master-metaphor that is the soul-body image, seems to reach a higher theoretical scope and purpose in the hands of authors deeply interested in both sides of the poetological spectrum. In the expert hands of Ruyyaka and Jayaratha, the conciliation of the old school who focused on *alaṃkāra* and the like and the new school of *dhvani* and *rasa* might therefore be said to have reached its historical and theoretical culmination.[33]

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[33]   As it has been often repeated throughout this essay, I do not claim to offer knockout historical arguments, if anything like that can ever be found. But I am accumulating pointers to a possible interpretation of Ruyyaka's historical and cultural role. As pointed out at the beginning, in order to establish this interpretation on a firmer ground, it would be necessary to thoroughly investigate not only the whole of the AS with Jayaratha's commentary, but also Ruyyaka's commentary on the KP, especially with regards to his seeming disagreements with Mammaṭa, and his commentary on Mahima Bhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka*, especially with regard to his understanding of the relation between figuration and

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suggestion as well as their relative importance and centrality as minimal requirements for poetry to be poetry. A further avenue of research worth investigating in this regard is the influence of Ruyyaka's work on the later *ālaṃkārika*s. For instance, the influence of Ruyyaka on Appaya Dīkṣita has been party studied in BRONNER 2004. Useful discussions on Ruyyaka's stance within the history of the development of some *alaṃkāra*s' definitions are to be found in TUBB AND BRONNER 2008.

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Vyaktivivekavicāra
See *Vyaktiviveka*

Why Isn't "Comparison"
a Means of Knowledge?

Bhāsarvajña on *Upamāna*[*]

ELI FRANCO

The inclusion of a paper on Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (hereafter NBhū) in this volume requires a word of justification. The evidence that ties Bhāsarvajña to Kashmir is wafer-thin[1] and in fact we do not know where he lived. On the other hand, there are very close affinities between the NBhū and the *Nyāyamañjarī* (hereafter NM) and thus the relevance of the former to the Nyāya philosophy of Kashmir is undeniable. Further, the NBhū was well known in Kashmir and our oldest manuscript of it, in Śāradā script, comes from the Kashmiri region. Furthermore, Bhāsarvajña's NBhū represents the most thorough response to the Kashmiri Buddhist philosopher Prajñākaragupta. Thus, even if Bhāsarvajña himself was not a Kashmiri, his work certainly played an important role in the region. Last but not least, Bhāsarvajña was known to and referred to by Abhinavagupta.

Bhāsarvajña is one of the most important and most fascinating philosophers of classical India and his magnum opus, the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, deserves far more attention than it has received so far. The work was thought to be lost for a long time and its first (and so far only) edition was published in 1968 by Swami Yogīndrānanda.[2] Since then, only a single book-length study and a handful of papers

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[1] See the discussion in JOSHI 1986, pp. 1-3.

[2] The edition is a small miracle. It is based on a single manuscript which the editor was not permitted to consult directly; instead a transcript was prepared for his perusal. The fact that the edition is nevertheless quite readable testifies to the accuracy of the single manuscript, the modern transcript, and the editor's capacity. However, at least two more manuscripts of the text have been discovered and a new edition is certainly a desideratum. Even in the small section translated below, a few significant improvements could be made.

have been devoted to it.[3] This is indeed surprising, for Bhāsarvajña is an unusual figure in the Nyāya tradition inasmuch as he did not hesitate to reject some of the most fundamental doctrines of his tradition. Mostly his new tenets relate to the metaphysics of the Vaiśeṣika. He unified the categories of qualities and motions and reduced the number of qualities[4]; he changed the doctrine of liberation in arguing that *mokṣa* is not a neutral state but a blissful one, and he considered God, time and space to be a single entity. In the area of *pramāṇas,* Bhāsarvajña's most conspicuous departure from the Nyāya tradition is that he accepted only three means of knowledge, perception, inference and verbal communication, and denied *upamāna* an independent status. It is on this rejection of *upamāna* that I would like to expand here today.

Upamāna, often translated as "analogy" or "comparison," is one of the minor means of knowledge. Only three philosophical traditions accepted it as an independent means, that is, assumed that it cannot be included in one of the other means of knowledge or reduced to a combination thereof: Nyāya (but not Vaiśeṣika), Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. The Vedānta theory merely repeats that of the Mīmāṃsā and thus there are basically only two theories of *upamāna* in

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[3]   Potter's bibliography mentions the following: (494.2.1) A. Thakur, "*Nyāyabhū-ṣaṇa*: a lost work of medieval Indian logic," JBRS 45, 1959, pp. 89-101; (494.2.2) G. Oberhammer, "Der Worterkenntnis bei Bhāsarvajña," Offenbarung, pp. 107-120; (494.2.3) G. Oberhammer, "Bhāsarvajñas Lehre von der Offenbarung," WZKSOA 18, 1974, pp. 131-182; (494.2.4) Summarized by B.K. Matilal, EnIndPh2, 1977, pp. 410-424; (494.2.5) T. Kumare, "*Sakalaja-gadvidhātranumānam* (I) – the proof of the God Śiva by Bhāsarvajña," JIBSt 28(1), 1979, pp. 7-10; 30(2), 1982, 26-29; (494.2.6) L.V.Joshi, *A Critical Study of the Pratyakṣa Pariccheda of Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, Ahmedabad: 1986; (494.2.7) E. Franco, "Bhāsarvajña and Jayarāśi: the refutation of skepticism in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*," BerlinIndStud 3, 1987, pp. 23-50; (494.2.8) P.K. Sen, "Some textual problems in *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*," Prajnajyoti, pp. 199-205; (494.2.11) P. Haag-Bernede with K. Venugopaladas, "Une vue dissidente sur le nombre: le *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* de Bhāsarvajña", BEFEO 88, 2001, pp. 125-159. To these and MUROYA 2011, a considerable number of studies in Japanese, notably by Shodo Yamakami, could be added. See http://www.cc.kyotosu.ac.jp/~yamakami/publication. html.

[4]   He denied that numbers, size (*parimāṇa*), separeteness, disjunction, farness, nearness and impetus (*vega*) are qualities. He also denied that viscosity (*sneha*) belongs to water alone.

classical Indian philosophy, namely, of the Mīmāṃsā[5] and the Nyā-
ya. In the pre-classical period, certain Buddhists, probably of the
Sarvāstivāda tradition, also accepted it.[6] However, already Vasu-
bandhu accepted only three means of knowledge (perception, infer-
ence, and verbal testimony), and Dignāga, followed by the entire
Epistemological Tradition, only two (perception and inference).

The minor position of *upamāna* in philosophical texts can be con-
trasted with its prominent position in Alaṅkāraśāstra. As Gᴇʀᴏᴡ
1971 (p. 140) points out, among the hundred or so known *alaṃkā-
ras*, about half are reducible to a basic simile.[7] One author, Vāmana,
even attempted, albeit not convincingly, to reduce all figures involv-
ing meaning (*arthālaṅkāra*) to *upamā*. Unlike what one may expect,
the reason why *upamāna* was rejected as an independent means of
knowledge, or even when accepted, hardly ever used in philosophi-
cal discourse, is not that arguments based on analogy or comparison
were considered uncertain. Rather, *upamāna* in philosophical texts
means something different; it cannot be understood as analogy or
comparison in the usual meaning of these terms, and it is, if its def-
inition is followed, quite useless.

Bhāsarvajña's main thesis on *upamāna* is that it is included in
verbal communication and thus does not constitute an independent
means of knowledge. The discussion is divided into two parts, the
first directed against the Mīmāṃsā, the second against the Nyāya.
One has to note perhaps that he does not identify his opponents by
name or school affiliation, but their identity is clear.

That Bhāsarvajña's first opponent is a Mīmāṃsaka is obvious al-
ready from the terms of discussion. For instance, he refers to the
division of Vedic sentences into injunctions, narrations and repeti-
tions (*vidhi, arthavāda* and *anuvāda*, NBhū, p. 417, ll. 23-24), uses
the typical Mīmāṃsā example for verbal communication (in a con-
text of sacrifice) "Bring fire" (p. 417, l. 24), brings presumption (*ar-
thāpatti*) into play, and mentions the typical Mīmāṃsā pair of terms
niyoga and *pratiṣedha* (p. 419, l. 12).

Bhāsarvajña presents his argument as a formal inference:[8]

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[5] Within the Mīmāṃsā there is a minor variation on the status of similarity (*sā-
dṛśya*), which according to Prabhākara forms a category in itself.

[6] See *Upāyahṛdaya* 13.3-4; see also Fʀᴀɴᴄᴏ 2004, pp. 486-487.

[7] On *upamā* in Alaṅkāraśāstra see also Pᴏʀᴄʜᴇʀ 1978, pp. 23-58.

[8] NBhū, p. 417, l. 22: *yathā gaus tathā gavaya ity upamānaṃ śabdāntarbhūtaṃ,
vākyarūpatvād, agnim ānayetyādivākyavat.*

Thesis: the *upamāna* "the gayal is like a cow" is included in verbal communication (*śabda*),

Reason: because it has the form/nature of a statement,

Example: like the statement "Bring fire."

If the Mīmāṃsaka would claim that the special form of *upamāna* justifies its being considered a separate means of knowledge, the same would apply to the injunctions, narrations, etc., and there would be no end to the number of *pramāṇas*.

Before we consider Bhāsarvajña's argument, it would be useful to take a brief look at the Mīmāṃsā theory of *upamāna*. Śabara himself does not mention *upamāna*. As is the case with other means of knowledge, he contents himself with citing an earlier commentary by an anonymous Vṛttikāra. For the latter too, *upamāna* does not seem to have been a major concern and in the quoted passage it is only briefly defined and illustrated (ŚBh 32.4-5):

upamānam api sādṛśyam asannikṛṣṭe 'rthe buddhim utpādayati, yathā gavayadarśanam gosmaraṇasya.

Upamāna, [i.e.] similarity, produces a cognition with respect to an object that is not in contact [with the senses].[9] For instance, seeing a gayal for someone who remembers a cow (*gosmaraṇasya*).

No matter whether *gosmaraṇa* in this sentence is taken as a *bahuvrīhi* or not,[10] it is clear that the word *smaraṇa* posed a problem to the later Mīmāṃsakas, for recollection is not accepted as a means of knowledge. Although it is not quite clear what the Vṛttikāra meant, the later Mīmāṃsā tradition (both Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara, and the Vedānta as well)[11] is unanimous that he could not have meant that *smaraṇa* simply means recollecting. Kumārila, who is probably[12] Bhāsarvajña's main adversary in this section, gives two interpretations: the object cognized by *upamāna* is either the cow qualified by the similarity to the gayal, or the similarity qualified by the cow.[13]

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[9]   Or perhaps: *upamāna* is similarity; it produces a cognition with respect to an object that is not in contact [with the senses].

[10] It is not entirely certain that *gosmaraṇa* has to be taken as a *bahuvrīhi*. Thus, one can also translate it "for the recollection of a cow."

[11] BHATT 1962, p. 290.

[12] Note that the discussion does not follow closely the one in the ŚV. Contrast for instance with the discussion in NM.

[13] ŚV, Upamāna 36: *tasmād yat smaryate tat syāt sādṛśyena viśeṣitam | prameyam upamānasya sādṛśyam vā tadanvitam ‖*. See also Jha's translation (JHA 1909, p.

Now, the Mīmāṃsakas argue that a cognition which has the form "my cow is similar to this gayal" cannot be subsumed under any other acceptable means of knowledge. It is not perception because the person in the forest who has this cognition cannot perceive his cow at home. Bhāsarvajña is not explicit as to why the opponent considers that the cognition cannot be inference or verbal communication, but this is clear. It cannot be subsumed under inference because is not conditioned by concomitance (*vyāpti*) and so on. Nor does one need a previous verbal communication in order to see the similarity between the two animals. This is, of course, one of the main differences between the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya theories of *upamāna*.

Thus, the Mīmāṃsā objection against Bhāsarvajña's inclusion of *upamāna* in verbal communication amounts to a denial that the reason "having the form/nature of a statement" occurs in the subject of inference (technically, the inference contains the fallacy *svarūpā-siddha-hetu* or *āśrayāsiddha-hetu*). *Upamāna* is something completely different, as is apparent from the following illustration: someone who owns a cow goes to the forest and encounters a gayal. He sees the similarity of the gayal to his cow, and has the cognition "my cow is similar to this gayal." Verbal communication plays no role in this example.

Bhāsarvajña rejects the Mīmāṃsā claim at first appearance by a surprising move. The cognition "the cow is similar to this gayal" was experienced before and is therefore nothing but recollection. And of course recollection cannot be the result of a means of knowledge. This point is generally accepted,[14] but the Mīmāṃsakas are especially sensitive to it because of its ramifications to the relationship between *smṛti* and *śruti*.

The opponent retorts that the cow was seen, but the similarity[15] between the two was not seen before. However, this is precisely what Bhāsarvajña claims. The cow was already perceived with its similarity to a gayal (even before the gayal was seen!) because this similarity is something visible (i.e., a visible property of the cow).

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227).

[14] The only philosophical tradition that admits memory as means of knowledge is that of the Jainas.

[15] This clearly refers to the definition of *upamāna* in ŚV, Upamāna 36 quoted above.

Or if it were not visible, it would never be perceived, even after the gayal is seen.

Further, the reverse cognition (i.e., the *upamāna* as means) is also produced: "This gayal is similar to my cow." But such a cognition is not produced by the sense faculty alone or assisted by a recollection of any old thing. So there must be something already perceived in the cow that triggers its recollection when the gayal is seen. If the Mīmāṃsaka admits that the *upamāna* is produced by a sense faculty assisted by a recollection of something specific, he must admit that the cow was seen as similar to a gayal. Otherwise one would not recollect the cow rather than, say, a buffalo. The recollection presupposes that something specific was perceived in the cow which was not perceived in buffaloes, etc. So the similarity to the gayal was perceived before. Thus, both *upamāna* (the gayal is similar to the cow) and *upamiti* (the cow is similar to the gayal) are rejected as recollection.

But how is it possible to perceive the similarity to the gayal before perceiving the gayal itself?

It is possible because this perception does not mean that one can ascertain the similarity to a gayal. Rather, when the cow is perceived for the first time by a non-conceptual cognition, that is, in an undifferentiated manner, its similarity to the gayal is also perceived, more precisely, what is later called the similarity to a gayal is also perceived, we would say intuitively, just as the universal cow-ness is perceived when seeing a cow for the first time (even though it can only be ascertained upon the perception of further individuals of the same species).

The upshot of the argument is this: similarity means to have a common property, and this (exact same) common property resides in both the cow and the gayal. Therefore, even though the gayal itself is seen for the first time, its similarity to the cow is not perceived for the first time because it was perceived when the cow was perceived. Thus, its similarity is recollected. Bhāsarvajña construes an analogous case to the perception of universals. Once the universal cow-ness or bovinity is seen, even when an individual cow is seen for the first time, the bovinity that resides in it cannot be said to be perceived for the first time because it was perceived before in other cows (otherwise one would not recognize the cow as cow).[16]

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16   In other words, when one sees a cow etc., for the first time, one perceives the

The opponent continues: the cognition that qualifies[17] the gayal, "the cow is similar to it,"[18] cannot be a recollection because it arises for the first time when the gayal is seen. Otherwise the conceptual cognition (which associates a perceived individual with a concept) would also be recollection.

Bhāsarvajña replies that this cognition can be proved by two other means of knowledge: *arthāpatti* and inference.

The proof by *arthāpatti* (NBhū, p. 418, l. 23) is this: if the cow were not similar to this gayal, it would not have been perceived as similar to it because the similarity resides in both. But the gayal is perceived as similar to the cow, therefore, the cow too is similar to it.[19]

Bhāsarvajña also formulates an inference to the same effect that could have been lifted straight from a Navya Nyāya text:

> The cow is similar to this gayal because the gayal is delimited by the similarity of the cow. (NBhū, p. 418, l. 26: *prayogo 'pi: anena sadṛśī gauḥ, svasādṛśyenāsyāvacchedakatvāt.*)

> *Vyāpti*: whatever A delimits B by its own similarity (i.e., by the similarity of A), that A is seen as similar to B, for instance, one brother to another. (NBhū, p. 418, l. 27: *yat svasādṛśyena yasyāvacchedakam, tat tena sadṛśaṃ dṛṣṭam, yathā bhrātrā bhrātrantaram.*)

A complicated statement, but trivial when understood. It amounts to an assertion that if A and B share a common property, that property resides also in B.

Further, if a different *pramāṇa* is assumed for such a case, this will lead to the assumption of an indefinite number of *pramāṇas*. Consider the following cognition: "Something seen before is longer

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universal cow-ness too, but one is not aware of it as such. However, after perceiving further cows, one becomes aware of it as well as of the fact that it was already seen when perceiving the first individual cow.

[17] The qualification is understood to be already verbal/conceptual. In *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* the differentiation between the qualified and the qualifications is not yet done.

[18] Should one expect, "the gayal is similar to the cow"? According to Bhāsarvajña, this same content can be a qualification of the cow or the gayal.

[19] I am not sure about the purpose of this statement. Perhaps Bhāsarvajña tries to show that both *pramāṇas* make *upamāna* superfluous.

than this object seen now."[20] This cognition is not *upamāna* because its object is not similarity. Nor is it perception, inference, etc., for the same reasons that the opponent refuses to subsume *upamāna* in them. Thus, a further *pramāṇa* would have to be assumed for such cognitions. This example is important because it clearly shows that the translation of *upamāna* as comparison is inaccurate.

When someone is asked, "how do you know that the cow that is at home is similar to the gayal present here?", he answers: "I saw the cow before by perception." For the same reason cognitions such as "this is bigger than that" should be considered as recollections, that is, because the size was perceived before, albeit in a non-differentiated manner by a non-conceptual cognition.

A final attempt is made by the Mīmāṃsaka to save his position by pointing out that inasmuch as the recollection imitates the experience, one cannot have a conceptual recollection on the basis of a non-conceptual and non-differentiated experience. But Bhāsarvajña denies that. One observes that conceptual recollection arises also from non-conceptual experience. (Although it is not stated here, recollection is generally considered to be always conceptual). That's the way things are and one cannot forbid them to be so.

This concludes Bhāsarvajña's arguments against the Mīmāṃsā. He now turns to his main or more important adversary, the Nyāya. The Nyāya defines the object, i.e., the result, of *upamāna* as the cognition of the relation between a term and a designated object (*saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandha*). Consider the following situation: one learns that for a certain sacrifice a gayal is required. The person who wants to obtain this animal hears a forest inhabitant saying: "The gayal is like a cow," and goes to the forest to look for a gayal. He sees an animal similar to a cow, but with a round neck, i.e., without the dewlap, and understands: "This is a gayal." In the same manner, someone is sent to the forest by a physician to bring some medicinal plants he has never seen before and is told for instance, "the plant called pea-leafed (*māṣaparṇī*) is like the sheaf of peas."[21] One goes to the forest, finds the plant and brings it to the physician. So *upamāna* as means is the cognition of similarity produced by a sense

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[20] Cf. NBhū, p. 418, ll. 28-29: *pūrvadṛṣṭaṃ vastu etasmāt sthūlam, etasmād dīrgham, etasmād hrasvam.*

[21] I am not sure what the word s*tamba* in NBhū, p. 419, l. 18 means. A similar example appears in NBh on 1.1.6., but the word s*tamba* does not appear in it.

faculty, assisted by recollection produced by mnemonic traces, produced by a cognition, produced by a statement (NBhū, p. 419, ll. 20-21): *vākyajajñānajanitasaṃskārajanitasmṛtisahakāriṇendriyeṇa janitaṃ sārūpyajñānam upamānam*.[22] The result (*phala*) of *upamāna*, as just mentioned, is the cognition of the relation between a word or a term and the object it designates.

But that is not correct, says Bhāsarvajña. The relation between a term and a designated object is known from the moment one hears the statement. When the gayal is seen, the relation is only remembered. Again, if asked "How do you know that this is a gayal?", one would answer: "I understood it from the statement of the forester." One would not answer: I know it from *upamāna*. In everyday practice we see only three *pramāṇas* being used, for instance, "I see a pot by perception," "I infer fire from smoke" and "I know about heaven from sacred writings." One never sees anyone saying "I know this by *upamāna*." Indeed, one should add here, that in philosophical texts too, *upamāna* is, to my knowledge, never used. I'll return to this point below.

Now, the opponent argues, of course, that as long as the gayal is not seen, the relation between the term and the designated object is not perceived or understood (for one cannot perceive a relation, if one of the relata is not perceived). That, says Bhāsarvajña, is simply not true. For instance, one apprehends a relation between an invisible god like Indra and his name Śakra. Another example: one can name a child before it is born.

Now the Naiyāyika objects that in these examples there is a cause of linguistic understanding (I understand *nimitta* here as in *vyutpattinimitta*) which allows the understanding of a term such as "thousand-eyes" in respect to Indra, but this is not the case for gayals etc.

Bhāsarvajña retorts that in such cases too there is a *nimitta*, namely, the similarity to the cow. The word "gayal" (*gavaya*) is understood by having recourse to a *nimitta*, namely, the similarity to the cow.

The opponent objects that the similarity is not the *nimitta*. Rather gayal-ness or being a gayal (*gavayatva*) is the *nimitta* for the usage (*pravṛtti*) of the term gayal. When the latter is not apprehended, one cannot use the term.

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[22] This seems like a modification of Vātsyāyana's statement in NBh, for whom *upamāna* seems to be the statement.

Bhāsarvajña retorts that this is not a problem because the gayal-ness too is understood from the statement that the gayal is similar to a cow. For instance, by showing a form in a picture, someone can explain: this is a camel, this is an elephant, and so forth. Or one can explain by words. One can explain a camel by saying that his neck has a special form and so forth, an elephant by saying that it has special teeth, and so on. Thus, from words alone one can understand the camel-ness and elephant-ness. When explaining the words camel and elephant by means of neck, teeth, etc., one can make them known, and no other means of knowledge is possible in this case.

Now, the Naiyāyika has to consent to that, but objects that the cognition that arises from a statement is afflicted, *upapluta*. This is a rather unusual term, but interestingly also used by Jayanta in the NM in the same context.[23] However, we cannot assume that Bhāsar-vajña refers to Jayanta. It seems rather that both use the same earlier source, undoubtedly lost now, Jayanta adopting it, Bhāsarvajña rejecting it. It is also clear that the relationship between the cognition that arises from the statement and the one that arises when seeing the gayal was perceived as a problem before Bhāsarvajña and Jayanta dealt with it, and one of the former Naiyāyikas must have suggested that the cognition based on the verbal communication is in some way defective or flawed, and that it becomes "corrected" only upon the actual seeing of the individual. Only when the relation between the term and the object is apprehended from *upamāna*, it is established in respect to a particular individual and the cognition stops being "afflicted."

But what could this affliction be?[24] It is not the falsity of cogni-tion, because the cognition is not false. Nor is it a doubt, because the cognition does not take the form of an alternative such as "is it a man or a pillar?". As the cognition "the gayal is similar to a cow" is actually a *pramāṇa*, there can be no affliction. The fact that the cog-nition is not related to an individual animal cannot be considered an affliction. Otherwise, the cognition of the fundamental entities of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which are known only from inference or sacred

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[23] E.g. NM, vol. I, p. 389: *yathā naiyāyikānām atideśavākyavelāyāṃ sopaplavā saṃjñāsaṃjñisamandhabuddhir upamānān nirupaplavībhavati...* On *upamāna* in the NM see also BIJALWAN 1977, pp. 187-213.

[24] As far as I understand, the "affliction" is a somewhat metaphorical way to say that the cognition based on verbal communication is not as clear and distinct (*vispaṣṭa*, cf. NM, vol. I, p. 379, l. 2) as the one that arises when the gayal is in front of one's eyes.

writings, would be afflicted, for instance, the Self, the mind (*manas*), *dharma* and *adharma*, and so on. They too are not related to an individual entity perceived by the faculty of vision, for instance, the Self is that in which desires inhere; the atom is the smallest thing; the mind exists because two cognitions do not arise at the same time.

Bhāsarvajña looks at the problem from another perspective. What is the difference between *upamāna* and a convention (*saṃketa*) that a certain word designates a certain object (i.e., when one learns the word gayal for the first time)? The Naiyāyika opponent agrees that when there is a verbal convention, the *upamāna*, i.e., the statement on the similarity, is not a different *pramāṇa* (i.e., is included in *śabda*).[25] In the convention one says "the gayal is that in which there is similarity to a cow[26]; the term gayal [is used] for that [animal]." However, when one hears "the gayal is like a cow," mere similarity is perceived, not the relation of the term with the designated object.[27] For this reason *upamāna* is accepted as having this relation as its object.

The argument seems almost gratuitous. Bhāsarvajña says that if the relation is not perceived from the statement, the statement is superfluous. Mere similarity is perceived even by someone who does not hear the statement.[28] Therefore, one and the same thing is perceived in statements such as "the gayal is similar to a cow," "such an animal is called gayal," or "the term gayal is used for such an animal." Otherwise one would need two different *pramāṇas* when saying in *saṃketa* "this is a cow" and "the word cow is used for this animal."

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[25] The convention here seems to be done without seeing the animal. The term *saṃketa* is usually used for the initial agreement, often attributed to God or the Rishis, which fixes the usage of words. But here it seems to refer to a situation where one learns a new word.

[26] Of course, *saṃketa* usually does not involve similarity, but a direct indication: this word designates that object present here.

[27] It is not clear to me what the difference, if any, should be between the two formulations: *yatra gosādṛśyam asti sa gavayaḥ*, and *yādṛśo gaus tādṛśo gavayaḥ*. The first formulation looks more like a definition, but since the definition is based on similarity, it is not clear why the opponent claims that in the one case *upamāna* is not another *pramāṇa* and in the other it is. Perhaps what the opponent means is that in *saṃketa*, in addition to the statement of similarity, there is also a statement about the word applying to its object, and that this additional element is lacking in *upamāna*.

[28] Indeed for the Mīmāṃsaka hearing the statement is not necessary for *upamāna*; cf. above.

One may object: when one understands in the forest that the word gayal is the term for this animal, one perceives an individual. Before that, the perception of the individual does not arise. But if so, one would not be able to apply the convention to further individuals of the same species, and a new *pramāṇa* would have to be assumed each time a new individual cow is recognized. But this is not the case. Even without saying it in so many words, the speaker intends and the hearer understands that the word cow is applied to every such individual.

The opponent attempts to save his position by claiming that this is understood by implication (*sāmarthya*). But the same would apply to the so-called *upamāna*. One says that the gayal is similar to a cow and one understands by implication that the term gayal applies to such an animal. Even when what is said explicitly differs from the intention, one understands from the context what is meant. For instance, sayings "eat poison; don't eat at his house." One understands that this is not an invitation to eat poison, but a warning that eating in that house is to be avoided at all costs. In the same manner, even though it is not explicitly stated, when one says that the gayal is similar to a cow, one also understands that the word gayal designates an object similar to a cow.

This brings to a close Bhāsarvajña's arguments against *upamāna*. His next task is to show that the Sūtrakāra also did not accept *upamāna* as *pramāṇa*, in spite of very clear statements to the contrary. But I will not go into that here.

Bhāsarvajña's argument against the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā is basically the same: in both cases *upamāna* and its result are nothing but recollection, that is, a mere repetition of a previous experience. As the theories of the two schools differ, so do the relevant recollections. For the Mīmāṃsā it is a recollection of a previous perception, for the Nyāya of a statement by a trustworthy person. But in both cases, Bhāsarvajña claims, they bring nothing new. It seems to me that we have to agree with this opinion as far as the Mīmāṃsā is concerned. It is less obvious about the Nyāya.[29]

For the Mīmāṃsā, as we have seen, *upamāna* is reduced to a trivial inference based on the reversibility of the relation of similarity,

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[29]   This is not necessarily Bhāsarvajña's original opinion. He certainly relies on Mīmāṃsā arguments against the Nyāya and vice versa. Since this is often the case, and given that most philosophical texts of classical India are lost, the original contribution of individual authors is difficult to ascertain.

namely, if A is similar to B, B is similar to A. The perception of the similarity of the gayal to the cow brings about the apprehension that the cow is similar to the gayal. Our understanding of the Mīmāṃsā *upamāna* as a trivial inversion is hardly new. As Govardhan Bhatt has pointed out in his foundational study of Kumārila (BHATT 1962, pp. 294, 304): "In Mīmāṃsā *upamāna* is a form of immediate inference in which from the similarity of A to B we infer the similarity of B to A. [...] The conclusion 'the cow is similar to the *gavaya'* follows from a single premise, viz. 'the *gavaya* is similar to the cow'[...]." Hardly something to write home about. And it is clear that *upamāna* cannot be translated as an "analogy" or "comparison" in this context; indeed Bhatt leaves it untranslated throughout the discussion.

When we come to the Nyāya theory of *upamāna*, things do not look much brighter. For the Nyāya, *upamāna* has to do with an identification of an object, but it is identification under extremely narrow conditions. It has to be based on a statement by a reliable person, the statement has to express similarity between two objects, one of the objects has to be unknown, and the identification should consist in relating a certain word to that unknown object.[30] Furthermore, even though it is not stated explicitly, there is some evidence to suggest that the object has to belong to an unknown species.[31] In other words, if I point out to the way to identify Yigal to someone who has never seen him before, by saying "Yigal is similar to Clark Gable," that would not count as *upamāna*, because the species of being human has already been seen by that person. But even if we ignore such doubtful cases, it is clear that the requirements of *upamāna* make extreme restrictions on its use as identification. It is for this reason that Uddyotakara suggested that dissimilarity[32] too should be included in *upamāna*.

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[30] That the identification is required to be based on similarity clearly limits its use, and in fact leads to unreasonable distinctions. If I say, for instance, the plant whose leafs form perfect triangles is called X, that would not count as *upamāna*. I would have to say "the plant whose leafs are like the perfect triangles that you see here." Further, an identification can also be done by having recourse to dissimilarity and other means. These too cannot count as *upamāna*. To avoid this corset, some have attempted to include "dissimilarity" under similarity. See BHATT 1962, p. 297.

[31] Cf. ŚV, Upamāna 13.

[32] That is, when one is informed: A is dissimilar (or in some respect opposite) to B.

The story of *upamāna* in philosophical literature is a sad one. Even the few schools that accepted it trivialized it and narrowed its scope to such an extent as to make it useless. It is, therefore, not surprising that *upamāna* was never actually used in the Indian philosophical discourse; at least I cannot recall even a single case. When Kumārila once attempted to show that *upamāna*, in the true sense of analogy, could actually be used in reasoning about Vedic ritual, the Naiyāyikas were quick to point out that such a usage of *upamāna* goes well beyond its definition (see NM, vol. I, pp. 392-395, see also BHATT 1962, p. 307). To use Bhatt's example again (ibid., p. 308), from the fact that I perceive a woman to be similar to my wife, I can conclude by *upamāna* that my wife is also similar to her, but I cannot conclude that I can use that woman as a substitute to my wife.

In trivialising *upamāna* and taking it away from its original meaning of analogy and comparison, Indian philosophy deprived itself of a most powerful tool of thought. We all know how persuasive analogies and comparisons can be. We know how a new example can open up a stilted discussion, give it a new perspective, lead to unexpected developments, or make things vivid and accessible (think of Plato's cave or Wittgenstein's family resemblance[33] or Chuang Tzu's butterfly and fish, or, to take at least one example of the Indian tradition, Dharmakīti's glow of the jewel through the keyhole[34]).

Of course, it is not the failure to develop *upamāna* into a significant means of knowledge that can account for the poverty of examples in Indian philosophy (examples in inference are not really examples, but instantiations of the property to be proved; they require neither creativity nor imagination, and indeed some logicians maintain that they are superfluous and argue that they should not be stated). But perhaps had it been developed, it could have facilitated the development of philosophy in India in more original directions. Actually, the treatment of *upamāna* itself is symptomatic to a more general avoidance in the Indian philosophical tradition of using new examples. It is disconcerting to observe that the example of the cow

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[33] To respond to a question by one of the participants in the conference, the example of the two brothers above has nothing to do with Wittgenstein's family resemblance.

[34] On the way this example prompted Śākyabuddhi to further philosophical developments see FRANCO 2014, pp. 22-23.

and the gayal appears already in relation to *upamāna* in the *Mahā-bhāṣya* of Patañjali,[35] and it is being repeated literally for more than two thousand years, while further examples are hardly ever mentioned or thought about seriously. And there is no doubt that the thinking always along the lines of this single example of the cow and the gayal has not facilitated creative philosophical developments. In addition, the adherence to the old definitions in the *Nyā-yasūtra* or *Śābarabhāṣya*, that are clearly inappropriate to capture the breadth of comparisons and analogies, has further contributed to a reduction of the scope of *upamāna* and prevented its interpretation and development as real analogy or comparison. Perhaps the most regrettable point in relying on these definitions is that they prevented many employments of analogies or comparisons in respect to well-known things, but nevertheless expressing something genuinely new, unexpected, illuminating a subject matter from a different perspective. This does not mean of course that Indian philosophers have, in practice, forgone analogies altogether, but they certainly used them to a smaller degree than in European and Chinese philosophy, and a theoretical reflection about them has not been developed.[36] The Ālaṅkārikas have far surpassed them in their insightful analysis of analogy.

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[35]   See also OBERHAMMER ET AL. 1991-2006, s.v. *upamāna*.

[36]   Interestingly, the fallacy of tu quoque, known also as the douchebag fallacy (i.e., I can be an idiot because you are an idiot), is not seldom used in Indian texts and to my knowledge has not been recognized as false.

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Elements of Ritual Speculation in the *Abhinavabhāratī*:

Abhinavagupta on the Visible and Invisible Purposes of the *Pūrvaraṅga**

ELISA GANSER

INTRODUCTION, OR WHY THEATRE CANNOT BE EASILY REDUCED TO A LITERARY WORK

As far as Abhinavagupta's aesthetic theory is concerned, both the *Dhvanyālokalocana* and the *Abhinavabhāratī* (end of the tenth/beginning of the eleventh c.) have been privileged grounds of enquiry in modern scholarship over the past century.[1] In the *Locana*, Abhinavagupta examines the aesthetic process taking place through the medium of poetry, while in the *Abhinavabhāratī* (henceforth ABh) this process has been analyzed taking into account the dramatic medium. This last includes not only the text of the play, but the whole array of spectacular devices and arts ancillary to theatre. In both cases – poetry and drama – the final aim of the work of art is to provoke an aesthetic experience in the reader or spectator, namely the savouring of the *rasa*, the "flavour" or "essence" of the literary

1 Among seminal studies on Abhinavagupta's aesthetic theory one may recall DE 1922, MUKHERJEE 1926, RAGHAVAN 1940, GNOLI 1956, MASSON AND PATWARDHAN 1970, INGALLS ET AL. 1990, BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, MCCREA 2008 and CUNEO 2009.

work.[2] Originally the object of two distinct intellectual disciplines or "sciences" (*śāstra*), the "Science of Poetic Ornaments" (Alaṃkāraśāstra), or poetics, and the "Science of Theatre" (Nāṭyaśāstra), or dramaturgy, the two art forms of poetry and drama started to merge in the work of Vāmana (beginning of the ninth c.), and were finally conflated into a single theory of the literary text with Ānandavardhana (second half of the ninth c.). Confined to its literary dimension, theatre began to be treated in the scholarly treatises like a poetic text (*kāvya*). As a consequence, excerpts from the famous medieval plays began to be counted among the repertoire of poetic examples. Poetry, which had until then been the object of formal analysis in the work of the first Ālaṃkārikas, came to be attributed with the capacity, formerly exclusive to theatre, of provoking one of the eight (or nine) aestheticized emotions (*rasa*) in its reader.[3]

The new approach to literary theory inaugurated by Ānandavardhana brought poetry and drama together as part of the same literary discourse centred on *rasa*, and superseded the old model of formalist poetics. As convincingly argued by MCCREA 2008, this presupposed the application of a model of text analysis originally extraneous to Alaṃkāraśāstra. It incorporated, namely, the theory developed in Vedic exegesis (Mīmāṃsā) according to which a text (paradigmatically the Veda) must have a single overriding purpose around which the other components are hierarchically arranged. *Rasa* was recognized as the single overriding goal of poetry by Ānandavardhana and his epigones. Such a way of interpreting a text, which McCrea calls "teleological text analysis," entails that the role of every poetic sentence, literary figure or dramatic segment, must be reassessed in terms of its subordination to the realization of the main *rasa* of the literary composition, be it a poem or a play.[4]

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[2]   The eight *rasa*s first canonized in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (henceforth NŚ) are the amorous (*śṛṅgāra*), the comic (*hāsya*), the pathetic (*karuṇa*), the furious (*raudra*), the heroic (*vīra*), the fearsome (*bhayānaka*), the loathsome (*bībhatsa*) and the wondrous (*adbhuta*). To these eight the later tradition adds a ninth flavour, the pacified (*śānta*). On the shift of the meaning of *rasa* from "flavour" to "essence," see CUNEO 2013.

[3]   On the two opposed models of literary analysis and their conflation in the work of Ānandavardhana, see MCCREA 2008, pp. 99ff.

[4]   For the Vedic exegetes, this single and overriding goal was to convey, through the Vedic text, an injunction (*codanā*) to undertake a sacrifice, accompanied by other subordinated injunctions describing its details.

This process reached its culmination in Alaṃkāraśāstra with Abhinavagupta's sub-commentary on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvany-āloka* (henceforth DhĀ), called the *Locana*. In Nāṭyaśāstra, the "teleological" analysis of the various components of a theatrical representation, as helpers in conveying a given *rasa* to the spectator, was brought to an end with the ABh.[5] The ABh is the last extant commentary on the whole of Bharata's NŚ, the seminal text on dramatic theory composed around the beginning of the Common Era. It knows no rivals in the breadth of the topics it combines into a unified coherent theory: its topics range from the composition of the dramatic text, its representation by means of the various arts ancillary to theatre, i.e. histrionics (*abhinaya*), instrumental music (*vādya*), vocal music (*gīta*) and dance (*nṛtta*), its aesthetic appreciation, up to the series of preliminary actions that precede every performance of a play (*pūrvaraṅga*). Abhinavagupta's approach to the work of art in his two major theoretical texts on literary criticism may be considered along the same paradigm: the teleological model of text interpretation, first devised by the Mīmāṃsakas and later applied by Ānandavardhana to the poetic or dramatic work, made it necessary to rethink the features of a poem or a play as fitting into the new model. But while most of the elements of a dramatic performance could be straightforwardly analyzed in connection with the main *rasa* of the work, just like in poetry, a certain number of theatrical components could be less easily subsumed under a strict *rasa*-oriented scheme.

In the work of the Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas starting with Ānandavardhana, in effect, the *rasa* is conceived primarily as a literary category: it is a meaning, i.e. the meaning which is the very "soul" or essence of a poetic text,[6] an uncommon meaning communicated through a specific function of language called *vyañjanā*, "suggestion." Translated into theatrical terms, this means that the *rasa* is first of all the concern of the playwright: the depiction of the characters, the conception of the plot-structure with its principal and

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[5]   Already in Bharata's NŚ (first centuries AD?) many elements are organized around *rasa*s and *bhāva*s as the factors lending cohesion to the various dramatic elements and techniques of representation forming a play, but as the theory of *rasa* evolved into a clear "reception theory" some of the tenets of the NŚ had to be re-interpreted to suit the new paradigm. On this shift, see Pollock 2010. For a plea for caution in the interpretation of Bharata's *rasa*, see Cuneo 2013, p. 59, n. 28.

[6]   See DhĀ 1.5: *kāvyāsyātmā sa evārtha*, and *Vṛtti*.

secondary articulations – the *sandhi*s and *sandhyaṅga*s to which I shall return later – the choice of the poetic embellishments including a repertoire of figures of speech, all of which is analyzed in poetics and in dramatics for the sake of the poet's instruction.

Despite the primary importance it enjoys in conveying the *rasa*, the dramatic text is but a part of the whole process that a theatrical production entails, for the theatrical process is much more complex than the poetical one: it consists of a mixture of different arts, each of which exists independently even outside of the theatre; it involves a plurality of agents acting at different times and pursuing different aims; it has to appeal to a variety of spectators through its universalistic character.[7] Moreover, not all of the elements involved in a theatrical production participate in the literary process, or can even boast of a discursive nature.[8] Dance and instrumental music, for instance, are non-linguistic in character, and yet they may appear at times so closely intermingled with a poetic text as to give the impression that they communicate a certain emotional meaning, as if they were a second language, or a poetic embellishment. In reality, as Abhinavagupta puts it in the case of dancing, it is only metaphorically that we can attribute some meaning to dance,[9] its main purpose in the performance being to charm the audience and thus aid

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[7]   While poetry is, according to the *Locana*, an activity which involves a high degree of literary cultivation through the assiduous study of poetic compositions, an activity reserved, therefore, to a restricted circle of connoisseurs or sensitive readers (*sahṛdaya*, "those endowed with heart"), theatre is regarded since its beginnings, and at least in theory, as an art equally accessible to the members of the highest classes, as well as to those less exposed to Sanskrit education, including women, children and the feeble-minded (*strībālamūrkha˚*, cf. NŚ 34.222).

[8]   This is not to say that the oral or performative dimension of poetry was not taken into account by Ānandavardhana, just as it had not been neglected by the earlier Ālaṃkarikas who dealt with both the "embellishments of speech" (*śabdālaṃkāra*), such as alliteration and the like, and the "embellishments of meaning" (*arthālaṃkāra*), such as metaphor, simile, etc. However, this distinction between prosodic and semantic features had no special role to play for Indian theoreticians in the critical evaluation of poetry, neither according to the earlier criterion of poetic beauty, nor in the *rasa*-focused analysis fostered by Ānandavardhana.

[9]   See ABh ad NŚ 4.261bc-263ab, vol. I, p. 176: *kalahāntariteyaṃ khaṇḍiteyaṃ nṛtyatīti vyavahāra aupacārikaḥ, tadarthagīyamānarūpakagatagītavādyānusāritvāt tannṛttasya.* "The common way of saying that 'this distanced woman (*kalahāntaritā*), [or] this deceived woman (*khaṇḍitā*), is dancing' is metaphorical, since her dance [merely] follows the vocal and instrumental music inherent in

the appreciation of the *rasa*.[10] Through similar interpretative proce-
dures, non-linguistic elements or elements exclusively belonging to
(in L. Bansat-Boudon's words[11]) the "spectacular dimension" of
theatre, can fruitfully be connected to the overall goal of the perfor-
mance.

In other phases of the theatrical spectacle, however, the same ele-
ments look totally unconnected to the dramatic text and to its emo-
tional core. Think, in particular, of the series of songs and ritual ac-
tions, the execution of which the theory prescribes before the per-
formance of each and every play, in order to propitiate the deities
and thus ensure the success of the performance. How can one ac-
count for these disparate elements as being part of one and the same
"expressive" unit, i.e. the theatrical performance, especially when
this unit is thought to have a single goal, i.e. the *rasa*, which is lin-
guistic in nature? The present article is an attempt to uncover some
of the interpretative strategies devised by Abhinavagupta in order to
address this complex issue. Its main focus will be the preliminaries
that take place in India before the performance of a play, collectively
called "*pūrvaraṅga*." The *pūrvaraṅga* offers a particularly good ex-
ample by which to illustrate the challenge posed by the analysis of
theatre as part of a larger literary discourse – a discourse that had
already partly adopted and adapted a model developed by ritual ex-
egetes – for three reasons: first, because it was conceptualized since
the first definitions of the NŚ as a ritual, i.e. the worship (*pūjā*) of
the deities of the stage;[12] second, because it comprises a series of
operations that are not easily connected to the rest of the perfor-
mance; and third, because it does not appear in the text of the trans-
mitted plays but is the exclusive work of theatre practitioners.

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the sung composition having such a meaning." On dance and its role in convey-
ing meaning "figuratively" or "by reflection," see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp.
399-404 and BANSAT-BOUDON 2004, pp. 193-198, and n. 57.

[10] I have dealt in detail with the function of dance within the aesthetic process
taking place through a dramatic performance in a previous article (GANSER
2013).

[11] See, for instance, BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 9.

[12] See for instance NŚ 5.55: *sarvadaivatapūjārhaṃ sarvadaivatapūjanam | dha-
nyaṃ yaśasyam āyuṣyaṃ pūrvaraṅgapravartanam ||.* "The execution of the *pūr-
varaṅga*, the worship of all the deities, which deserves to be worshipped by all
the deities, bestows wealth, confers renown and ensures a long life." (I am fol-
lowing the ABh in my reading of the first compound, cf. ABh ad NŚ 5.55, vol.
I, p. 225: *sarvair daivataiḥ pūjārhaṃ praśaṃsanīyam*).

THE *PŪRVARAṄGA*: RITUAL THEATRE
OR THEATRICAL RITUAL?

The study of the *pūrvaraṅga* has been marked, in modern scholarship, by a recurring concern with the origins of Indian theatre: the rituals that are described by Bharata in the *pūrvaraṅga* chapter of the NŚ in fact betray, according to some, the ritual origins of the dramatic art. No doubt, the *pūrvaraṅga* displays a strong ritual character, which has puzzled many scholars since the discovery of Bharata's NŚ, and has given rise to a cluster of distinct arguments in connection with the "quest for the origins." However, the gap between this ritualistic interpretation of drama and the greater concern with aesthetics displayed both in the earliest dramatic works as well as in the technical treatises, does not allow us to rule out at once the hypothesis that the *pūrvaraṅga* is not primarily a ritual, but an already dramatized version of a ritual.[13]

As the NŚ describes it, the *pūrvaraṅga* is a ritual worship (*pūjā*) made up of eighteen or nineteen parts (up to twenty in the later treatises) – technically called limbs (*aṅga*) – which is invariably carried out on stage at the beginning of a theatrical performance, insofar as a theatrical performance is conceived as the unit of the preliminaries (*pūrvaraṅga*) and the play (*nāṭya*, or one of the ten dramatic genres called *daśarūpaka*). The limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga* are divided into two groups, the first being performed behind a stage curtain, the second after its removal and directly in front of the audience. The first group consists of a series of technical preparations such as arranging the orchestra on the stage, tuning the instruments, training the voice etc., and ends with a complete musical piece. The second part of the *pūrvaraṅga* includes not only musical pieces, dances, circumambulations on the stage, salutations to the deities that preside over it, a benedictory verse and other actions that we can easily regard as being part of a ritual, but also the first hints at histrionics, as well as a direct reference to the topic of the following play.

The nine limbs performed behind the stage curtain (*antaryavanikāṅga*) are:[14]

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[13] For a partial review of the different ritualistic and aesthetic interpretations of Indian drama in modern scholarship and a bibliography thereon, see GITOMER 1994.

[14] The list of the limbs is given in NŚ 5.9-15 and their definitions in NŚ 5.17-29.

	NAME	DESCRIPTION
1.	*pratyāhāra*	disposition of the orchestra on stage
2.	*avataraṇa*	entrance of the female singers
3.	*ārambha*	act of training the voice through vocalizing
4.	*āśrāvaṇā*	entertainment through musical instrumentation
5.	*vaktrapāṇi*	rehearsing the styles of playing
6.	*parighaṭṭanā*	playing on the strings
7.	*saṃghoṭanā*	playing on drums
8.	*mārgāsārita*	playing together strings and drums
9.	*āsārita*	playing and singing on different rhythmical structures

The ten limbs performed after the removal of the stage curtain (*bahiryavanikāṅga*) are:

	NAME	DESCRIPTION
1.	*gītaka/vardhamāna*	song in praise of the gods (without or with dance)
2.	*utthāpana*	establishment of the performance on stage
3.	*parivartana*	circumambulation and praise of the protectors of the directions
4.	*nāndī*	verses eulogizing gods, Brahmins and kings
5.	*śuṣkāvakṛṣṭa*	song with meaningless syllables and praise of Indra's staff (*jarjara*)
6.	*raṅgadvāra*	first representation by means of the voice and bodily gestures
7.	*cārī*	bodily movements expressing the amorous *rasa*
8.	*mahācārī*	bodily movements expressing the furious *rasa*
9.	*trigata*	humorous conversation between the jester, the theatre director and an assistant
10.	*prarocanā*	invitation to the audience to watch the play by alluding to its contents

A very influential interpretation of the *pūrvaraṅga* was advanced by
J.F. Kuiper. Neglecting altogether the first phase of the prelimina-
ries, Kuiper saw in the practice around the erection of the staff re-
presenting Indra's banner – the *jarjaraprayoga*, which he equated
with the second phase of the *pūrvaraṅga* – the kernel of the whole
practice of the preliminaries. He therefore proceeded to connect the
pūrvaraṅga, or at least its second part performed in front of the pub-
lic, to the Vedic cosmogonic rite of New Year which is the festival
of Indra's banner called Indradhvajamaha, thus claiming Vedic ori-
gins for Sanskrit theatre.[15] In Kuiper's view, the *pūrvaraṅga* is a
ritual comparable to a Vedic sacrifice, which would give to the thea-
trical performance following it a ritual character: all theatrical per-
formances, in fact, would be meant to commemorate the first play
that took place in the times of yore in occasion of the festival of
Indra's banner.[16] This interpretation of the *pūrvaraṅga* as a ritual
was preceded and followed by concurring interpretations along the
ritualistic model, all marked by a similar concern for the origins of
Indian theatre.[17]

As should be clear by now, Kuiper's interpretation was based on
the recognition of a distinction between the function of the first and
the second phase of the *pūrvaraṅga*. Nevertheless, the very hetero-
geneity of the single elements within the second phase alone had not
passed unnoticed in early studies on Indian theatre. Just like Kuiper,
Feistel did not pay much attention to the first phase of the *pūrvaraṅ-
ga*, whose elements he regarded as "purely technical preparations
for the musical accompaniment of the second part of the prelimina-
ries" (FEISTEL 1972, p. 3).[18] As for the second phase, he considered
it religiously relevant, despite his remark that the last two limbs, i.e.
the *trigata* and the *prarocanā*, constituted exceptions, since these are
directly connected to the following play (ibid., p. 2, and KUIPER
1979, p. 171). The focus, however, remained for him mainly on the
problem of the origins of the theatrical art taught by Bharata. In ef-
fect, following GONDA 1943 and THIEME 1966, Feistel tried to con-
nect the *trigata* and the *prarocanā* to the popular mimic theatre and

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[15]   See KUIPER 1977, especially pp. 166-171.

[16]   KUIPER 1979, p. 170. See also BIARDEAU 1981 and, for some caution about Kui-
        per's conclusions, BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 69ff.

[17]   See, for instance, GONDA 1943, THIEME 1969, FEISTEL 1972 and LIDOVA 1994.

[18]   The article by Feistel on which I am basing my observations is an English sum-
        mary, published in 1972, of his German thesis discussed in 1969.

to the shadow play respectively, while the other limbs of the *pūrva-raṅga* he linked to cult dances.

In a more recent study, BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, the heterogeneity of the various limbs that make up the preamble to a theatrical performance is given full attention, not so much in terms of "origins" (of the whole theatrical practice in India, of the preliminaries or of different sections of the preliminaries), but with regard to their coherence as distinct members forming the unitary entity which is the *pūrvaraṅga*, and at the same time as parts of the same theatrical event consisting of the *pūrvaraṅga* and the play together. In this analysis, both the commentary by Abhinavagupta and a broad understanding of the wider cultural context in which Sanskrit theatre is inscribed are relied upon. Differently from Kuiper and his predecessors, Bansat-Boudon considers the *pūrvaraṅga* a continuum where the ritual, whose elements are still dominant in the first phase, gradually gives way to the theatre in the second phase, through the successive introduction of theatrical elements which give theatre its peculiar identity:

> [Le *pūrvaraṅga*] se présente comme un rituel théâtralisé destiné, par là-même, à fonder la théâtralité de l'événement qui doit suivre. De fait, rituel et théâtre se trouvent si étroitement associés qu'il est parfois difficile de les distinguer l'un de l'autre (BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 70).

Rather than there being a clear cut between an essentially sacred rite (the *pūrvaraṅga*) and a profane event (the play) (cf. KUIPER 1979, p. 169), there is a kind of twilight zone (the *pūrvaraṅga*), marking the transition from the ritual, i.e. the rite of installation and worship of the deities of the stage (the *raṅgadaivatapūjana* described in NŚ, ch. 2), to the theatre (the play following the *pūrvaraṅga*) (BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 79 and n. 154).

The present paper takes its cues from the acknowledgement of the twofold nature of the *pūrvaraṅga* as highlighted by Bansat-Boudon, but looks particularly at the exegetical strategies devised by Abhinavagupta to explain this double nature, taking into account McCrea's views concerning the "teleological turn" in poetic theory. By looking at Abhinavagupta's ABh not exclusively as a text on aesthetics or as an instrument to better understand Bharata's instructions on staging, but as a work also concerned with problems of hermeneutics in general and of ritual hermeneutics in particular,[19] this

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[19]   On some of the exegetical sources of Abhinavagupta's aesthetics, see DAVID 2014, who also argues that at least one passage of the ABh, concerned with the

article is meant as a contribution to the study of the intellectual history of medieval Kashmir, and to the study of concepts travelling across what we often regard as self-contained compartments of scholarly investigation.[20] In order to identify if not the direct sources for some concepts originally extraneous to poetic and dramatic theory, at least a possible context common to other exegetical traditions, I will concentrate, in what follows, on Abhinavagupta's use of the two concepts of *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* (lit. "seen" and "unseen") in his analysis of the purposes of the different parts of the *pūrvaraṅga*, a topic which has received very little attention so far in studies on Indian theatre and aesthetics.[21]

THE PURPOSE OF THE LIMBS OF THE *PŪRVARAṄGA*: THE *LOCANA* PASSAGE

An enquiry into whether Abhinavagupta uses concepts that issue from speculations on ritual cannot but take as its starting point the *Locana*, Abhinavagupta's first work on literary criticism.[22] There

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"generalisation" of emotions operated by art, might suggest "an original statement as to the nature of religious Scriptures themselves."

[20]   As many of the papers presented on the occasion of the conference "Around Abhinavagupta" showed, texts belonging to different "disciplines" or "domains of knowledge" were widely circulating around the turn of the millennium in Kashmir, and were not at any rate bound to be read only by the exponents of one particular scholastic or religious tradition.

[21]   The concepts of *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* are mentioned by LATH 1978, pp. 82-85 with reference to Gāndharva, the music used in the *pūrvaraṅga*. He considers "*adṛṣṭa*" as the transcendental merit resulting from ritual, and equals it to the Mīmāṃsaka's *apūrva*, a position I do not share. RAMANATHAN 1999 also speaks of Abhinavagupta's use of *adṛṣṭaphala* and *adṛṣṭaprayojana* with regard to Gāndharva. However, no attempt is made to find a *ratio* behind the use of this terminology. INGALLS ET AL. 1990 (cf. below) recur to the oft invoked analogy of the *pūrvaraṅga* as a Vedic sacrifice. His conclusions about the meaning of *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* in the *pūrvaraṅga*, are only partly in agreement with the analysis conducted here.

[22]   Besides the greater sophistication of Abhinavagupta's aesthetic theory in his commentary on Bharata's NŚ, the chronological priority of the *Locana* is confirmed by Abhinavagupta's references, in the ABh, to theoretical developments already expounded in his commentary on Ānandavardhana's work, to whom he refers three times: twice under the name *Sahṛdayālokalocana* (ABh ad NŚ 7.1, vol. I, p. 343 and ABh ad NŚ 16.5, vol. II, p. 300), and simply as *Vivaraṇa* in the third instance (ABh ad NŚ 19.76a, vol. III, p. 42). On the chronology of Abhinavagupta's works on literary criticism, see also INGALLS 1992, p. 31.

Abhinavagupta acknowledges for the first time the fundamental alterity of the various parts making up the *pūrvaraṅga*, with respect to other parts of the play subsumed under the dominant *rasa*-centred analysis of theatre. I consider this an early, and not yet fully developed, attempt to account for the arrangement of disparate elements into a single theatrical performance.

In the long commentary on DhĀ 3.10-14 – a pentad of stanzas meant to explain how a poet should achieve the suggestion of the *rasa* through the literary work as a whole – Abhinavagupta points out a difference between the purpose (*prayojana*) of the *sandhyaṅgas* (lit. "the limbs or subsidiary divisions (*aṅga*) of the joints (*sandhi*)"), i.e. the subdivisions of the successive stages of plot development in a story, and that of the *pūrvaraṅgāṅgas*, (lit. "the limbs or subsidiary divisions of the *pūrvaraṅga*"), i.e. the different parts of the preliminaries to a dramatic performance. Now, we have seen above that the *pūrvaraṅga* is described in the NŚ as the ordered sequence of a given number of elements, or *aṅgas*. The name *sandhyaṅga* refers, similarly, to a technical category that stems from the NŚ, where it is treated immediately after the category called *sandhi*.[23] The relevant passage in DhĀ 3.10-14 lists the *sandhyaṅgas* together with the *sandhis* as one of the five means by which a literary work as a whole becomes capable of conveying the main aesthetic emotion to the spectator:

> The arrangement of *sandhis* and *sandhyaṅgas* should be done with regard to the manifestation of *rasa*, [and] not out of the mere wish to carry out a practice prescribed by a treatise (*śāstra*). [...] These are [the five] causes that make a literary work capable of suggesting the *rasa*.[24]

Before proceeding to Abhinavagupta's remarks on *sandhis* and *sandhyaṅgas*, it is necessary to say something about the explanation of

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[23] On *sandhis* and *sandhyaṅgas*, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 132-137. As Bansat-Boudon remarks, more than junctures, as the term *sandhi* is literally translated, *sandhis* and *sandhyaṅgas* are segments, and are defined in the ABh as parts of the subject matter (*arthāvayava, arthabhāgarāśi, kathāvayava, kathābhāga*) (ibid., p. 132, n. 240).

[24] *sandhisandhyaṅgaghaṭanaṃ rasābhivyaktyapekṣayā | na tu kevalayā śāstrasthitisampādanecchayā ǁ* DhĀ 3.12 ǁ *... prabandhasya rasādīnāṃ vyañjakatve nibandhanam ǁ* DhĀ 14cd ⌋. Transl. based on INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 428.

this passage as found in the *Vṛtti* (Ānandavardhana's auto-commentary on the DhĀ,[25] of which Abhinavagupta's *Locana* is a commentary). First of all, the examples taken to illustrate the point at stake are all borrowed from dramatic literature: Harṣa's *Ratnāvalī* is the perfect illustration of a play where plot elements and their subsidiaries (*sandhi*s and *sandhyaṅga*s) are properly composed according to the main *rasa*, the amorous (*śṛṅgāra*), while Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa's *Veṇīsaṃhāra* provides the paradigmatic example of a play where a blind reliance on the rules of plot composition provokes a failure in the effective communication of the appropriate *rasa*. In the second act of this play, the author has shown Duryodhana suddenly in love, in accordance with Bharata's rule that the second act should display the *sandhyaṅga* called *vilāsa* ("playful amorousness"), notwithstanding the inappropriateness and incompatibility of this emotion to the overall tone of the act, otherwise centred on the theme of war and vengeance. Secondly, and not really unexpectedly, the treatise (*śāstra*) mentioned in DhĀ 3.12 as the basis for plot composition is none other than Bharata's NŚ (*śāstrasthitisampādanecchayā* is glossed in the *Vṛtti* as *bharatamatānusaraṇamātrecchayā* "out of the wish merely to follow Bharata's opinion"), since this is the authority to be followed in matters of dramatics. Abhinavagupta's sub-commentary, on the other hand, gives an unexpected twist to the passage, turning an apparently straightforward question – can the plot be creatively constructed in spite of the rules, provided it highlights the dominant *rasa*? – into a true problem of textual exegesis.

On DhĀ 3.12, the *Locana* comments:

> [Ānandavardhana] uses the word "mere" and the word "wish" [in the *kārikā*] with the following intention: the sage Bharata has taught that the purpose of the *sandhyaṅga*s is to bring about the excellence of the plot, which is instrumental in [the arousal of] *rasa* (*rasāṅgabhūta*), and not to produce an invisible [result] (*adṛṣṭasampādana*) or (*vā*) to prevent the obstacles etc. (*vighnādivāraṇa*) [from arising], as in the case of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*.[26]

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[25] On the much debated question of the authorship of the *Vṛtti*, see INGALLS 1990, pp. 26-27.

[26] *Locana* ad DhĀ 3.12, p. 340: *kevalaśabdam icchāśabdaṃ ca prayuñjānasyāyam āśayaḥ. bharatamuninā sandhyaṅgānāṃ rasāṅgabhūtam itivṛttaprāśastyotpādanam eva prayojanam uktam. na tu pūrvaraṅgāṅgavad adṛṣṭasampādanaṃ vighnādivāraṇaṃ vā*. Transl. based on INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 440. The text of the Nirnaya Sagar Edition (p. 185) reads *adṛṣṭasampādanaṃ vighnavāraṇam*

Such a view is further supported by a quotation from the NŚ, which supplies the definition of the purpose of *sandhyaṅga*s given by Bharata:

> As [Bharata] has taught [in NŚ 19.51-52]: "The purpose of the [*san-dhy*]*aṅga*s is observed to be sixfold in the *śāstra*: 1) developing the desired topic [of the play][27], 2) preserving the plot from decay, 3) enabling the performance to please [the audience], 4) concealing what has to be concealed, 5) expressing [the subject matter] in an outstanding way, 6) revealing what has to be revealed.[28]

If we follow Abhinavagupta's commentary on DhĀ 3.12, it is clear that the sense we should give to NŚ 19.51-52 is that the sixfold purpose of the *sandhyaṅga*s coincides with the production of an excellent plot, which is instrumental for *rasa*-appreciation. The use of this very quotation shows that Abhinavagupta is not completely keen on interpreting DhĀ 3.12 in terms of a conflict between rule-reliance and poetic sensitivity, because the production of a good plot leading to *rasa* is indeed what he believes Bharata teaches to be the purpose of the *sandhyaṅga*s. Consequently, compliance with the *rasa* in the creation of a good plot-sequence is itself subject to regulation and is not a matter of individual taste. The quotation of NŚ 19.51-52 could then possibly be regarded as supporting an interpretation of the DhĀ passage in terms of conflicting rules and the hierarchy between different rules. For instance, in case of conflict between the given succession of the stages of the plot and the *rasa* one wishes to bring about, the *rasa* will be the leading factor in plot-composition, and

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instead of *adṛṣṭasampādanaṃ vighnādivāraṇaṃ vā*. The translation would then be "[...] not the production of an unseen [result], i.e. the prevention from obstacles (*vighnāvāraṇa*), [which is the purpose of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*]." Although this reading cannot be completely ruled out prior to a detailed examination of the manuscripts of the *Locana*, as I try to show in this paper the production of an invisible result (*adṛṣṭa*) is not co-extensive with the protection from obstacles, since it refers, in the first place, to the satisfaction of the gods.

[27] I follow Abhinavagupta's commentary on Bharata's passage to interpret the first purpose, in ABh ad NŚ 19.51, vol. III, p. 32: *abhīṣṭasya prayojanasya rasāsvādakṛtā* [°*kṛtā* conj. : °*kṛto* ABh] *racanā vistāraṇā*: "Developing, i.e. expanding, according to the *rasa* to be relished, the purpose aimed at [by the literary composition]."

[28] *Locana* ad DhĀ 3.12, p. 340: *yathoktam: iṣṭasyārthasya racanā vṛttāntasyānu-pakṣayaḥ | rāgaprāptiḥ prayogasya guhyānāṃ caiva gūhanam || āścaryavad abhikhyānaṃ prakāśyānāṃ prakāśanam | aṅgānāṃ ṣaḍvidhaṃ hy etad dṛṣṭaṃ śāstre prayojanam ||* (NŚ 19.51-52). Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 440, modified.

some of the subsidiary stages of the plot could be omitted without any transgression of the primary rule taking place. However, the contrastive category introduced by Abhinavagupta at this point of his commentary on DhĀ 3.10-14, namely the "invisible" (*adṛṣṭa*) (lit. the "unseen," i.e. what is beyond the range of the senses because of its supersensible nature), as well as in his own commentary on NŚ 19.51-52 in the ABh, make this interpretation rather weak.

Now, Abhinavagupta does not comment directly on the compound *śāstrasthiti°* of DhĀ 3.12 as the *Vṛtti* did, since both the distribution of the *sandhyaṅga*s according to a given sequence in the various acts of a play (as the *aṅga vilāsa* in the second act), and compliance with the dominant *rasa* of the play, are the object of rules prescribed by Bharata, as it is made explicit through the quotation of NŚ 19.51-52. It therefore makes no sense for him to say that one has to harmonize his plot with the *rasa*, rather than with the rules stipulated by a treatise. The expression "not out of the mere wish to carry out a practice prescribed by a treatise (*śāstra*)" must therefore point to a difference in the purpose following which one carries out a certain rule-bound activity, as indicated by the contrastive category of the *aṅga*s of the *pūrvaraṅga*. The latter are said to have a different purpose, in that they aim to produce something invisible (*adṛṣṭa*), or to prevent the obstacles from hindering the performance, which implies that they do not primarily help in conveying the *rasa*. The failure of the author of the *Veṇīsaṃhāra* in conveying the heroic *rasa* (*vīra*) is not due to his failure to understand that, although it is prescribed by Bharata, the *sandhyaṅga* called *vilāsa* should be avoided under specific circumstances, but to his failure to interpret Bharata's teachings in the proper way. On the proper use of *sandhyaṅga*s, the *Locana* concludes:

> And later, in defining *vilāsa* (amourousness) as a component of the *pratimukhasandhi*, he [i.e. Bharata] says: "*Vilāsa* is said to be a yearning for the enjoyment of *rati*" [NŚ 19.76]. The term "enjoyment of *rati*" is used to imply such *vibhāva*s and the like as shall suggest the basic emotional drive (*sthāyibhāva*) of the main *rasa* of the play. [The author of the *Veṇīsaṃhāra*] *has failed to understand the meaning properly*, for in that play the *rasa* in question is the heroic (*vīra*).[29] (Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 440, emphasis mine.)

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[29]   *Locana ad* DhĀ 3.12, p. 340: *tataś ca – samīhā ratibhogārthā vilāsaḥ parikīrti-taḥ | (NŚ 19.76) iti pratimukhasandhyaṅgavilāsalakṣaṇe. ratibhogaśabda ādhi-kārikarasasthāyibhāvopavyañjaka-vibhāvādyupalakṣaṇārthatvena   prayuktaḥ,*

Thus, the sense given by Abhinavagupta to DhĀ 3.12 (see n. 24) could be supplied as follows:

> The arrangement of *sandhi*s and *sandhyaṅga*s should be done with regard to the manifestation of *rasa*, [and] not out of the mere wish to carry out a practice prescribed by a treatise (*śāstra*) [*without applying any reasoning concerning the very purpose of those rules*].

Why is it not the case for the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*? Going back to the aim of these limbs, this is the only occasion where an invisible result is mentioned in the *Locana*, and it is no accident that it should be mentioned not in connection to poetic elements, but rather to purely theatrical ones: the *pūrvaraṅgāṅga*s are in fact exclusively found in theatre. They find no place in poetic theory, for they are part of the spectacular or performative dimension of the play, not of the literary or dramatic one. But if the *aṅga*s of the *pūrvaraṅga* are said to result in the production of something unseen (*adṛṣṭa*), should we assume that what the *sandhyaṅga*s bring about, namely "excellence of the plot" (*itivṛttaprāśastya*), has to be considered, by contrast, to be a visible effect (*dṛṣṭa*)? I will elaborate on this hypothesis shortly. With regard to the second aim of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga* referred to, it is no surprise that the obstacles threatening the successful accomplishment of a given activity – be it literary or not – should be warded off at the very beginning of the activity in question.[30] Moreover, the beginnings of Indian theatre are mythically marked by the occurrence of obstacles, personified by demonic beings who impeded the first performance to take place in front of an assembly of gods.[31] What the causal link between the performance of the *pūrvaraṅga* and the elimination of the obstacles is will be clarified in what follows.

To sum up, in the *Locana* we find the following opposition:

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yathātattvaṃ nādhigatārtha iti, prakṛto hy atra vīrarasaḥ. See also INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 442, n. 17.

[30] On the difficulty of beginnings in India, see Malamoud as quoted in BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 69-70. On beginnings in treatises and on the need of an auspicious verse or act (*maṅgala*) in order to ward off potential obstacles, see SLAJE 2008 on *Śāstrārambha*.

[31] On the accounts of the origins of the theatical art in the NŚ and its commentary, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 54-61, BANSAT-BOUDON 1997 and BANSAT-BOUDON 2004, pp. 50-53, 63-77. For an accurate analysis of the aesthetic failure of the first performance, see BANSAT-BOUDON 2012.

	PURPOSE (*prayojana*)	RESULT (*phala*)
*sandhyaṅga*s	→ *itivṛttaprāśastyotpādana/ rasāṅgabhūta*	→ [*dṛṣṭa*?]
≠		
*pūrvaraṅgāṅga*s	→ *adṛṣṭasampādana*	→ *adṛṣṭa*
	→ *vighnādivāraṇa*	→ ?

In medieval models of practical rationality, the actions of a rational person generally imply a purpose (*prayojana*) which ultimately corresponds to the expected result of that action (*phala*) provided no obstruction occurs. A farmer, for instance, will undertake to plant a seed in order to obtain crops, which will eventually be obtained provided no heavy rains or draught takes place between the time of sowing and that of the harvest. The farmer, who is a rational agent, acts on the basis of the empirical observation of the said causal relation. There are actions, however, whose results are invisible to the ordinary man, as for instance ritual actions or actions having an ethical bearing. The unseen results of these actions are taught by scripture, as for instance in the famous Vedic formula: "A man desirous of heaven should perform the fire oblation" (*agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*). The causal link between the invisible object "heaven" and the action of sacrificing into the fire, which is the means to obtain it, cannot be known through empirical means, but only through scripture, since such objects lie beyond the range of the senses.[32] In the same way, in the *Locana* passage (see n. 26), the implication seems to be that one has to follow the prescriptions of the *śāstra* alone when performing the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga* if one wants to obtain an invisible result, since there is no other way to know empirically that one's performance of them will lead to the expected result.

Two questions should concern us here. First of all, what exactly is the double purpose of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*, and how are the two purposes connected to one another? Secondly, can the result of the *pūrvaraṅga* called "invisible" (*adṛṣṭa*) be conceived as endowed with a "visible" (*dṛṣṭa*) counterpart? In order to solve these,

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[32]   On the medieval model of "practical rationality" in its different Brahmanical and Buddhist versions, and its epistemic limits regarding actions undertaken for the sake of invisible realities, see BIARDEAU 1969, pp. 83-85, DAVID 2013, pp. 273-274 and ELTSCHINGER 2013, pp. 103-134.

it is now necessary to delve into Abhinavagupta's second major work on literary theory, the ABh.

THE PURPOSE OF THE LIMBS OF THE *PŪRVARAṄGA*: THE *ABH* PASSAGE

As already noted by Ingalls in a note to his translation of the passage of the *Locana* seen above (see n. 26) (INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 442, n. 14), the opposition between elements having an invisible result and elements aiming at a visible one, only suggested by way of a cursory remark in the *Locana*, is more accurately dealt with in the ABh and, we can add, it undergoes a major development there. Let us now turn to ABh ad NŚ 19.51-52, the passage dealing with the purpose of plot subdivisions (*sandhyaṅga*s):

> The purpose of the [*sandhy*]*aṅga*s is observed to be sixfold in the *śāstra*. [NŚ 19.52cd]

Abhinavagupta comments:

> As to the first purpose [of *sandhyaṅga*s], [i.e developing the desired topic of the play (*iṣṭārthasya racanā*)], it is based on aesthetic relishing (*camat-kārakṛta*), [thus] it is validated just through a particular direct perception although it is seen in a *smṛti*[-text]. It is not something invisible (*adṛṣṭa*), like [the purpose of] the twilight-worship (*sandhyopāsana*) and other [permanent rites], or a [purpose] having both natures (*ubhayarūpa*)[, i.e. visible and invisible,] as in the case of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*. This is the sense. [The expression] "in [the] *śāstra*" [used by Bharata] means: "in the Veda which is theatre."[33]

We are now faced with a threefold type of purpose (*prayojana*) concerning:

1. The subdivisions of the successive stages of plot development, or *sandhyaṅga*s.

2. The twilight worship or *sandhyopāsana* and other permanent rites.

3. The limbs of the preliminary rite, or *pūrvaraṅgāṅga*s.

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[33] ABh ad NŚ 19.52, vol. III, p. 32: *ādyaṃ tu prayojanaṃ camatkārakṛtaṃ smṛti-dṛṣṭam api pratyakṣaviśeṣasiddham eva, na tu sandhyopāsanādivad adṛṣṭaṃ, nāpi pūrvaraṅgāṅgavad ubhayarūpam ity arthaḥ. śāstra iti nāṭyātmake veda ity arthaḥ.*

In terms of category of purpose we can schematize:

PRAYOJANA

1. *sandhyāṅga*s → *camatkārakr̥ta* (*rasāṅgabhūta* = [*dr̥ṣṭa*])[34]

2. *sandhyopāsanādi* → *adr̥ṣṭa*

3. *pūrvaraṅgāṅga*s → *ubhayarūpa* (=*dr̥ṣṭa*+*adr̥ṣṭa*)

If, as this passage seems to confirm, the *sandhyaṅga*s have a visible purpose (*dr̥ṣṭa*), which coincides with their being subservient to the aesthetic experience of *rasa*, and if religious rites such as the twilight worship have an invisible one, what would then be the twofold purpose of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*, having an observable and unobservable nature at the same time? One possibility would be to connect this statement to the *Locana* passage, and thus read back the twofold-purpose assigned to the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga* here, into the two purposes listed there:

	PRAYOJANA	PHALA
*pūrvaraṅgāṅga*s	→ production of something invisible (*adr̥ṣṭasaṃpādana*)	→ *adr̥ṣṭa*
	→ protection from the obstacles (*vighnādivāraṇa* [=*dr̥ṣṭa*?])	→ [*dr̥ṣṭa*?]

However tempting such equation might look, it is not always necessarily sound to superimpose a scheme developed by an author in a later text on a previous work by the same author. According to Ingalls, the contrast drawn by Abhinavagupta between the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga* and the limbs of the *sandhi* is one between things having a religious purpose (*adr̥ṣṭa*, "invisible"), which would in turn give the *pūrvaraṅga* the character of a ritual similar to a Vedic sacrifice, and things having a purely secular one (*dr̥ṣṭa*, "visible"), which he

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[34] I take the first purpose of *sandhyaṅga*s alone as paradigmatic for the group of six purposes listed by Bharata, since no separate explanation of the other five purposes is provided by Abhinavagupta, and since I take the compound *camatkārakr̥ta* ("based on aesthetic relishing") as a synonym of *rasāṅgabhūta* ("instrumental in [the arousal of] *rasa*"), which the *Locana* passage ad DhĀ 3.12 recognizes as the property of the overall purpose of *sandhyaṅga*s, i.e. the production of the "excellence of the plot."

identifies with the beautification of the play. As he further explains on the basis of the ABh passage, the effect of the *pūrvaraṅga* is not completely religious, but it is partly visible due to this same beautifying character: "After all, the *pūrvaraṅga* too can be beautiful." (INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 442, n. 14). In my opinion, "religious" vs. "secular=beautiful," are probably not the best candidates to make full sense of the terms *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* with relation to the double purpose of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*. Their meaning needs to be ascertained through a closer analysis of the ABh passage, and by looking at other usages of the same words, and at the concepts they convey. In effect, this twofold scheme of visible and invisible purposes, to which correspond visible and invisible results, is one which is employed to a great extent by Abhinavagupta in the ABh, although its origin has to be searched for outside the realm of poetic theory since, as noticed above, it is neither used in the DhĀ and *Vṛtti*, nor is it fully developed in the *Locana*. Its systematic application to dramatic theory appears to be an innovation of the ABh.[35]

A closer analysis of the three paradigmatic elements said to serve different sets of purposes reveals a clue about the possible sources for the concepts of visible and invisible purposes and results, borrowed by Abhinavagupta while making sense of the *pūrvaraṅga*.

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[35] The concept is indeed totally absent from the NŚ. Of course it is not possible to completely rule out the possibility that other commentators on Bharata's NŚ applied the concepts of *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* to dramatic theory. However, this does not seem to be the case if we judge from the extant fragments of these commentaries as known to us from the ABh. As for the use of *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* concepts in poetic theory, the terminology is not completely absent. We find it, namely in the work of Ānandavardhana's predecessor Vāmana. In *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra* 1.5, poetry is given a double aim: "Good poetry has two purposes, an observable one and an unobservable one: it produces pleasure [for its appreciator] and renown [for its composer]" (*kāvyaṃ sad dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārtham, prītikīrtihetutvāt*). This means, according to the auto-commentary: "The observable purpose [of poetry] is beauty, since it produces pleasure [in the reader], while [its] unobservable purpose is due to the fact that it causes the renown [of the poet] (*cāru dṛṣṭaprayojanaṃ, prītihetutvāt. adṛṣṭaprayojanaṃ kīrtihetutvāt*). Note that pleasure and renown are listed already in Bhāmaha's (7th c.) *Kāvyālaṃkāra* 1.2cd as the two effects of poetry: "The composition of good poetry imparts fame and pleasure" (*karoti kīrtiṃ prītiṃ ca sādhukāvyanibandhanam*). As far as I can judge, Vāmana speaks of observable and unobservable aims of poetry with reference to the immediacy of the results: beauty is a visible purpose of poetry, since its result, i.e. the pleasure caused in the reader, can be immediately verified. Fame or renown, on the other hand, is not visible as such. This acceptation of *dṛṣṭa/adṛṣṭa* is known to Abhinavagupta, but it is not exactly the model he has in mind here, as we shall see.

1. Sandhyaṅgas and Dṛṣṭaprayojana

Apart from their being construed in accordance with the aesthetic emotion, a piece of information already provided in the *Locana*, the *sandhyaṅga*s, says Abhinavagupta in the ABh (see n. 33), have their purpose observed in a *smṛti*-text and validated through a special kind of direct perception. The *smṛti*-text invoked here is, I believe, none other than the NŚ, as the authoritative treatise where the rules of theatre are laid down. This conforms to the classification of *śruti* and *smṛti* under the same category of *śāstra* (as opposed to *itihāsa* "history" and *kāvya* "poetry"), discussed by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on *sandhi*s and *sandhyaṅga*s in the *Locana* passage ad DhĀ 3.12.[36] It moreover agrees with the widespread medieval meaning of *smṛti* as a codified non-Vedic scripture.[37] According to the analysis carried out by Mīmāṃsakas and Dharmaśāstra authors, *smṛti*-texts contain regulations pertaining to both domains, the empirical and the ethical-ritual. Some regulations have a purpose that is visible (*dṛṣṭa*), for they clearly serve some practical transaction, such as the rules about inter-caste marriage, food consumption, etc., while others have an invisible purpose (*adṛṣṭa*), insofar as no result can be empirically observed from their performance, as for instance in the case of the Aṣṭaka, a ceremony performed for the ancestors. One would not know about the causal relation between ethical-ritual actions and their unseen results if they were not laid down in a scripture. As a consequence, when the purpose of an action prescribed

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[36] *Locana* ad DhĀ 3.12: *iha prabhusammitebhyaḥ śrutismṛtiprabhṛtibhyaḥ karta-vyam idam ity ājñāmātraparamārthebhyaḥ śāstrebhyo ye na vyutpannāḥ, na cā-py asyedaṃ vṛttam amuṣmāt karmaṇa ity evaṃ yuktiyuktakarmaphalasamban-dhaprakaṭanakārikebhyo mitrasammitebhya itihāsaśāstrebhyo labdhavyutpat-tayaḥ, atha cāvaśyaṃ vyutpādyāḥ prajārthasampādanayogyatākrāntā rājapu-traprāyās teṣāṃ hṛdayānupraveśamukhena caturvargopāyavyutpattir ādheyā. hṛdayānupraveśaś ca rasāsvādamaya eva.* "Princes, who are not educated in scripture – those works of *śruti*, *smṛti*, etc. which consist in commands, like those of a master, to do this or that – and who have not received instruction from history, which like a friend reveals to us the connection of cause and effect as endowed with reasoning such as 'this result came from such an act,' and who are therefore in pressing need of instruction, for they are given the power to accomplish the wants of their subjects, can be given instruction in the four goals of man only by entering into their hearts. And what enters into the heart is the relish of *rasa* (*rasāsvāda*)." (Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 437, slightly modified.)

[37] On the shift of the meaning of "*smṛti*" from memorized traditional customs to non-Vedic normative texts, see BRICK 2006 and YOSHIMIZU 2012, pp. 643-647.

by a scripture is not seen, one is allowed to infer that the rule for the performance of the action in question must have an invisible purpose and therefore an expected invisible result. However, according to a principle of economy, when the purpose is empirically ascertainable there is no need to search further for an invisible purpose.[38] To say that the purpose of the *sandhyaṅga*s which is the development of the desired subject matter of a play is contained in a *smṛti*-text, and that this purpose is ascertained through a particular perception, suggests in my view an analogous kind of rule analysis: a rule has a visible purpose when a result is directly observed as caused by the performance of the action they prescribe, which is the means of realization of that expected result. In the case of the *sandhyaṅga*s, we can certainly ascertain a causal link between the proper arrangement of the plot-segments in a play, and the development of the desired topic of the play, namely when we savour the emotion that is conveyed by the literary composition. This savouring or delectation (*camatkāra*) is, according to the aesthetic theory propounded by Abhinavagupta, a kind of perceptive knowledge, a perception sui generis.[39]

2. Sandhyopāsana and Adṛṣṭaprayojana

As its name indicates, the *sandhyopāsana* is worship (*upāsana*) performed in the morning and evening twilight (*sandhyā*) through a sequence of fixed actions.[40] According to a well-known classification, first laid down by Mīmāṃsakas and largely adopted by the other schools and in Dharmaśāstras, religious acts or rites can be divided into three broad categories: obligatory regular rites performed on

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[38] This principle, known as the rule of economy in postulating something invisible (*adṛṣṭakalpanālpīyasī nyāyyā*), or Ockham's razor (KATAOKA 2010, p. 137), is already laid down in the *Śābarabhāṣya* (ad 2.1.7), and becomes very widespread within and beyond ritual exegesis. That it was known and used by Abhinavagupta in the ABh is testified by a variation on the same theme in a passage of the first chapter, ABh ad NŚ 1.84-86, vol. I, p. 31: *evaṃ sarvatra dṛṣṭam api sadṛśopalakṣaṇāntaṃ prayojanam utprekṣyam. sarvathā tadalābhe niyamādṛṣṭam eva.* "Similarly, some visible purpose as well has to be imagined for each and every [element of the theatrical performance], through the indirect mention of similar [things]. And in every case, if a [visible purpose] is not obtainable, an invisible [one based on] restriction [in performance has to be] necessarily [postulated]."

[39] See GNOLI 1968, p. xxxv.

[40] On *sandhyā* worship, see for instance KANE 1941, vol. II.1, pp. 312-321.

fixed occasions (*nitya*), occasional rites (*naimittika*) and rites performed to obtain a certain desired result (*kāmya*). *Sandhyā* worship is considered to belong to the first group of obligatory rites, as stated also in Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka* (TĀ 26.12-13). Although Mīmāṃsakas do not, as far as I am aware, directly connect the three categories of rituals with rules aiming at visible or invisible results, Kane quotes a text belonging to the corpus of juridical literature, namely Aparārka's (12th c.) commentary on the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*, in which the content of *smārta* rules is divided into various categories on the basis of a previous text, the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa*. Among these types of purposes for *smārta* rules are found the very three used by Abhinavagupta in the passage under discussion: those having a visible purpose (*dṛṣṭa*), those having an invisible one (*adṛṣṭa*), and those having both (*dṛṣṭādṛṣṭa*). The example for a purely *adṛṣṭārthasmṛti* is, according to this source, none other than the twilight worship.[41] Following the type of analysis implemented by both Mīmāṃsakas and jurists, such a rule would have the Veda as the source of its validity, since its purpose is not seen, and it has a result which we could call "religious."[42]

3. Pūrvarāṅgāṅgas and Dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaprayojana

As in the other two cases, it may be useful to look at similar types of rule-analysis discussed by Mīmāṃsāka and Dharmaśāstra authors. Again, the quotation by Aparārka might be of help since, despite the fact that his work is later than Abhinavagupta, and its source, the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa*, was possibly unknown to Bharata's commentator, the two share a very similar conception of rules having a twofold purpose (*dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārtharūpa*, *ubhayarūpa*), and could thus be thought to reflect a common view. Moreover, the idea that rules can have more than one purpose goes back to older Mīmāṃsā sources. The example provided by the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa* is the rule according to which a brahmanical student should carry a staff made

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[41] KANE 1946, p. 840, n.1634. I am not certain about what Mīmāṃsakas would regard as the result of the particular rite of *sandhyā*. It could be noted here that in Manu 2.101 *sandhyā*s are said to purify one from the sins committed during night and day. The discussion about *nitya* rites in general and their result, developed in his various works by Kumārila, has been analyzed in detail in YOSHIMIZU 2007.

[42] See YOSHIMIZU 2012, pp. 667-669, with "religious" meaning "pertaining to the sphere of *dharma*, which is the domain of the Veda."

of *palāśa*-wood. This rule clearly has as its purpose the protection of the student. However, the restriction that the staff should be made of *palāśa* and not of some other material, has an invisible purpose. The idea that, within a rule having a visible purpose, the restriction to perform an action in a particular manner aims at an invisible result, is already present in Kumārila's discussion of *smārta* rules, at *Tantravārttika* 1.3.2. The principle is called "restrictive injunction" (*niyamavidhi*) and it allows the Mīmāṃsā thinker to preserve the religious function of some rules and their consequent basis in the Veda, despite their clearly visible purpose. The paradigmatic example in the context of *smārta* rules[43] is that a student should obey his teacher. Following common sense, showing obeisance to a master has the visible purpose of pleasing him and thus prompting him to teach. However, the restriction concerning obedience to one's teacher as the preferred procedure over other means, such as making donations and the like, which are amenable to the same result, has an invisible purpose (*adṛṣṭārtha*), namely to establish an "invisible potency" (*apūrva*) leading the student to the completion of his studies bereft of obstacles.[44] In this light and despite the fact that Abhinavagupta never uses the term *apūrva*, unlike Kumārila and his successors, the purpose of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*, which is the prevention from obstacles, can be considered to be equally invisible. Should then the particle *vā* in the *Locana* passage "*na tu pūrvaraṅgāṅgavad adṛṣṭasampādanaṃ vighnādivāraṇaṃ vā*" (see

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[43] Within Vedic exegesis and in the work of later Mīmāṃsā authors, the typical example of a restrictive injunction is that which enjoins the sacrificer to beat the unhusked rice with a mortar and pestle before preparing the sacrificial cake. This injunction has the observable (*dṛṣṭa*) purpose of having the rice husked in order to prepare the cake, but it aims at the same time at an unobservable (*adṛṣṭa*) effect through a restriction in the means of obtaining husked rice, namely by using a mortar and pestle and not, say, one's fingernails. See KANE 1962, vol. V.2, pp. 1229-1230 and YOSHIMIZU 2012, p. 669.

[44] *Tantravārttika* 1.3.2: *tasmāt saty api dṛṣṭārthatve sambhāvyate vedamūlatvaṃ niyamādṛṣṭasiddher ananyapramāṇakatvāt. ... dṛṣṭaṃ ca prīto gurur adhyāpayiṣyatīty evam ādi niṣpadyate. niyamāc cāvighnasamāptyarthāpūrvasiddhiḥ.* "Even if serving an observable purpose, (the obedience to one's teacher) can be regarded as based on the Veda because the establishment of an invisible [purpose] through restriction has no other means of knowledge [except the Veda]. [...] It is true that we observe that a teacher is willing to teach (his student) if pleased (by any means); but (if the student always obeys his teacher) following the [*smārta*] restriction, he establishes an *apūrva* [i.e., unobservable potency] that leads to the completion (of his study) without interruption." (Text and transl. YOSHIMIZU 2012, p. 670, n. 26, modified.) "Without interruption" translates here the term *avighna˚*, literally "without obstacles."

n. 26) be intended as pointing out an option rather than an exclusive alternative? What would then be the visible purpose of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga* advocated in the ABh though absent in the *Locana* passage?

For the time being, to our initial scheme the following can be added:

	PRAYOJANA	PHALA
*pūrvaraṅgāṅga*s	→ *adṛṣṭasampādana*	→ *adṛṣṭa*
	→ *vighnādivāraṇa* [=*adṛṣṭa*]	→ [*adṛṣṭa*]
	→ ?	→ *dṛṣṭa*

In order to supply the missing elements, I will next look at other statements in the ABh regarding the twofold purpose of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*. In the analysis Abhinavagupta pursues in the fifth chapter of his commentary devoted to the *pūrvaraṅga*, and partly in the fourth chapter as well, the distinction between elements performed behind the curtain and elements performed in front of the spectators becomes relevant, not so much in terms of their being directly performed in front of an audience or not, but in terms of the variety in the type of rule analysis implemented for them. Both phases of the *pūrvaraṅga*, to be sure, are grasped by the audience through direct perception, though by different sense faculties (music being the object of hearing, and dance of sight). However, their purpose as objects of rule regulation can be known either through direct perception or through other epistemic means, i.e. scripture.

"*ADṚṢṬA*" AS THE PURPOSE OF RULE RESTRICTION (*NIYAMĀDṚṢṬA*)

As mentioned above, the first phase of the *pūrvaraṅga* is performed behind a curtain, thus hidden from the spectators. It consists mainly of a musical phase, and includes nine limbs, from the arrangement of the orchestra on stage (*pratyāhāra*) to the rendering of the first musical piece combining singing and instrument playing (*āsārita*). In the fifth chapter of the ABh, Abhinavagupta regards this group of limbs to be performed behind the curtain as having a visible purpose (*dṛṣṭārtha*), i.e. an empirically ascertainable goal: without the arrangement of the orchestra on stage, without tuning the instruments and

training the voice, in other words without the raw material or the causal complex necessary for the production of a performance, how can a play ever take place?[45] However, despite the fact that the limbs performed behind the stage curtain have such an evident role to play in the theatrical performance, and although they take place hidden from the eyes of the spectators, the actions prescribed for those limbs have to be executed exactly in the way taught by the *śāstra*, and in no other way. This explains why they can be considered to have an additional invisible purpose, which is expressed through a double analogy:

> In the absence of the *pratyāhāra* (i.e. the arrangement of the musical instruments on stage) and the other limbs [performed behind the curtain], in fact, the causal complex (*sāmagrī*) consisting in [the arrangement of the group of] the singers, and other [preliminary actions that are necessary for a theatrical performance], remains incomplete. How, then, can a theatrical performance take place? Indeed, it is certainly not possible to make a cloth without threads, brush, loom etc. [The same applies to the *pratyāhāra* etc. as well,] with the exception that, as we will teach, [their performance according to the rules laid down in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*] has an additional purpose, due to the restriction (*niyamaprayojana*)[in performance intended for an invisible result], just as the act of eating while facing the east.[46]

The analogy of the cloth is commonly used in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to illustrate the conditional complex (*sāmagrī*) which is necessary to bring about an effect.[47] Just as a cloth cannot be produced without the threads, the brush, the loom and the other causes, so a theatrical performance cannot be produced if the musical orchestra is not sitting on stage, if the singers have not warmed up their voices and if the musicians have not tuned their instruments, i.e. if the group of limbs performed behind the curtain have not been executed. This purpose alone would have been sufficient to justify the performance of these *aṅga*s as part of the *pūrvaraṅga*. However, an additional

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[45] ABh ad NŚ 5.17-20, vol. I, p. 214: *evaṃ tāvad antaryavanikāṅgānāṃ dṛṣṭārtha eva prayogaḥ, tāny antareṇa prayogasyaivāsampatteḥ.* "In this way, the performance of the elements behind the curtain has first of all an observable aim, in that a performance cannot be produced without them."

[46] ABh ad NŚ 5.5-7, vol. I, p. 209: *pratyāhārādikena hy aṅgena vinā gāyanādisāmagryasampatteḥ kathaṃ nāṭyaprayogaḥ. na hy aho kila tantuturīvemāder vinā* (*vinā* conj. Ed., om. mss.) *śakyaḥ paṭaḥ kartum. kevalaṃ prāṅmukhānnabhojanavan niyamaprayojanatvam apīti* (conj. Ed., *niyojanatve 'pīti* mss.) *vakṣyate*.

[47] See for instance FOUCHER 1949, pp. 103-106.

element is brought in by Abhinavagupta through the second analogy. It is not completely evident from this terse passage what Abhinavagupta has in mind when he talks about the purpose due to restriction as the additional purpose of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga* performed behind the curtain. The maxim which is the source of his analogy is a common one and, in its classical phrasing, the rule that "one should eat food facing the east" (*prāṅmuko 'nnāni bhuñjīta*) is quoted in many different contexts, including Dharmaśāstra and Mīmāṃsā sources.[48]

In order to understand how the second analogy works in the context of the ABh, we therefore need to look closer at both internal and external evidence. To be sure, the same analogy of eating towards the east is used in two other instances in the ABh. Both instances make it clear that a restriction (*niyama*), concerning the way of performing an action that has already a visible purpose, aims at "the unseen" (*adṛṣṭa*).[49] The idea is therefore quite similar to the Mīmāṃsaka "restrictive injunction" (*niyamavidhi*) seen above, by which *smārta* rules can acquire a double purpose and result in both seen

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[48] According to BENSON 2010, p. 526, the source of this principle is to be found in juridical texts, namely the *dharmasūtra*s. The *Kūrmapurāṇa* quotes it twice (*Kūrmapurāṇa* 2.12.63.1 and 2.19.1.2: *prāṅmuko 'nnāni bhuñjīta sūryābhimukha eva vā* |). In *Mānavadharmaśāstra* (henceforth MDhŚ) 2.51-52, the same principle is found with a slightly different formulation: *samāhṛtya tu tad bhaikṣaṃ yāvad artham amāyayā | nivedya gurave 'śnīyād ācamya prāṅmukhaḥ śuciḥ ‖ āyuṣyaṃ prāṅmukho bhuṅkte yaśasyaṃ dakṣiṇāmukhaḥ | śriyaṃ pratyaṅmukho bhuṅkte ṛtaṃ bhuṅkta udaṅmukhaḥ ‖.* "After collecting as much almsfood as he needs without guile, he should present it to his teacher, purify himself by sipping some water, and eat it facing the east. Facing the east while eating procures long life; facing the south procures fame; facing the west procures prosperity; and facing the north procures truth." (Text and transl. by Olivelle.)

[49] ABh ad NŚ 33.1, vol. IV, p. 396. *anena ca phalavailakṣaṇyam api vyākhyātam. gāndharvasya prayoktari prādhānyenādṛṣṭaphalatvād* [*prādhānyenādṛṣṭaphalatvād* conj.: *prādhānyena dṛṣṭaphalatvād* Ed.]. *gānasya tu... dṛṣṭaṃ mukhyaṃ phalaṃ prāṅmukhabhojanavat tv adṛṣṭam apy astu.* "By this [reasoning], we have explained even the difference in the result [of *gāndharva* and *gāna* music], since the result of *gāndharva* is mainly an invisible one and it concerns the performer. [The music added to drama and called] (*gāna*), on the contrary, [...] has as its main result (*phala*) something visible (*dṛṣṭa*). However, just like in taking food facing eastwards, it also has an invisible (*adṛṣṭa*) [result]." ABh ad NŚ 32.421, vol. IV, p. 389: *anye tu dṛṣṭaprayojane 'pi niyamād adṛṣṭam* [*niyamād adṛṣṭam* conj. : *niyamād adṛṣṭaprayojane 'pi niyamād adṛṣṭaṃ* Ed.] *bhojanaprāṅmukhatvavad iti.* "Others [maintain that] although there is a visible result (*dṛṣṭaprayojana*), an invisible result is also [attained] because of a restriction, just as in facing the east while eating."

and unseen fruits. For the Mīmāṃsā thinker Kumārila, however, the particular restriction prescribed for the performance of a certain action has an invisible result (*adṛṣṭa*) which coincides with an *apūrva* and helps in the production of the final result of the whole sacrifice, a position which is not found as such in the ABh.

The closest parallel to Abhinavagupta's formulation of the analogy of eating while facing the east, functioning as a typical illustration of an action producing an invisible result (*adṛṣṭa*) through a restriction (*niyama*), is found in Candrānanda's (7th-8th c.?)[50] commentary on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 6.2.2. The *mūla* text has established that the result of actions prescribed by the *śāstra* is ripened by the performer of that action (VS 6.1.5). It then proceeds to establish that the performance of those actions aims at felicity (*abhyudaya*), when they are not performed with a view to their visible goal (VS 6.2.1). *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 6.2.2 provides a list of those actions aiming at the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*), among which are actions for which the *śāstra* prescribes various restrictions in performance. According to the commentator, an example of an action with a special restriction concerning direction (*diṅniyama*), is that of consuming one's meal facing the east. If one does not perform eating with its visible result, i.e. satiety, in mind, then the performance aims at religious merit (*dharma*).[51]

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[50] About the date of Candrānanda there is little certainty. Abhinavagupta likely knew his commentary on the VS, as he quotes a lost work by one Bhaṭṭa Candrānanda in one of his own works. This might be the same person as Candrānanda the VS commentator, who is moreover believed to have lived in Kashmir (see ISAACSON 1995, pp. 141-142). I thank Isabelle Ratié for this reference.

[51] VS 6.2.2.: *abhiṣecanopavāsabrahmacaryagurukulavāsavānaprasthyayajñadānaprokṣaṇadiṅnakṣatramantrakālaniyamāś cādṛṣṭāya |*. "Ablution, fast, abstinence, residence in the house of the preceptor, life in the state of an anchorite, sacrifice, gifts donation, consecration by sprinkling, restrictions concerning direction, constellation, ritual formula and time, [all these] aim at the invisible." *Vṛtti* ad VS 6.2.2, p. 48: *diṅniyamaḥ – 'prāṅmukho 'nnāni bhuñjīta.' ... evaṃ etat sarvaṃ dṛṣṭaprayojanatiraskāreṇa prayujyamānaṃ dharmāya saṃpadyata iti.* "A restriction about spatial direction [is to be found, for instance, in the rule] 'one should take food facing the East.' [...] Thus all these [actions], which are performed without resorting to their visible purpose, are produced in view of religious merit (*dharma*)." Note that other commentators take *niyama* as a separate element of the long coordinative compound in VS 6.2.2, with the meaning of "religious observance," while Candrānanda takes *niyama* separately with all the elements starting with direction (*diś-*), so that there are restrictions concerning direction (*diṅniyama*), constellation (*nakṣatraniyama*), ritual formula (*mantraniyama*) and time (*kālaniyama*).

Despite the great conceptual and semantic similarity between Abhinavagupta's and Candrānanda's formulations, the former does not explicitly equate the invisible result achieved through rule restrictions (*niyamādṛṣṭa*) to *dharma*, while the latter does not seem to acknowledge a double purpose for those restricted actions when he says that the visible purpose is set aside (*tiraskāra*), probably following the *sūtra*'s formulation that the visible purpose is absent (*dṛṣṭābhāve*, in VS 6.2.1) for them. Is it then legitimate to consider Abhinavagupta's *niyamādṛṣṭa* as an equivalent of the *apūrva* invoked by Kumārila in TV 1.3.2, the invisible purpose aimed at through the restriction about paying obeisance to one's master and resulting in the absence of obstacles? This might not be the case: first of all, Abhinavagupta never uses the term "*apūrva*" as a synonym of "*adṛṣṭa*"; second, and more crucially, it seems to me that that the kind of causality implied by Kumārila's analysis of *niyamādṛṣṭa* would be far too mechanical for Abhinavagupta who is, unlike the champion of Vedic exegesis Kumārila, reluctant to deny any kind of agency to the deities in the attainment of a religious result.[52] It should also be pointed out that for Abhinavagupta the production of an invisible result through restrictive rules is not the only possible way to achieve an "*adṛṣṭa*," and certainly not the only way for the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*. Other kinds of causalities are envisaged by the author of the ABh between the performance of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga* and the "unseen," "*adṛṣṭa*."

"*ADṚṢṬA*" AS THE RESULT KNOWN THROUGH A SCRIPTURE: WARDING OFF THE DEMONS WHILE PLEASING THE GODS

Far from consigning the production of *adṛṣṭa* in the *pūrvaraṅga* to a strict adherence to the rules, which automatically brings about some invisible result, as in the Mīmāṃsaka analysis of ritual action, Abhinavagupta has demons and gods also play a role in the preliminaries of Sanskrit theatre. After all, as we saw earlier in the *Locana* passage, the *pūrvaraṅga* aims at removing potential obstacles that may hinder the performance and that actually disturbed the first mythical representation. However, a direct causal link between the production of an *adṛṣṭa* (or *apūrva*) and the removal of obstacles such

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[52] As is well known, the gods play a minor role in the analysis of sacrificial action conducted by Mīmāṃsā authors. They are considered, namely, as nothing but names constituting the addressee of the sacrificial oblation. See CLOONEY 1997.

as the one advocated by Kumārila is never called for in Abhinava-gupta's analysis.[53] The obstacles imagined as demons threatening a Sanskrit play are, in effect, not really destroyed; they are appeased insofar as they are, just like the gods, satisfied by the performance of the *pūrvaraṅga*. The pacification of the obstacles can be consi-dered an invisible purpose of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*, since this purpose is known only through the *śāstra*, and not through any other means of knowledge. Abhinavagupta explains it in his commentary on NŚ 4.271cd-272ab. The relevant verse in the NŚ reads:

> After the orchestra has been properly arranged [on stage], o best among the twice-borns, the practitioners (understand "the musicians and the sing-ers") should perform the song called *āsārita*.[54]

In order to justify the absence of the intermediate elements between the *pratyāhāra* (first limb) and *āsārita* (last limb), Abhinavagupta takes the verse to refer to the entire group of limbs performed in the first phase of the *pūrvaraṅga*:

> By this [verse], the following is taught: this injunction to perform [the *āsārita* applies] once the whole collection of limbs [of the *pūrvaraṅga*] occurring behind the curtain has been executed. The visible result (*dṛṣṭaphala*) of this [group of limbs], whose essence if the singing of meaningless syllables, consists in an introduction to the performance of instrumental music that will follow [in the second phase of the *pūr-varaṅga*]. Moreover, it has a result that is [known only] through the *śāstra*, i.e. the pacification of the obstacles by satisfying the *daitya*s etc.[55]

In this passage, a visible result is contrasted to a scriptural one (*śā-strīyaphala*) that coincides with the pacification of the obstacles. This agrees in principle with what was stated above with regard to

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[53] The direct causality between the production of an *adṛṣṭa* and the removal of obstacles was also advocated by some early Buddhist authors to explain the practice of composing an auspicious verse (*maṅgala*) before the beginning of a treatise. This *adṛṣṭa* corresponds to merit (*puṇya*), which is regarded as the di-rect cause of the removal of obstacles, as for instance in Sthiramati's commen-tary on Vasubandhu's *Madhyāntavibhāga*, and in Yaśomitra on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (cf. SLAJE 2007, p. 17, and n. 27).

[54] NŚ 4.271cd-272ab: *kṛtvā kutapavinyāsaṃ yathāvad dvijasattamāḥ ǁ āsāritapra-yogas tu tataḥ kāryaḥ prayoktṛbhiḥ ǀ.*

[55] ABh ad NŚ 4.271cd-272ab, vol. I, p. 184: *tena tad uktaṃ bhavati – antaryava-nikāgate śuṣkākṣaraprayogaprāṇabhaviṣyadātodyaprayogaprastāvanātmake dṛṣṭaphale [dṛṣṭaphale conj. : dṛṣṭaphala° Ed.] daityādiparitoṣaṇayā tadvigh-naśamanaśāstrīyaphale ca prayukte 'ṅgakalāpe 'yaṃ prayogavidhiḥ.*

Kumārila's analysis of *smārta* rules: warding off the obstacles to ensure a successful performance is an invisible purpose that we can only learn about through scripture (here through *śāstra*, i.e. the NŚ).[56] However, it would be a mistake to consider Abhinavagupta's analysis a direct application of the Mīmāṃsaka model, since the obstacles are prevented only insofar as they get satisfied by the performance of music in the *pūrvaraṅga*, and not by means of an impersonal potency that is produced through strict rule observance. This, in fact, is not a case of restrictive injunction leading to an invisible result.

Now, to please the obstacles or demons is the invisible aim of the first phase of the *pūrvaraṅga*, and this is what the *śāstra* tells us. Yet, demons are neither the only category of beings that have to be satisfied through the *pūrvaraṅga*, nor the main one.[57] Quoting his master Bhaṭṭa Tauta, whose opinions Abhinavagupta usually makes his own, he says:

> Our teacher [Bhaṭṭa Tauta] maintains: unless the demons are acting as obstacles and [other obstructive means], what is the need for a *pūrvaraṅga* [to be performed] on the basis of rules? The [*pūrvaraṅga*], in fact, is mainly the cause of satisfaction of the deities installed in the [various] parts of the playhouse, because of [their] action[s] protecting against the obstacles. And it is only due to invariable connection (*nāntarīyaka*) that demons are satisfied. Once the obstacles have occurred, [it makes sense to perform the] *pūrvaraṅga*.[58]

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[56]   Here the opposition between *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* is definitely of an epistemological order. In his translation of the *Codanāsūtra* of the *Ślokavārttika*, K. Kataoka explains the dichotomy of the "seen" (*dṛṣṭa*) vs. the "heard" (*śruta*), parallel to the one between the "perceptible world" (*dṛṣṭa*) and the "imperceptible one" (*adṛṣṭa*), common in the *Śābarabhāṣya*, as originating from a contrast between *pramāṇa*s in terms of their objects, namely direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) vs. scriptural teaching (*upadeśa*). Religiously, the same dichotomy is configured in terms of the worldly vs. the dharmic (KATAOKA 2010, p. 343, n. 287).

[57]   This is in accordance with NŚ 5.45-52, which provides a list of all the various semi-divine and divine beings that are satisfied by the performance of the various limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*.

[58]   ABh ad NŚ 1.56cd-57ab, vol. I, p. 25 : *asmadupādhyāyās tu − yāvad daityais tatra vighnādyācaraṇaṃ na kṛtaṃ tāvat pūrvaraṅgasya vidhipūrvakasya ko 'vakāśaḥ. sa hi vighnarakṣākaraṇena maṇḍapabhāganiveśitadevatāparitoṣahetuḥ prādhānyena, nāntarīyakatayā ca daityaparitoṣakāraṇam. vighnās tu yadā jātās tataḥ prabhṛti pūrvaraṅgaḥ.*

The causal sequence outlined in this passage has the action of the obstacles as the main reason for doing the *pūrvaraṅga*: actors perform the *pūrvaraṅga* in order to protect the performance against obstacles. This, however, is not an automatic process, nor does it explain the particular chain of actions performed in the *pūrvaraṅga*. Since the gods appointed to the various parts of theatre[59] exercise a protective action against the obstacle, they have to be satisfied, or propitiated, so that they bestow their protection as a result. How do they get pleased? Through the various songs, dances etc., occurring in the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*. As a by-product, or secondary result, the demons are also pleased through the songs of the first part of the *pūrvaraṅga*. Here, the aesthetic quality of the *pūrvaraṅga* definitely plays a role, but this is certainly not a visible purpose, as Ingall's equation "*dṛṣṭa*=secular=beautiful" would imply. We know that the gods are pleased through beautiful dances and songs not because we can directly cognize it, but because the scriptures tell us so. If it were not for the mythical account recalled in the NŚ, and for a direct injunction to do so, no one would perform the *pūrvaraṅga*, let alone in a way conforming to a scripture!

I will now look at the third qualification of the couple "*dṛṣṭa*"/"*adṛṣṭa*" in the context of the purpose of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga*.

"*ADṚṢṬA*" AS A RESULT BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN EXTRAORDINARY BEAUTY

Concerning the twofold result of the limbs occurring in the second phase of the *pūrvaraṅga*, their observable result mainly consists in introducing the common spectator to the theatrical reality and its dimension, as well as to some of the specific features of the forthcoming play. Abhinavagupta cleverly creates a series of correspondences between these limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga* and some effect helpful to the play. Thus the benediction (*nāndī*) attracts the attention of the spectators, while the *cārī* and *mahācārī* introduce the amorous and the heroic *rasa*s, and the *trigata* the comic, a *rasa* appealing even to the uneducated audience. One by one, the elements of the second phase of the *pūrvaraṅga* are connected to a result which is

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59   The installation of deities in the various parts of the auditorium, following the construction of a playhouse, is rendered necessary in order to protect the performance against obstacles. This installation is accompanied by a ceremony of worship, which forms the topic of the third chapter of the NŚ.

called "visible" since it can be directly verified for every performance. Although elements of the second phase of the *pūrvaraṅga* are more easily linked with the forthcoming play and its literary dimension, and consequently with the savouring of *rasa*, the function of the so-called *bahiryavanikāṅga*s does not exhaust itself in it. Says Abhinavagupta:

> In this way, [the group of limbs] at the beginning of a theatrical performance, starting with the *gītaka* song and the *piṇḍī* dances and ending with the *prarocanā*, indeed conforms to the ways of the world (*laukikānusārin*). In this regard, one should not raise the question whether any of these limbs has the capacity [to produce something] (*sāmarthya*), whether [something] has to be achieved (*lakṣyatva*) [through them], etc., because their performance concerns the unsophisticated [spectators]. Therefore, this [group of limbs] has nothing extra-worldly (*alaukika*) in itself. It is only because theatre has mainly the nature of a composition [that some *alaukika* components] have to be added, in order to provide variety [in the performance of the *pūrvaraṅga*], and so as to produce an invisible [result]. This has to be borne in mind, so let us not run on at too great length with it.[60]

The opposition *laukika*/*alaukika* ("worldly"/"extra-worldly") fostered in this passage is not the same as the one seen above, i.e. *laukika* vs. *śāstrīya* as "actions motivated by worldly purposes" and "actions whose motive we can only know through a scripture." The motive of this second series of limbs is indeed visible since their use is self-evident: they help the unsophisticated ones, by preparing and introducing them gradually to the spectacle they are going to witness. This alone would be enough to justify their performance before a play. However, to this phase of the *pūrvaraṅga* are added elements which do not seem to have any practical aim other than charming the spectator. These elements are often called *alaukika* in the ABh, not because they are of a suprasensitive or otherworldly nature, but since they belong to the sphere of theatre, which is different from the mundane sphere albeit not totally divorced from it.[61]

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[60] ABh ad NŚ 5.26-29, vol. I, p. 220: *tathaiva nāṭyārambhe gītakapiṇḍyādiprarocanāntaṃ laukikānusāry eva. nātra kasyacid aṅgasya sāmarthyalakṣyatvādi codanīyam, sukumārajanaviṣayatvād asya prayogasya. tasmān nālaukikaṃ kiñcid etad. kevalaṃ nāṭyasya racanāprādhānyād vaicitryeṇa yojanīyam adṛṣṭasampattaye ceti mantavyam ity alaṃ bahunā.*

[61] I am currently preparing an article dealing with the status of "artifice" and its relation to the "natural" in Indian theatre (see GANSER forthcoming).

A typical example of an extraordinary element would be dance, whose insertion in the *pūrvaraṅga* occurs as an addition to an already existent whole.[62] However, even other elements of the *pūrvaraṅga* such as songs, or instrumental music may be considered *alaukika*, in the sense that they do not occur as such in the ordinary world. These elements are said to introduce variety (*vaicitrya*), seen as a beautifying factor, into the performance. This same beauty charms the spectator and entices him into the performed events he is attending.[63] Since this adherence to the performance is necessary for the appreciation of the *rasa*, the purpose which is variety can be considered a visible one, akin to that of the *sandhyaṅga*s. At the same time, these elements produce an unspecified unobservable result, possibly again through the intermediary of the gods' satisfaction, although we would have liked Abhinavagupta to linger somewhat longer on the connection between *alaukika* elements and invisible purposes.[64]

CONCLUSION

To sum up, different but connected values are assigned to the opposite concepts of "seen" or (*dṛṣṭa*) and "unseen" (*adṛṣṭa*), in the performance of the different phases that make up the preliminaries of a play in Indian theatre. The concept of visible purpose (*dṛṣṭaprayojana*) in the context of the *pūrvaraṅga* always refers to the fact that certain actions regulated by text-bound rules aim at directly perceivable results, i.e. they have an evident usefulness for the theatrical performance: they either enable the performance to take place at all, or help the audience to connect to the future play and appreciate it aesthetically. This kind of purpose can be verified though direct experience, and in this sense it is "seen," as it can be experientially verified by everyone. The concept of unseen or invisible purpose

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[62] The account about the introduction of dance in the *pūrvaraṅga* is given in NŚ 4.1-18ab.

[63] See GANSER 2013.

[64] If we are to read between the lines, we know at least from the fourth chapter of the ABh that an invisible purpose is given to some of the danced sequences in the *pūrvaraṅga*: since the movements reproduce the attributes of the different deities, the various dance patterns are supposed to please them. See for instance ABh ad NŚ 4.259-260, vol. I, p. 169: *ata evānayā kevalasyāpi karaṇasya devatāparitoṣaṇenādṛṣṭārthaṃ prayogaḥ.* "Therefore, this [indicates] that even a single dance unit (*karaṇa*) can be performed in view of an invisible [result], by pleasing the deities."

(*adṛṣṭaprayojana*), on the other hand, is somewhat more problematic, and varies considerably according to the function of the different phases of the *pūrvaraṅga*. It can refer to the purpose of rule restriction, to the purpose which is cognized through an authoritative scripture, or to the purpose of extraordinary elements.

This ambiguity probably has to do with the complex history of the concept of *adṛṣṭa* outside literary theory. Here is not the place to reconstruct the semantic, linguistic, or textual history of the "unseen," a history that already stretches for over a millennium by the time of Abhinavagupta. Several modern studies inform us about its developments in the different domains of Indian scholarly investigation.[65] The original conceptual unity of the early uses of *adṛṣṭa* is itself a matter of debate, let alone its incorporation and adaptation in the various scholarly systems of medieval India! Abhinavagupta's use of *adṛṣṭa* can be regarded as a sophisticated adoption and adaptation of a concept, developed elsewhere, for his own purposes. Just as, to echo Halbfass, the development of the concept of *apūrva* (or *adṛṣṭa*) in Mīmāṃsā is the encounter of Vedic exegesis and of the theory of sacrifice with a general theory of *karma*, and the concept of *adṛṣṭa* in classical Vaiśeṣika is the encounter of a system of cosmology with soteriological ideas and the theory of *karma*, Abhinavagupta's concept of *adṛṣṭa* in the ABh may be regarded as the encounter of Indian aesthetics – itself already an encounter of formalistic Alaṃkaraśāstra and Nāṭyaśāstra with the Mīmāṃsā theory of the unitary text – with a theory of ritual and Vedic exegesis.

In this connection, rather than trying to give a "closed" meaning to the concepts of *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* used by Abhinavagupta, or to refer them to definite and circumscribed realities, I deem it more useful to consider them to be principles of textual hermeneutics. Given the paucity of systematic explanations of these two concepts in the ABh, despite their frequent recurrence throughout the text, and given the total absence of a context of reference within the poetic tradition as a whole for interpreting them satisfactorily in the domain of this discipline, it has been necessary to look for different models of textual interpretation outside the confines of the literary discourse. A comparison with some of the procedures developed in the exegetical tradition by Mīmāṃsā (especially Kumārila) and Dharmaśāstra authors (Aparārka, but certainly others before him)

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[65]   See HALBFASS 1980 and WEZLER 1983.

has highlighted the fact that, in looking for the sources of Abhinavagupta's concepts of *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa*, the domain of ritual speculation is a good candidate.

The comparison with the analysis of *smārta* rules has shown that visible and invisible purposes in the domain of theatre can safely be connected with worldly and ethical-ritual goals, something already suggested by Ingalls et al. However, the equation between the visible purposes of the *pūrvaraṅga* and an aesthetic concern for beauty has to be rejected: visible purposes are not necessarily linked with beauty, as for instance in the whole series of limbs occurring behind a curtain. Conversely, an extraordinary beauty can well have an invisible purpose if it results in the satisfaction of the gods and therefore contributes to the attainment of an imperceptible result such as the removal of the obstacles to the performance. The adjunction of some extraordinary elements in the second phase of the *pūrvaraṅga* aims, in effect, at satisfying the gods, while giving pleasure at the same time to even the less refined spectator, thus enabling the whole audience to savour the *rasa* of the play. The use of this exegetical model thus allows Abhinavagupta to connect elements that are not easily linked with one another, and to subordinate disparate elements to wider goals. But there is, I believe, another reason why such a model has been applied in the first instance to the analysis of the *pūrvaraṅga*, namely its primarily ritual nature, as the scheme of twofold results of the preliminaries as a whole demonstrates.

Applying a twofold purpose to the limbs of the *pūvaraṅga* thus entails two different operations. First of all, it connects in a meaningful and coherent way the different parts of the preliminaries between them, as well as to the theatrical performance as a single unit with a single overriding goal. Secondly, it preserves the identity of the *pūrvaraṅga* as a specific kind of ritual, the worship of the deities of the stage through songs and dances, a rite altogether different from the Vedic sacrifice around which ritual exegesis traditionally revolves.

If the context from which Abhinavagupta's analysis of the *pūrvaraṅga* stems is, as suggested in this essay, one of ritual exegesis closely linked with the hermeneutics of scriptural rules, we must admit that Abhinavagupta was looking at the NŚ not merely as a manual for actors, but as a scripture containing rules of performance hierarchically organized and analysable through the same tools developed by the Brahmanical exegetes for the analysis of the Vedic

and non-Vedic sources of *dharma*.[66] Such a model requires, in my view, an even deeper appropriation of the exegetical paradigm than the one applied by Ānandavardhana to the analysis of a poetic text, since it does not only take into account the teleological organization of the minimal elements of poetics into one and the same literary work, but it also elaborates, just as the ritual exegetes had done in the case of Vedic rituals and the text enjoining them, a close parallelism between the elements of a theatrical composition (here both the *pūrvaraṅga* and the play), and the scripture prescribing their performance, the NŚ.[67]

In conclusion, I regard the transition from the single, invisible purpose of the limbs of the *pūrvaraṅga* in the *Locana* passage, to the twofold model of visible and invisible purposes presented in the ABh, and implemented throughout the text, as an actual refinement in Abhinavagupta's aesthetic thought triggered by the challenge posed by the complex phenomenon that is theatre, as well as a personal contribution to ritual speculation by an original Śaiva philosopher.

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[66] On this distinction, see YOSHIMIZU 1992.

[67] This development in the appropriation of the model of ritual exegesis in the ABh is reflected also by the fact that Abhinavagupta considers not only a play or a poem as a single complex sentence (*mahāvākya*) (cf., for instance, ABh ad NŚ 1.107: *rāmāyaṇaprāyād ekasmān mahāvākyād*; and Abh ad NŚ 19.37, vol. III, p. 23: *mahāvākyārtharūpasya rūpakārthasya pañcāṃśāḥ*), but also the NŚ, a large sentence of 6.000 verses (ABh ad NŚ 1.6, vol. I, p. 9: *mahāvākyātmanā ṣaṭsahasrīrūpeṇa... śāstreṇa tattvaṃ nirṇīyate.* "The true essence [of theatre] is established by the treatise in form of a large utterance of six thousand verses"). The idea of a single "large sentence" (*mahāvākya*), with the unity of purpose that such a single complex sentence should have, again has its origins in Mīmāṃsā. The fact that the whole tradition stemming from the NŚ considers theatre to be a fifth Veda could have played a role in the parallelism with ritual speculation. However, a closer investigation into the status of Ālaṃkāraśāstra and Nāṭyaśāstra within Brahmanical knowledge classification, and into the place assigned to the *śāstra*s of poetics and dramatics by the exponents of the poetic and aesthetic tradition, is still a desideratum.

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[*Tantravārttika*] See *Mīmāṃsādarśana*

VS

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The Force of *Tātparya*:
Bhaṭṭa Jayanta and Abhinavagupta[*]

ALESSANDRO GRAHELI

1. INTRODUCTION

In India, most theories of meaning have hinged on two distinct capacities of language to convey meanings, *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*. The two, respectively, have been widely used to explain direct, primary meanings, and secondary, implied, and metaphorical meanings. IN-GALLS 1990 (p. 14) writes that, in addition to these two,

> the school of ritualists founded by Kumārila held that there existed a third power which furnished a "final meaning" to the sentence as a whole. They called this the *tātparyaśakti*, and defended its reality against their opponents, the Prābhākara ritualists, who claimed that the designative force in each word kept on operating until at the conclusion of the sentence it worked automatically in harmony with the other words.

Here, Ingalls evokes the Bhāṭṭa theory of sentence signification, *abhihitānvaya* ("correlation of designated meanings"), and the Prābhākara one, *anvayābhidhāna*, "designation of correlated [words]."[1] The notion of *tātparyaśakti*, however, is not found in Kumārila's

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[1] Details on the *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* theories, seen from different angles, can be found in BROUGH 1953, KUNJUNNI RAJA 1963, pp. 189-227, SIDERITS 1985, TABER 1989, MATILAL 1990, pp. 106-119, and PRASAD 1994, pp. 331-338, among others. SIDERITS 1985, p. 96, rendered *abhihitānvaya* as the "designated relation theory"; MATILAL AND SEN 1988, p. 73, as "signification before connection," and MATILAL 1990, pp. 107ff., as "designation before connection"; PRASAD 1994, p. 331, as "theory of compositional significance."

works nor in other early Bhāṭṭa sources. Ingalls is not alone in attributing the *tātparyaśakti* idea to the Bhāṭṭas, as noticed also by KUNJUNNI RAJA 1963, p. 221:

> Some of the ancient commentators, and modern scholars following them, have thus associated *tātparyavṛtti* with the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā. But there is one difficulty in such an assumption which many of the scholars have not noticed. All the great authoritative writers on Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā like Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, Vācaspatimiśra, Cidānanda and Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa have unequivocally stated that according to the *abhihitānvaya* theory advocated by them the syntactically unified sentence-meaning is to be conveyed through the secondary power, *lakṣaṇā*.

Long after Kumārila (7th c. CE), the *tātparyaśakti* became a common feature in explanations of the process of sentence signification, particularly in Navyanyāya and Ālaṅkāra treatises, two of Ingalls's interests that justify his assumption in the above-quoted passage. In Nyāya sources, the earliest use of *tātparyaśakti* is found at the end of the 9th c., in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* (henceforth NM), while in poetics the first occurrence is, to my knowledge, in Abhinavagupta's *Dhvanyālokalocana* (10th-11th c., henceforth *Locana*). Both Jayanta and Abhinavagupta, in fact, appear to have adopted a form of *abhihitānvaya* in which the role of *lakṣaṇā* is covered by that of *tātparya.*

The theme of this paper is a comparison of Jayanta's and Abhinavagupta's version of *abhihitānvaya*. I will try to find answers to three main questions:

- What is the import of the term *tātparya* in Jayanta's expression *tātparyaśakti*?

- What were the reasons behind Jayanta's modification of the Bhāṭṭa theory of *abhihitānvaya*, which brought about the replacement of *lakṣaṇā* with *tātparyaśakti*?

- Is there a connection between Jayanta's and Abhinavagupta's views on sentence signification and the use of *tātparyaśakti*?

To do this, I will sketch relevant traits of the Bhāṭṭa theory of *abhihitānvaya*. I will then discuss differences in Jayanta's adaptation of the theory, and focus on the *tātparyaśakti* concept. Lastly, I will describe Abhinavagupta's version of the theory, trying to detect possible links with Jayanta's and Kumārila's ideas.

2. JAYANTA AND THE MĪMĀṂSAKAS

2.1. *Designation of Word-Meanings*

2.1.1. *From Phonemes to Words*

Jayanta's theory of meaning evolved from a criticism of the Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā positions, particularly Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭavāda*, the Bhāṭṭa theory of *abhihitānvaya*, and the Prābhākara *anvitābhidhāna*. In the first part of NM 6, Jayanta concludes that phonemes are the cause of word-meanings (*padārtha*), polemizing with the Sphoṭavādins and in agreement with the Mīmāṃsakas: a string of phonemic sounds in a fixed sequence, i.e., a word, causes the cognition of the meaning in the hearer, in a psychological process that involves perceptions (*anubhava*), dispositions (*saṃskāra*) and recollections (*smaraṇa*).

In this paper I will render *artha* with "meaning," and *śabda*, occasionally, with "words," to simplify the exposition and the linguistic scope of the paper. Yet, translations such as "sound," "word," "language," "linguistic expression," "verbal testimony," are all in some way too narrow, and the same is true of "thing," "object," "thing-meant," "referent," "reference," "sense," "meaning," etc., for *artha*. The main difficulty is the conflation of the linguistic, epistemic, and ontological senses in the two Sanskrit words. Also, these English words are for the most part loaded terms that carry the inheritance of centuries of philosophical speculations, not necessarily reflected in the Sanskrit milieu. For instance, see NM^Va, vol. II, p. 540, l. 16, where Jayanta distinguishes the teleological from the ontological use of the word *artha*.[2]

For passages of the NM and the *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* (henceforth GBh) quoted in this paper, I will supply substantive variants from the relevant manuscript materials and occasionally re-edit the text. A list of available manuscripts of the NM can be found in GRAHELI 2012a, and the criteria used in the choice of the best readings are discussed in GRAHELI 2012b and GRAHELI 2015b, ch. 5.

The process of word-signification is debated in depth in NM^Va, vol. II, pp. 143-184. Jayanta's position on this issue is summed up in Figure 1. In this diagram, as well as in the following ones, the

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2   *arthaḥ arthyamānaḥ ucyate, na vasturūpa eva, abhāvasyāpi prayojanatvasaṃbhavāt.*

designative causation is indicated by a straight arrow, and phonemic expressions are in italics (e.g., *g au ḥ*). In Figure 1, specifically, the object of designation is indicated in single quotation marks.

Figure 1: Signification of phonemes

$$g–au–ḥ$$

'gauḥ'

Words, which are constituted of phonemes, convey word-meanings by direct designation (*abhidhā*). Jayanta largely quotes from and adheres to the Mīmāṃsā atomistic and compositional view, but while Mīmāṃsakas speak of *abhidhāvyāpāra*, "designative operativity," Jayanta calls it *abhidhātrī śakti*, "designative capacity."

2.1.2. Jayanta on śakti

Jayanta does not use the term *śakti* casually. He glosses *śakti* as "that which has the nature of contributing to the own form [of something],"[3] and he frequently resorts to this term when discussing causal relations. A *śakti* is not a property-possessor, but rather a property inhering in a property-possessor: *śakti*s and other properties are considered by him as distinguishing factors that prove the plurality of entities (*dharmin*; see NM[Va], vol. II, p. 42, l. 15-p. 43, l. 2).[4] Hence, *śakti*s are counted as delimiting properties (*avacchedā dharmāḥ*, see GBh, p. 136, ll. 11-17). This means that *abhidhā* and *tātparya* are understood by Jayanta as properties of linguistic expressions.

In a general discussion on causality, Jayanta distinguishes two types of *śakti*, fixed (*avasthitā*) and situational (*āgantukī*): in the production of a clay-pot, an example of the first type is the *śakti* of clay, and of the second that of the combination of stick, wheel, etc. (NM[Va], vol. II, p. 403, ll. 8-10)[5]. If we apply this distinction to the two *śakti*s

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[3]   E.g., NM[Va], vol. I, p. 182, l. 11: *svarūpasahakārisvabhāvaiva*; NM[Va], vol. I, p. 403, l. 8: *yogyatāvacchinnasvarūpasahakārisannidhānam eva.* See also *Nyāya-kośa*, s.v. *kāraṇaniṣṭhaḥ kāryotpādanayogyo dharmaviśeṣaḥ.*

[4]   *api cāsmanmate bhinnaiḥ dharmair yuktasya dharmiṇaḥ | dharmo 'sya kenacit kaścit pratyayena grahīṣyate ‖ vicitrasahakāryādiśaktibhedaś ca dharmiṇaḥ | nānopādhyupakārāṅgaśaktyabhinnātmatā kutaḥ ‖.*

[5]   *saiveyaṃ dvividhā śaktir ucyate avasthitā āgantukī ca. mṛttvādyavacchinnaṃ svarūpam avasthitā śaktiḥ. āgantukī ca daṇḍacakrādisaṃgarūpā.*

under discussion, it is possible that Jayanta either considered *abhi-dhāśakti* to be a fixed *śakti*, and *tātparyaśakti* a situational one, or that he took them both as situational ones, although he does not explicitly say so.

Whatever the case, Jayanta contrasted his own notion of *vācaka-śakti* with that of the Mīmāṃsakas, who thought of it as permanent and natural (e.g., NM[Va], vol. I, p. 591, ll. 1-3; vol. II, p. 403, l. 6). In Nyāya, indeed, signification is based on a convention (*samaya, saṅketa*), so *abhidhāśakti* must either be situational, or "fixed" after the *saṅketa,* but certainly not "permanent" in the Mīmāṃsaka sense. Therefore, to understand the signifier-signified relation as a natural or permanent *śakti* is not acceptable for Jayanta (NM[Va], vol. II, p. 596, ll. 16-10).[6] The conventional nature of the signifier-signified relation is a necessary assumption in the Nyāya epistemology of *śabda*, which is founded on the trustworthiness of the speaker (*āp-tavācakatva*) and, consequently, on the authorship of the Veda (*pau-ruṣeyatā*). In the NM, the *abhidhātrī śakti* seems indeed to be linked to the very definition of *śabda* in *Nyāyasūtra* (henceforth NS) 1.1.7, *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*, since Jayanta glosses *upadeśaḥ* with *abhidhā-nakriyā* (NM[Va], vol. I, p. 399, ll. 1-2).

Here I will render *abhidhāna* with "designation" and *śakti*, or its synonym *sāmarthya*, with "capacity," meaning that the combined phonemes of a word have the potentiality to cause a word-meaning. In Figure 1 and the following diagrams, therefore, the straight arrow shows the actualization of the designative capacity.

A compositional theory of sentence signification is necessarily influenced by the implied theory of word signification, namely whether the *artha* of the word is considered as a particular (*vyakti*), a configuration (*ākṛti*), or a natural kind (*jāti*), the three options contemplated in NS 2.2.66.

2.1.3. Mīmāṃsakas on word-meanings

Śabara distinguished the meaning of a word from that of a sentence, thus establishing a general principle that would become central in the formulation of later Mīmāṃsā theories: "The word functions in relation to the natural kind, the sentence in relation to the particular" (*Śābarabhāṣya* [henceforth ŚBh] ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* [henceforth MSū] 1.1.24, p. 112, l.1).[7] Kumārila elaborates on this rule in the

---

6   *iti na śaktirūpaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ.*

7   *sāmānye hi padaṃ pravartate viśeṣe vākyam.*

Tantravārttika (henceforth TV). It is clear, from the observation of its practical usage, that in language we have sentence-meanings that must be particulars, because the force of an injunctive sentence such as "Bring the white cow!" produces a specific act of bringing a particular cow. Each word-meaning is a natural kind (*ākṛti* or *jāti*, the two terms being used interchangeably by Kumārila, unlike in Nyāya). By mutual specification among the word-meanings, the particular sentence-meaning is produced. More precisely, the mutual specification is the sentence-meaning (TV 2.1.46, pp. 436-437):

> In the theory that the word-meaning is the natural kind (*ākṛti*), the sentence-meaning is the mutual influence caused by the contiguity of the naturally (*svarūpeṇa*) designated "whiteness" and "cowness," in which the difference of meanings is [already] accomplished. This correlation of whiteness with cowness, or of cowness with whiteness, is grasped as a collection from the sum of the single entities [i.e., of the single word-meanings].[8]

2.1.4. Jayanta on word-meanings

According to Jayanta (NM^Va, vol. II, p. 59, l. 4-p. 60, l. 7), instead, what is designated by a word is not just a generality (a natural kind), nor a particular, as in Vyāḍi's theory (see GANERI 1995, p. 410), but rather a *tadvat* (*tad asyāstīti*), a property-possessor, in which general and particular aspects are predominant according to the specific applications. This theory of meaning allows the Naiyāyika the necessary flexibility to account for both types of reference.[9] In the following diagrams, I have inscribed a particular in a circle, and a natural kind in a dashed circle. The kind-possessing particular (or particular-possessing kind) is inscribed in both a dashed and a continuous circle (see Figure 2).

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[8] *ākṛtipadārthapakṣe śuklatvagotvayoḥ svarūpeṇābhihitayoḥ saṃnidhānād itaretarānurañjanam arthasiddhabhedaṃ vākyārthaḥ. sa ca gotve śuklatvasaṃsargaḥ śuklatve vā gotvasaṃsargaḥ sāmastyenaikaikavyaktyupasaṃhārād upalabhyata iti.*

[9] See GANERI 1999, pp. 102-104, for the philosophical implications of this concept. The tadvat theory was already in existence before Jayanta's time, since it is mentioned in the *Nyāyavārttika* ad NS 1.1.1, p. 4, l. 16; ad NS 1.1.3, p. 28, l. 3; ad NS 1.1.29, p. 100, l. 3; ad NS 2.2.66, pp. 306-312.

**Figure 2: Three views on word-meaning:
Vyāḍi, Śabara, Jayanta**

gauḥ	*gauḥ*	*gauḥ*
(gauḥ)	(gauḥ)	(gauḥ)
particular	natural kind	property-possessor

Leaving aside the particularistic position, which is of no direct relevance here, the ontological difference between the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya versions of direct designation is an important factor in the development of the two parallel theories.

2.2. Signification of Sentence-Meanings

I will now consider a recurrent example of injunctive sentence, *gām abhyāja kṛṣṇāṃ daṇḍena*, "Bring the black cow, by means of the stick," used in the NM as well (NM[Va], vol. I, p. 695, l. 17, NM 4). The single words designate their own meanings, which in Jayanta's view are neither merely natural kinds, nor particulars, but rather property-possessors. Up to this point, as far as the designation of word-meanings is concerned, there is no disagreement with the Bhāṭṭas's *abhihitānvaya*, except for the ontological quality of the word-meanings. But what about the step from the word-meanings to the sentence-meaning, i.e., the *anvaya*? Here, too, the Bhāṭṭas and Jayanta share the view that the sentence-meaning is the correlation of word-meanings. This correlation is indicated by the horizontal line connecting the word-meanings in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Correlation of word-meanings

[Bhāṭṭa]

gām abhyāja kṛṣṇāṃ daṇḍena

gām — abhyāja — kṛṣṇāṃ — daṇḍena

[Jayanta]

gām abhyāja kṛṣṇāṃ daṇḍena

gām — abhyāja — kṛṣṇāṃ — daṇḍena

2.2.1. The Bhāṭṭas on the correlation of word-meanings

In the Bhāṭṭa version of *abhihitānvaya*, the correlation of the word-meanings is derived by *lakṣaṇāvyāpāra*, an indirect significatory process that needs some explanation. The recurrent passage in support of *lakṣaṇāvyāpāra* is found in *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, *vākyārtha-mātṛkā*, p. 396, l. 6 and *Tattvabindu*, p. 153): "Our position is that in every case that the sentence-meaning is indirectly indicated (*lakṣya-māṇaḥ*)." Both Śālikanātha and Vācaspati ascribe it to Kumārila, although I could not find it in his extant works.[10]

In the mainstream Bhāṭṭa theory, *lakṣaṇā* should be understood in the general sense of "indication" or "implication"[11] as opposed to

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[10]   *vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ.* Interestingly, with rare exceptions, *abhihitānvaya* has been mostly studied on the basis of an opponent's presentation, that of Śālikanātha, a very detailed and lucid presentation, but not necessarily an unbiased one. A historical reconstruction of the Bhāṭṭa theory is not within the scope of this paper. However, the role of *lakṣaṇā* is confirmed in later Bhāṭṭa sources, e.g, in the *Mānameyodaya*, p. 94, l. 5: *vayaṃ tu padārthā lakṣaṇayaiva vākyārthaṃ bodhayantīti brūmaḥ.*

[11]   See TABER 1989, p. 426, n. 10, and PRASAD 1994, p. 333. FUJII 2001, p. 14, renders it as "metaphor."

"direct designation" (*abhidhā*). Nārayaṇa Bhaṭṭa, in the *Mānameyo-daya* (p. 94, l. 6-p. 95, l. 2) explains that such an implication (*lakṣa-ṇā*) is obtained by a presumptive inference (*arthāpātti*). The argument runs as follows:

> If in the *gām ānaya* sentence the word-meanings "cow" and "bring," evoked by the words [*gām* and *ānaya*], remained in their general form of natural kind without a mutual relation, this [general notion] would contradict the words' purpose (*tātparya*) of making known a single, specified meaning, [a purpose that is] fixed at the time of language acquisition. Since a signified [sentence-meaning] in the form of natural kind is not possible, the word-meanings must culminate in a particular constituted of their mutual relation. Thus, this [particular] cow must be brought, and [the natural kind] "bringing" is related to [this] "cow": so, once this mutual relation is achieved, the sentence-meaning constituted of "cow" and "bringing" is realized.[12]

In the Bhāṭṭa view, there are three necessary conditions that must be met for a successful correlation of word-meanings: mutual expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), proximity (*saṃnidhāna*, *sannidhi*, or *āsatti*), and suitability (*yogyatā*).[13] Whether these conditions can pertain to word-meanings, as apparently implied in the Bhāṭṭa theory, is a debated issue that I will not enter here. In short, however, we can say that mutual expectancy answers the need of a syntactical relation among word-meanings; suitability relates to word-meanings, too, and guarantees the semantic coherence of the sentence-meaning; proximity, however, seems to belong to the sphere of words, since it guarantees the compactness and unity of a sentence.

   In this way the individual word-meanings – i.e., the natural kinds designated by the individual words – mutually specify each other and thus compose a unitary sentence-meaning, a particular, according to the principle stated in ŚBh ad MSū 1.1.24, p. 112, l. 1: "The word functions in relation to the natural kind, the sentence in relation to the particular" (*sāmānye hi padaṃ pravartate viśeṣe vākyam*). This correlation of word-meanings is indirectly assumed, because

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[12] *atra ca padaiḥ smāryamāṇā gavādipadārthā yady anyonyānvayaṃ vinā sāmā-nyarūpā evāvatiṣṭheran tarhi padānāṃ vyutpattisamayāvadhṛtam ekaviśiṣṭā-rthabodhatātparyaṃ virudhyeta iti sāmānyarūpasya vācyasyānupapatter anyo-nyānvayarūpe viśeṣe eva padārthāḥ paryavasyanti. tataś ca gaur iyam ānīya-mānaiva ānayanaṃ ca gosambaddham eva iti parasparānvayalābhāt gavāna-yanarūpavākyārthasiddhiḥ.*

[13] TV 2.1.48: *ākāṅkṣā saṃnidhānaṃ ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam | sambandhakāra-ṇatvena klptaṃ nānantaraśrutiḥ ॥.*

the pragmatic use of language would not be explainable otherwise, as shown by means of dotted arrows in Figure 4.

Figure 4: The Bhāṭṭa theory

gām abhyāja kṛṣṇām daṇḍena

2.2.2. Jayanta on the correlation of word-meanings

The notion of the sentence-meaning as a correlation (*saṃsarga*) of word-meanings is introduced by Jayanta in NM 5, after a thorough discussion on the ontological nature of word-meanings (*padārtha*s). Although such a correlation is not designated by words, we still know it because of them.[14]

This correlation among word-meanings, i.e., the sentence-meaning, is possible due to the conjoined action (*saṃhatyakāritva*) of words. Thus, words uttered together in a sentence convey a single sentence-meaning (NM^Va, vol. II, p. 216, ll. 6-7).[15] To explain the phenomenon, Jayanta uses the argument of *Ślokavārttika* (henceforth ŚV), *vākyādhikaraṇa* 272: a root and a suffix designate an individual meaning, but simultaneously depend on each other, because they are never used in isolation.[16] The meaning of the suffix of an optative verb is not designated by the root, because the injunctive force is not expressed by the verbal root; neither is the meaning of

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[14] *nanu saṃsargo 'pi na śabdārthaḥ. satyam. sa hi śabdasyābhidheyo na bhavati, na tu tato na pratīyate. anabhidheyaḥ kathaṃ pratīyate iti cet etad agre nirṇī-ṣyate.*

[15] *saṃhatyakārīṇi hi padānīty uktam. samuditaiḥ padair eko vākyārthaḥ pratyāy-yate.*

[16] *prakṛtipratyayau yadvat apekṣete parasparam | padaṃ padāntaraṃ tadvat vā-kyaṃ vākyāntaraṃ tathā ॥.*

the root expressed by the suffix, because it is impossible, for the optative endings, to express the meaning of the verb *yāji* by themselves; nor can they produce their respective effect independently from each other. In the same way, also words produce their effect in mutual dependence, while still designating their individual meaning (NM^Va, vol. II, p. 217, l. 14-p. 218, l. 7).[17]

2.2.3. Jayanta on the capacity of tātparya

In NM 6 (NM^Va, vol. II, pp. 202-219) Jayanta resumes the topic of the relation among word-meanings, already introduced in previous parts of the NM. By analyzing the contrasting theories of *abhihitā-nvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* he develops a sui generis explanation to suit the needs of his own school (NM^Va, vol. II, p. 190, ll. 8-10):

> Words have two capacities, designative and *tātparya*. Of these, the designative capacity serves the word-meanings, and the *tātparya* capacity culminates in the sentence-meaning.[18]

In other words, the *tātparya* capacity is the cause of knowledge of the correlation of the word-meanings (NM^Va, vol. II, p. 218, ll. 9-10).[19]

If the sentence is composed of single words that designate their respective meanings, to account for a unitary meaning by tracing it back to the phonemic segments is problematic, because to postulate two quite different capacities of one same linguistic expression raises issues of theoretical parsimony.[20] Words, i.e. phonemic strings, have exhausted their role in the designation of the word-meaning. Hence, commenting on MSū 1.1.25, Śabara (ŚBh, p. 116, ll. 5-6) maintains that there cannot be a meaning of the sentence independently of the meanings of the words composing it:

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[17] *api ca prakṛtipratyayau parasparāpekṣam artham abhidadhāte. na ca prakṛtyā pratyayārtho 'bhidhīyate, niyogasyādhātuvācyatvāt. na ca pratyayena prakṛty-artho 'bhidhīyate yajyāder* (yajyāder] P K; *niyogāder* NM^Va) *liṅvācyatvānupa-patteḥ. na ca tau pṛthak pṛthak svakāryaṃ kurutaḥ. evaṃ padāny api paraspa-rāpekṣīṇi saṃhatyakāryaṃ kariṣyanti.*

[18] *padānāṃ hi dvayī śaktir abhidhātrī ca* (ca] P K; om. NM^Va) *tātparyaśaktiś ca. tatra abhidhātrī śaktir eṣāṃ padātheṣūpayuktā | tātparyaśaktiś ca* (ca] P NM^Va; *tu* K) *vākyārthe paryavasyatīti.*

[19] *teṣāṃ tātparyaśaktis tu saṃsargāvagamāvadhiḥ.*

[20] SIDERITS 1985 (pp. 262-265, 287-288) eloquently deals with the pros and cons of the parsimony argument.

Words, having designated their respective meanings, cease to function. Then the word-meanings, at that point already known, convey the meaning of the sentence.[21]

But this, for Jayanta, is not acceptable.

The cognition of a sentence-meaning is not produced by word-meanings, but rather by the sentence itself. That is why the expression "meaning of the sentence" is used, and not "meaning of the word-meanings." Just as a word, constituted by a conceptual group of phonemes, produces the cognition of the word-meaning, so a sentence, constituted by a conceptual group of words, will produce the cognition of the sentence-meaning (NM[Va], vol. II, p. 188, ll. 2-3).[22]

Here Jayanta wants to safeguard the epistemological autonomy of *śabdapramāṇa*, the epistemic instrument of verbal testimony. Linguistic communication happens mostly by means of sentences, so if word-meanings were accepted as the cause of sentence-meaning, word-meanings would themselves be *śabdapramāṇa*, which is not the case. A word-meaning would be an object of knowledge (*prameya*) when designated by a word, and subsequently become an instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) to convey a sentence-meaning, akin to smoke, when it is in a first moment the object of perception, and later generates inferential knowledge of fire. Echoing the Bhāṭṭa usage of the term *tātparya*, as shown below, Jayanta says that those very words that have designated their meanings fulfil their role in the cognition of the sentence-meaning by conveying their word-meanings (NM[Va], vol. II, p. 189, l. 20-p. 190, l. 2).[23]

Thus debating with the Bhāṭṭas, Jayanta at this point of the discussion quotes in his favor ŚV, *vākyādhikaraṇa* 343, and accuses them of misunderstanding their very source:

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[21] *padāni hi svaṃ svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi. athedānīṃ padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārtham avagamayanti.*

[22] *na padārthebhyo vākyārthāvagatiḥ api tu vākyād eva. tathā cāyaṃ vākyārtha iti prasiddho (prasiddho] P K; prasiddhiḥ NM[Va]) na padārthārtha iti. yathā hi kālpanikavarṇasamūhātmakaṃ padaṃ padārthapratipattim ādadhāti tathā kālpanikapadasamūhātmakaṃ vākyaṃ vākyārthapratipattim ādhāsyati.*

[23] *kiṃ tu viratavyāpāre cakṣuṣīva śabde dhūmādivat prameyāt padārthāt agner iva vākyārthasyāvagamo nāsti. na hi padārthāḥ prameyībhūya dhūmavat punaḥ pramāṇībhavitum arhanti. kiṃ tu padāny eva tatpratipādanadvāreṇa vākyārthapratipattau paryavasyanti.*

> Their [i.e. the phonemes'] activity of conveying the word-meaning is in-separable (*nāntarīyaka*) from their activity of producing knowledge of the sentence-meaning, just as it happens with the activity of fuel producing flames while cooking [food].[24]

If one looks at the immediate context of the ŚV, Jayanta's reasons to see this stanza as conducive to his case are even clearer (ŚV, *vā-kyādhikaraṇa* 342): "Even if they directly convey the word-mean-ings, phonemes do not turn sterile (*niṣphale*)."[25]

Jayanta understands the production of the word-meanings and of the sentence-meaning as two distinct processes (*vyāpāra*s) carried on by the very same words. These two processes, the intermediate (*avāntara*) and the final one (*pradhāna*), do not hamper each other, and are explained by postulating two distinct capacities of words, *abhidhātrī śakti* and *tātparyaśakti*. The first conveys the word-meanings, the second the sentence-meanings (NM^Va, vol. II, p. 190, ll. 7-10).[26]

Interestingly, even Pārthasārathi utilizes the term *tātparya* while commenting on these very ŚV verses, where he asserts that even if words complete their designative operation with the word-mean-ings, at that moment the *tātparya* of the words is not completed, be-cause *tātparya* concerns the knowledge of the sentence-meaning.[27] There are some parallels with Jayanta's explanation:

- Both Jayanta and Pārthasārathi speak of *tātparya* in the context of the same ŚV stanza.

- Śabara's principle that words cease to function with the desig-nation of the word-meanings is interpreted analogously: what ceases is *abhidhā*, while their *tātparya* is not yet completed.

- Designation is understood as an intermediate, propaedeutic op-eration.

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[24]   *vākyārthamataye (mataye]* P K; *pratyaye* NM^Va) *teṣāṃ pravṛttau nāntarīyakam | pāke jvāleva kāṣṭhānāṃ padārthapratipādanam ‖*.

[25]   *sākṣād yady api kurvanti padārthapratipādanam | varṇās tathāpi naitasmin pa-ryavasyanti niṣphale ‖*.

[26]   *avāntaravyāpāro hi na kārakasya pradhānavyāpāre (pradhāna-]* P K; *pradhāne* NM^Va) *kārakatāṃ vihanti (vihanti]* P K; *vyāhanti* NM^Va) *padānāṃ hi dvayī śak-tiḥ abhidhātrī tātparyaśaktiś ca. tatra abhidhātrī śaktir eṣāṃ padārtheṣūpayuk-tā. tātparyaśaktiś ca vākyārthe paryavasyatīti.*

[27]   *ataḥ padārthāvasitābhidhāvyāpārāṇām api padānāṃ tatrānavasitatātparyāṇāṃ vākyārthāvagatāv eva tātparyam iti.*

- The *tātparya* is that of words, not of the word-meanings. The integrity of *śabda* as an independent means of knowledge, is thus guaranteed.

In this particular passage, the word *tātparya* does not occur in the ŚV itself, and while I think that Pārthasārathi uses the term in a general sense of "purpose,"[28] it is also possible that the *tātparya* concept was evoked in the same context of ŚV, *vākyādhikaraṇa* 342-343, by some Mīmāṃsā source available to both Jayanta and Pārthasārathi, but no longer extant. Umbeka's *Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* is a prime suspect, since we know that Jayanta was familiar with it.[29] Unfortunately, at present, there are no known manuscripts that cover the *vākyādhikaraṇa* portion of the ŚV.

Jayanta's theory of *tātparyaśakti* is sketched in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Jayanta's *tātparyaśakti* theory

gām abhyāja kṛṣṇāṃ daṇḍena

(tātparyaśakti)

gām — abhyāja — kṛṣṇāṃ — daṇḍena

2.2.4. What does tātparya mean in the NM?

The term *tātparya* is frequently found in Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, and Alaṅkāra works, but with different shades of sense.[30]

Tātparya is often understood, quite simply, as "speaker's intention."[31] Yet, the word is certainly not used in this sense by Mīmāṃsākas in the ritual context, where it is derived from *tatpara*, and

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[28]   See also his commentary ad ŚV, *vākyādhikaraṇa* 230.

[29]   Evidence of Jayanta's re-use of Umbeka's commentary is discussed in GRAHELI 2015a.

[30]   A reliable historical account of the development of the concept was sketched by KUNJUNNI RAJA 1963, pp. 213-224. PRASAD 1994 also added thought-provoking reflections, but he largely focused on the later reception and implementation of the term.

[31]   See e.g. STAAL 1966, p. 308: "The term *tātparya*, lastly, refers to the speaker's

where *tat* is taken as referring to *kārya*, the ultimate purpose of a Vedic ritual.[32] "According to the Prābhākaras, on the other hand, the *tātparya* makes the primary significatory power itself capable of conveying not only the individual word-meanings, but their mutual connection as well. Thus even when *tātparya* is not taken as a separate *vṛtti*, it could be referred to as the motive force conveying the syntactic relation" (KUNJUNNI RAJA 1963, p. 223). There certainly cannot be any speaker's intention in a Vedic injunction, since the Veda is by definition authorless (*apauruṣeya*).[33]

It is helpful to observe the context in which the expression *tātpa-ryaśakti* is used in the NM. Its first occurrence is in NM[Va], p. 696, l. 1 (NM 4), in the context of the polemic, against the Mīmāṃsakas, on the authorlessness of the Veda. In Nyāya, even the Veda has an author, albeit a divine one, and not a common human being. The Prābhākaras' idea that Vedic injunctions are *kāryapara*, and consequently their usage of the term *tātparya* (from *tatpara*) in reference to *kāryapara*, is not applicable to Jayanta's position (NM[Va], vol. I, p. 695, ll. 13-14).[34]

Most interestingly, in the same context Jayanta rejects the idea that the sentence-meaning is the speaker's intention and gives two examples in support of his argument. With the first, "Hey Devadatta, bring the white cow by means of the stick," he shows that if the sentence-meaning were the speaker's intention, there would be no sentence-meaning in this case, because there is no word designating

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intention."

[32] See e.g. *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 378, l. 9: *tena tatraiva tātparyam*, where *tatra* clearly refers to *kārya* in the immediate context.

[33] PRASAD 1994, p. 321, perhaps in an attempt to find a synthesis of the two different applications, wrote that it is also used to mean "an intention, in the form of a demand, of a word in order to complete the sentence in which it occurs. Anything which is intended, such as explicit or inexplicit contests, background assumptions, demands for incomplete expressions to be completed, and the volitional attitude or state of the speaker, is covered by intention (*tātparya*)." Moreover, "[...] a theory of meaning is a theory of understanding, which takes 'intention' in its broadest sense. Therefore, the speaker's intention is one of the meaning contents. But if he intends his utterance 'to be understood' by the hearer with all the meaning contents, then his intention must be taken in the broadest sense" (PRASAD 1994, p. 341, n. 22).

[34] ... *vaidikāni punar apauruṣeyatayā kāryaparāṇy eva vākyānīti etad api na peśalam. apauruṣeyasya vacasaḥ pratikṣiptatvāt, vede 'pi kartur īśvarasya sādhitatvāt.*

the speaker's intention, and one cannot say that the sentence-meaning is indicated by a nonexistent word-meaning. In a second example, Jayanta shows that the *tātparya* capacity is not capable of conveying the speaker's intention of the prohibition implied in the statement that eating poison is better than eating in someone else's house. The speaker's intention, in fact, is not to enjoin actual poisoning, and it can be guessed only in a second moment, once the sentence-meaning is known. It is not that the *tātparya* function can be stretched to every case by ignoring the *abhidhātrī* function. Therefore, the purpose of language is not to convey the speaker's intention (NM^Va, vol. I, p. 695, l. 16-p. 696, l. 3).[35]

Commenting on this very passage, Cakradhara underlines the necessity of the *abhidhātrī* function:

> The designative capacity of words relates to word-meanings. The *tātparya* capacity relates to sentence-meaning, the correlation of word-meanings. How could the sentence-meaning, the correlation of word-meanings, be known without the word-meanings?[36]

Furthermore, *tātparya* cannot mean "speaker's intention" (*vivakṣā*), also because it is consistently used as a property of words, and not of the speaker. Elsewhere Jayanta declares that the knowledge of the speaker's intention is the result of an inference, not of verbal testimony.[37]

In sum, my hypothesis is that *tātparya* is intended by Jayanta as deriving from *tatpara* in the sense of "with the purpose of the sentence-meaning" (*vākyārthapara*), as in the Bhāṭṭa tradition. However, with the *tātparyaśakti* compound Jayanta has used the term in

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[35] *... na ca puruṣavacanam api vivakṣāparam iti darśitam. tathā hi, na vivakṣā vā-kyārthaḥ. "devadatta gām abhyāja śuklaṃ* (*śuklaṃ*] P K; *kṛṣṇāṃ* NM^Va) *daṇḍe-na" iti padagrāme vivakṣāvācinaḥ padasyāśravaṇāt apadārthasya ca* (*ca*] P K; om. NM^Va) *vākyārthatvānupapatteḥ | na ca viṣabhakṣaṇavākyasyeva paragṛhe bhojananivṛttau pauruṣeyavacaso vivakṣāyāṃ tātparyaśaktir api prabhavati | na hi sarvātmanā 'bhidhātrīṃ śaktim avadhīryaiva tātparyaśaktiḥ prasaratīti na vivakṣāparatvam.*

[36] GBh, pp. 123, ll. 22-24: *na hi sarvātmanābhidhātrīm iti | padānāṃ hi padārthe 'bhidhātrī śaktiḥ, padārthasaṃsargātmake vākyārthe tātparyaśaktiḥ, padārthā-bhāve ca kathaṃ tatsaṃsargātmakavākyārthalābhaḥ.*

[37] See NM^Va, vol. I, p. 696, ll. 4-5: *kathaṃ tarhi puruṣavacanād uccāritāt vivakṣā-vagama iti cet, anumānād iti brūmaḥ.* On the speaker's intention as an object of inference, see TABER 1996 and GRAHELI forthcoming.

a wider sense that embraces both the syntactical and semantic correlation among word-meanings and the context in which a sentence happens to be used. This context may also include considerations on the reliability of the speaker, a crucial factor in Nyāya epistemology.

3. ABHINAVAGUPTA

KUNJUNNI RAJA 1963 (p. 219) suggests that Abhinavagupta may have taken the idea of *tātparyaśakti* from Jayanta himself, with the intention of adjusting the theory to the particular needs of the Ālaṃkārikas:

> What prompted Abhinavagupta to accept Jayanta's modified form of *abhihitānvaya* theory and not that of the real followers of the Bhāṭṭa school seems to be the fact that the Ālaṃkārikas of the *dhvani* school could not accept *lakṣaṇā* to explain the syntactic relation among the word-meanings, since they accepted it only in cases of *anvayānupapatti* and not in cases of *tātparyānupapatti*.

Before turning to Abhinavagupta's views on sentence signification, however, it is necessary to look at Ānandavardhana's ideas on this matter.

3.1. Ānandavardhana and the Dhvani Theory

Ānandavardhana (*Dhvanyāloka* [henceforth DhvĀ] 1.2) classified two possible types of meanings in poetry, directly expressed (*vācya*) and implied (*pratīyamāna*). He called the latter one "suggestion" (*dhvani*), a meaning produced by words, and even by meanings of words, when the primary meaning becomes marginal (DhvĀ 1.13).[38]

The *dhvani* theory built a bridge between pre-existing theories of sentence signification and the aesthetic theory of *rasa*. It was presented in an inclusivistic spirit, explaining other approaches as partial representations of the complete picture. Ānandavardhana also tried to fence arguments against the postulation of *dhvani*, such as those of the Mīmāṃsakas and of the Naiyāyikas, which are here reflected in Jayanta's dismissal of *dhvani*.[39]

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[38] *yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā tam artham upasarjanīkṛtasvārthau | vyaṅktaḥ kāvyaviśe-ṣaḥ sa dhvanir iti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ ǁ*.

[39] For a general introduction to the criticism and defense of the *dhvani*, see KUNJUNNI RAJA 1963, pp. 277-315.

The first exemplification of *dhvani* is found in DhvĀ 1.4, where an often-quoted verse of the *Sattasaī* (2.75) is used as an instance in which the literal meaning (*vācya*) is a positive request and the suggested meaning (*pratīyamāna*) is a prohibition:

> Go your rounds freely, gentle monk;
> the little dog is gone.
> Just today from the thickets by the Godā
> came a fearsome lion and killed him.[40]

3.1.1. Jayanta and the DhvĀ

In the NM, Jayanta cites this very passage when referring to the *dhvani* theory and, probably, to Ānandavardhana. Jayanta dismisses the necessity of postulating *dhvani*, and reduces poetic suggestions to the larger domain of sentence signification, which he discusses in NM 5 and 6. Abhinavagupta, in turn, discusses the mainstream theories of sentence signification while commenting on this same passage of the DhvĀ.

In the context of the discussion on *arthāpatti*, which is used by Mīmāṃsakas to explain elliptic sentences,[41] Jayanta summarily brushes aside the *dhvani* theory as follows:

> Another self-fancied scholar resorted to a certain *dhvani*, which is also encompassed by the capacity (*sāmārthya*) of *śabda*. Knowledge of a prohibition comes from an injunction, and knowledge of an injunction from a prohibition, as in "Go freely, gentle monk" and "Do not enter the house, traveller." [Yet,] this is the capacity of the very words, which express the form of things delimited by other instruments of knowledge, in various ways and circumstances. Actually such a discussion with poets does not

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[40] Transl. INGALLS 1990, p. 83. DhvĀ, p. 16: *bhama dhammia vīsattho so suṇao ajja mārio teṇa | golāṇaikacchaku aṅgavāsiṇā dariasīheṇa ‖ (chāyā: bhrama dhārmika viśrabdha sa śunako 'dya māritas tena | godāvarīnadīkulalatāgahanavāsinā dṛptasiṃhena ‖).* In the NM editions there is a substantive variant in the citation of this *gāthā*: Varadacarya (NMVa, vol. I, p. 129, l. 13) reads *bhava dhammiya* in place of *bhama dhammia*. The reading *bhava* is also found in J (fol. 29v, 3), although Shah (GBh, p. 32) emends it into *bhama*. As for the NM text, however, the main manuscript evidence has *bhama*, including K, 50r,6 and P, 37r,11. For other variant readings, see *Sattasaī* 175, p. 63.

[41] On *arthāpatti* in relation to elliptic sentences, see KUNJUNNI RAJA 1963, pp. 169-174.

even look good. Even scholars are perplexed in the impervious path (*adhvani*) of *vākyārtha*.[42]

The "mighty capacity of *śabda*," which for Jayanta can encompass also the suggestive meanings in poetry, refers to its capacities of designation and *tātparya*, the two causes of knowledge of the sentence-meaning.

3.2. Abhinavagupta on Tātparya and Lakṣaṇā

In the context of the *bhama dhammiya* verse, and for that matter in the whole introductory section of the DhvĀ, there is no discussion on word-meanings and sentence-meanings, as frequently done in later treatises on poetics such as the *Kāvyaprakāśa* and the *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*. A lengthy discussion on these issues is found in the *vṛtti* of DhvĀ 3.32-33, although even there the *abhihitānvaya* theory is not explained in detail, and *tātparyaśakti* is not mentioned at all. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to say that the signification of word- and sentence-meanings, as explained by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, was considered inadequate by Ānandavardhana, because it could not do justice to the expressed/suggested dichotomy of poetical meanings.

Unlike Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta chose to discuss the Bhāṭṭa, Prābhākara and Vaiyākaraṇa views on signification exactly in his commentary on DhvĀ 1.4, pp. 16ff. Abhinavagupta's discussion stems from the conflict of injunction and prohibition which characterizes the verse. He analyzes the verse in the light of four capacities of words: *abhidhā*, *tātparya*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā*.

Abhinavagupta, in the first mention of *tātparyaśakti*, presents it as an objector's view, which could well be referring to Jayanta's (*Locana* ad DhvĀ 1.4, p. 16):

> One may object that the non-exhausted *tātparyaśakti* − by means of the
> intention of the speaker (*vivakṣayā*), and by means of the inverse meta-

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[42] NM^Va, vol. I, p. 129, l. 7-p. 130, l. 2: *etena śabdasāmarthyamahimnā so 'pi vā-ritaḥ | yam anyaḥ paṇḍitaṃmanyaḥ prapede kaṃcana dhvanim ‖ vidher niṣe-dhāvagatir vidhibuddhir niṣedhataḥ | yathā | bhava dhammiya vīsattho mā sma pāntha gṛhaṃ viśa* (vl. *viśaḥ* K, 20r,5) ‖ *mānāntaraparicchedyavasturūpopade-śinām* (vl. *vasturūpāpadeśinām* P) | *śabdānām eva sāmarthyaṃ tatra tatra tathā tathā ‖ athavā nedṛśī carcā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate | vidvāṃso 'pi vimuhyanti vā-kyārthagahane 'dhvani ‖.*

phor (*viparītalakṣaṇā*) caused by a contradiction on the strength of an obstruction of the primary meaning which has the form of a disconnection of word-meanings such as *dṛpta*, *dhārmika*, *tat*, etc. – generates the cognition of a prohibition, which becomes the sentence-meaning (*vākyārthī-bhūtaniṣedhapratītim*): this meaning is based only on the [regular] signification capacity of language (*śabdaśakti*).[43]

Indeed, this seems to partially represent Jayanta's view, seen above (see § 3.1.1). Jayanta did maintain that the Śabara principle that words exhaust their capacity is limited to the designation of word-meanings, leaving room for the other capacity of words, i.e., *tātparya*. And in the above criticism of the *dhvani* theory, he wrote that the suggested meanings are explainable by this very capacity of words (*śabdānām eva sāmarthyaṃ*), a view that seems mirrored here by Abhinavagupta (*śabdaśaktimūla eva so 'rthaḥ*).

This explanation, however, is not accepted by Abhinavagupta. In general, he conceives four powers of signification, *abhidhā*, *tātparya*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjana*. Three of these, *abhidhā*, *tātparya*, and *vyañjana*, are at play in the case of the *bhama dhammiya* verse.

The step of designation is limited to the signification of natural kinds. The designation is based on a convention (*samaya*), which concerns only natural kinds and not particulars (*Locana* ad DhvĀ 1.4, p. 16).[44] As for the reasons behind the notion of word-meanings as natural kinds, the principle is clearly derived from Śabara's and Kumārila's explanations discussed above (see § 2.1.4), unlike the conventional nature of signification, which is a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tenet.

Once the designation of the natural kinds is completed, the syntactic correlation of word-meanings, i.e. the particular sentence-meaning, can be grasped. Here Abhinavagupta explicitly resorts to

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[43] *nanu tātparyaśaktir aparyavasitā* (*aparyavasitā*] Kri Pa; *paryavasitā* Ja) *viva-kṣayā dṛptadhārmikatadādipadārthānanvaya*(*padārthānanvaya*] Kri Pa; *padār-thānvaya* Ja)*rūpamukhyārthabādhaka* (*bādhaka*] Ja Kri; *bādha* Pa)*balena viro-dhanimittayā viparītalakṣaṇayā ca vākyārthībhūtaniṣedhapratītim abhihitānva-yadṛśā karotīti śabdaśaktimūla eva so 'rthaḥ.* This and the following passages from the Locana are based on three editions, DhvĀL^Ja, DhvĀL^Kri, and DhvĀL^Pa (respectively, Ja, Kri and Pa in the attribution of the variant readings).

[44] *naitat. trayo hy atra vyāpārāḥ* (*vyāpārāḥ*] Kri Ja Pa; *vyavahārāḥ* Ja v.l.) *saṃve-dyante – padārtheṣu sāmānyātmasv abhidhāvyāpāraḥ, samayāpekṣayārthāva* (*samayāpekṣayārthāva*] Kri Pa; *samayāpekṣārthāva* Ja)*gamanaśaktir hi* (*hi*] Kri Pa; om. Ja) *abhidhā. samayaś ca tāvaty eva, na viśeṣāṃśe.*

the Mīmāṃsaka principle that the natural kinds, i.e., the word-meanings, convey knowledge of the particular, i.e. the sentence-meaning, by quoting from ŚV, *arthāpatti* 70cd (*Locana* ad DhvĀ, 1.4, p. 16).[45]

To analyze the processes at play in the *Sattasaī* verse, I shall reduce the wording to the bare essence. In Figure 6 Abhinavagupta's description of the process is sketched. The word-meanings, i.e., the natural kinds, are generated by each individual word by designation, and the particular meanings of the two sentences involved, *bhrama dhārmika* and *śunakaḥ māritaḥ siṃhena*, are due to the *tātparyaśakti*. The remarkable difference with the Bhāṭṭa theory, however, is that Abhinavagupta does not mention *lakṣaṇā* as the process that causes the sentence-meaning. Rather, like Jayanta, he resorts to *tātparyaśakti*, although he assigns to it the same role played by *lakṣaṇā* in the Bhāṭṭa view. The expression *tātparyaśakti* is not found in the DhvĀ, although the word *tātparya* is frequently used in its generic sense, e.g. twice in the stanzas (2.22 and 3.40) or DhvĀ 3.42, *vṛtti*, p. 221 (*rasādiṣu vivakṣā tu syāt tātparyavatī yadā*), and mostly in connection with *vivakṣā*, "the speaker's intention," and related terms. Therefore, in its technical application to poetics, it could well be Abhinavagupta's own coinage.[46] While commenting on the *vṛtti* of DhvĀ 3.33, where an objection attributed by Abhinavagupta to the Mīmāṃsakas is raised, Abhinavagupta characterizes again the *abhihitānvaya* process without mentioning *lakṣaṇāvyāpāra*. After quoting ŚV, *vākyādhikaraṇa* 343, he adds (*Locana* ad DhvĀ, 3.33, p. 188): "The meaning generated through *tātparya* by the word-meanings known from the words is itself the sentence-meaning, and it is expressed (i.e., it is not suggested)."[47]

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[45] *tato viśeṣarūpe vākyārthe tātparyaśaktiḥ parasparānvite, "sāmānyāny anyathā-siddher viśeṣaṃ gamayanti hi" iti nyāyāt.*

[46] In the same period, the expression *tātparyaśakti* is also found in Dhanika's commentary to the *Daśarūpaka*, 4.37, p. 211, l. 15, *kāryaparyavasāyitvāt tātparya-śakteḥ*. In this passage, Dhanika explicitly adopted the Prābhākara usage of *tātparya* as derived from *tatpara* in the *kāryapara* sense. He elaborated further on the technical use of *tātparya* in a string of *Kāvyanirṇaya* stanzas (*Daśarūpaka*, p. 212).

[47] *śabdāvagataiḥ padārthais tātparyeṇa yo'rtha utthāpyate sa eva vākyārthaḥ sa eva ca vācya iti.*

Figure 6: Designation and *tātparyaśakti*
in the bhama dhammiya verse

bhrama dhārmika. śunakaḥ siṃhena māritaḥ

(tātparyaśakti)   (tātparyaśakti)

These two stages of expression of general word-meanings and sig-
nification of the particular, however, do not generate any poetical
meaning. What is conveyed so far is merely an injunction, "Go free-
ly, gentle monk," and a description, "the dog was killed by a lion"
(*Locana* ad DhvĀ 1.4, p. 16).[48] Yet, the implicit message is obvious-
ly the negation of an injunction, which cannot be appreciated with-
out the power of poetical suggestion (*dhvani*).

Besides designation and *tātparya*, Abhinavagupta conceives a
third power, *lakṣaṇāśakti*, "metaphor," but he explains that in the
instance of the *Sattasāī* verse it does not apply, because there are no
problems of semantic coherence that require the intervention of this
metaphoric power. Here the primary meaning – "the dog that was
impeding your movement has been killed by a lion, so now you are
allowed to move around, since the cause of impediment is gone" –
is perfectly congruous, so there is no scope for the metaphoric pow-
er (*Locana* ad DhvĀ 1.4, p. 16).[49]

The third power, *lakṣaṇaśakti*, applies instead to cases such as
"there is a hamlet on the Ganges," where the primary meaning is

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[48] *tatra ca dvitīyakakṣāyāṃ bhrameti vidhyatiriktaṃ na kiṃcit pratīyate, anvaya-
mātrasyaiva pratipannatvāt.*

[49] *... yogyatāvirahāt. tathā tava bhramaṇaniṣeddhā sa śvā siṃhena hataḥ. tad idā-
nīṃ bhramaṇaniṣedhakakāraṇavaikalyād bhramaṇam tavocitam ity anvayasya
na kācit kṣatiḥ. ata eva mukhyārthabādhā nātra śaṅkyeti na viparītalakṣaṇāyā
avasaraḥ.*

nonsensical and a secondary meaning, "there is a hamlet on the Ganges's bank," is implied (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Application of designation, *tātparya*, and metaphor

Abhinavagupta's main purpose here is to defend Ānandavardhana's postulation of *dhvani* or *vyañjanāśakti*, the fourth stage of signification in Abhinavagupta's scheme. The idea is that "there is a hamlet on the bank of the Ganges" conveys a subtler message, that such a hamlet is pure, cooled by the river's breeze, sanctified by the holy river, etc. These notions are not automatically generated by designation, nor by the correlation of the word-meanings, nor by metaphorical usages. Also, they are not produced by other epistemic instruments, such as perception or inference. Therefore, a fourth level of signification must be accepted (*Locana* ad DhvĀ 1.4, p. 18).[50]

In *Locana* ad DhvĀ 1.4, p. 18, Abhinavagupta sums up the topic of signification by giving an eloquent definition of the four stages:[51]

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[50] *yat tv idaṃ ghoṣasyātipavitratvaśītalatvasevyatvādikaṃ prayojanam aśabda*(*aśabda*] Kri; *aśabdāntara* Ja Pa)*vācyaṃ pramāṇāntarāpratipannam... tasmād abhidhātātparyalakṣaṇā*(*lakṣaṇā*] Kri Pa; *lakṣaṇa* Ja)*vyatiriktaś caturtho 'sau vyāpāro dhvananadyotanavyañjanapratyāyanāvagamanādisodaravyapadeśanirūpito 'bhyupagantavyaḥ.*

[51] *tena samayāpekṣā vācyārthāvagamana*(*vācyārthāvagamana*] Kri; *vācyāvagamana* Ja Pa)*śaktir abhidhāśaktiḥ. tadanyathānupapattisahāyārthāvabodhanaśaktiḥ tātparyaśaktiḥ. mukhyārthabādhādisahakāryapekṣārthapratibhāsanaśaktir lakṣaṇāśaktiḥ. tacchaktitrayopajanitārthāvagamamūlajātatatpratibhāsa*(*pratibhāsa*] Kri Pa; *pratibhā* Ja)*pavitritapratipattṛpratibhāsahāyārthadyotanaśaktir dhvananavyāpāraḥ.*

1. The designative power is the capacity to designate expressed
    meanings on the basis of the conventional relation among
    words and meanings.

2. The *tātparya* power is the capacity to convey the meaning as-
    sisting those [expressed meanings], because they would not be
    possible otherwise, i.e., by implication (*anyathānupapatti*, i.e.,
    arthāpatti).

3. The metaphoric power is the capacity to manifest a meaning by
    assisting the obstruction of the primary meaning.

4. The suggestive power is the capacity to illuminate a meaning
    by assisting the intuition (*pratibhā*) of the knower, which is pu-
    rified by the reflection originated from the comprehension of
    the meanings produced by these three powers.

4. CONCLUSIONS

In the NM the discussion on sentence signification takes place in the
larger picture of the epistemological investigation on *śabda*, verbal
testimony, as an instrument to know reality, and the same applies to
the Mīmāṃsaka sources. Before Jayanta, in extant Pracīna Nyāya
works, not only was the concept of *tātparyaśakti* not used, but there
was hardly any elaboration on the process of sentence signification,
with linguistic discussions focusing on word signification rather
than sentence signification. This void was well known to Jayanta,
who, after discussing the different Mīmāṃsaka positions on sen-
tence signification, explained why he could not count on his own
tradition on this matter (NM^Va, vol. II, p. 135, l. 15-p. 136, l. 10; NM
5):

> The authors of the *sūtra* and of the *bhāṣya* did not provide clues on sen-
> tence-meanings anywhere. Wherefrom shall we learn about the nature of
> the sentence-meaning, before discussing it [here]? One may ask why they
> did not provide clues, and the answer is that these sciences deal with
> something different: *ānvīkṣikī* (i.e., Nyāya) is the science of epistemology,
> not the science of sentence-meanings (i.e., Mīmāṃsā). One may further
> ask why was then word-meaning taught at all, [by the *sūtra*] "the word-
> meaning, however, is the particular, the configuration, the universal cha-
> racter," and this is a good question. That endeavour, however, was under-
> taken by the author of the *sūtra* in order to establish the epistemic validity
> of *śabda*, and to put to rest the Buddhist (*bhadanta*) who asserts the ab-
> sence of contact among words and meanings.

One may then argue that, if this is so, the epistemic foundation of verbal testimony would be weakened, without the sentence-meaning as a real external object, so an effort should be made in that area as well. This is true. The author of the *sūtra*, by teaching only word-meanings, thought that he had covered also that [area of sentence-meanings], and thus he did not teach sentence-meanings separately. Therefore, his purport is that the word-meaning itself is the sentence-meaning. [...] It is not that the sentence-meaning is a single word-meaning; rather, it is constituted by multiple word-meanings.[52]

On this topic, therefore, Jayanta largely drew from Mīmāṃsā theories, his sympathy clearly leaning towards the Bhāṭṭa version of these. He could not accept, however, Mīmāṃsaka views in conflict with basic Nyāya tenets:

- the fixed nature of the word-meaning relation, opposed to the Nyāya idea of a conventional relation;

- the notion of word-meaning as "natural kind," opposed to that of "property-possessor";

- explaining the knowledge of the sentence-meaning, i.e. the correlation of word-meanings, as an inferential process, thus undermining the autonomy of *śabdapramāṇa*;

- limiting epistemically valid *śabda* to injunctions, and deriving the term *tātparya* from *tatpara* in the sense of *kāryapara*.

Consequently, it was necessary for Jayanta to devise a new theory, enriched by the Mīmāṃsaka scholarship, but not incompatible with the axioms of his tradition. Hence, his theory contains elements of

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[52] *vākyārthas tu na kvacid api sūtrakārabhāṣyakārābhyāṃ sūcita iti kutaḥ śikṣitvā vākyārthasvarūpaṃ vayam ācakṣmahe | kim iti tābhyām asau na sūcita (sūcita]* P NM[Va]; *sūtrita* K) *iti cet pṛthakprasthānā imā (-prasthānā imā]* P; *-prasthānā hīmā* NM[Va]; *-prasthānāgamā* K) *vidyāḥ. pramāṇavidyā ceyam ānvīkṣikī na vākyārthavidyeti ‖ yady evaṃ padārtho 'pi kasmād iha darśitaḥ (darśitaḥ]* P NM[Va]; *pradarśito* K) *"vyaktyākṛtijātayas tu padārthaḥ" iti sthāne praśnaḥ. sa tu śabdānām arthāsaṃsparśitāṃ vadantaṃ bhadantaṃ (bhadantaṃ]* K P; *rudantaṃ ca* NM[Va]) *śamayituṃ śabdaprāmāṇyasiddhaye sūtrakṛtā (sūtrakṛtā]* P NM[Va]; om. K) *yatnaḥ kṛtaḥ. yady evaṃ vākyārtham api bāhyaṃ (bāhyaṃ]* P NM[Va]; *sāhyāṃ* K) *vāstavam antareṇa śabda(śabda-]* K P; *śāstrasya* NM[Va]) *pramāṇatā na pratiṣṭhāṃ labhata iti tatrāpi prayatnaḥ kartavya eva. satyam. padārthapratipādanayatnenaiva tu kṛtena tatra yatnaṃ kṛtaṃ manyate sūtrakāraḥ, yad ayaṃ pṛthak padārthebhyo na vākyārtham upadiśati sma. tasmād ayam asyāśayaḥ padārtha eva vākyārthaḥ iti... kiṃ tu naikaḥ padārtho vākyārthaḥ. anekas tu padārtho vākyārthaḥ.*

the *abhihitānvaya* theory, some correctives derived from the Prā-
bhākaras's criticism, and adaptations to the Naiyāyikas's needs.

In the light of the material gathered so far, it is likely that Abhi-
navagupta knew Jayanta and was influenced by his use of the term
tātparyaśakti. Abhinavagupta's theory was based on ideas derived
not only from Mīmāṃsā, as is most obvious, but also from the Nyā-
ya tradition, such as the conventional relation between words and
meanings, and the use of the term *śakti* in the causal sense of contri-
butory cause.

The term *tātparya* would later acquire more specific and techni-
cal usages in Nyāya and poetics. For instance, it was glossed in *Kā-
rikāvali* 84cd as "the speaker's intention" (*vaktur icchā*), and the
awareness of the speaker's intention was listed (ibid., 82cd) – along
with knowledge of words' contiguity, consistency, and mutual ex-
pectancy – as the cause of knowledge resulting from language (*āsat-
tijñānaṃ yogyatājñānam ākāṅkṣājñānaṃ tātparyajñānaṃ ca śābda-
bodhe kāraṇam*).

In *ālaṅkārika* theories of signification, too, *tātparya* has often
been an object of the discussion. For instance, to quote two of the
most widely used manuals of poetics, at the beginning of the second
ullāsa of *Kāvyaprakāśa* 6 (p. 24), Mammaṭa explained that "*śabda*
is of three types, directly designative, indirectly indicative, and sug-
gestive, and its *artha*s are [respectively] directly designated, etc. Ac-
cording to some, it is also the *artha* of *tātparya*."[53] And in the *vṛtti*
he explained, in the context of *abhihitānvaya*, that the *tātparyārtha*
is the *artha* of the sentence, and not of individual words. Mammaṭa's
addition of *tātparya* was noticed and reiterated also by Viśvanātha
in *Sāhityadarpaṇa* 27 (p. 66), at the end of the second *pariccheda*.[54]

Such explanations and usages of the term *tātparya*, however, are
not found in Nyāya and poetics before Jayanta and Abhinavagupta.
As for Abhinavagupta, it is possible that his idea of *tātparya* as the
second step in sentence signification came from reading, directly or
indirectly, either Jayanta's work or a common source. After weigh-
ing Jayanta's criticism of the dhvani theory, comparing Jayanta's
and Abhinavagupta's discussions on sentence signification, and
considering their geographical and chronological proximity, one

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[53] *syād vācako lākṣaṇikaḥ śabdo 'tra vyañjakas tridhā | vācyādayas tadarthāḥ
syuḥ tātparyārtho 'pi keṣucit ‖.*

[54] *tātparyākhyāṃ vṛttim āhuḥ padārthānvayabodhane | tātparyārthaṃ tadarthaṃ
ca vākyaṃ tadbodhakaṃ pare ‖.*

may reasonably assume a direct influence of Jayanta's work on Abhinavagupta's.. Although the creativity and literary skill of these two luminaries seem to occasionally hide re-uses and quotations, there still is a strong impression of a thread connecting them.[55]

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[55] Abhinavagupta seems to have borrowed from Jayanta also in his criticism of *vijñānavāda* Buddhism, as noticed in RATIÉ 2010, p. 460, n. 66.

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K
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NM[Va]
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NS
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ŚBh
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ŚV

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TV
[*Tantravartika*] See MD

Abhinavagupta
as Intellectual Historian of Buddhism

LAWRENCE MCCREA

The importance of Buddhist philosophy, and specifically the Buddhist epistemological tradition of Dharmakīrti, in the development of the Pratyabhijñā tradition initiated by Somānanda and further developed by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta has long been recognized and subjected to serious scrutiny (e.g. TORELLA 1992, RATIÉ 2010 and 2011b). But, though Buddhist terminology and modes of argument exercised a pervasive influence on Pratyabhijñā philosophical and discursive practice throughout its history, the type of influence displayed in Abhinavagupta's magnum opus, his *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (henceforth ĪPVV), is of an altogether different scale and character from anything seen earlier in the Pratyabhijñā literature. This work, a long and extremely elaborate commentary on Utpala's own (now only partly extant) *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti*, is arguably Abhinavagupta's magnum opus, and certainly represents his fullest exploration of the Pratyabhijñā tradition. Closely as Abhinavagupta follows Utpala in the theory of consciousness and reality he elaborates there, I think that the ĪPVV represents in certain key respects a major departure from any earlier work in the Pratyabhijñā tradition, and even from Abhinavagupta's own treatment in his shorter *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* (henceforth ĪPV).

What I want to draw attention to here is not any major doctrinal innovation on Abhinavagupta's part. I think it is right to say that the essentials of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical stance are there in Utpaladeva's work (insofar as the available fragments of his *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti* allow us to judge). Rather, I want to show how Abhinavagupta's highly detailed, sophisticated, and bibliographically ambitious analysis of the Pratyabhijñā position and, even more so, of the Buddhist epistemological tradition it both draws on and seeks to refute, broke important new ground in the analysis and pre-

sentation of Buddhist thought and its relation to his own and Utpala's theories and, in doing so, quite transformed the nature of the argument between these competing forces, in effect replacing a clash of abstracted, depersonalized and dehistoricized philosophical positions with a *narrative* account, in which the proponents of the various Buddhist positions each develops his own view through the analysis and critique of his predecessors, and in which the Prātyabhijñānika Utpala, latest in the historical sequence of positions on display here, is shown to be historically as well as philosophically conclusive.

To explore in somewhat more detail Abhinavagupta's methods and the picture they allow him to develop of the wealth of Buddhist thought that forms the historical background for his own and Utpala's theorizing, I would like to examine in particular the arguments for and against the existence of external or extra-mental objects – *bāhyārtha*s – given in section 1.5 of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (henceforth ĪPK) and its commentaries. The section begins, in verses 1-3, with a general case made for an idealist view – that "objects" can in no way exist independent of or separate from awareness. In verses 4-5, an opponent's arguments for the reality of mind-independent objects is raised, and in verses 6 and following these arguments are rejected and the specific Pratyabhijñā argument that "objects" can only exist as part of the awareness of a single permanent knower is explained and defended.

The objection raised against the idealist view in ĪPK 1.5.4-5 is not a generic or "common sense" realist view, but represents a specific philosophical position well known in the time Utpala and Abhinavagupta were working. This is the *anumeyabāhyārtha* or "inferable external object view," labeled by Abhinavagupta himself, as by many other doxographers of the period, as the view of the "Sautrāntikas."[1] This view holds that, even though all that appears to us in any mental episodes are the images – *ākāra*s – that form the content of our awareness, we can infer that, because particular images occur only at some times and not at others, and because there is no apparent cause for this variation in one's own consciousness stream, there must be some cause external to our consciousness stream that causes us, for example, to have the awareness "blue" at a particular

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[1]   See, for example, *Tarkabhāṣā* (henceforth TBh), pp. 34-36, KAJIYAMA 1998, pp. 139-144, DREYFUS 1997, pp. 103-105, and RATIÉ 2011b, pp. 481-482.

moment – this inferred external cause is, they claim, the "object" of the awareness.

The chapter which outlines this theory and the responses made to it is an interesting one for exploring Abhinavagupta's knowledge of and attitude toward the Buddhists, as it is centrally concerned with two different groups of Buddhist philosophers who are at odds with one another, as well as with the Pratyabhijñā Śaiva who critiques them. The philosophical arguments between the Buddhist externalist view and the anti-externalist views of both the Buddhist idealists and the Pratyabhijñā theorists have already been explored in some detail by Isabelle Ratié in several recent publications.[2] One thing her work on this topic has made very clear is the complex interplay Utpala creates between the two different Buddhist views under consideration here and his own position, which both he and his commentator Abhinavagupta describe as the *īśvara-advaya-vāda*, the "belief in non-duality in (or as) God." Utpala obviously is unwilling to accept the *bāhyārthavādin* view of the Sautrāntika, but also wishes to differentiate his position from that of the Buddhist *vijñānavādin*, showing in effect that the non-dualist Śaiva is able to formulate an effective rejoinder to the Buddhist *bāhyārthavādin*, while the Buddhist idealist or *vijñānavādin* cannot do so. There are times, then, when Utpala appears to endorse the *bāhyārthavādin*'s attacks against the *vijñānavādin* (though not against his own view, of course).

While it is obvious from his arguments that he was closely familiar with both older and more nearly contemporary Buddhist philosophical works, Utpala very rarely quotes or names his Buddhist interlocutors. There are two quotations of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (henceforth PVin) known to date, but these seem to be rare exceptions.[3] In marked contrast to this nearly citation-free exposition of the various Buddhist positions in Utpala's works, we see in Abhinavagupta's commentaries on Utpala (to some extent in the ĪPV, but much more so in the ĪPVV) an extraordinarily thorough and exacting effort to match up the positions Utpala ascribes to the Buddhist *vijñānavādin*s and *bāhyārthavādin*s with citations from actual Buddhist texts. (Students of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, many with little or no interest in Pratyabhijñā for its own sake,

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[2]   Ratié 2010, Ratié 2011b.

[3]   *Vivṛti* on ĪPK 1.5.3 (see Torella 2007d, pp. 928 and 937) and 1.3.5 (see I. Ratié's contribution to the present volume).

have long appreciated the value of the ĪPVV precisely as a treasury of quotations from lost Buddhist works – even now when some of these lost works have recently become accessible). But what I want to explore here, at least in the first instance, is what this massive citational apparatus tells us about Abhinavagupta's own picture of Buddhist intellectual history as it bears on his larger project – not only who held what view, and who Utpala is referring to, borrowing from, and reacting against, but how Abhinavagupta sees the representatives of various positions interacting and reacting against one another (a topic that greatly interests him, as it happens).

This strong interest of Abhinavagupta in mapping the specific Buddhist texts in which these rival views are embedded is one thing that sets his work very much apart from that of Utpala – even from his most elaborate exposition of his views in the *Vivṛti*, to judge from the surviving fragments of that text. Quite apart from whatever value it may have as a philosophical or theological work in its own right, or as an exegesis of the complicated and fragmentary work of Utpala, Abhinavagupta's ĪPVV tells us a complex and carefully documented story about several major strands in the history of Buddhist thought in India from Vasubandhu's time to his own – a story which, as I hope to show here, departs in some rather striking ways from the picture of this history developed by scholars over the past century, and which is at least in some cases based in textual materials no longer available to us. Whether or not we conclude on further reflection that his account is accurate, it seems that it is at the very least worth paying attention to, and what I would like to do here is to offer a preliminary account of some of the more noteworthy features of Abhinavagupta's reconstruction of the history of Buddhist philosophy, particularly as it bears on the arguments over the status of objects in section 1.5 of the ĪPVV.

WHO ARE ABHINAVAGUPTA'S *BĀHYĀRTHAVĀDIN*S?

One of the most obvious features of historical interest in Abhinavagupta's account is that, where Utpala usually leaves his Buddhist opponents and interlocutors anonymous, Abhinavagupta often puts names to them. For example, at the end of the preliminary rejoinder to the *bāhyārthavādin* view in 1.5.6, Utpala reviews with approval a set of arguments against external objects already set forth, as he puts it, "by the *vijñānavādin*s," by which, it is clear, he specifically means to refer to Buddhist opponents of the external-object view.

Abhinavagupta, in commenting on the passage, supplies us with a list:

> "**By the *vijñānavādin*s**" – This matter has been stated at length in Dignā-ga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā* and other works, in Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātra-tāsiddhi* [i.e. the *Viṃsikā*], here and there in the works of Bhaṭṭa [Śaṅka-ranandana] such as the *Prajñālaṃkāra*, and elsewhere.[4]

So Abhinavagupta names the Buddhist *vijñānavādin*s whose views he is considering, as well as giving the titles of their works, in contrast to Utpala, who was content to retain a generic label. And, in the same way, where Utpala was content to leave unnamed the Buddhist *bāhyārthavādin*s who attack both Buddhist and Śaiva idealism in ĪPK 1.5.4-5, Abhinavagupta here too supplies us with the identity of at least one of them. Near the conclusion of the presentation of the *bāhyārthavādin* view in *kārikā* 5, Utpala apparently presents a supplemental argument in favor of the reality of extramental objects propounded, as he simply puts it "by the *bāhyārthavādin*s themselves" ("*bāhyārthavādibhir eva*").[5] True to his usual form, he seems to have left these *bāhyārthavādin*s unnamed, just as he did in the case of the vijñānavādins referred to above. And Abhinavagupta, in commenting on this passage in the ĪPVV, follows just the same pattern as before, specifying the unnamed *bāhyārthavādin*s:

> He says, "**By the *bāhyārthavādin*s themselves.**" For here a new argument is stated. And an effort respecting this has been made by those such as the Teacher Dharmottara, in works such as the *Proof of External Objects* [*Bā-hyārthasiddhi*].[6]

Here Abhinavagupta makes it quite plain that he believes Dharmot-tara to have written a work called the *Proof of External Objects* in which he argued for a *bāhyārthavādin* position. The mention here of "those *such as* the teacher Dharmottara" (*upādhyāyadharmottarādi-bhiḥ*), and of "works *such as* the *Bāhyārthasiddhi*" (*bāhyārthasid-dhyādau*) might be seen as leaving open at least the possibility that the *Bāhyārthasiddhi* was not written by Dharmottara but by one of

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[4] ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 144: *"vijñānavādibhiḥ" iti. ālambanaparīkṣādau daiṅnāge, vi-jñaptimātratāsiddhau vāsabandhavyāṃ* [*vijñaptimātratāsiddhau vāsabandha-vyāṃ* corr. : *vijñaptimātrādisiddhāvāsabandhanyāṃ* Ed.] *prajñālaṃkārādiṣu bhāṭṭadarśaneṣu tatra tatra cānyatra vitatyāyam artha ukta iti.*

[5] ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 128.

[6] ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 128: *āha "bāhyārthavādibhir eva" iti. apūrvaṃ hy atrocyate. kṛtaś cātra prayāso bāhyārthasiddhyādāv upādhyāyadharmottarādibhiḥ.*

the other, unnamed *bāhyārthavādin*s – though this would constitute a fairly dramatic violation of standard citational practice if it were so. But, in any case, there is a second reference later in the ĪPVV (vol. II, p. 394) to a position "shown at length in the *Bāhyārthasiddhi* by the teacher Dharmottara" (*pradarśitaṃ vitatya bāhyārthasiddhāv upādhyāyadharmottareṇa*), leaving no room whatsoever for doubt. Whether or not Abhinavagupta actually had access to this work of Dharmottara's or knew it merely by hearsay is more open to doubt, though he seems to have some fairly specific information regarding its contents and does include at least one likely quotation of the work which I shall examine shortly.[7]

It is worth noting here parenthetically that Abhinavagupta's attempt to pin down the identity of the *bāhyārthavādin*s referred to by Utpala, and his discussion of Buddhist *bāhyārthavāda* in general, reveals an interesting lacuna in his otherwise seemingly very broad knowledge of Buddhist arguments and texts. Abhinavagupta shows no sign whatever that he is familiar with the works of Śubhagupta who is, from our point of view at least, the most famous and widely known post-Dharmakīrtian Buddhist advocate of the reality of extra-mental objects, as argued in his oft-quoted *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*.[8] Abhinavagupta never names Śubhagupta, or (so far as I can determine) quotes him, and none of his references to Buddhist *bāhyārthavāda* show any specific features which indicate that he knew his work. There is one passage in which Abhinavagupta refers to a specific doctrine associated with Śubhagupta. In explaining the *bāhyārthavādin*'s response to the challenge of explaining how macroscopic (*sthūla*) objects can appear in our awareness, even though no such objects can exist externally, Abhinavagupta quotes a *bāhyārthavādin* claim to the effect that "macroscopicness is a property of *appearance*" (*pratibhāsadharmaḥ sthūlatā* – ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 85). This might seem like a reference to Śubhagupta, who famously argued in in his *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* that "blue" atoms, even though they are infinitesimally small and individually imperceptible, can produce in us an awareness of an apparently macroscopic object; the macroscopic size, *sthūlatā*, belongs to the perceptual image, not to

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[7] These two mentions in the ĪPVV would appear to be the only known references to Dharmottara's *Bāhyārthasiddhi*. The work appears not to have been recognized ot mentioned in any of the secondary literature on the Buddhist epistemological tradition (apart from a brief reference in MCCREA AND PATIL 2010, p. 143).

[8] See, principally, HATTORI 1960 and SASTRI 1967.

the atoms which cause it to arise.[9] But in fact the very words quoted here by Abhinavagupta – *pratibhāsadharmaḥ sthūlatā* – are quoted (with only the minor variant reading *sthaulyam* for *sthūlatā*) by Mokṣākaragupta in his TBh, where they are ascribed not to Śubhagupta, but to *Dharmottara*. And, incidentally, they are quoted as representative of what Mokṣākara explicitly labels as the "Sautrāntika" view, which would seem to be an independent confirmation of Abhinavagupta's apparent assignment of Dharmottara to the Sautrāntika camp.[10]

Abhinavagupta's two references to the *Bāhyārthasiddhi* should in themselves be sufficient to establish that, whether rightly or wrongly, Abhinavagupta at least regarded Dharmottara as a proponent of the reality of extra-mental objects, and therefore as a representative of what he terms the "Sautrāntika" view. But, if anyone were still in doubt on this point, there are in fact clear confirmations of this view in several of Abhinavagupta's other named references to Dharmottara in the ĪPVV. Several of the passages where Abhinavagupta juxtaposes the views of Śaṅkaranandana against those of Dharmottara clearly indicate that Dharmottara was a believer in external objects, and that Śaṅkaranandana repeatedly criticized him on this basis. I will cite here two brief examples. The first occurs in the ĪPVV on ĪPK 1.5.2, during the initial presentation of the idealist position, and before the onset of the major *bāhyārthavādin pūrvapakṣa* in 1.5.4-5. After presenting the basic view that consciousness can have no "object" outside of itself, since anything that appears to consciousness must itself have the form of conscious illumination (*prakāśamānatā*), Abhinavagupta considers and rejects a secondary argument in the following terms:

> In just the same way even pragmatic effect [*arthakriyā*] exists only insofar as it is apparent to consciousness [*prathamāna*]. Hence the very same principle applies to it as well. Thus he [Utpala] has used the word "**object**" [*artha*] in the expression "**a determinate object**,"[11] in order to explain

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9   See HATTORI 1960, pp. 11-12, DREYFUS 1997, pp. 363-364, as well as Kamala-śīla's description and critique of Śubhagupta's position in his comment on *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1973-1979, pp. 552-553.

10   See TBh, p. 36; also KAJIYAMA 1998, p. 144.

11   See TORELLA 2007d, p. 935 for the relevant passage of Utpala's *Vivṛti*. (*na hi yathāṅkurasya ghaṭasyaiva vā sattā nijātmamātrapariniṣṭhitā bhavati. prathate cāparanirākāṅkṣaiva tathā ghaṭaḥ prakāśamāno devadattasya prathamāna iti pramātṛsaṃlagna eva paryavasitārtho bhavati.*)

that one cannot establish externality [*bāhyatā*] by means of pragmatic effect [*arthakriyā*] in accordance with the view of Dharmottara [*dharmottaradṛśā*]. And this is what the Master [*bhaṭṭa*, i.e. Śaṅkaranandana] says: "A distinct thing exists via its properties, which are invariably associated with conscious illumination and whose nature is linked with its existence; [but] this does not lead to a proof of anything external." [*Prajñālaṃkāra*][12]

Here the argument being rejected – that *arthakriyā* can serve as a reliable indicator of the real existence of a mind-independent object – is specifically ascribed to Dharmottara, and is presented as a target of criticism by both Utpala and Śaṅkaranandana, who are shown to make the same point in attacking it.

A similar dynamic is seen in the next quotation, which comes from the previous chapter of the ĪPVV on ĪPK 1.4.1:

So, what the Master Śaṅkaranandana says in order to refute Dharmottara when he says that "Conceptual awarenesses are transformed into experiences" [*anubhavāyante vikalpāḥ*] – namely, that "It is established that a thing is discerned as something established [*siddha*], but it is not therefore the case that it *is* so"[13] – this shows that nothing external [*bāhya*] to one's own experience need be accepted.[14]

Here again Śaṅkaranandana is presented as specifically setting out to refute Dharmottara, and this refutation is shown to be striking a blow at the externalist, *bāhyārthavādin* position. The words here ascribed to Dharmottara – that "conceptual awarenesses are transformed into experiences" [*anubhavāyante vikalpāḥ*] are cited repeatedly, with minor variations, throughout the ĪPVV.[15] Though no such formulation is to be found in any of Dharmottara's extant Sanskrit works, the view it expresses is very much in keeping with what Dharmottara says about what he takes to be the necessary role of

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[12] ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 71: *arthakriyāpi prathamānaiva tathā bhavatīti tatrāpy ayam eva vidhir ity arthakriyayāpi na bāhyatā siddhyati dharmottaradṛśeti vaktuṃ "paryavasitārthaḥ" ity arthapadam. tad āha bhaṭṭaḥ: "prakāśenāvinābhūtaiḥ sattāyāṃ niyatātmabhiḥ | dharmair bhāvaḥ pṛthagbhāvo na bāhyasiddhim ṛcchati ||" iti.* (*Prajñālaṃkāra* – see BÜHNEMANN 1980, p. 195.)

[13] A quotation from the *Prajñālaṃkāra* – see BÜHNEMANN 1980, p. 196.

[14] ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 16: *tena yad āha bhaṭṭaśāṅkaranandanaḥ "anubhavāyante vikalpāḥ" iti dharmottaraṃ dūṣayituṃ "siddhaṃ siddhatayā vastu nirūpyaṃ na tathā tataḥ |" iti, tat svānubhavabāhyam anoṃkāryam iti darśayati.*

[15] ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 271 (*vikalpāḥ pratyakṣāyante*), vol. II, p. 219 (*pratyakṣāyante hi vikalpāḥ*), p. 228 (*vikalpāḥ hi pratyakṣāyante*), p. 277 (*darśanāyante vikalpāḥ*).

determination, *adhyavasāya*, in perception, as for example, most famously, in his *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (henceforth NBṬ), where he says that "determination produced by the force of perception determines the object *as something seen*"[16] and "only insofar as it produces *adhyavasāya* is perception a *pramāṇa*."[17] As we shall see below, Śaṅkaranandana's attack on Dharmottara's theory of *adhyavasāya* as Abhinavagupta understands it is intimately linked to his attack on the theory of extra-mental objects.

I would like to quote one more, rather lengthy, passage reflecting Dharmottara's *bāhyārthavāda* at this point – one which may carry more evidentiary weight, as in contains what certainly appears to be a quotation of Dharmottara's own words. The passage begins with an objection to the idealist view raised by a Buddhist *bāhyārthavādin* opponent:

> But external objects are established by perception itself, their real existence or non-existence being determined through their coherence with their pragmatic effects [or the lack thereof]; and these very [external objects], insofar as they form part of the unified set of causal factors, will be the causes of those appearances whose nature is invariably linked to the establishment of an object, which are awarenesses, and which arise in a sequence.[18]

Abhinavagupta then explains Utpala's response in this manner:

> Having considered this [view] of Dharmottara [*dharmottarīya*], he [Utpala] says "**No...**" "**According to the principle stated previously**" – i.e. in the previous two *sūtra*s. For there it was said that "Perception itself has the form of consciousness; how could it serve to manifest something that does not have the form of consciousness?" Therefore, what has been said by the teacher Dharmottara – namely that "The object's difference [from

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16   NBṬ, p. 85: *pratyakṣabalotpannenādhyavasāyena dṛśyatvenārtho 'vasīyate.* See also MCCREA AND PATIL 2006, p. 330. Dharmottara's claim here, as explained in MCCREA AND PATIL 2006, pp. 330-331, is that the determination that immediately follows a perceptual awareness presents its own (conceptually constructed) object *as if it were something actually perceived*. This tracks very closely with the claim made here that "conceptual awarenesses are transformed into experiences."

17   NBṬ, p. 84: *adhyavasāyaṃ kurvad eva pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ bhavati.* See also MCCREA AND PATIL 2006, p. 320.

18   ĪPVV, vol. II, pp. 82-83: *nanu pratyakṣasiddhā evārthakriyāsaṃvādapratilabdhasatyabhāvābhāvā bāhyāḥ, ta evābhāsānāṃ viṣayavyavasthāniyatasvabhāvānāṃ bodhānāṃ krameṇodbhavatām ekasāmagrīrūpatānupātena hetavo bhaviṣyanti.*

consciousness] is established [*siddha*] by experience; its non-difference is not based on experience, but is conditionally established [*vyavasthāpya-māna*][19] through the reasoning that 'Since every awareness is similar to every other insofar as it has the nature of mere experience, it must have some feature which differentiates it according to each object' [quoting *Pramāṇavārttika* (henceforth PV), *pratyakṣa* 302]" – [this] is shown to be unreasonable [*ayuktīkṛtam*].[20]

The passage begins with a restatement of the basic *bāhyārthavādin* or "Sautrāntika" position, as already outlined by Utpala: that it can only be "external objects" that account for the different appearances that periodically arise and disappear in our stream of consciousness. And this position is explicitly labeled as "belonging to Dharmottara" (*dharmottarīya*). Furthermore, the *pratīka*s encapsulating Utpala's response to this argument are followed by what is presented as Dharmottara's own statement, seemingly an extended quotation (possibly from the aforementioned *Bāhyārthasiddhi*, though one cannot be certain of this). The quotation too clearly represents the *bāhyārthavādin* position, and is said by Abhinavagupta to have been effectively refuted by Utpala's argument against the possibility of extra-mental objects. Furthermore, the citation of the PV as an authority within this apparent quotation of Dharmottara suggests not only that Abhinavagupta took Dharmottara himself to be arguing from a Sautrāntika point of view, but believed that Dharmottara wished to read Dharmakīrti as supporting this position as well.

DHARMAKĪRTI'S CONTESTED ROLE

This line of inquiry leads directly into a second, perhaps even more surprising, element in Abhinavagupta's reconstruction of the history of Buddhist thought on objects – the question of Dharmakīrti's own position on the matter. Recall that, in the passage quoted above, Abhinavagupta specified the "*vijñānavādin*s" referred to by Utpala

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[19]   For the translation of √*vyavasthā* as "conditionally establish," see MCCREA AND PATIL 2006, pp. 340ff.

[20]   ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 83: *iti dharmottarīyam āśaṅkyāha "na ca" iti. "uktanyāyena" iti pūrvasūtradvaye. tatra hi "pratyakṣam eva prakāśātmakam aprakāśarūpa-bhāvane kathaṃ syāt" ity uktam. tena yad āhācāryadharmottaraḥ – "anubha-vasiddho bhāvasya bhedaḥ, yas tv abhedaḥ sa "tatrānubhavamātreṇa jñānasya sadṛśātmanaḥ* [*sadṛśātmanaḥ* corr. : *sadṛśātmanā* Ed. – see PVV, cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 79] | *bhāvyaṃ tenātmanā yena pratikarma vibhajyate* ‖" [PV 2.302] *iti yuktibalena vyavasthāpyamāno 'nānubhavika" iti tad ayuktīkṛtam.*

in the concluding *Vivṛti* on 1.5.6 – Diṅnāga, Vasubandhu, and Śaṅkaranandana. Conspicuous by his absence in that list is Dharmakīrti. And this, I believe, is not a mere oversight, or the result of some deliberately restricted subgrouping of Buddhist idealists. Rather, I think it can be clearly shown that, as far as Abhinavagupta is concerned, and in terms of his and Utpala's doxography, Dharmakīrti cannot be definitively classified as either a *vijñānavādin* or a *bāhyārthavādin*, but must be seen as a *neutral*, or at least as someone whose real views on the question of external objects cannot be conclusively determined.

It is true that we do find here many of the standard quotations of Dharmakīrti offered up in support of the *vijñānavādin* position, such as the ever popular *sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ* – "Because of necessary co-apprehension, there is no difference between 'blue' and the awareness of it."[21] But, in addition to these, there are quite a few passages of Dharmakīrti quoted in support of the externalist stance as well. At least in Abhinavagupta's reconstruction, the *vijñānavādin*s and *bāhyārthavādin*s dealt with in ĪPK 1.5 are *both* committed, card-carrying Dharmakīrtians, and they both freely and extensively quote from the master's works in support of their own positions.

I will cite here just two examples of the *bāhyārthavādin*'s use of quotations from Dharmakīrti specifically in support of his own externalist position. Explaining the relation between the image that immediately appears in our awareness and the external object he insists we must infer as its cause, the *bāhyārthavādin* states as follows:

> If you ask how something not grasped [i.e. the inferable external object] can be determined [*adhyavasita*] as something seen, he replies, "**Because of similarity.**" Whatever variation there is of form, together with time and place, for the "blue" which exists in an awareness, all of it, without exception, belongs to that [object] which imparts its form to it. And thus, like the mixing up of foods served up together, a determination [*adhyavasāya*]*,* springing from an error caused by similarity, and having the *awareness's* form as its object, arises, having this form: "I am determining the form *of an object*, distinct from my awareness, fit to be designated as 'this.'" And this determination, even though it springs from an error, is not like the determination of "silver" as applied to mother-of-pearl.[22] It

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21   ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 78.

22   One of the standard examples of perceptual error. One at first sees a shiny bit of mother-of-pearl, and mistakes it for a piece of silver, but then upon closer

takes the form of error, certainly, since it determines an external object
when it is really the form of an awareness that is grasped, but, insofar as,
on the basis of invariable connection with an object, it determines an ob-
ject which is the root of that awareness, which is capable of imparting
form to the awareness, and which is its cause, it displays in itself that it is
the function of a *pramāṇa*, on the principle that "Even error can be a *pra-
māṇa*, on the basis of a connection" [*bhrāntir api saṃbandhataḥ pramā* –
quoting PVin 2.1].[23] As [Dharmakīrti] says: "Even in the case of percep-
tion, it is a *pramāṇa* because it does not arise when the object does not
exist. Both [*pramāṇa*s] are alike in that they are caused by something that
has an invariable connection with them." [Quoting PVin 1.3.] [*The bāhyā-
rthavādin continues*:] and this "function of the *pramāṇa*," arising from the
power of sight, takes on the form of a determination through perception
etc., and treats the perception that assists it as the grasper of the object (so
that one thinks to oneself, "I see"), in the same way that a minister acts
toward a king who is subject to his will. Thereby one conforms to the
everyday notion that the external object is grasped by perception itself.
[Pūrvapakṣin:] *Then what is it that the inference operates on?* He [Utpala]
says: "**With agreement**" [*sasaṃvāda*]. [That is to say,] the object, which
is the root cause, and which imparts forms to the cognition, is similar in
form to it. It is *this* that the inference operates upon.[24]

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examination realizes one's error. The "error" in question here is not of the same
sort, as (at least for the non-epistemologist) there is no moment when one dis-
covers one's mistake, no "blocking awareness" (as it is usually described). For
more on this, see McCrea and Patil 2010, pp. 164-165.

23   See p. 46.

24   ĪPVV, vol. II, pp. 90-91: *agṛhītaḥ kathaṃ dṛṣṭatvenāvasita iti ced āha "sārū-
pyāt" iti. yāvat kiṃcid deśakālasahacārisvarūpavaicitryaṃ* [°*sahacārisvarūpa*°
corr. : °*sahacāri svarūpa*° Ed.] *jñānānta*[*r*]*vṛtter nīlasya, tāvat sarvam avikalaṃ
tadarpakasyeti samānābhihāramelananyāyena jñānīyākāraviṣayo 'dhyavasāya
utpannaḥ sārūpyakṛtād vibhramāj jñānabhinnam arthākāram idaṃtocitam
adhyavasyāmīty evam upajāyate, na cāsau vibhramajo 'py adhyavasāyo gṛhītā-
yāṃ śuktikāyāṃ rūpyādhyavasāya iva gṛhīte jñānākāre bāhye 'vasāyatayā
bhramamātrasvabhāvaḥ, kiṃtv arthapratibandhanān maulikaṃ jñānākārārpa-
ṇasamartham arthaṃ kāraṇabhūtam adhyavasyan "bhrāntir api sambandha-
*[ta]ḥ pramā" iti nyāyena pramāṇavyāpāratām ātmany ādarśayati. yad āha "ar-
thasyāsaṃbhave 'bhāvāt pratyakṣe 'pi pramāṇatā | pratibaddhasvabhāvasya
taddhetutve samaṃ dvayam ‖" iti. pramāṇavyāpāraś cāyaṃ bhavan darśanaba-
lāt paśyāmīty evaṃ pratyakṣādinādhyavasāyarūpatāṃ gṛhṇan pratyakṣam anu-
grāhakam arthasyāmātya iva paravaśīkṛtaṃ rājānaṃ grāhakatvena vyavahara-
ti, tataḥ pratyakṣagṛhīta eva bāhyo 'rtha iti laukikam anusṛtaṃ bhavati. tarhy
anumānasya kutra vyāpāraḥ. āha "sasaṃvāda" iti mūlakāraṇabhūtaḥ samar-
paka ākārāṇām asty arthas tadākārasadṛśa iti. etāvati vyāpāro 'numānasya.*

It is perfectly clear that the *bāhyārthavādin* portrayed here sees himself as a Dharmakīrtian, and quotes two passages from the PVin in support of his argument for the reality of external objects, in the evident belief that Dharmakīrti's statements are not only consistent with but actually advocate an externalist position.

The second passage I wish to examine here comes at the very end of Abhinavagupta's commentary on *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti* 1.5.5, as the very culmination of the *bāhyārthavādin pūrvapakṣa*. (It follows directly on the first of the two *Bāhyārthasiddhi* references given above, and may be meant as a recapitulation of an argument actually made by Dharmottara.) Here Abhinavagupta, apparently following Utpala's lead, recapitulates the *bāhyārthavādin* argument earlier advanced in 1.5.4 – that the occasional occurrence of particular awarenesses such as "blue" in our stream of consciousness cannot be accounted for from any cause internal to the consciousness stream, and that we must therefore infer some external object whose presence or absence causes us to be aware of blue at some times but not others:[25]

> It is not only the argument just stated that applies here, since there is this argument as well – that is, the one stated in the previous *sūtra*: something additional must be postulated, just as the sense-capacity [*indriya*] must be postulated, and that thing *is* the external object. As the Noble One [Dharmakīrti] has said: "There can be proof of the external object through disjunction" [*bāhyasiddhiḥ syāt vyatirekataḥ* – quoting PVin 1.58cd].[26]

Here again Dharmakīrti is treated by the *bāhyārthavādin* as a supporter of his own position, and the quotation of the PVin is presented

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[25] See ĪPVV vol. II, p. 128: *tathā hy ahaṃkārātmakamanaḥsaptamānāṃ śabdādi-sukhādijñānānāṃ janikā yāḥ śaktayo vāsanās tadādhārabhūtam ekam ālayavi-jñānaṃ svāpamadādau pravṛttijñānasaptakābhāve 'pi santānavṛttyā vartamā-naṃ tat svasantānavartino nimittasyābhāvāt parasantānānāṃ ca sadāsannidhā-nāt* [*sadāsannidhānāt* corr. : *sadā sannidhānāt* Ed.] *kathaṃ krameṇa pravṛtti-jñānāni kuryāt.* ("That is to say: how can the single 'storehouse consciousness' that is the substratum for the [various] traces which are the capacities that produce the six kinds of awareness, sound etc., plus such things as pleasure, along with the 'mind' – i.e. the sense of self – as a seventh, which [storehouse consciousness] exists even in states such as sleep or madness, when none of the seven types of occurrent awareness are present, [how can it] produce the occurrent awarenesses in sequence, since no cause for this exists in one's own consciousness stream, and since other consciousness streams are always remote?")

[26] ĪPVV, vol. II, pp. 128-129: *na kevalaṃ pūrvokto 'trābhiprāyaḥ, yāvad ayam apīti pūrvasūtre ya ukto nyāya indriyavad adhikaṃ kiṃcit kalpanīyaṃ sa bāhyo 'rthaḥ. yad āryaḥ – … bāhyasiddhiḥ syād vyatirekataḥ ‖* [PVin 1.58cd.]

not only as backing the *bāhyārthavādin* position, but as the very cul-
mination and summation of it. There is no question that both the
vijñānavādin and the *bāhyārthavādin* presented by Abhinavagupta
see themselves as followers of Dharmakīrti and wish to invoke his
words as an authority in support of their views. And, as far as I can
determine, Abhinavagupta has no interest in attempting to adjudi-
cate this question; he does not appear to make any effort to declare
whether he finds the *vijñānavādin* or the *bāhyārthavādin* reading of
Dharmakīrti to be the more plausible.

Neither the *bāhyārthavādin* nor the *vijñānavādin* Dharmakīrtians
as portrayed by Abhinavagupta in the ĪPVV reflect extensively on
the tension between the seemingly pro- and anti-externalist state-
ments found in different parts of Dharmakīrti's works. But there is
one particularly striking passage where the *bāhyārthavādin* does di-
rectly confront the hermeneutic issue. It reflects the *bāhyārthavā-
din*'s response to a *vijñānavādin* opponent, who points to Dharma-
kīrti's own writings, in particular his *Santānāntarasiddhi*, as evi-
dence for his advocacy of the "mind only" position:

> [Pūrvapakṣin:] But the Teacher [Dharmakīrti] has himself raised this
> doubt and rejected it, so how is this question raised? – To enlighten the
> one who suffers from this confusion, he[, the *bāhyārthavādin*,] after re-
> peating his text, refutes its meaning, with the passage beginning "**What**"
> and ending "**As if it were not described by him**" [*atadvarṇitam iva*]. By
> saying "**As if it were not described by him**" the *bāhyārthavādin* makes
> this clear: even though he is authoritative, the teacher Dharmakīrti, out of
> conformity with the works of the teacher Diṅnāga, due to his partiality
> toward him, speaks in this way, but this is not his own inclination. The
> meaning of his work, the *Santānāntarasiddhi*, is as follows: just as, on the
> theory of external objects, the intentionality of other people is inferred
> from speech belonging to another body, in just the same way, on the theo-
> ry of [mere] awareness, [it is inferred] from the appearance of speech be-
> longing to the appearance of a body.[27]

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[27] ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 111: *nanu parihṛtam etad ācāryena svayam eva śaṅkitvā, tat
kim idaṃ codyata iti yasya bhramaḥ syāt taṃ pratyāyayituṃ tadgranthapāṭha-
pūrvakaṃ tadarthaṃ dūṣayati "yad api" ityādinā "atadvarṇitam iva" ityante-
na. "atadvarṇitam" iti vacasā bāhyārthavādīdam āviṣkaroti – prāmāṇiko 'py
ācāryadharmakīrtir ācāryadiṅnāgagranthānurodhāt tatpakṣapātād evam abhi-
dhatte, na punar asya svarucir eṣeti. asya santānāntarasiddhigranthasyārthaḥ
– yathaiva bāhyanaye vyāhārāt parakāyagatāt parasamīhānumīyate, tathaiva
vijñānanaye vyāhārābhāsāt parakāyābhāsagatād iti.*

The passage is tantalizing for several reasons. Judging from the available *pratīka*s and from Abhinavagupta's comment "after repeating his text" (*tadgranthapāṭhapūrvakam*), it would appear that Utpala, speaking in the voice of the *bāhyārthavādin*, actually quotes a text which purports to show Dharmakīrti's advocacy to *vijñānavāda* and prompts his attempt at reinterpretation – possibly a quotation from the *Santānāntarasiddhi* itself. But it also represents a kind of discussion we do not very often find about mechanisms of interpretation, about the role of context, and about assessing the motivations of authors in a way that opens up questions of sincerity or hidden motivation. It engages directly with a question that is still very much a live one – why is it that Dharmakīrti seems to write sometimes in a way that seems to presuppose the existence of mind-independent objects while at other times writing from what seems to be an idealistic position? Whether or not one finds this reading of the *Santānāntarasiddhi*, or this account of Dharmakīrti's intention in writing it, to be at all convincing (as many, I imagine, will not), it is clear in any case that the *bāhyārthavādin* wishes to support the view that Dharmakīrti was a consistent and principled upholder of a materialist position, and that apparent indications to the contrary in his work can be explained away. The *bāhyārthavādin*'s point about the actual argument of the *Santānāntarasiddhi* seems, to me at least, to be well taken. It does not in fact offer a positive argument for an idealistic stance; rather it removes one potential obstacle to such a stance. It aims to show that one can establish the existence of other minds just as easily on an idealist view as on an externalist one, but this is not in itself inconsistent with a belief in extra-mental objects. So the *bāhyārthavādin*'s reading of the text may not be as untenable as would at first appear to be the case; though the motive for writing it if one were a committed believer in external objects (as the *bāhyārthavādin* plainly supposes Dharmakīrti to be) would remain something of a puzzle, as his own admittedly somewhat strained rationalization itself suggests. It is not at all clear whether Abhinavagupta is paraphrasing an argument actually made by a Buddhist *bāhyārthavādin* here or simply engaging in a bit of creative rational reconstruction of his own, but in any case it is certainly plain that he understands the Buddhist *bāhyārthavādin*/Sautrāntika as an adherent of Dharmakīrti, and that the *bāhyārthavādin* as portrayed by him believes Dharmakīrti to have been a *bāhyārthavādin* himself. The contest between Abhinavagupta's *vijñānavādin* and *bāhyārthavādin* is then not simply a philosophical dispute over which view is more

workable, but a struggle over the intellectual legacy and the interpretation of Dharmakīrti's works as well.

ADHYAVASĀYA AND *BĀHYĀRTHAVĀDA*

The third component of Abhinavagupta's reconstruction of the intra-Buddhist debate over objects I want to consider here concerns another aspect of the confrontation between Dharmottara and Śaṅkaranandana, already referred to above. We have seen that Abhinavagupta presents Śaṅkaranandana as criticizing Dharmottara in his works, and criticizing him specifically as an upholder of the Sautrāntika theory of inferred external objects. But there is a second axis to Śaṅkaranandana's criticism which is linked to the first. Śaṅkaranandana is regularly portrayed not only as a critic of the Buddhist *bāhyārthavādin*s, but also as a critic of "those who believe that validity is dependent on determination" (*adhyavasāyāpekṣaprāmāṇyavādin*s). Neither Śaṅkaranandana (in the relevant passages quoted from his works) nor Abhinavagupta specifies who is referred to by this phrase, but it is not at all difficult to determine; there are significant indications that point to the fact that here too the real opponent is Dharmottara. This label will not, I imagine, seem inappropriate to anyone at all familiar with Dharmottara's work. It may come as a surprise to hear Dharmottara described as a *bāhyārthavādin*, but no one should be at all surprised to find him labeled an *adhyavasāyāpekṣaprāmāṇyavādin*; "belief that validity is dependent on determination" is in fact as succinct and clear a description as one could wish of Dharmottara's principal and distinctive contribution to Buddhist epistemology.

What is more surprising is that Śaṅkaranandana openly and specifically attacks this doctrine. Among post-Dharmottaran Indian Buddhist authors, he is the only one I know of to do so. Dharmottara's epistemic revolution and his dramatic elevation of the status of determination as a crucial element of perception, radical as it was when he advanced it, seems quickly to have gained near-universal acceptance among Dharmakīrtians – even those who were strongly critical of Dharmottara in other areas. Śaṅkaranandana's position on this question, then, seems quite distinctive, and acquiring a clearer picture of how exactly he understands perception to function as a *pramāṇa* without allowing any role for *adhyavasāya* is, for me at least, one of the more enticing hopes raised by the recent recovery of many of Śaṅkaranandana's *prakaraṇa* texts.

Abhinavagupta's many critical remarks on *adhyavasāya* and its controversial role in Buddhist epistemology are widely scattered throughout his work, and often embedded in rather complex chains of argument which are hard to disentangle. I will mention here only two brief passages which show the linkages between the *bāhyārtha* issue and that of *adhyavasāya*. In the first, the relation between the contents of conceptual awareness and external objects is under discussion, and the following view is advanced:

> ... For the Buddhists who hold that validity arises by force of determination, even inference has an external object, as has been said [by Dharmakīrti]: "The validity of both [*pramāṇa*s] has the real thing [*vastu*] as its object." [Quoting PVin 2.7ab.][28]

This shows the link between *bāhyārthavāda* and belief in the importance of *adhyavasāya*, and, incidentally, provides another instance of the *bāhyārthavādin*'s invocation of Dharmakīrti. Abhinavagupta's criticism of this argument revolves around the impossibility of any awareness having as its "object" something which is not itself directly manifest to consciousness and therefore having the form of illumination (*prakāśa*). And here again, as in one of the passages I quoted above, the argument turns to the proposed role of *arthakriyā* in accrediting the linkage of conceptual awarenesses to their associated external objects. It is at this point that Śaṅkaranandana is brought into the conversation once again. To quote:

> And *arthakriyā* as well, insofar as it is phenomenally apparent, culminates in mere appearance. Hence the external object cannot be proven even on the basis of that. As the Master [Śaṅkaranandana] has said. Beginning by saying, "If the appearance is different, what does the object matter... ?" and concluding by saying "If you think it is for some purpose, the knowledge will serve that purpose; so what recourse is there?", he shows that what supports worldly activity is nothing but a chain of appearances. So, as for the claim that the external object is established precisely through its general acceptance [*prasiddhi*] – it is actually just the opposite that is true.[29]

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[28] ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 131: *saugatais tāvad adhyavasāyabalāt prāmāṇyaṃ vadadbhir anumānam api bāhyaviṣayam evety uktam "prāmāṇyaṃ vastuviṣayaṃ dvayor api... ‖"* [*Pramāṇaviniścaya* 2.7ab]

[29] ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 132: *arthakriyāpi cābhāsamānatayaivābhāsaviśrānteti tato 'pi na bāhyasiddhiḥ. yathā ca bhaṭṭaḥ "ābhāsabhede tv arthaḥ kaḥ... ‖" ity upakramya "yatphalāyeti cej jñānaṃ tatphalāyeti kā gatiḥ ‖"* [quoting *Prajñālaṃ-*

This recapitulates the argument against the *bāhyārthavādin* given above (in which Abhinavagupta similarly invoked Śaṅkaranandana in support of his attack), but here the attack is pressed against an opponent named as the "*adhyavasāyāpekṣaprāmāṇyavādin*." The same linkage between the *bāhyārtha* and *adhyavasāyāpekṣaprāmā-ṇyavāda* arguments is made clear by another passage, in which a quotation from Śaṅkaranandana's *Prajñālaṃkāra* earlier cited as a critique of *bāhyārthavāda* is pressed into service as an attack on *adhyavasāya*:

> It is for this very reason that the Master [Śaṅkaranandana] does not accept that validity is dependent on *adhyavasāya*. As he says: "It is established that a visible thing is discerned as something established [*siddha*], but it is not therefore the case that it *is* so."[30]

So to challenge the dependence of validity on *adhyavasāya* and to attack the reality of extra-mental objects are apparently seen as more or less equivalent tasks. It is clear that Śaṅkaranandana and, implicitly, Abhinavagupta as well accepted that these doctrines were so closely linked that an attack on one amounted to an attack on the other.

Śaṅkaranandana's and (apparently) Abhinavagupta's acceptance of a hard and fast link between denying the reality of external objects and rejecting the necessary role of *adhyavasāya* in all *pramāṇa*s would appear to shed some light on another important and rather surprising lacuna in Abhinavagupta's survey of Buddhist opinion on objects – namely on Abhinavagupta's total failure to engage with what was arguably the dominant stance on both issues in tenth and eleventh century Buddhist philosophy in India, that of Prajñākara-gupta. Prajñākaragupta and his followers were adamant advocates of the "mind only" theory, and totally rejected the existence of extra-mental objects. But they also fully endorsed the need for *adhyava-sāya* in all valid awareness, both perceptual and inferential, and later followers of Prajñākaragupta such as Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti

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kāra – see BÜHNEMANN 1980, p. 195] *ity ābhāsaparamparām eva vya-vahāropakaraṇabhūtām avādīt. tataś ca prasiddhyaiva bāhyaḥ siddhyatīti pra-tyuta viparītam etat...*

[30] ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 250: *bhaṭṭas tv adhyavasāyāpekṣām etadartham eva prāmā-ṇyasya necchati. tad āha "siddhaṃ siddhatayā rūpaṃ nirūpyaṃ na tathā ta-taḥ |" iti.*

explicitly model their account of *adhyavasāya* on that of Dharmottara.[31] Abhinavagupta was aware of Prajñākaragupta's work. He nowhere quotes him, as far as I can determine, and he refers to him by name only once – as the upholder of the *bhāvikāraṇatāvāda*, the belief that future objects can act as causes for events that precede them.[32] This interesting and distinctive doctrine of Prajñākara's, which Eli Franco has investigated in some detail,[33] is fairly recondite, and Abhinavagupta's familiarity with it suggests that he had more than a casual, second-hand awareness of Prajñākaragupta's work and most likely had access to his *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*. Yet, if so, it is surprising that he altogether overlooks Prajñākara's synthesis of the anti-*bāhyārtha* and pro-*adhyavasāya* positions. Abhinavagupta seems to accept without question the assumption that support of *adhyavasāya* as a criterion for *prāmāṇya* and belief in external objects naturally and inevitably go together – an assumption he apparently shares with and presumably derives from Śaṅkaranandana who, as we have seen, stresses the linkage between these two views in his criticisms of each (at least as Abhinavagupta explains his position). This represents a rather serious gap in his attempt to displace all of the various Buddhist positions and show the superiority of the Pratyabhijñā view, as it leaves unaddressed what had already become by his time arguably the dominant Buddhist view, even though the most important text arguing for that view was apparently known to him. This shows that, immensely erudite and sophisticated as Abhinavagupta's reconstruction of Buddhist philosophical opinion may be, it is neither all encompassing nor free from distortions and biases. Whether we attribute this oversight on Abhinavagupta's part to his uncritical adoption of Śaṅkaranandana's polemical lens or to some other factor, it does give us a significant sense of the limits of his vision in these matters.

CONCLUSION

Much of Abhinavagupta's reconstruction of the history of the Buddhist debate over objects is based on texts he apparently had access to that we, at least for the time being, do not – Dharmottara's *Bā-*

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[31]   For Prajñākaragupta's views on *adhyavasāya*, see MCCREA 2011. For Jñānaśrīmitra, see MCCREA AND PATIL 2006, pp. 333-336.

[32]   ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 227.

[33]   See FRANCO 2007.

hyārthasiddhi, the *Prajñālaṃkāra* and other *prakaraṇa* texts by Śaṅ-
karanandana, as well as the full text of Utpala's *Vivṛti*. Much uncer-
tainty must therefore remain in any attempt to make sense of and to
evaluate the story Abhinavagupta is telling here – in particular, in
determining how accurate is his depiction of the various players'
views, and how much it may be distorted or obscured by his own
agenda, or by that of Śaṅkaranandana, the latest in Abhinavagupta's
array of Buddhist luminaries, and the one to whose views he seems
most sympathetic. Some important gaps in our knowledge of the
background here have recently been filled, and others certainly will
be filled in the near future. Several important fragments of Utpala's
Vivṛti have now been recovered and edited by Professor Torella and
Professor Ratié, and it is at least possible that more will come to
light in time.[34] Many of Śaṅkaranandana's works, including the *Pra-
jñālaṃkāra*, are now available in manuscript and, as these begin to
make their way into print, it is virtually certain that a clearer picture
will emerge of the ways in which Abhinavagupta responds to, uses,
and is perhaps in some ways co-opted by Śaṅkaranandana's work in
his writings. Also, one imagines, a clearer picture will emerge of
how Śaṅkaranandana builds on and responds to the work of Dhar-
makīrti and, one hopes, Dharmottara. All this being said, the main
contours of Abhinavagupta's reconstruction of the previous half-
millennium of Buddhist thought on objects are crystal clear, and I
believe are very unlikely to be altered materially by any new disco-
veries. That he (1) regarded Vasubandhu and Diṅnāga as unambi-
guous advocates of *vijñānavāda*, (2) that he took Dharmakīrti's
stance on the question of external objects to be inconclusive, or at
least contested by his followers, (3) that he took Dharmottara and
Śaṅkaranandana to be, respectively, the chief post-Dharmakīrtian
advocates of the Buddhist *bāhyarthavādin* and *vijñānavādin* posi-
tions, (4) that he believed Śaṅkaranandana's arguments against *bā-
hyārthavāda* to be at least in part specifically directed against Dhar-
mottara, and (5) that he understood Śaṅkaranandana's critique of
Dharmottara's *bāhyārthavāda* to be crucially linked to his attack on
Dharmottara's belief in the constitutive role of *adhyavasāya* in all
*pramāṇa*s, such that attacking the latter was crucial to, and perhaps
sufficient for, undermining the other – all this seems to be fairly
certain.

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[34]   Torella 1988, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, Ratié 2015, forthcoming, and I.
    Ratié's contribution to the present volume.

Whether he is correct or incorrect in these suppositions is of course more difficult to determine, and judgement on this point will certainly be much affected by reflection especially on the works of Śaṅkaranandana as they come to light. In particular, the question of how much Abhinavagupta's picture of the constellation of Buddhist opinions of the issue is borrowed from or shaped by Śaṅkaranandana's own polemical concerns remains a pressing one. It seems likely that Abhinavagupta's overlooking of Prajñākaragupta's anti-*bāhyārtha* but pro-*adhyavasāya* position can be accounted for at least in part by Śaṅkaranandana's own linking of the two issues in his attack on Dharmottara, and access to Śaṅkaranandana's *Prajñālaṃkāra* and other works may well serve to illuminate the issue.

It would seem vain to hope for any further data on Dharmottara's lost *Bāhyārthasiddhi*, but it is possible of course that the portions of his *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* soon to become available may shed some further light on his position on the *bāhyārtha* question.

In any case, all potential doubts regarding the accuracy of his reconstruction aside, Abhinavagupta's bibliographically ambitious and historically nuanced recapitulation of Buddhist thought on the *bāhyārtha* issue, and on many others of course, forms one of the central components of what is arguably his magnum opus, and is one of the features that most obviously sets it apart from both earlier and later works in the Pratyabhijñā tradition. Abhinavagupta's turn toward intellectual history should itself be seen as a noteworthy historical event in Kashmiri intellectual and cultural life at the turn of the millennium, and richly deserves to be made the subject of long and searching scrutiny.

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A Note on the Sāṅkhya Theory
of Causation
in Utpaladeva's *Īśvarasiddhi*[*]

SHINYA MORIYAMA

The aim of this paper is to shed new light on Utpaladeva's *Īśvara-siddhi* (henceforth ĪS). This 10th-century work is important for considering the intellectual links in that period between Kashmir Śaivism and Sāṅkhya philosophy. As earlier studies have shown, the great philosopher Utpaladeva, who was a member of the Pratyabhi-jñā school of Kashmir Śaivism, composed the *Īśvarasiddhi* to establish God's existence on the basis of a classical proof by the Nyāya philosopher Aviddhakarṇa, whose original text of the proof is now lost. After presenting Aviddhakarṇa's proof of God's existence[1] and defending it against Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist criticism, Utpaladeva continues with a long discussion that presents the Sāṅkhya's and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school's theories of causation and liberation. TABER 1986 (pp. 128-129) finds the discussion in this final section peculiar, as has been summarized by Ratié in the following way:

> John Taber finds rather strange the length of this discussion with Sāṃkhya (which spreads over about two thirds of Utpaladeva's tract), since according to him, Utpaladeva's zeal in attacking the Sāṃkhya position contrasts with the Nyāya's relative indifference to this opponent, and since the Sāṃkhya does not seem to have been an influential school in Utpaladeva's time. (RATIÉ 2015, pp. 289-290)

But, of course, it is unsure whether the Nyāya were really indifferent to the Sāṅkhya position. As Ratié has pointed out, Uddyotakara's

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[1] See ĪS, p. 1, ll. 9-12. For details on Utpaladeva's proof, see RATIÉ 2015, pp. 259-265. For Aviddhakarṇa's proof, see KRASSER 2002, pp. 150ff. and MORI-YAMA forthcoming.

criticism of the Sāṅkhya can be seen as an "embryonic form" of Ut-
paladeva's sophisticated discussion. In addition, Ratié also mentions
Bhāsarvajña, a contemporary of Utpaladeva, as a Naiyāyika who
presented an elaborate criticism of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. How-
ever, since the chronological order of these two authors is uncertain,
Ratié carefully avoids concluding that Bhāsarvajña had an impact
on Utpaladeva's argument. Instead, she moves to the more promis-
ing idea that Utpaladeva's *Īśvarasiddhi* was motivated by Sadyo-
jyotis' *Nareśvaraparīkṣā*, an important work on Śaiva dualism. She
writes:

> [...] although Utpaladeva's criticism of the Sāṃkhya argument often
> seems more refined than Sadyojyotis', both refutations focus on the idea
> that a complex effect can only be the product of a conscious entity, and
> that intellect, if conceived as a material entity, cannot account for the uni-
> verse. Utpaladeva's treatise thus seems to emphasize a principle shared
> by both dualist and nondualist Śaivas, namely the idea that only the cons-
> cious is independent (*svatantra*) and therefore capable of action, whereas
> unconscious entities only seem to act insofar as their actions are always
> prompted by consciousness. (RATIÉ 2015, p. 321)

In this manner, Ratié regards the aim of Utpaladeva's treatise as be-
ing "to show to the Saiddhāntikas that Śaiva nondualists too can ap-
propriate the Nyāya inference of the Lord."

Ratié's conclusion is quite convincing. Nevertheless, there still
remain some unanswered questions about this unique controversy
on the theories of causation and liberation between the Sāṅkhya and
the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools.[2] Of them, our following examination

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[2]   It is also remarkable that Utpaladeva criticizes the Sāṅkhya theory of liberation,
seemingly by using some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika materials of the same content. In my
symposium presentation upon which the present paper is based, I pointed out
that the discussion in ĪS, p. 25, l. 18-p. 27, l. 16 is in part comparable to Vyo-
maśiva's argument against the Sāṅkhya soteriology (Vyom, p. 7, ll. 8-24) and
to Bhāsarvajña's discussion in NBhūṣ, p. 570, l. 23-p. 574, l. 10. In addition, I
also discussed the difference in their approaches to the Sāṅkhya notion of *bud-
dhi*: whereas the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors, who accept *buddhi* as an imperma-
nent quality (*guṇa*) of the permanent soul, Utpaladeva repeatedly questions the
perceptibility (*saṃvedyatva*) of the *buddhi* because for the Śaivas the idea of a
buddhi, if it has any role in cognitive processes, has to be of a conscious nature.
Although a further comparison between Utpaladeva's criticism against the Sāṅ-
khya soteriology and parallel arguments by contemporary authors of the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika school would allow a better understanding of Utpaladeva's perspec-
tive on this topic (for a chronology of these authors, including Bhaṭṭa Jayanta,
see SLAJE 1986), I will not include this incomplete examination in this paper.

concerns a question about Utpaladeva's knowledge of Sānkhya philosophy, especially the material he used for reconstructing the Sānkhya theory of causation.[3]

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In the first place, we shall review Utpaladeva's modification of the Sānkhya theory of causation, in particular, the concept of *sahakārin* (auxiliary cause), which is rarely found in Sānkhya literature. Utpaladeva's Sānkhya classifies *sahakārin* into two types, namely, those that, "uniting with the material cause, give rise to the effect through transformation of the material cause" (TABER 1986, p. 120), and those that "do not unite with the material cause but operate externally to it, e.g., the stick and wheel a potter uses to fashion clay." Let us look at Utpaladeva's explanations of these two types of *sahakārin*:

The first type of *sahakārin* is described as follows:

> [1a] ĪS, p. 10, ll. 4-7: *tataś ca ye te sahabhāvam āpannāḥ kāryam āvirbhāvayanti te parasparayoge vicitravṛttayo dṛśyante. tathā hi – bīj<u>āntargamanena</u> bījabhūtā jalabhūmyādayo rasādipariṇāmāt dīrghapracitasaṃniveśam aṅkuraṃ sahakāritayā kurvanti.*

And therefore, those which come into co-existence [with the material cause] and make the effect manifest are seen as possessing various functions when they unite with each other. To explain: as auxiliary causes, [entities] like water and earth, which have become [part of] the seed by penetrating into it, cause a sprout that has a [certain] configuration accumulated over a long time, due to [their] transformation into flavor, etc.

> [1b] ĪS, p. 11, ll. 8-11: *hetum <u>antaḥ praviśyānye prāpyopādānarūpatām</u> | citrayanti hi kāryāṇi bhaumodakarasā iva ‖16‖*

The other [auxiliary causes] like earthy water and flavor, having entered a [material] cause (e.g., a seed) and taken on the material form, produce a variety of effects.[4]

> [1c] ĪS, p. 19, ll. 16-18: *na cāpi sahakāriṇām upādānakāraṇasy<u>āntaḥ praveśamātrād</u> upayogaviśeṣānusandhānavataḥ kasyacid avyāpāre 'pi vicitrā puruṣārthopayoginī racanā upakalpyate.*

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[3] For the relation of Sānkhya to Śaiva Tantrism, see TORELLA 1999. For Rāmakaṇṭha's reaction to the Sānkhya theory of *buddhi* and liberation, which is also comparable to Utpaladeva's argument, see WATSON 2006, pp. 95ff.

[4] See also TABER 1986, p. 136, n. 30.

Moreover, [the following Sāṅkya opinion is] not accepted: even if there is no activity of a certain [agent, i.e., God] who would possess the synthetic awareness of [each] specific contribution [of each effect for the benefit of souls], there is a variety of configurations that serve for the benefit of souls merely due to the penetration of auxiliary causes into the material cause.

The second type of *sahakārin* is described as follows:

[2a] ĪS, p. 10, ll. 21-24: *yatra punaḥ sahakāriṇo bahiḥ svadeśasanniviṣṭā eva kāryeṣu upayujyante, yathā mṛtpiṇḍacakrādayaḥ, tatropādānasanni-veśavaisādṛśye syād avasaro buddhimataḥ kumbhakārasyeva.*

On the other hand, when auxiliary causes contribute to their effects while being arranged in their respective places, outside [of the material cause], like a wheel and such like for a lump of clay, then, there can be room for an intelligent [cause, i.e. *nimittakāraṇa*] like a potter as regards dissimilar configurations of the material cause.

[2b] ĪS, p. 11, ll. 12-15: *anye punar upādāne bahir viparivartinaḥ | rūpa-vaicitryayogāya kāryeṣu na tathā kṣamāḥ ‖17‖*

On the other hand, the other [auxiliary causes], which operate on the material cause from outside, are not capable [of producing] effects suitable for the variety of forms [and other qualities] likewise (i.e., the second type of auxiliary cause allows the necessity of God differently from its first type).

By relying on the operation of the first type of *sahakārin*, the Sāṅkhya opponent thus explains that the arising of a specific configuration (*sanniveśaviśeṣa*) such as a sprout can be fully explained, even without an intelligent agent, within the schema of their causality, which ultimately presupposes a single material cause called primordial matter (*pradhāna/prakṛti*). This position is the opposite of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account, which accepts an intelligent agent as the regulative cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) and atoms as the basic components of the variety of the universe. But, were there really any Sāṅkhya authors who held such a well-ordered view of causation?

On this point, Taber has assumed that it is "a somewhat Buddhist formation of the Sāṅkhya," whereby he quotes Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.24-25:

yeṣu satsu bhavaty eva yat tebhyo 'nyasya kalpane |
taddhetutvena sarvatra hetūnām anavasthitiḥ ‖
svabhāvapariṇāmena hetur aṅkurajanmani |

bhūmyādis tasya saṃskāre tadviśeṣasya darśanāt ‖

If one assumes that the [effect's] cause is something different than those things which are present when the [effect] arises, everything will have an infinite number of causes. The earth and such like become the cause for the arising of a sprout by undergoing a special transformation of its own nature. For it is observed that when it is perfected (by plowing, manuring, etc.), the [sprout] has special properties.[5]

Because these two verses are quoted in Sadyojotis' *Nareśvaraparī-kṣā* (p. 120, ll. 1-4), they were certainly known to Utpaladeva as well. Moreover, the terms *svabhāvapariṇāma* and *viśeṣa*, which Dharmakīrti uses for illustrating the arising of sprout from a seed together with earth, etc., are similar to the terms Utpaladeva uses in his exposition. Although Dharmakīrti does not use the term *sahakā-rin* here, elsewhere he explains the two functions of *sahakārin*, namely, operating together to accomplish a single effect (*ekārtha-kriyā*) and producing difference (*viśeṣotpādana*) in the continuity of the material cause.[6] The latter function obviously corresponds to Ut-paladeva's first type of *sahakārin*. However, unlike Dharmakīrti, Utpaladeva's Sānkhya opponent emphasizes the *sahakārin*'s "pene-tration" (*praveśa*) into the material cause. In this sense, Taber's as-sumption does not fit well with Utpaladeva's description of the first type of *sahakārin*.

<center>***</center>

When we focus on the "penetration of *sahakārin*," another passage comes to mind, namely, a reference to this concept in the *Yuktidīpikā* (henceforth YD). To my limited knowledge, this is the only instance of such a reference in the extant Sānkhya literature. The concept appears in its commentary on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* (henceforth SK) 9c as follows:

YD 123.1-11 (ad SK 9c): *syān matam – yathāpo bījād aṅkurasyotpattau* [*aṅkurasyotpattau* A : *bījāṅkurasyotpattau* ed.] *samarthā bhavanti na kāṣ-ṭhād agner vā, ubhayaṃ ca tat tāsu na vidyate bījād apāṃ vicchinnatvāt, ... tathā ca tantvādīnāṃ paṭasyaiva śaktiniyamaḥ syāt, na ca paṭasya tan-tuṣu sattvaṃ syād iti. etat cāyuktam. kasmāt. sādhyatvāt. aṅkurādayo 'pi kāryam abādīnām. ... yat tūktam – apāṃ vicchinnatvān na tāsv aṅkuro*

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[5]   The above translation basically follows FRANCO forthcoming, pp. 304-305. For another translation, see TABER 1986, p. 136, n. 28.

[6]   Cf. HB, p. 11*, ll. 12-23; p. 15*, ll. 7-14.

'stīti tatrāpi yāsām apāṃ <u>*bījānuprvaveśād*</u> *aṅkurabhāvena vipariṇāmaḥ,*
tābhyas tasyānanyatvaṃ [*tasyānanyatvaṃ* A : *tasyānyatvaṃ* ed.] *sā-*
dhyam. ato na kiṃcid etat.[7]

[Objection:] One might argue: for instance, [a *sahakārin* like] water is
capable of producing a sprout from its seed, but not [capable of producing]
fire from pieces of wood, and the two [i.e., both a sprout and fire] do not
exist in this [water] because [the *sahakārin* like] water is different from [a
material cause like] a seed. [...] Likewise, the causal power of threads for
instance must be restricted to the [production of] the cloth only [and not
to the production of anything else], and the cloth cannot exist in the
threads [because the cloth and threads are different from each other]. [Re-
ply:] This is not correct. [Objection:] Why? [Reply:] Because [the effect]
is accomplished [by *sahakārin*]. [The effects] like a sprout, too, are [ac-
cepted as] the effect of water. [...] On the other hand, with regard to [the
objection] that a sprout does not exist in [water] because water is different
from [a sprout], too, [the following is replied:] "It is established that [a
sprout] is not different from the water that transforms [itself] into a sprout
by penetrating into the seed." Thus, the [objection] carries no weight.

Here the author of the YD explains the manner in which the notion
of *sahakārin* is fully compatible with the Sāṅkhya's *satkāryavāda*.
Even though the effect (a sprout) does not exist in a *sahakārin*, such
as water, which is a different entity than the material cause (a seed),
inasmuch as the water penetrates into the seed, one can see the
sprout as a transformation of the water. This corresponds precisely
to Utpaladeva's presentation of the first type of *sahakārin*. But is
there any evidence for Utpaladeva's familiarity with the YD? The
latter is not unimaginable when considering Kashmir Śaivism's
close relation to the Sāṅkhya text. For instance, with regard to the
above term *sādhyatvāt*, Wezler and Motegi have documented a mar-
ginal note found in a Kashmir manuscript of the YD as follows:

YD, p. 123, marginal note (5): **sādhyatvād** *iti. na hi sarvathaivāpsu na*
vidyate 'ṅkuraḥ. yā hy āpo bījadeśānupraveśenāsīnād upādānād antarvi-
parivarttitayāṅkuraṃ janayantīti tāsv apy aṅkuro 'sty eveti.

According to the editors' introduction (YD, pp. xxiv-xxv), "[t]he
author, or one of the authors, ... was remarkably familiar with Ma-
hāyāna Buddhism, a fact that would suggest that he/they may have
lived before the extinction of Buddhism in Kashmir, i.e. in the 14th

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[7]   Against the edition of the YD, I prefer to read these two parts as found in the
      manuscript A mentioned in the footnotes of the edition.

century A.D." There is also another marginal note where we find the words "Abhinavagupta's *Sāṃkhyanirṇaya*," which A. Sanderson has identified as a section of the *Tantrāloka* (YD, p. xxv). From such information, it is at least possible to say that this unique Sāṅkhya text had a certain impact in the Kashmir region, where it was studied together with Kashmir Śaiva texts.[8]

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

In this connection, it is also remarkable that Utpaladeva's grand-disciple Abhinavagupta mentions this type of *sahakārin* in his commentary (*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, henceforth ĪPVV) on Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti*, a work of which most is lost. In one section of his commentary, Abhinavagupta refutes the Sāṅkhya dualism, especially the difference between the soul (*puruṣa/ātman*) as a conscious being and the intellect (*buddhi*) as a product of primordial matter. Here, the Sāṅkhya opponent claims that a pot arises from a lump of clay as its material cause, and its specific features (*viśeṣa/śeṣa*)[9] are given by *sahakārin*s like a stick, a wheel, and a potter; in the same manner, the soul takes the role of a *sahakārin* as a co-operating factor for the arising of various things from primordial matter. But if this is so, Abhinavagupta says, the Sāṅkhya should accept causality based on a "causal complex" (*sāmagrī*) rather than a "single material cause" (*ekopādāna*).[10] Against this, the Sāṅkhya opponent claims the following:

> ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 171, l. .22-p. 172, l. 4: *nanu kānicit sahakārīṇi upādāna-rūpam āviśanty eva kāraṇatāṃ pratipadyante. jalabhūmyoḥ pariṇāmiko hi*

<p>[8]   With regard to this, Dr. Yohei Kawajiri kindly informed me about an important marginal note in a manuscript of the <i>Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā</i>: <i>anyā ca vṛttiḥ pariṇāmāt pariṇāmo hi pūrvasvabhāvatirodhānenaiva yathā ghaṭasya kāpālānivṛt-tis tu tasyaiva rūpasyāpratyastamitasya yathā bhūtenaiva parāmṛśamānasya yathā tathā vattena tadyathā devadattasya gamana ghaṭasyodakāharaṇaṃ tadvṛttibhedā-nutattvabhedo bhavati tenaiva rūpeṇāvādhitapratyajñāviṣayatvāt iti ca nṛpativār-tikaṭīkāyām ||.</i> This marginal note describes the distinction between the concept of <i>vṛtti</i> and that of <i>pariṇāma</i> on the basis of a text called <i>Nṛpativārt(t)ikaṭīkā.</i> The name "Nṛpativārttika" reminds us of <i>Rājavārttika,</i> another name of the YD (see "Introduction" of the YD, pp. xxv-xxvii). Thus this might be another piece of evidence for the popularity of the YD in Kashmir.</p>

<p>[9]   Cf. ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 171, l. 11: <i>śeṣaśabdavācyaṃ viśeṣamātram.</i> Thus, in the following, I choose to translate the term <i>śeṣa</i> as "specific feature."</p>

<p>[10]   See ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 171, ll. 8-22. I would read <i>ekopādāna-</i> for <i>ekakopādāna-</i> (p. 171, l. 22).</p>

rasa ūṣmaṇo vegavatā kālaprabhāvitena bījāntarvartitām eva upayāti, tā-
vatā vicitrasya aṅkurasya svarūpalābhāt. anyāni tu dharmādharmapuru-
ṣārthaprabhṛtīni abhivyaktimātre vyāpriyante. teṣu kā kāryaśeṣāntarga-
manacintā. yady evam, abhivyaktir na kāryaśeṣa iti tatra vyāpriyamāṇā-
nām eṣāṃ dīpacakṣurādīnām iva kathaṃkāraṃ kāraṇatāparigaṇanaṃ
bhavet. kāryaśeṣaḥ seti cet, tarhi asatī saiva. enāṃ tāni yathā utthāpayan-
ti, tathā upādānam api mukhyakāryam utthāpayet.

[Objection:] Only certain auxiliary causes entering into the nature of a material cause become the [material] cause, for the flavor as a transformation of water and earth comes into existence exactly inside of the seed, through the heat that has strengthened during the time, and to this extent, a variety of sprouts arise. On the other hand, other [auxiliary causes] such as merit, demerit, and the soul's purpose operate on the mere manifestation [of the effect] (*abhivyaktimātra*). With regard to those [auxiliary causes like merit], what is the point of considering [their] entering into the specific features of the effect?

[Reply:] If so, since manifestation is not a specific feature of the effect, how could one consider as causes these [auxiliary causes] operating on the [manifestation], such as light and the visual organ? [If they do not operate on the specific features of the effect, they are not the cause]. If the [manifestation] is [also] a specific feature of the effect, then the [manifestation] itself is non-existent [at the moment of the cause]. Just as those [auxiliary causes] produce a [non-existent] manifestation, likewise the material cause, too, would produce a [non-existent] primary effect (*mukhyakārya*). [Thus, the Sāṅkhya's *satkāryavāda* is rejected].

In this manner, Abhinavagupta introduces the Sāṅkhya claim by using the notion of "penetration of *sahakārin*," according to which he is able to explain how various specific features can arise from a single material cause. However, the Sāṅkhya opponent also insists on another kind of *sahakārin* that operates only for the manifestation of the effect. If we compare the two kinds of *sahakārin* with the previous explanation of Utpaladeva, we soon notice that Abhinavagupta strongly criticizes "manifestation" as the effect of the second type of *sahakārin*,[11] which Utpaladeva explained in another way. But what is more important for us is that both philosophers describe the first type of *sahakārin* as a factor that can enter into a material

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[11]   For more details about the concept of *abhivyakti* in the Pratyabhijñā school, see Ratié 2014.

cause and that they do not criticize this unique concept. Why were they indifferent to the Sāṅkhya claim?

<center>***</center>

To close this short essay, I would like to present my tentative thoughts on this question. This Sāṅkhya concept of "penetration of the *sahakārin*" was probably acceptable for the Pratyabhijñā philosophers when both the material cause and auxiliary causes were regarded as "manifestations" (*ābhāsa*) of Śiva's consciousness. For instance, Utpaladeva's passage, *śaukalyamahattvapaṭatvādyavabhāsāḥ parasparānupraveśakṣamāḥ* (*Vṛtti* on ĪPK II.3.7) and that of Abhinavagupta, *sarvapadārthānupraveśanāt prakāśa ity etāvanmātram abhinnaṃ tattvam avaśiṣyate* (ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 76, ad ĪPK I.5.3) give a significant role to "penetration" (*anupraveśa*) in their presentation of the non-dualism of Śiva's consciousness or illumination (*prakāśa*). As is well known, the Sāṅkhya theory of causation is compatible with Śaiva philosophy, even though Utpaladeva gave a sharp criticism against the Sāṅkhya concept of *buddhi*.[12] Just as the Sāṅkhya explains the evolution of the world from a single, material cause, the Śaiva maintains the manifestation of the world from Śiva's consciousness; just as the Sāṅkhya accepts the nature of primordial matter as existing in every material thing, the Śaiva claims the omnipresence of Śiva's nature in this world. Taking such a Śaiva schema of causality into consideration, it is no wonder that both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta focused on the Sāṅkhya idea of the *sahakārin*'s penetration into the material cause, which is easily adopted for an exposition of the dynamic relation between various manifest things that are capable of entering each other through the single, divine nature of Śiva. This is possibly the reason that the two philosophers of the Pratyabhijñā school did not come up with any objections to the Sāṅkhya theory of the first type of *sahakārin*.

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[12]   Cf. TORELLA 1994, p. 185, n. 31. For Utpaladeva's specific notion of the soul as the agent and the cognizer in comparison with its Sāṅkhya ideas, see BRONKHORST 1996. For more details of Utpaladeva's argument that adjusts the Sāṅkhya theory of causation to his own system, see RATIÉ 2014. For the lengthy criticism of the Sāṅkhya notion of *buddhi* in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, see RATIÉ 2011, pp. 94-106 and 276-289. In Utpaladeva's short treatise, APS, too, there is a brief criticism against the Sāṅkhya notion of *buddhi*, see LAWRENCE 2009, p. 638.

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Jayanta as Referred to by Udayana and Gaṅgeśa[*]

YASUTAKA MUROYA

INTRODUCTION

It is well known that the Navya-Nyāya author Gaṅgeśa, or Gaṅge-śvara Upādhyāya (ca. 14th century CE), refers to an author he calls "Jayanta." It has been held that this reference is to Bhaṭṭa Jayanta (ca. 9th c.), the Kashmiri Nyāya philosopher, also known as the "Commentator" (*vṛttikāra*).[1] Gaṅgeśa's historically interesting reference is found in the *upamāna* chapter (*upamānakhaṇḍa*) of his

1   For two of the most recent investigations on the background of Jayanta's an-cestors and his composition of the NM, including the relevant bibliographical information up to date, see DEZSŐ 2004 (Part I, Introduction, Chapter 1 "Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's life") and SLAJE 2012. On his designation as the *vṛttikāra* (cf. RAGHA-VAN 1960; DEZSŐ 2004, p. vii), cf., e.g., NM, vol. II, p. 718, ll. 5-6 (*pāda*s a-b of Śārdūlavikrīḍita): *vādeṣv āpta[a]jayo jayanta iti yaḥ khyātaḥ satām agraṇīr anvarthena ca vṛtti[b]kāra iti yaṃ śaṃsanti nāmnā budhāḥ* | (v.l.: a. *āpta-*] P; *ātta* ed. – b. *anvarthena ca vṛtti-*] P; *anvarthe navavṛtti* ed.). The hitherto known reading *navavṛttikāra* is not supported by one of the best manuscripts from Pune; for a survey of the known mss. of the NM and on their genealogical re-lationship in the sixth chapter, see GRAHELI 2012 and 2011, pp. 113-114. For

Tattvacintāmaṇi (TC), an investigation into comparison, identification or analogy (*upamāna*), where Jayanta and others are given the epithet "old Naiyāyikas" (*jarannaiyāyikā jayantaprabhṛtayaḥ*).[2] In the first English translation of the entire analogy chapter, published in 2012, Stephen Phillips remarks that "rival Naiyāyika positions are sometimes aired, and often he [Gaṅgeśa (YM)] distinguishes his contemporary or "New" (*navya*) Nyāya from that of "Old" Nyāya, as he does in one place in this chapter, even mentioning one philosopher of Old Nyāya by name (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa)."[3] The present article is a preliminary attempt to examine a possible link between Jayanta and Gaṅgeśa, a point that as yet scholars have left open.

1.

In his introduction to the monumental *editio princeps* of Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM) published in 1895, the editor Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga already calls attention to the fact mentioned above:[4]... *jayantabhaṭṭo nāma, yaṃ jarannaiyāyikapadena vyapadideśa nyāyacintāmaṇāv upamānakhaṇḍe gaṅgeśopādhyāyaḥ.* The renowned professor of the Benares Sanskrit College then turns to the issue of Jayanta's dates, examining in particular his chronological relation to another representative of Nyāya, Vācaspati Miśra I (ca. 10th c.), arguing that Vācaspati predates Jayanta.[5] The Benares paṇḍit, who also published the first edition of the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*

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another text-critical problem regarding the printed edition of the NM, cf. n. 91 below.

[2]　TC (C), p. 61, ll. 2-3 = TC (D) = TC (V), p. 19, l. 2.

[3]　Phillips 2012, p. 106. In the appendix to his translation, Phillips renders *jarannaiyāyikā jayantaprabhṛtayaḥ* as "the Old Naiyāyikas, Jayanta and the rest" (p. 121).

[4]　Cf. NM (V), *nyāyamañjarībhūmikā*, p. 1, with the reference "*kalikātāsosāiṭīmudritapustake* 61 pṛ."

[5]　Śāstrī identifies the *ācāryaḥ* mentioned by Jayanta as Vācaspatimiśra (n. *: *tātparyaṭīkāyāṃ vācaspatimiśrāḥ*) in a famous passage discussing the *pratyakṣasūtra* (NS 1.1.4). See NM (V), p. 78, l. 5 = NM, vol. I, p. 204, l. 2: *avyapadeśyapadasya varṇāyāṃ cakrur ācāryāḥ*; cf. von Stietencron 1970, p. 216. Varadacarya, the editor of the NM Mysore edition, appears to follow Śāstrī's identification in structuring the relevant portion. See e.g., NM, vol. I, p. 175, l. 1: *vācaspatimatam* for NM, vol. I, p. 175, l. 2 (*atrācāryās tāvad ācakṣate*). Marui supposes that the Varanasi paṇḍit is the first to mention the relative chronology of Jayanta and Vācaspati; see Marui 2001, p. 443 = Marui 2014, p. 98. On designations such as *ācārya* and *vyākhātṛ*, including relevant, up-to-date bibliographical information, see Marui 2006 and 2014, pp. 231-299.

(NVTṬ), is not the only one to have associated Jayanta with Vācaspati in terms of relative chronology. The dating of Vācaspati in particular has often been discussed in relation to the controversy concerning the famous *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* (NSN), which is to have been composed in the year 898 (*vasvaṅkavasuvatsare*), albeit of an unspecified era, and is ascribed to an author named Vācaspati.[6] In 1936 there was a turning point in the discussion. Erich Frauwallner, reviewing Gopinath Kaviraj's evaluation made in 1924,[7] took recourse in a comparative method based on the two Nyāya philosophers' theoretical development to determine their relative chronology. Against the earlier premise of Śāstrī, he concluded that Jayanta preceded Vācaspati.[8] But this was not the end of the controversy.

1.1. A new piece of information found in a work by Udayana prompted a new historical examination of the timeline of the Nyāya au-

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[6] For an important investigation on the relative chronology of Vācaspati and Jayanta in relation to the NSN, see HACKER 1951; for a systematic overview of the controversy among scholars, see MARUI 2001 (=MARUI 2014, pp. 96-113) and ACHARYA 2006, Introduction, pp. xviii-xx. On the problematic identity of the author of the published version of the NSN edited by Dvivedin (in the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the NV, Calcutta 1887-1914), as well as its text-critical and genealogical features related to fourteen categorically selected *Nyāyasūtrapāṭha* mss., see MUROYA 2006. The hitherto only known ms. that could be identified as a NSN is found in the I.S. Desai collection (Acc. No. 99.12) at the Mumbai University Library; see VELANKAR 1953, p. 146 (Ser. No. 753, Devanagari, 14 fols.). My recent, albeit not yet completed examination of the ms. shows that it is not Dvivedin's exemplar; for instance, a worm-eaten portion (MUROYA 2006, p. 421) found in his exemplar is lacking; and where the Mumbai ms. reads *trayodaśabhiḥ* exactly as Dvivedin's ms. (MUROYA 2006, pp. 420 f.), there appears an additional passage, NS (R) 2.2.13a (= NBh, p. 104, l. 15), which is even wrongly allocated at the end of the *catuṣṭvaprakaraṇa*, and not at the beginning of the next *prakaraṇa* (see Ruben's remark in NS [R], p. 43). Furthermore, it retains NS (R) 2.1.30 against the printed NSN as well as Vācaspati's identification of it as the text of the NBh; see Ruben's remark in NS (R), p. 29 and 187, n. 122; cf. MARUI 2001, pp. 453-454 (=MARUI 2014, p. 110) and MUROYA 2006, pp. 406-407. Inasmuch as the Mumbai ms. assigns the structural relationship *upodghāta* to NS 3.2.10-17 just as the Dvivedin's NSN and other mss. examined (MUROYA 2006, pp. 410-416 and 424), I estimate that their genealogically reconstructed archetype could "hardly have been established in, or before, the period of Keśavamiśra," the author of the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśa* (ca. 16th c.); see MUROYA 2006, p. 427.

[7] For Kaviraj's counterargument, see KAVIRAJ 1924, p. 104 and FRAUWALLNER 1936, pp. 149-150 = 1982, pp. 267-268.

[8] FRAUWALLNER 1936. For a summary of Frauwallner's arguments, see MARUI 2001, p. 443 = MARUI 2014, pp. 99-100.

thors of the early medieval period. Eight years before the publication, in 1967, of Udayana's *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi* (NVTP) on the first book of the *Nyāyasūtra* (NS), Anantalal Thakur disclosed a profoundly interesting reference to Jayanta,[9] writing:

> Udayana shows that Vācaspati refers to the view of Jayanta – the "Old Logician." This reference is highly important for determining the date of Vācaspati. [...] The reference makes Vācaspati at least a younger contemporary of Jayanta.[10]

1.2. The passage in question runs:

> *upamānasya phale vipratipadyamānān prati sāśaṅkaṃ jarannaiyāyikajayantaprabhṛtīnāṃ parihāram āha – yady apīti.*[11]

The *pratīka* "*yady api*" extracted by Udayana refers to Vācaspati's NVTṬ. Thakur makes a reference to p. 170 of the Calcutta edition of the NVTṬ, unfortunately without specification or further explanation. Ever since Thakur's edition of the NVTP in 1967, the relevant passage has been accessible to the scholarly world; in fact it appears in the commentary on the definition *sūtra* of analogy (NS 1.1.6: *prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam upamānam*). The analysis of this passage by modern scholars has varied.

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9. Thakur must have recognized this at the latest in 1953. According to the preface of the NVTṬ and NVTP, Thakur started with the editorial work of the various NS commentaries in 1953 on the basis of the Jaisalmer mss. supplied by P.L. Vaidya and J.S. Jetly; see also the preface in ND (M) and NA.

10. Thakur 1959, Introduction, p. 21 (elision by YM). Thakur's information is briefly reviewed by Svāmī Yogīndrānanda, the editor of the NBhūṣ; see his prāgbandha, p. 14. See also Thakur's similar remarks in Thakur 1974, p. 403 ("Udayana shows that Vācaspati refers to the view of Jayanta, the old Logician"), and his introduction to the NVTP, Preface, p. viii ("The *Pariśuddhi* says that Vācaspati reproduces the views of old logicians including Jayantabhaṭṭa of Kashmir"). Later than Thakur, but independently, Umesha Mishra records (Mishra 1966, p. 199) the various philosophical figures mentioned by name by Udayana, consulting a ms. of the NVTP (altogether 1215 pages [sic]) most of which was then unpublished. Among them is found a mention of "Jarannaiyāyika Jayanta-prabhṛtīnām," albeit without any concrete information about the context or the relation to the NS.

11. See Thakur 1959, Introduction, p. 21, n. 1. The passage corresponds to NVTP, p. 215, ll. 20-21 = ND (M), p. 362, ll. 3-4. The editor records *phalaiḥ* in "J." This refers to a highly faithful and precise 15th-century transcript, NVTP (J2) in my abbreviation, but its 13th-century exemplar NVTP (J1) clearly reads *phale*; cf. NVTP (J1), f. 229r,1.

1.3. The first issue to be clarified may be reduced to answering the following questions: (1) which passage does the *pratīka* "*yady api*" refer to in the NVTṬ? (2) What is the implication of the *parihāra* ("refutation") intended by Vācaspati? (3) Where are Jayanta's views found in the text of the NVTṬ? (4) Reversely, which are the actual passages of the NM that Vācaspati seems to refer to?

1.4. Regarding question (2), it was noted by Matilal that "Vācaspati Miśra I refuted a view of Jayanta. Thus, accepting the authority of Udayana, we place Jayanta prior to Vācaspati. [...] This also explains why Gaṅgeśa referred to Jayanta as 'the old Naiyāyika' (*jaran-naiyāyika*)."[12] Matilal does not refer to the other three points above.

1.4.1. Regarding question (1), Bruce Perry and Diwakar Acharya, independently of one another, have identified the *pratīka* with the *yady api* occurring in the following passage:[13]

> **yady api** *prasiddhasādharmyam upamānam ity ucyamāne pramāṇaviśe-ṣābhidhāyyupamānapadasāmānādhikaraṇyāt karaṇatvalābhaḥ, tathāpi tadābhāsanirākaraṇāya* **sādhyasādhana***padopādānam. tenopamānābhā-sam apākṛtaṃ bhavati* [emphasis by YM].

Both hold that it is concerned with the gloss validating *sādhyasā-dhana*, a term that appears in the analogy *sūtra*. Perry suggests that "a close examination of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's treatment of *upamāna* might corroborate the accuracy of Udayana's presentation." He renders *jarannaiyāyika* as "old-fashioned Naiyāyika."[14]

1.4.2. Acharya notes, with pertinent reservations about Udayana's reliability (pp. xxvii-xxviii):

> [...] Udayana, commenting upon *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.6, makes a remark that the view there that Vācaspatimiśra refuted is the view of Jayanta and the other *jarannaiyāyikas* [...]. Even if we set aside the question whether Uda-yana was right in assigning the view Vācaspatimiśra criticised to Jayanta and other *jarannaiyāyikas*, it can be deduced from Udayana's remarks that

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[12] MATILAL 1977, pp. 93-94.

[13] The indication in PERRY 1995, p. 20, n. 46 is made in regard to ND (M), p. 357, ll. 6-8 with further references ("cf. also NVT, p. 357, ll. 15ff. and NVTP, p. 362, ll. 22-23, NVT, p. 358, ll. 20 ff and NVTP, p. 364, l. 12"). ACHARYA 2006, Introduction, p. xxvii quotes the whole text of NVTṬ, p. 162, ll. 13-15, equiva-lent to ND (M), p. 357, ll. 6-8 in the edition used by Perry.

[14] PERRY 1995, pp. 19-20, n. 46 and n. 47, respectively.

Jayanta was regarded as anterior to Vācaspatimiśra in the early half of the eleventh century [elision by YM].

Furthermore, Acharya specifies the relevant passage in question in the NM:

prasiddhasādharmyajñānam upamānam, phalaṃ sañjñāsañjñisamban-dhajñānam ity uktaṃ bhavati.[15]

Although Acharya has basically clarified all four questions mentioned above, the exact correlation between the passages in the NVTṬ and the NM remains to be examined.

1.5. Voicing his doubts about Matilal's analysis of an alleged antagonism between Jayanta and Vācaspati, Hiroshi Marui has presented a new interpretation. Marui provides a different identification of the *pratīka* "*yady api*" than that of the scholars mentioned above, namely, with "NVTṬ, [p.] 163, [ll.] 8ff.":

yady api *yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya ity etasmād api gosādṛśyasya gavaya-śabdaḥ samākhyeti śakyam avagantum. na khalu pratyakṣa eva sañjñākar-ma, samānajātīyavyavacchinne hi tad bhavati* [The text as such is not quoted by him; emphasis by YM].[16]

This passage is connected with Vācaspati's explanation of the concept of *prasiddhi* as contained in *prasiddhasādharmyāt* in the analogy *sūtra* (cf. § 1.2 above).[17] Marui's interpretation of Udayana's remark suggests a new perspective:

Vācaspati introduces here the refutation of (or as the text may alternative-ly mean: made by) old scholars of Nyāya beginning with Jayanta who refuted the opponents' rejection of the *upamāna* as another means of cog-nition [English rendering by YM].[18]

The alternative possibility reflected in the above translation is point-ed out by Marui. In addition, Marui remarks that a comparison of the relevant portion in the NM and NVTṬ does not show their clear correspondence, and cautions against relying blindly upon Udaya-na's information.

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[15]   NM, vol. I, p. 382, ll. 7-8; p. 205 in Gaurinath Sastri's edition of the NM (3 vols., Varanasi 1982-1984) used by Acharya.

[16]   NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 8-10.

[17]   On Vācaspati's concept of *prasiddhi*, see n. 73 below; cf. § 3.5.

[18]   The original is in Japanese. See MARUI 2001, p. 446 = MARUI 2014, p. 102.

2.

As shown above (§§ 1.4-1.5), there are different opinions about the identification of the *pratīka* "*yady api*" in the NVTṬ. Udayana's commentary NVTP reveals another significant piece of information on this point. Immediately after his reference to Jayanta, Udayana paraphrases the expression *sañjñākarma* ("naming action") as *sañjñākaraṇa* ("naming"). The immediate vicinity of the two expressions (*yady api* and *sañjñākarma*) leads us to identify Udayana's *sañjñākarma* with the same term that appears in a sentence of the NVTṬ: *na khalu pratyakṣa eva* **sañjñākarma** ("As you should know, the naming action is not [applied] only to the perceptible object").[19] This corroborates Marui's identification, and is confirmed by the sequence of the *pratīka* immediately preceding.[20]

2.1. There is a further textual source of relevance. Let us turn our attention to Vardhamāna's commentary on Udayana's NVTP, the so-called *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa* (NNP). The printed editions of this work by Gaṅgeśa's son cover the commentary incompletely, the first one up to NVTP, p. 210, l. 12 on NS 1.1.5 (ed. V.P. Dvivedin and L.S. Dravida, Calcutta: 1911-1924) and the second, the *Trisūtrī* section (ed. S.K. Sadhukhan, Kolkata: 2009). A critical edition of the commentary, including the portion of the analogy *sūtra* in question, has been announced by Sadhukhan as in preparation. Accordingly, the following information is based on a paper ms. from Mysore made available to me recently.

2.2. There is a relevant gloss by Vardhamāna on Udayana's mention of *jayantaprabhṛtīnāṃ parihāraḥ*, a gloss which supports Marui's identification of the *yady api* in question. It runs as follows:

> *sāśaṃkaṃ pūsarvvapakṣaṃ* (recte: *sapūrvapakṣaṃ*) *yady apītyādinā'vagatagavaya* (recte: *'vagaṃtuṃ gavayaḥ*) *ity aṃtena pūrvvapakṣaḥ tathāpītyādinā pramāṇāṃtaram āstheyam ity aṃtena jayantaprabhṛtīnāṃ parihāra ity arthaḥ* (transliteration of NNP Ms., f. 67r,8-9, without recording scribal correction).

According to Vardhamāna, the relevant portion of the NVTṬ is divided into two parts. The first part – from *yady api* to *avagantuṃ gavayaḥ* – is attributed to the *pūrvapakṣa*, as implied by *sāśaṅkam*

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[19]   NVTP, p. 215, l. 21 and NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 9-10.

[20]   The preceding *pratīka* in NVTP, p. 215, l. 19, namely, *prasiddhasādharmyād ity atra*, corresponds to NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 5-6.

("accompanied by a doubt or objection," if it is a *bahuvrīhi* compound[21]), and the second – from *tathāpi* through *pramāṇāntaram āstheyam* – to *jayantaprabhṛtīnāṃ parihāraḥ*. Vardhamāna appears to render the second part as the *uttarapakṣa* presented by Jayanta and others.

2.3. In the following reproduction of the relevant text of the NVTṬ, the aforementioned information by Vardhamāna is incorporated:

NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 8-13 [= Pūrvapakṣa]:

yady api *yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya ity asmād*[a] *api gosadṛśasya*[b] *gava-ya*[c]*samākhyeti śakyam avagantum. na khalu pratyakṣa eva sañjñākarma. samānāsamāna*[d]*jātīyavyavacchinne hi tad bhavati. tac ca yadi mānāntareṇāpi tathāvagamyate, kas tatra*[e] *sañjñākarma nivārayet. gosādṛśyena copalakṣitaḥ piṇḍo ya iti sarvanāmnā parāmṛṣṭaḥ*[f] *śakyo ghaṭādibhyo 'samānajātīyebhyo*[g] *mahiṣādi*[h]*bhyaś ca samānajātīyebhyo vyavacchinno 'vagantuṃ gavayaḥ,*

NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 13-17 [= Jayantaprabhṛtīnāṃ parihāraḥ]:

tathāpi *yāvad ayam asau gavaya iti sākṣāt pratīte sambandhini sañjñām na niveśayati*[i] *tāvad ayaṃ pariplutamatiḥ pramātā "kaccit*[j] *khalu drakṣyāmi tādṛśaṃ piṇḍaṃ yatra gavayasañjñām pratipatsye*[k]*" iti pramotsuka evodīkṣate. na cāsau vākyamātrasahāyo 'pratyakṣīkṛtagosadṛśagavayatvajātimatpiṇḍaḥ*[l] *"ayam asau gavayākhyaḥ" iti pratipattum arhati, na ca vākyaṃ vinā pratyakṣamātrāt. tasmād āgamapratyakṣābhyām anyad evedam āgamasmṛtisahitam sādṛśyajñānam upamānākhyaṃ pramāṇam āstheyam.*[22]

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[21]   Otherwise, if an *avyayībhāva* compound, this would carry the sense of "apprehensively."

[22]   NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 8-17 = ND (C), p. 170, ll. 13-22 = ND (M), p. 357, l. 23-p. 358, l. 6. v.l.: a. *asmād*] J1; *etasmād* ed., C, M – b. *-sadṛśasya*] J1, C, M; *sādṛśyasya* ed. – c. *gavaya-*] J1; *gavayaḥ* ed. ("J"), M ("J"); *gavayaśabdaḥ* ed., C, M – d. *samānāsamāna-*] J1; *samāna* ed., C, M – e. *kas tatra*] ed., J1, M; om. C – f. *parāmṛṣṭaḥ*] J1, C, M; *pararāmṛṣṭaḥ* ed. – g. *-jātīyebhyo*] J1, C; *jātiyebhyo* M; *jātibhyo* ed. – h. *mahiṣādi-*] ed., C, M; *mahiṣyādi* J1, ed. ("J"), M ("J") – i. *niveśayati*] J1, C, M; *niveśyati* ed. – j. *kaccit*] ed., J1, M; *kañcid* C (see also the corresponding *pratīka* in NVTP, p. 216, l. 6: *enam evārtham kañcid ityādinā darśitavān*; however, NVTP [J1] reads *kaccit*) – k. *pratipatsye*] J1; *pratipatsya* ed., C, M – l. *-sadṛśagavayatvajātimatpiṇḍaḥ "ayam asau*] J1; *sadṛśagavayatvajātimatpiṇḍo 'sau* ed., M; *sadṛśagavayapiṇḍam asau* C; *sadṛśe piṇḍe 'yam asau* ed. ("C Var"; however, the Calcutta edition records "*gosadṛśe piṇḍo yam asau*" as the reading of "kha-pu-pāṭhaḥ," the text of a manuscript of the "Asiatic Society Bengal Calcutta"; cf. ND [C], p. 170, n. 3), M ("C var"). Due to the

Vardhamāna's analysis leaves the impression that one can take the concessive conjunctive *yady api* as syntactically connected to the *tathāpi*, with both parts constituting a single very long main sentence with several subordinate sentences.[23]

2.4. Vardhamāna's gloss indirectly corroborates the following two points: (1) the *pratīka* "*yady api*" refers to NVTṬ, p. 163, l. 8, and (2) the refutation *by* Jayanta and others comprises a response to the objection. This implies that the view introduced by Vācaspati is not his own refutation of Jayanta's theory, but Jayanta's argumentation against those who disprove the *upamāna* theory of Nyāya (*viprati-padyamānān prati* in the NVTP; cf. § 1.2 above).[24] Of course, if one does not take the genitive of the *jayantaprabhṛtīnām* in the NVTP in the subjective sense, but in the objective, one can still suppose, for instance, that the *pūrvapakṣa* portion corresponds to the objection as represented, or treated, by Jayanta, and the *uttarapakṣa* portion to Vācaspati's refutation of Jayanta's objection, or counterargument, against his opponent.

2.5. It seems unlikely, however, that this latter supposition is the understanding purported by Vardhamāna, when we look at his father's reference to the theory of "Jayanta and others." Gaṅgeśa makes an unacknowledged quotation of the last sentence of the passage adduced above from the NVTṬ (*tasmād... āstheyam*) and subsequently concludes his presentation by saying "thus say the old Naiyāyikas headed by Jayanta" (*iti jarannaiyāyikā jayantaprabhṛtayaḥ*). This treatment by the 14th-century philosopher suggests that the last sentence in question still belongs to Jayanta and others. The table below shows possible sources used by Gaṅgeśa. For purposes of analysis, the relevant portion of the TC is divided into nine parts.[25]

significance of the cited passage, the collation of the Calcutta edition (C) and Thakur's earlier one (M) is noted here.

23   The Calcutta edition (ND [C], p. 170, ll. 13-20) only places commas between *yady api* and *evodīkṣate* which ends with a *daṇḍa* (... *śakyam avagantum*, ... *saṃjñākarma*, ... *tad bhavati*, ... *nivārayet*, ... '*vagantuṃ gavayaḥ*, ...). Thakur's punctuation for the same portion (NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 8-15) is different (... *śakyam avagantum*. ... *sañjñākarma*, ... *tad bhavati*. ... *tathāvagamyate*, ... *nivārayet*? ...'*vagantuṃ gavayaḥ*, ...). Thakur's earlier punctuation for the same portion (ND [M], p. 357, l. 23-p. 358, l. 3) is again different (... *śakyam avagantum*, ... *sañjñākarma*, ... *tad bhavati*. ... *tathāvagamyate*, ... *nivārayet*? ...'*vagantuṃ ga-vayaḥ*, ... *niveśayati*, ...).

24   Both points are in accordance with Marui's interpretation (cf. § 1.5 above).

25   In the context of the TC, according to Phillips's structural analysis (PHILLIPS 2012, pp. 120-121), parts 1 to 5 pertain to the discourse by "Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and

Table 1: Gaṅgeśa's Presentation and His Sources[26]

TC *upamāna*	Sources
1. C, p. 56, ll. 2-5 = D, p. 26, ll. 11-13 = V, p. 17, ll. 8-10: "*kīdṛśo*[a] *gavayaḥ*" *iti jijñāsāyāṃ* "*yathā gaus tathā*[b] *gavayaḥ*" *iti śrutottaravākyasya*[c] *tathābhūte piṇḍe dṛṣṭe* "*tathā'yam*[d]" *ity atideśavākyārthānusandhāne* "*ayaṃ gavayaśabda*[e]*vācyaḥ*" *iti matir upamānaphalam.*[27]	NKus, p. 377, ll. 4-5: "*yathā gaus tathā gavayaḥ*" *iti śrutātideśavākyasya gosadṛśaṃ piṇḍam anubhavataḥ smarataś ca vākyārtham* "*ayam asau gavayaśabdavācyaḥ*" *iti bhavati matiḥ.*
2. C, p. 56, l. 5-p. 57, l. 1 = D, p. 26, ll. 13-15 = V, p. 17, l. 10-p. 18, l. 1: *na ceyaṃ vākyamātrāt, apratyakṣīkṛtapiṇḍasyāpi prasaṅgāt. nāpi pratyakṣamātrāt, aśrutavākyasyāpi prasaṅgāt.*	NKus, p. 377, ll. 5-7: *seyaṃ na tāvad vākyamātraphalam, anupalabdhapiṇḍasyāpi prasaṅgāt. nāpi pratyakṣaphalam, aśrutavākyasyāpi prasaṅgāt.*
3. C, p. 57, l. 1-p. 58, l. 1= D, p. 26, ll. 15-18 = V, p. 18, ll. 1-4: *nāpi tayoḥ samāhārāt. sa hi pramāṇasamāhāro vā phalasamāhāro vā? ādye pramāṇatve sati samāhāraḥ, samāhṛta-*	NVTP, p. 216, ll. 9-12: *etena vākyapratyakṣasamāhāro 'pi nirastaḥ. sa hi pramāṇasamāhāro vā syāt, phalasamāhāro vā? ādye 'pi pramāṇatve sati samāhāraḥ, samāhṛtayor vā prāmāṇyam iti? na tāvat prathamaḥ, phalānekatve sati samāhārānupapatteḥ*[a],

company." Parts 6 and 7 are attributed to "Objection" and "Old Nyāya," respectively. As for Part 8, he seemingly attributes it to "Old Nyāya." Part 9 is Gaṅgeśa's response. The text subsequent to part 9, which is not reproduced here, is the articulation of "a fully adequate view in a *siddhānta* of New Nyāya"; see PHILLIPS 2012, p. 156, n. 17.

26   For an English translation of the relevant portion of the TC, see PHILLIPS 2012, Appendix, pp. 120-121 and notes (p. 156). I have tentatively edited the text quoted in the table on the basis of the corresponding text in the right column. Selection of variant readings in the TC can be reasonably modified in accordance with the selection of available textual variations in the right column. In particular, the text of the NKus has not been compared with other editions of the work. It is to be noted that the variant readings marked by "kha" in the Calcutta edition of the TC correspond in some crucial cases to the readings of the Jaisalmer mss. of the NVTṬ and NVTP.

27   v.l.: a. *kīdṛśo*] V; *kīdṛśa* C, D – b. *tathā*] C, V; *tadvad* C (kha), D – c. *śrutottaravākyasya*] C (kha), D; *śrutottarasya* C, V – d. *tathā'yam*] C, D, V; *tathā gavaya ity* C (kha) – e. *-śabda-*] C, D; *pada* V.

yor vā prāmāṇyam[a]? *nādyaḥ, phalā-nekatve samāhārānupapatteḥ, tasya parasparasahakārirūpatvāt.*[28]

tasyaikaphalaṃ prati parasparā-dhipatyarūpatvāt.[29]

4. C, p. 58, l. 1-p. 58, l. 3 = D p. 26, ll. 19-21 = V, p. 18, ll. 4-5: *nāntyaḥ, vākyapratyakṣayor bhinnakālatvāt, vākyatadarthayoḥ smṛtidvāropanaye 'pi gavayapiṇḍasambandhenāpīndriyādinā tadgatasādṛśyānupanaye*[a] *samayaparicchedāsiddheḥ.*[30]

NVTP, p. 216, ll. 12-14: *nāpi dvitī-yaḥ, vākyapratyakṣayor bhinnakāla-tvāt, vākyatadarthayoḥ smṛtidvāro-panītāv api gavayapiṇḍasambaddhe-nāpīndriyādinā tadgatasādṛśyānupa-naye samayaparicchedāsiddheḥ.*

NKus, p. 377, ll. 7-9: *nāpi samāhāra-phalam, vākyapratyakṣayor bhinna-kālatvāt, vākyatadarthayoḥ smṛtidvā-ropanītāv api gavayapiṇḍasamban-dhenāpīndriyeṇa tadgatasādṛśyānu-palambhe samayaparicchedāsiddheḥ.*

5. C, p. 58, l. 3-p. 59, l. 1 = D, p. 26, ll. 21-22 = V, p. 18, ll. 5-6: *phalasa-māhāre ca tadantarbhāve śabdānu-mānayor api pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgaḥ.*

NVTP, p. 216, ll. 14-15: *phalasamā-hāre tu tadantarbhāve 'numānaśab-dayor api pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgaḥ.*

NKus, p. 377, ll. 9-10: *phalasamāhā-re tu tadantarbhāve 'numānāder api pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgaḥ.*

6. C, p. 59, l. 2-p. 60, l. 1 = D p. 26, l.22-p. 27, l. 2 = V, p. 18, ll. 6-7: *tat kiṃ tatphalasya pramāṇabahirbhāva eva? antarbhāve vā kiyatī sīmā*[a]*? tat-tadasādhāraṇendriyādisāhityam?*[31]

NVTP, p. 216, ll. 15-16: *tat kiṃ tat-phalasya tatpramāṇabahirbhāva eva? antarbhāve vā kiyatī sīmā? tat-tadasādhāraṇendriyādisāhityam.*

NKus, p. 377, ll. 10-11: *tat kiṃ tat-phalasya tatpramāṇabahirbhāva eva? antarbhāve vā kiyatī sīmā? tat-tadasādhāraṇendriyādisāhityam?*

7. C, p. 60, l. 1-p. 61, l. 1 = D p. 27, ll. 2-6 = V, p. 18, ll. 7-10: *asti tarhi sādṛśyajñāne 'pi visphāritasya cakṣu-*

NVTP, p. 216, ll. 16-19: *asti tarhi sā-dṛśyādijñānakāle 'pi visphāritasya cakṣuṣo vyāpāraḥ. na*[a]*, tasmin sati ta-*

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[28] v.l.: a. *prāmāṇyam*] C, V; *pramāṇatvam* C (kha), D.

[29] v.l.: a. *-papatteḥ*] J1; *papatte* ed.

[30] v.l.: a. *gavayapiṇḍasambandhenāpīndriyādinā tadgatasādṛśyānupanaye*] C (kha), D; om. C, V.

[31] v.l.: a. *sīmā*] C (kha), D; *sā matiḥ* C, V.

ṣo vyāpāraḥ. tasmin[a] sati tasyānupa-
yogāt. upalabdhagosādṛśyaviśiṣṭaga-
vayapiṇḍasya vākyārthasmṛtimataḥ
kālāntare 'pi tadanusandhānabalāt
samaya[b]paricchedopapatteḥ[c].[32]

syānupayogāt, upalabdhagosādṛśya-
viśiṣṭagavayapiṇḍasya vākyasmṛti-
mataḥ kālāntare 'py anusandhānaba-
lāt samayaparicchedopapatter[b] iti.[33]

NKus, p. 378, ll. 1-3: asti tarhi sādṛ-
śyādijñānakāle visphāritasya cakṣuṣo
vyāpāraḥ. na, upalabdhagosādṛśya-
viśiṣṭagavayapiṇḍasya vākyatadar-
thasmṛtimataḥ kālāntare 'py anusan-
dhānabalāt samayaparicchedopa-
patteḥ.

8. C, p. 61, ll. 1-3 = D, p. 27, ll. 6-7 =
V, p. 19, ll. 1-2: tasmād āgamapra-
tyakṣābhyām anyad evedam āgama-
smṛtisahitaṃ sādṛśyajñānam upamā-
napramāṇam iti jarannaiyāyikā jaya-
ntaprabhṛtayaḥ.

NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 17-18: tasmād āga-
mapratyakṣābhyām anyad evedam
āgamasmṛtisahitaṃ sādṛśyajñānam
upamānākhyaṃ pramāṇam āstheyam.

9. C, p. 61, l. 3-p. 62, l. 5 = D, p. 30,
ll. 6-11 = V, p. 19, ll. 3-7: tan na. vai-
dharmyāvyāpteḥ. yadodīcyena[a] kra-
melakaṃ[b] nindatoktam[c] – dhik kara-
bham atidīrghagrīvaṃ pralambaca-
palauṣṭhaṃ kaṭhoratīkṣṇakaṇṭakāśi-
nam[d] kutsitāvayavasanniveśam apa-
sadaṃ paśūnām iti, tad upaśrutya dā-

NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 19-22: nanu yado-
dīcyena kramelakaṃ nindatoktam –
dhik karabham atidīrghavakragrīvaṃ
pralamboṣṭhaṃ kaṭhoratīkṣṇakaṇṭa-
kāśinaṃ kutsitāvayavasanniveśam
apasadaṃ paśūnām iti, tad upaśrutya
dākṣiṇātya uttarāpathaṃ gatas tādṛ-
śaṃ vastūpalabhya "nūnam ayam[a]

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[32]   v.l.: a. *tasmin*] V; *asmin* C, D – b. *samaya-*] C, V; *sama* D – c. *-cchedopapatteḥ*]
      C (kha); *cchedotpatteḥ* C, D, V. The word *asti* at the beginning is placed in all
      three editions as part of the previous sentence and syntactically connected to -
      sāhityam; cf. also Kṛṣṇakānta's (ca. 1800; cf. EIPh, vol. I, p. 732, no. 1476)
      Dīpanī in TC (C), p. 60, l. 5: *samādhatte – tarhīti*. However, Pragalbha (ca.
      1470; cf. EIPh, vol. I, p. 535, no. 901) and Gokulanātha (ca. 1645; cf. EIPh, vol.
      I, p. 644, no. 1186), commentators of the TC's analogy chapter, begin a new
      sentence with *asti*; see the former's *Pragalbhī* or *Upamānasaṅgraha* in TC (V),
      p. 18, l. 23 (*kvacid aṃśe vyāpāraṃ dṛṣṭvā śaṅkate – astīti*) and the latter's *Raś-
      micakra* in TC (D), p. 29, ll. 25-26 (*śaṅkottarābhyām āha – astītyādi*). This
      interpretation is attested to by Varadarāja (ca. 12th c.) in his commentary on the
      NKus; cf. *Bodhanī* in NKus, p. 378, l. 11: *... samayapariccheddo 'pi pratyakṣa-
      phala*(!) *syād ity āha – asti tarhīti*.

[33]   v.l.: a. *na*] ed., J1 (added by a second hand); om. J1 (thus in the main text) – b.
      -papatter] J1 (added by the second hand); *papattir* ed.

kṣiṇātya uttarāpathaṃ gatvā[e] *tādṛ-*
śaṃ vastūpalabhya "*nūnam asau ka-*
rabhaḥ" *iti pratyeti. tatra kiṃ mā-*
nam? *na tāvad upamānam, sādṛśyā-*
bhāvāt. na ca pramāṇā[f]*ntaraṃ sam-*
bhavati.[34]

asau karabhaḥ" *iti pratyeti. tat kata-*
mad eteṣu pramāṇam? *na tāvad upa-*
mānam, sādharmyābhāvāt. nāpi pañ-
camaṃ pramāṇam upeyate[b].[35]

2.6. The textual parallels identified in the table above reveal how well thought out Gaṅgeśa's composition is. He may have been inspired by Udayana's specification of "*jarannaiyāyika-jayanta-pra-bhṛtīnāṃ parihāraḥ*." His description of the *upamāna* theory of the old Nyāya basically follows the presentation and structure of Udayana's NKus, but another work by Udayana, the NVTP, and its target, the NVTṬ, have also been carefully studied, passages put together and incorporated. It is possible that Gaṅgeśa shared his view of the structure of the NVTṬ and NVTP passages with his son.

2.7. Udayana's additional gloss is also highly relevant: parts 3 to 7 are not found in the NVTṬ, but this text was introduced by Udayana into the NVTP to clarify the coherence and background of part 9 beginning with *nanu* (originally presented by Vācaspati). Udayana identifies the passage (parts 3-7) as the theory of old Naiyāyikas (*jarannaiyāyikamata*) that was attacked by some opponent (part 9) in the NVTṬ.[36] This opponent, who advocated subsuming *upamāna* under verbal testimony, presents a deviating case of analogical identification with the example of an abusive or censuring statement (*nindatokta*) made by a northerner (*udīcya*), where an analogical statement as intended by the Nyāya plays no role, because the statement does not involve any indication of the similarity or homogeneity (*sādharmya*) between a thing already known and something still unknown. This northerner merely adduces the distinctive character

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[34]   v.l.: a. *yadodīcyena*] C, D; *yadā audīcyena* V – b. *kramelakaṃ*] C (kha), V; *krameṇa kaṃ* C, D – c. *nindatoktam*] C (kha); *ninditoktaṃ* V; *nirgatyoktaṃ* C, D – d. *-tīkṣṇakaṇṭakāśinam*] C (kha), D; *śūkāśinaṃ* C; *śukāśinaṃ* V – e. *gatvā*] C, D, V; *gata*(!) C (kha) – f. *pramāṇā-*] D, V; *pramānā* C.

[35]   v.l.: a. *ayam*] J1; om. ed. – b. *upeyate*] J1; *upagamyate* ed. As paṇḍit Sukhlalji Sanghavi, one of the editors of Hemacandra's (1089-1172) PM, has noted (p. 76, l. 16), this passage of the NVTṬ (p. 163, ll. 19-21) is silently quoted in the PM with some modifications, where the reading *nindatoktam* is confirmed, while the corresponding text in the TC varies among the mss.; cf. PM, p. 34, l.25-p. 35, l. 3 (*yathā vā audīcyena... karabhaśabdasya*' *iti*).

[36]   Cf. NVTP, p. 216, l. 19: *tad etaj jarannaiyāyikamatam āskandati – nanv iti*.

of a camel (*karabha*), whereupon a southerner (*dākṣiṇātya*) hears this and identifies an animal encountered on his way with the name "camel" at a later point in time. Udayana appears to call the opponent responsible for part 9 "*pūrve*" ("the former, or elder"), although his identity is open to further examination.[37] A detailed analysis of parts 3-7, especially in regard to Udayana's understanding of the theory of old Naiyāyikas, is beyond the scope of the present examination.

2.7.1. Whichever philosophical tradition the opponent may have belonged to, Gaṅgeśa, who understands the coherence of the discussion in the NVTṬ and NVTP, inserts parts 3-7 between part 2 and 8. Gaṅgeśa's presentation in its totality is the result of his editorial rearrangement of the extant sources.

2.7.2. Vācaspati, in turn, responds to the opponent by interpreting the term *sādharmya* in the *upamāna-sūtra* as indicating attributes in general (*dharmamātropalakṣaṇa*), an interpretation by which the fault of non-pervasion or narrow application (*avyāpti*) of the *sūtra*'s definition can be avoided.[38] This maneuver opens up a historically important dimension. After this synecdochic interpretation by Vācaspati, the idea that analogical reasoning is based on "attributes in general" is incorporated into the interpretation of the *sūtra* as conforming to the Nyāya tenets.[39] This interpretation seems to have been unknown to Uddyotakara and Jayanta. Nevertheless, it may not

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[37] Cf. NVTP, p. 216, ll. 19-21, and p. 217, l. 1: *pūrve hi yathā gaus tathety eva vākyaṃ gavayapadenāpratītasamayenāpi prayogamātropayoginā sahitaṃ sambandhapratipattihetuḥ... ity āhuḥ.* Curiously enough, Abhayatilaka glosses *pūrve* as *jaradvaiśeṣikāḥ*; he appears not to follow the classical theory recognizing only two means of valid cognition; see NA, p. 127, ll. 18-19: *une* [= Udayane]. *pūrve iti. pratyakṣānumānaśābdapramāṇatrayavādinaḥ, śābde copamānam antarbhāvayanto jaradvaiśeṣikāḥ.* For a type of analogy adduced by those who deny the independence or distinctness of *upamāna* as a *pramāṇa* on the basis of the description or indication of some distinctive characters or attributes of something unknown, see NM, vol. I, p. 378, ll. 3-9 (on *ruru* "deer" and *caitra*; the latter is partly quoted in PM, p. 34, ll. 18-19), NBhūṣ, p. 420, ll. 18-22 (on *uṣṭra* "camel" and *gaja* "elephant") and PM, p. 34, ll. 20-23 (on *haṃsa* "goose"). Cf. also n. 25 above.

[38] Cf. NVTṬ, p. 16, ll. 6-7: *sādharmyagrahaṇaṃ ca dharmamātropalakṣaṇam iti karabhasañjñāpratītiphalam apy upamānam eveti nāvyāptiḥ.*

[39] On the three kinds of analogy in Varadarāja's TR (*k.* 1.22) and its TRSS (p. 87, l. 12-p. 88, l. 3), see BIJALWAN 1977, pp. 204-205 and KUMAR 1994, pp. 20-21. The instance adduced by Varadarāja in the case of *dharmamātropamāna* is based on that of the NVTṬ (part 9 in table 1); see KUMAR 1994, p. 19.

necessarily be Vācaspati's creation. Indeed, it appears to be a slight improvement on an idea presented by his probable predecessor, Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara (ca. 10th c.) in his commentary *Nyāyasūtratātparyadīpikā* (NTD).[40]

2.7.3. Gaṅgeśa's reference to Jayanta was obviously influential in the later tradition of the NS commentaries. The 15th-century "Naiyāyika and Dharmaśāstrin Vācaspati Miśra of Mithilā" also presents the theory advocated by the "old Jayanta and others" (*jaranto jayantādayaḥ*).[41] Although his description basically runs along the lines of Gaṅgeśa's, to a certain extent it shows reformulations and additions.[42]

2.8. In the table below, a comparison of the structure of the passage in the NVTṬ, NVTP, NKus and TC is made in accordance with the sequence found in the NVTṬ.

Table 2: Division of the NVTṬ into Five Parts from A to E and Their Correspondence to Other Works

NVTṬ (Vardha-māna's gloss)	NVTP	NKus	TC
(n.c.)		Part 1	Part 1
Part A: Pūrvapakṣa (*yady api... avagantum gavayaḥ*)	(cf. p. 215, l. 21- p. 216, l. 4)		
Part B: Jayanta-prabhṛtīnāṃ parihāraḥ (*tathāpi yāvad... evodīkṣate*)	(cf. p. 216, ll. 5-6)		

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40 Vāgīśvara already mentions the possibility of interpreting the term *sādharmya* in the analogy *sūtra* as the indication of attributes (*dharmopalakṣaṇa*); cf. NTD, p. 37, ll. 4-5 on NS (NTD) 2.1.47 = NS 2.1.44: *lakṣaṇasūtragatasya sādharmyaśabdasya dharmopalakṣaṇatvena vyākhyānāt*. Even the term *dharmamātra* appears in the NTD; cf. NTD, p. 37, l. 15, and 25. On the doctrinal and chronological relationship of Vācaspati and Vāgīśvara, see MUROYA 2013, forthcoming a and b, where I have put forward the hypothesis that Vāgīśvara predates Vācaspati.

41 On Vācaspati Miśra II, see PREISENDANZ 2005, pp. 70-73.

42 Cf. NTĀ, p. 82, ll. 3-15.

Part C: Jayanta-prabhṛtīnāṃ pa-rihāraḥ (*na cā-sau... pratyakṣa-mātrāt*)	(cf. p. 216, ll. 7-8)	≈ Part 2	≈ Part 2
(n.c.)	Parts 3-7 (*jaran-naiyāyikamata*)	Parts 4-7	Parts 3-7
Part D: Jayanta-prabhṛtīnāṃ pa-rihāraḥ (*tasmād ... āstheyam*)			Part 8 (*jarannaiyāyikā jayantaprabhṛta-yaḥ*)
Part E: (*nanu... upeyate*)	= Pūrve (cf. *ja-rannaiyāyikama-tam āskandati*)		Part 9

2.9. In the NVTṬ, there is a portion where Vācaspati presents his own theory, as introduced with the expression "*atrocyate*" (NVTṬ, p. 164, l. 10-p. 165, l. 6). This is a reply to the opponents whose theories appear in part 9 (NVTṬ, p. 163, l. 19-p. 164, l. 9) and a subsequent part (NVTṬ, p. 164, ll. 1-9, which is not reproduced here). Udayana's characterization of Vācaspati's response is note-worthy, because he calls Vācaspati the "quite new, or modern Nai-yāyika" (NVTP, p. 217, l. 13: *atrocyate 'bhinavanaiyāyikaiḥ*).[43] And, as Thakur's *index nominum* "Viśiṣṭanāmasūcī" of the NVTP confirms, this is the only occurrence of the epithet in the NVTP, just as there is only one mention of Jayanta. The unmistakably sharp contrast between the two epithets, *jarannaiyāyika* and *abhinavanai-yāyika*, is probably not merely coincidental, especially in the work of such a rigorous thinker. In Udayana's historicist view, the philo-sophical, and perhaps temporal, distance between Jayanta and Vā-caspati is evident and probably significant. Udayana's distinction

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[43] Cf. ACHARYA 2006, Introduction, p. xxvii: "he [Udayana; YM] takes Vācaspa-timiśra's concluding remarks on the topic as the view of the *abhinavanaiyāyikas* or *ādhunikas*, situating himself among them." As regards the latter epithet, how-ever, Abhayatilaka understands it as designating contemporary Vaiśeṣikas (*nū-tanavaiśeṣika*); see NA, p. 127, ll. 24-25: *ādhunikā iti. pratyakṣānumānapra-māṇadvayavādino 'numāne ca śabdam upamānaṃ cāntarbhāvayanto nūtana-vaiśeṣikāḥ*. On the views of *ādhunika*s in the context of Udayana's description, see CHATTOPADHYAY 2007, pp. 75-76.

explicitly supports Vācaspati's superiority in theoretical construction and systematization – a superiority that might have been acknowledged and prevalent at the time, and possibly region, of Udayana's activity. It may not be unrealistic to assume that Udayana recognized, or intended to proclaim, the emergence of the "new period" of the Nyāya tradition by underlining the alleged novelty of Vācaspati's theory (cf. § 2.10.3 below).[44]

2.10. What is then Vācaspati's own theory?[45] His main justification of analogy as an independent means of valid cognition is presented in the classical framework of the theory of analogy, but appears to be closely related to the theory of the synthetic process of cognitions originating from verbal testimony (*śrutamayī*) and perception (*pratyakṣamayī*).[46] Vācaspati provides an analytical description of the process in which a word's relation to its initially unknown referent is determined through analogy (cf. NVTṬ, p. 164, l. 17: *vācyavācakasambandhāvasāya*).[47] This aspect illustrates the goal of analogy, which is the resultant cognition of analogy (*upamiti* or *upamānaphala*), namely, the determination of the relation between a word and its referent (*sañjñāsañjñisambandhapariccheda*; cf. *samayapariccheda* in the NVTP, NKus and TC). This analogical result is proclaimed to be the objective of analogy, as is already found in the classical theory.[48]

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[44] On Udayana's crucial role as the founder of the Navya-Nyāya, see WADA 2007, pp. 9-23 (chapter 1).

[45] For an account of Vācaspati's theory of analogy, see, e.g., BHATTACHARYA 2004, pp. 288-289.

[46] Cf. n. 73 below.

[47] Udayana classifies the establishment of the relation of a word and its referent (*vācyavācakabhāvavyavasthā*) into five cases; see NVTP, p. 217, ll. 13-17. His fivefold classification is mentioned by Pragalbha, but in a different manner and order; cf. *Pragalbhī* in TC (V), p. 19, ll. 21-22: *pañcadhā hi sañjñā: śṛṅgagrāhikā, pāribhāṣikī, aupādhikī, nimittasaṅkocavatī, naimittikī ceti*. On the fivefold classification of the names or terms (*sañjñā*) in the Navya-Nyāya period, see, e.g., EIPh, vol. VI, p. 416 (in reference to Śaṅkaramiśra's [15th c.] *Vādivinoda*, summarized by V. Varadachari): "Words operate in five ways to give their meaning;" or ibid., p. 327 for a fourfold classification (in reference to Vardhamāna's *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*, summarized by Nani Lal Sen and V. Varadachari); or EIPh, vol. XIII, pp. 385-386 for a threefold classification (in reference to Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācārya's [ca. 17th c.] *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, summarized by B.K. Matilal).

[48] See NVTṬ, p. 363, ll. 11-12 on NS 2.1.47: *tasmāt pratyakṣa eva gavaye gavayatvasya pratyakṣatvāt sañjñāsañjñisambandhaparicchedaḥ pramāṇārthaḥ*.

2.10.1. In this context, Vācaspati's focus is to clarify the mutual re-lationship of each term involved, such as *sañjñā*, *sañjñin*, and *sam-bandha*. According to Vācaspati, the word *gavaya* does not directly denote a thing (*piṇḍa*) as its object; its denotative application to the target object is mediated by *gavaya*-hood (*gavayatvaṃ nimittīkṛ-tya*).[49] This is for him reality or the ultimate state of affairs (*paramā-rtha*).[50]

2.10.2. Since Vācaspati describes the theoretical details mostly in an indirect and deductive manner, an overview of his theoretical con-struction can only be tentative. The presupposition that the universal (*gavaya*-hood) is the basis for the usage of a word (*gavaya*) appears to be closely linked to the conceptualization of the "object charac-terized by a name" (*sañjñin*),[51] or the object to be denoted (*vācya*) in analogical cognition. For Vācaspati, this is *gavaya*-hood, and not (solely) its substratum. An implicitly presupposed condition may be that (1) the denotative application of a word must be preceded by the perception of the thing (such as an animal) which is to be taken for its referent (cf. n. 48 above). Vācaspati practically holds that (2) the knowledge of an analogical statement such as "a *gavaya* is like a cow" is not sufficient, in terms of conclusive causal efficacy, to enable the denotative application of a word. What is required for the application, in addition to (1) the perception of its referent, is a co-herently connected complex of three more elements, namely, in our case (3) the perception of the animal's *gavaya*-hood as the specific

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For classical expressions, see nn. 68 and 72; for the theory in the Spitzer manu-script, see FRANCO 2010, pp. 132-136.

[49]   See NVTṬ, p. 164, ll. 10-11: *atrocyate. na tāvad ākāśādiśabdavad eṣa gavaya-śabdaḥ sākṣāt piṇḍasya vācakaḥ, kintu gavayatvaṃ nimittīkṛtya piṇḍe vartata iti paramārthaḥ*. In response to his opponent, Bhāsarvajña illustrates that the *gavayatva* as the *pravṛttinimitta* is understood by means of a verbal statement; cf. NBhūṣ, p. 420, ll. 14-16: *gavayatvam eva gavayasañjñāpravṛttau nimittaṃ tadagrahaṇe kathaṃ tatsañjñāpravṛttir iti cet, nanu gavayatvam api tata eva vākyāt pratipadyate*; cf. Kumar 1994, p. 43. On Gaṅgeśa's "best (analysis of the) meaning" (*paramārtha*), as translated by PHILLIPS 2012, p. 122, see TC (C), p. 65, l. 3-p. 66, l. 1 = TC (D), p. 30, l. 21-p. 31, l. 2 = TC (V), p. 20, ll. 6-8: *ato gandhādyupalakṣitena pṛthivītvena nimittena pṛthivyādipadavat sādṛśyādyupa-lakṣite gavayatvādau gavayādipadānāṃ śaktir iti tu paramārthataḥ*; cf. n. 53 below. On the role of *gavayatva* in the NKus, see CHATTOPADHYAY 2007, pp. 77-79. On the view of Navya-Nyāya philosophers that "an individual entity qualified by a universal is the meaning of a word," see WADA 2006.

[50]   Udayana paraphrases this word with *vastugati* ("apprehension of reality"); see NVTP, p. 217, l. 20: *paramārtho vastugatiḥ*.

[51]   See NVTṬ, p. 363, l. 9 on NS 2.1.47: *gavayatvaṃ hi sañjñi*.

universal (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*), (4) the perceptual determination about the relation of the *gavaya* and *gavaya*-hood, and (5) the connection of the *gavaya*-hood with the *gavaya*'s similarity to a cow (*gosādṛśya*). The "similarity" in the fifth element is regarded as an indication (*upalakṣaka*) of *gavaya*-hood.[52] The totality of the above elements would justify the epistemological independence of an analogy.

2.10.3. While it is possible that Vācaspati's idea that an analogy must have a linguistic and semantic basis is indirectly represented in his formulation of the resultant cognition of analogy (cf. § 3.4.3 below), it is nonetheless clearly discernible from Jayanta's less explicit and more classical formulation (cf. § 3.1.1 below). Vācaspati formulates his own understanding of analogy as follows:

> NVTṬ, p. 164, ll. 20-21: *vākyārthasmaraṇasahakāri gavayatvajātimataḥ piṇḍasya gosādṛśyadarśanam eva tarkasahāyaṃ gavayatvābhidhāne pramāṇam.*[53]

Not only does Vācaspati's formulation contain the classical elements such as the auxiliary function of recollection and perception of similarity (cf. n. 72 below), it also reflects a more advanced stage of theoretical development, such as the specification by *gavaya*-hood, as described above. Vācaspati sheds fresh light upon the supporting and mediating function of suppositional reasoning (*tarkasahāya*), which excludes, on the grounds of theoretical cumbersome-

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52   Cf. NVTṬ, p. 164, ll. 11-15: *na ca yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya iti vākyād gavayatvam avagatam. na hy anavagatasambandhaṃ gavayapadam etad avabodhayati. tatas tadavagamāt tu sambandhavedane parasparāśrayaprasaṅgaḥ. na ca gosādṛśyenopalakṣyate gavayatvam. na khalv anupalabdhacareṇa gavayatvena gosādṛśyaṃ sambaddhaṃ dṛṣṭam. na cādṛṣṭasambandham upalakṣakam. na hi puruṣeṇādṛṣṭasambandho daṇḍaḥ puruṣam upalakṣayitum arhati.* For another point of view on this text, see KUMAR 1994, p. 40.

53   Translation: "Precisely the perception of the similarity of the thing possessing the universal *gavaya*-hood with the cow, inasmuch as [the perception is] assisted by the recollection of the meaning of the verbal testimony, is the means of valid cognition [called analogy] with regard to the designation of *gavaya*-hood, while [it is] accompanied by suppositional reasoning." For a similar formulation by Gaṅgeśa emphasizing the corroborative and subsidiary role of *tarka*, see TC (C), p. 86, l. 5-p. 87, l. 3 = TC (D), p. 53, ll. 20-22 = TC (V), p. 27, ll. 8-10: *paścāc ca dṛṣṭe 'pi piṇḍe 'tideśavākyārthaṃ smaratas tarkasahakārāt "gavayatvaviśiṣṭo dharmī gavayaśabdavācyaḥ" iti pravṛttinimittaviśeṣaparicchittir upamānaphalam;* for an English translation, see PHILLIPS 2012, pp. 128-129; cf. also n. 49 above.

ness (*kalpanāgaurava*), the view that similarity (*sādṛśya*) is a quali-
fier of the object designated by a word.[54] For Vācaspati, similarity,
which is the object of perception required for an analogical cogni-
tion, remains an element indicative of, for example, *gavaya*-hood,
but not necessarily the qualifier of the target thing. It is of interest
to observe that this latter position, deemed "heavy" or theoretically
cumbersome by Vācaspati, corresponds to the one adopted by Ja-
yanta's "contemporaries," as will be shown below (cf. §§ 3.1.2 and
3.3).

Vācaspati's theoretical elaborations and sophistication appear to
be the basis for the emerging development of the theory of analogy
put forth by Udayana through Gaṅgeśa (cf. § 2.9 above). A further
investigation of the relevant portion of their theories is, however,
beyond the scope of the present paper.

<div align="center">3.</div>

What, then, is Jayanta's description and could the presentation by
Vācaspati under investigation (cf. table 2 above) be connected to
it?[55] Vācaspati's literary style as well as his philosophical tendency
to integrate earlier thoughts in ingenious ways makes it difficult to
prove this conclusively[56] – a frequent methodological difficulty
when examining Vācaspati's indebtedness to his predecessors. Al-
though it is admitted that there is no compelling evidence (such as
evident textual parallels or quotations) on either side, Udayana's
historical information justifies the following investigation. As for
general *points d'appui* indicative of Vācaspati alluding to Jayanta,
there are two terms that appear in the relevant portions in the NVTṬ
and NM. One is the relation of the "naming action" (*sañjñākarma*)

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[54] On Vācaspati's description of the reasoning process based on *tarka*, see NVTṬ,
p. 134, l. 19-p. 135, l. 6 on NS 1.1.6. In particular, for his concluding remark in
terms of logical economy (*lāghava*), see NVTṬ, p. 165, ll. 5-6: *gavayatvajāti-
matpiṇḍābhidhāne tu lāghavam*. On Vācaspati's denial of similarity as a quali-
fier, see NVTṬ, p. 164, l. 22: *tarkaś ca gosādṛśyaviśiṣṭapiṇḍābhidhāne kalpa-
nāgauravaprasaṅgaḥ*; and on the denial of it as *sañjñin*, see NVTṬ, p. 363, l.
11 on NS 2.1.47: *na ca sādṛśyaṃ sañjñi* ≈ NTD, p. 38, l. 31 on NS (NTD ed.)
2.1.51: *na ca... sādṛśyam eva sañjñi* [elision by YM]. On the role of "belief-
warranting *tarka*" after Udayana, see PHILLIPS 2012, e.g., pp. 30-32.

[55] For an account of Jayanta's theory of analogy, cf., e.g., BHATTACHARYA 2004,
pp. 233-237.

[56] For very detailed and helpful observations on Vācaspati's style, see ACHARYA
2006, pp. lxiii-lxvii.

to a perception (*pratyakṣa*). The other is the distinctive role of *upa-plava* ("clouding, covering, obscuring,"[57] or "disturbance, obstacle"). I shall examine this connection in the following sections.

3.1. While in the NVTṬ an opponent denies that there is an exclusive relationship between the action of naming and something actually visible (cf. *na khalu pratyakṣa eva sañjñākarma* in § 2 above),[58] this is treated positively, though with a different implication, by the Naiyāyika proponent in the NM and illustrated as a doctrinally crucial component of analogy. It is referred to thrice in the NM: (1) *ata eva pratyakṣapūrvakaṃ sañjñākarmety ācakṣate* (NM, vol. I, p. 377, l. 2);[59] (2) *pratyakṣapūrvakaṃ sañjñākarmeti na hi vaidikī | codanā* (in a stanza; NM, vol. I, p. 377, ll. 11-12); and (3) *pratyakṣapūrvakaṃ tasmāt sañjñākarmeti gīyate*[60] (in a stanza; NM, vol. I, p. 380, l. 1).

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[57] In addition to lexicographically known meanings such as "*Störung*" (PW, vol. I, p. 960), my tentative renderings are derived from the meaning of the verb *upa-plu* (PW, vol. IV, p. 1191: "*überziehen*"; and "*getrübt, bezogen*" for *upapluta* used in some compounded words).

[58] Bhāsarvajña, who, as a Naiyāyika, is well known for his exceptional rejection of analogy as an independent means of valid cognition, and insists upon the analogy's inclusion in verbal testimony (see Eli Franco's contribution to the present volume), appears to advocate a similar objection; see NSāra, p. 422, ll. 5-6: *na ca pratyakṣa evārthe sañjñāsañjñisambandhapratipattiḥ, apratyakṣe 'pi śakrādau sañjñāsañjñisambandhapratipattidarśanāt*; cf. NBhūṣ, p. 420, ll. 10-11. Svāmī Yogīndrānanda, the editor of the NBhūṣ, believes that the *uttarapakṣa* part in the NVTṬ (parts B-D in table 2) as identified by Vardhamāna is refuted by Bhāsarvajña, and quotes the texts of NBhūṣ, p. 420, ll. 10-11 and 24-25 to compare them; see the editor's *prāgbandha*, p. 11, item (4): *tad etad nyāyabhūṣaṇakāro nirākaroti*. However, parts from B to D, including part A, are basically to be traced back to the NM, as the present paper will show. For a hint of allusions to Jayanta in Bhāsarvajña's presentation, see nn. 78, 81 and 82 in relation to the concept of *upaplava*. On Bhāsarvajña's anteriority to Vācaspati, see MUROYA 2011.

[59] K.S. Varadacharya, the editor of the NM, connects this statement to Vācaspati's formulation (in my division it is part B in table 2; cf. § 3.3 below) and probably to a passage in Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*, *upamāna* section, *k.* 9 as quoted by Jayanta (NM, vol. I, p. 389, ll. 15-17: *yathā bhavadbhir naiyāyikā uktāḥ – atha tv adhikatā kācit pratyakṣād eva sā bhaved iti*). See Varadacharya's *ṭippaṇī*, NM, vol. I, p. 377, ll. 17-20 (*etattattvaṃ tu uttaratra* [389 puṭe] *vyaktī-bhaviṣyati. ācakṣate – tathā ca vācaspatimiśrāḥ...*); cf. KUMAR 1994, p. 24.

[60] Apart from this, Jayanta associates the action of "singing, praising" ($\sqrt{g\bar{\imath}}$) with *pravaramuni* ("eminent sage") at the end of the analogy section (NM, vol. I, p. 395, l. 7: *parigrāhyaṃ tasmāt pravaramunigītaṃ sumatibhiḥ* ‖), but this sage's identity is not clear from Jayanta's ambiguous formulation. SHAH 1978, p. 189 holds that he is referring to Akṣapāda. Jayanta's use of the epithet *muni* to refer

The first statement is placed at the end of introducing the position of Naiyāyika "contemporaries" (*adyatanāḥ*), the second in their opponent's criticism and the third in the response by Jayanta's "contemporaries." The aspect centered upon perception is also advocated by presumably Naiyāyika opponents ("*anye*"[61]) introduced by the Vaiśeṣika philosopher Vyomaśiva (ca. 10th c.), probably the learned Śaiva guru Vyomaśiva of Araṇipadra (modern Ranod), in his *Vyomavatī*.[62] These Naiyāyika opponents, reminiscent of Jayanta's description of his "contemporaries," adduce an alleged *sūtra* "*pratyakṣaṃ sañjñākarma*" as authenticating evidence for acknowledging analogy as an independent means of valid cognition.[63]

3.1.1. What is the theory of Jayanta's "contemporaries"? To begin with their stock example, there is a creature (*prāṇin*) which is not known to a city-dweller, featured as the cognizing subject (*pramātṛ*); this city-dweller has heard a statement of extension (*atideśavākya*)[64] such as "a *gavaya* is like a cow" (*yathā gaus tathā gavayaḥ*)

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to the legendary author of the NS is found in the NM several times (e.g., *akṣapādamuni* in NM, vol. I, p. 2, l. 6 and p. 282, l. 3; *akṣapādo muniḥ* in NM, vol. II, p. 718, l. 4; or *munir akṣapādaḥ* in NM, vol. I, p. 614, l. 4; *mahānuni* in NM, vol. I, p. 71, l. 14), in addition to *vyāsamuni* in NM, vol. II, p. 453, l. 18 or *kapilamuni* in NM, vol. I, p. 70, l. 18.

61   See Vyo, p. 588, l. 28.

62   On this identity, including bibliographical information, see DEZSŐ 2004, Notes, pp. 58-60. I am grateful to Professor Alexis Sanderson for initially drawing my attention to this identity and allowing me to access valuable extracts from his "prosopographical file" (dated 27 April 2012). On different possibilities including bibliographical information, see, e.g., EIPh, vol. II, pp. 424-425; PATIL 2013, p. 97, n. 16.

63   See Vyo, p. 589, ll. 2-3: *na ca vākyād eva saṅketapratipattiḥ, gavayapiṇḍasya parokṣatvāt, pratyakṣaṃ sañjñākarmeti sūtravyāghātāc ca*; the edition appears to disconnect *sañjñākarmeti* from *sūtravyāghātāc* by placing a comma in between, which I do not adopt here. In his summary of the Vyo, V. Varadachari regards this *sūtra* as *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (VS) 2.1.19 (*pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt sañjñākarmaṇaḥ*), and includes the relevant portion in Vyomaśiva's response to the presumably Naiyāyika opponent, with which my above description is not compatible; cf. EIPh, vol. II, p. 448. On Śaṅkaramiśra's different transmission of VS 2.1.19, cf. VS, *prathamaṃ pariśiṣṭam*, p. 81.

64   The term *atideśavākya* is variously rendered by modern scholarship. On its usage in the context of analogy, see NTD, p. 38, l. 13 on NS (ed. NTD) 2.1.51 = NS 2.1.48: *tatheti sādṛśyābhidhānam upasaṃhāraḥ, atra sthitasyānyatrātideśaḥ* ("The *upasaṃhāra* ['application' as mentioned in the *sūtra*] means the statement of similarity such as '[it is] like this,' [and is] the extension of something subsisting in this [object] to a different [object]."). For a detailed account of its general usage in philosophical contexts, see OBERHAMMER, PRETS AND

from a forester; wandering about in a forest, the city-dweller notices a creature similar to a cow; recalling the above statement, he understands that "this is that which is designated by the word *gavaya*" (*ayaṃ sa gavayaśabdavācyaḥ*).[65] In this process of identifying the formerly unknown animal with the specific name *gavaya*, according to Jayanta's "contemporaries," analogy (1) is the cognition of the creature's resemblance to a thing already well known (*prasiddha-piṇḍasārūpyajñāna*), (2) arises from the perception (*indriyaja*) of the creature and (3) brings about the understanding of the relation between the name and the thing denoted by it (*sañjñāsañjñisamban-dhapratipattiphala*).[66]

3.1.2. How much does Jayanta's own theory comply with these three aspects focused upon by his "contemporaries"? His acceptance of the third aspect is roughly confirmed in the description (underlined as [3'] below) given in his *Nyāyakalikā* (NKal).[67]

> NKal, p. 3, ll. 12-14 = NKal (K), p. 216, ll. 3-5: *yathā gaus tathā gavaya ity āṭavikaprayuktātideśavākyasaṃskṛtamater aṭavīṃ paryaṭato* (a)*gopin-ḍasārūpyāvacchinnagavayapiṇḍajñānaṃ* (3')*sañjñāsañjñisambandhapari-cchedaphalam upamānam*.[68]

PRANDSTETTER 1991, pp. 22-24 ("Einbeziehendes Hinweisen").

[65] See NM, vol. I, p. 376, ll. 5-8: *śrutātideśavākyo hi nāgarakaḥ*[a] *kānane paribhra-māṇo*[b] *gosadṛśaṃ prāṇinam avalokayati*[c]. *tato vanecarapuruṣakathitam "yathā gaus tathā gavayaḥ" iti vacanam anusmarati. smṛtvā ca pratipadyate − ayaṃ sa*[d] *gavayaśabdavācya iti.* (v.l.: a. *nāgarakaḥ*] ed., P, S; *nāgarikaḥ* C − b. *pari-bhramāṇo*] C, P; *paribhraman* ed., S − c. *avalokayati*] C, P; *avagacchati* ed., S − d. *sa*] C, P, S; om. ed.)

[66] NM, vol. I, p. 376, ll. 1-3: *adyatanās tu vyācakṣate*: *śrutātideśavākyasya pra-mātur aprasiddhe piṇḍe* (1) *prasiddhapiṇḍasārūpyajñānam* (2) *indriyajaṃ* (3) *sañjñāsañjñisambandhapratipattiphalam upamānam.* Cf. BIJALWAN 1977, p. 188.

[67] On Jayanta's authorship of the NKal, see MARUI 2000, 2008 and 2014, pp. 59-95.

[68] From a terminological point of view, the expression *sañjñāsañjñisambandha-paricchedaphala* is used in the NM by an opponent of the elder Naiyāyikas; see NM, vol. I, p. 374, ll. 10-11: *na ca sañjñāsañjñisambandhaparicchedaphala-tvena pramāṇāntaratā vaktavyā*; at the same time, a similar expression, *sañjñā-sañjñisambandhapariccheda*, appears in Vācaspati's own formulation of analo-gy's objective, as in n. 48 above; see also Udayana's NKus, *k*. 3.10: *samban-dhasya paricchedaḥ sañjñāyāḥ sañjñinā saha* │ *patyakṣāder asādhyatvād upa-mānaphalaṃ viduḥ* ‖ (cited in TRSS, p. 89, ll. 10-11 as *udayanasammati* "Uda-yana's view"); cf. BIJALWAN 1997, p. 196. Expressions such as *-sambandha-pratipatti* (see n. 66 above) or *-sambandhabodha* (NM, vol. I, p. 381, l. 1) appear in the position Jayanta supports.

NM, vol. I, p. 380, ll. 15-16: (a')*gosārūpya*ᵃ*viśesitavipinagatagavayapinda-darśanam* (2')*adhyaksa*ᵇ*phalam api tadanavagata*ᶜ*sañjñāsañjñisamban-dhabodhavidhānād*ᵈ *upamānam ucyate.*[69]

The expression underlined with (a) in the NKal does not fully cor-respond to the first aspect indicated by Jayanta's "contemporaries" (cf. § 3.1.1), but rather to the expression underlined as (a') in the passage quoted here from the NM.

Yet, the correspondence between (a) and (a') is not free of un-certainty. The usage of *gavayapindajñāna* in the NKal is slightly ambiguous in relation to its equivalent *gavayapindadarśana* in the NM, since the former does not specify the perceptional aspect of analogy (the aspect listed as [2] above) as clearly as Jayanta's "con-temporaries" do. The above passage of the NM shows up in the counterargument by Jayanta's "contemporaries" against their oppo-nent, where they establish analogy's status, admitting that (2') it is in effect the result of perception (*pratyaksaphala*, *adhyaksaphala*).[70]

As mentioned above (cf. § 2.10.3), the aspect of the *gavaya* being qualified by its similarity to a cow (cf. *avacchinna*, a slightly strong term, in the NKal, and *viśesita* in the NM) as formulated in (a) and (a') is regarded by Vācaspati as theoretically cumbersome.

3.1.3. K.S. Varadacharya, the editor of the NM, calls the position of Jayanta's "contemporaries" *upamānasvarūpe vārttikapaksaḥ*.[71] The pandit from Mysore appears to ascribe the position to Uddyotakara. This position can be in essence traced back to Uddyotakara's proto-typical formulation.[72] As mentioned above (cf. § 3.1.2), however,

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[69] v.l.: a. *gosārūpya-*] ed., C, S; *gosādṛśya* P – b. *adhyaksa-*] ed., P, S; *apy aksa* C – c. *tadanavagata-*] ed., P, S; *tadavagata* C – d. *-dhānād*] ed., P, S; *dhānām* C.

[70] Gaurinath Sastri, the editor of the TC (V), includes the above passage of the NM in Jayanta's own opinion: *jayantabhattais tu svamatavarnanāvasare kathi-tam...* [elision by YM]; cf. his *prāstāvika*, p. (ca). Such being the case, the *vayam* ("we") in NM, vol. I, p. 380, l. 13 can be rendered as referring also to Jayanta himself: *tasyaiva ca vayam brūma upamānapramānatām* ‖. "And we claim that precisely this [result of perception] is the means of valid cognition [called] ana-logy."

[71] For this designation, see NM, vol. I, p. 376, l. 1.

[72] See NV, p. 54, ll. 2-3 on NS 1.1.6: *āgamāhitasamskārasmrtyapeksam sārūpya-jñānam upamānam* ("Analogy is the cognition of resemblance on the basis of the recollection [arising] from the impression left by verbal testimony."); cf. ibid., p. 245, ll. 8-9 on NS 2.1.48: *āgamāhitasamskārasmrtyapeksam sārūpya-pratyaksam upamānam*. On Uddyotakara's formulation, see, e.g., KUMAR 1994,

the primary definition of analogy by Jayanta's "contemporaries" explicitly states that it arises from perception (*indriyaja*, *indriyajanita*), showing a relatively more advanced stage of theoretical development.[73]

3.1.4. One might mention in passing that the theory of the elder Naiyāyikas, who clearly advocate analogy as being a "statement of extension" (*atideśavākya*),[74] is not mentioned in the NKal. In the

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p. 17, OBERHAMMER, PRETS AND PRANDSTETTER 1996, p. 47 (containing a German translation of the second passage) and BHATTACHARYA 2004, p. 178). For Vācaspati's re-formulation, see NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 3-4 on NS 1.1.6: *etad uktaṃ bhavati – na kevalaṃ sārūpyajñānaṃ samākhyāsambandhapratipattihetuḥ, api tv āgamārthasmṛtyapekṣam iti*; cf. ibid., p. 361, ll. 15-16 on NS 2.1.44: *yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya ity atideśavākyārthasmṛtisahakāri sārūpyajñānaṃ sādhyasya gavayo 'yam iti sañjñāsañjñisambandhasya sādhanam upamānam*. Uddyotakara's formulation is closely related to a definition referred to by Jinendrabuddhi (ca. 8th c.), the commentator on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and its *vṛtti*, as pertaining to some Pakṣila: see PIND 2009, A29 (*pakṣilas tv āha – āgamāhitasaṃskārasmṛtyapekṣāt sādharmyajñānāt samākhyāsambandhapratipattir upamānārtha iti*). The first half of this definition by Pakṣila is found nowhere in the current version of Vātsyāyana's NBh.

73 A specific mention of the aspect of perception in the analogical process is also made by other Naiyāyikas, as is shown in their definition of *upamāna*: NBhūṣ, p. 419, ll. 20-21 (*vākyajajñānajanitasaṃskārajanitasmṛtisahakāriṇendriyeṇa janitaṃ sārūpyajñānam upamānam*) ≈ NMuk, vol. II, p. 36, l. 22 (*vākyajanitajñānāhitasaṃskārasamudbhūtasmaraṇasahakārīndriyajanitaṃ sārūpyasaṃvedanam upamānam*); NTD, p. 37, ll. 3-4 (*vākyārthasmaraṇasahakāri pratyakṣajanitadharmajñānaṃ sañjñāsañjñisambandhapratītiphalakam upamānam*; cf. also NTD, p. 4, ll. 3-4 and p. 39, ll. 3-5). Vācaspati holds that analogy is preceded by perception and verbal testimony: *upamānaṃ tu pratyakṣapūrvakam api śabdapūrvakam evety asyānumānād apakarṣaḥ* (NVTṬ, p. 84, ll. 8-9 on NS 1.1.3). While keeping the same theoretical focus, Vācaspati also adopts other terminologies. He divides the analogical process, more precisely the establishment (*prasiddhi*) of similarity, into the two aspects, one by verbal testimony (*śrutamayī* "born of verbal testimony") and the other by perception (*pratyakṣamayī* "born of perception"); see NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 5-6 (*prasiddhasādharmyād ity atra prasiddhir ubhayī: śrutamayī pratyakṣamayī ca*); see also KUMAR 1994, p. 18. Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara's similar formulation as edited by Kishore Nath Jha (NTD, p. 4, l. 22: *prasiddhiś cobhayī. pratyakṣamayy anumānamayī ca*) is not supported by the manuscript NTD (T) from Trivandrum, whereas its transcript NTD (M), utilized for the printed edition, reads as reproduced by Jha; see NTD (M), p. 6, l. 13. The manuscript points to a lacuna due to the presence of the second *ca*: *prasiddhiś cobhayī patyakṣamayī ca* (NTD [T], f. 3v,1), which is most probably to be reconstructed together with *śrutamayī* as Vācaspati transmits it: *prasiddhiś cobhayī ⟨śrutamayī⟩ pratyakṣamayī ca*.

74 See NM, vol. I, p. 374, ll. 1-2: *atra vṛddhanaiyāyikās tāvad evam upamānasvarūpam ācakṣate – sañjñāsañjñisambandhapratītiphalaṃ prasiddhetarayoḥ*

NM, for its part, the elder's position is characterized as reflected in the Bhāṣyakāra's words and is not explicitly denied by Jayanta.[75]

3.2. If we return to the issue of the relationship between Jayanta's presentation and that of Vācaspati, the criticism of the opponent in the NVTṬ that perception is not exclusively in charge of an action of naming (cf. § 2 above) may be regarded as standing in affinity with the objection by the opponent in the NM. The following passages in the discourse of Jayanta's opponent may also be of relevance for a comparison with the text of part A in the NVTṬ:

> NM, vol. I, p. 378, ll. 1-2: *sa tu pratyakṣato vāstu pramāṇāntarato 'pi vā ǀ smaryamāṇe 'pi cārthe 'sti saṅketakaraṇaṃ kvacit ǁ*; ibid., l. 14: *pratyakṣāgamasiddhe 'rthe tasmān mānāntareṇa kim ǁ*.[76]

> NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 10-11: *tac ca yadi mānāntareṇāpi tathāvagamyate, kas tatra sañjñākarma nivārayet*.[77]

The main argument by both opponents is that the objective of analogical cognition, which is the act assigning or establishing a verbal convention (*saṅketakaraṇa* in the NM) or the action of naming (*sañjñākarma* in the NVTṬ), is realized by a means of cognition other than analogy, as acknowledged in the Nyāya tradition. This shows that the Naiyāyika's analogy is superfluous.

3.3. Furthermore, the opponent of Jayanta's "contemporaries" analyzes the psychological state and process that occurs during analo-

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sārūpyapratipādakam atideśavākyam evopamānam ≈ NKC, vol. II, p. 497, ll. 9-10. For a German translation of this passage, see OBERHAMMER, PRETS AND PRANDSTETTER 1996, p. 47.

[75] See NM, vol. I, p. 375, l. 16: *bhāṣyākṣarāṇy apy etat[a]pakṣasākṣyacchāyām iva vahanti[b] lakṣyante* (v.l.: a. *etat-*] C, P; *caitat* ed., S – b. *vahanti*] P; *vadanti* ed., S; *dadhantī* C).

[76] Translation: "But let it [i.e., the determination of the object to be named (*avacchedaḥ sañjñinaḥ*)] be either due to perception or to some other means of valid cognition. Furthermore, one conventionally assigns [a name to its object] in reference to a particular thing when the object is recollected. [...] Therefore, when an object is established by perception and verbal testimony, there is no use of another means of valid cognition [such as analogy]."

[77] Translation: "And if it [i.e., the naming action (*sañjñākarma*)] is also apprehended by some other means [of valid cognition that is not analogy] in this manner [i.e., if it is applied to the thing as excluded from the homogenous and heterogeneous (*samānāsamānajātīyavyavacchinna*)], who could suppress the naming action regarding this [kind of thing]?"

gical reasoning. He holds that even if a cognizing subject's awareness of a yet unidentified animal *gavaya* remains "covered" or "obscured/fuzzy" (*sa-upaplavā*), on the mere basis of verbal testimony about the *gavaya*'s likeness to cow, the connection between the name *gavaya* and the animal denoted by it is not obscured at all.[78] Jayanta's "contemporaries" deny this. Their response suggests a possible affinity with the idea presented by Vācaspati (part B in table 2):

NM, vol. I, p. 379, ll. 2-3: *atrāhuḥ − nāṭavikaraṭitād vākyād vispaṣṭaḥ*[a] *sañjñāsañjñisambandhapratyayo bhavitum arhati, sañjñinas tadānīm apratyakṣatvāt. yady api ca*[b] *gosārūpyaviśiṣṭatayā tadavaccheda*[c] *upapāditaḥ, tathāpi sopaplavaiva tadānīm bhavati*[d] *buddhiḥ.*[79]

NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 13-15: *tathāpi yāvad* "*ayam asau gavayaḥ*" *iti sākṣāt pratīte sambandhini sañjñām na niveśayati, tāvad ayaṃ pariplutamatiḥ pramātā* "*kaccit khalu drakṣyāmi tādṛśaṃ piṇḍaṃ yatra gavayasañjñāṃ pratipatsye*" *iti pramotsuka evodīkṣate.*[80]

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[78] NM, vol. I, p. 378, ll. 10-11: *atha sopaplavā vākyād buddhir ity abhidhīyate ‖ upaplavo 'pi sambandhe na kaścid anubhūyate |*. As regards this passage, Yogīndrānanda, the editor of the NBhūṣ, refers to a passage by an opponent appearing in the NBhūṣ (p. 420, l. 24: *nanu vākyād upaplutā pratipattir āsīt*) as evidence for Bhāsarvajña's reproduction of Jayanta's views (prāgbandha, p. 15, no. 5: *bhāsarvajñas tu jayantavādān anuvāvadītīti vidyate*); cf. his prāgbandha, p. 16, item (ca) under no. 5; see also n. 58 above.

[79] v.l.: a. *vispaṣṭaḥ*] ed., P, S; *vispaṣṭaṃ* C – b. *ca*] C, P; om. ed., S – c. *-avaccheda*] C, P, S; *avagama* ed. – d. *tadānīṃ bhavati*] C, P; *bhavati tadānīm* ed., S. Translation: "They reply to this [objection]. An awareness of the relation between a name and its object cannot become vivid on the [mere] basis of a statement shouted by a forester, because the object denoted by the name is not cognized by perception at that time [of the cognizer's hearing the statement]. And even if the determination of this [object], as qualified by [its] similarity to a cow, is established [by the statement], even in this way the awareness [of the cognizer] remains obscured at that time." For an account of this passage, see BIJALWAN 1977, p. 201.

[80] Translation: "Even in this manner, as long as he does not apply a name to the object that is related [to the name and] is cognized directly in this way: 'This is that *gavaya*,' this cognizer, whose awareness is thoroughly obscured, is [still] expectant [of the following], just striving after true cognition: 'I really hope that I will see such a kind of thing for which I will understand the name *gavaya*.'" I have understood *kaccit* as an interrogative in the sense of *kāmapravedana* (*Amarakośa*) or *iṣṭaparipraśna* (*Medinīkośa*), an aspect which is implied by *-utsuka*; cf. PW, vol. II, p. 47, s.v. "*kad* mit *cit*." The editor of the NM reads *kaścit* instead of *kaccit*; cf. n. 59 above.

Despite the differences in rhetoric and theoretical details, the above comparison shows that their main argument is grounded in the idea that for the city-dweller, the cognizing subject, the awareness (*buddhi* or *pratyaya* in the NM, or *mati* in the NVTṬ) of the *gavaya* remains obscured (*sa-upaplava* in the NM or *paripluta* in the NVTṬ) until the actual connection of the name with its object, or the actual application of the name to its object, takes place. This becomes possible only after the target object is perceived on the spot. In Jayanta's work the concept of *upaplava* recurrently appears in the justification of analogy by his "contemporaries," in sharp contrast to the unique mention in the NVTṬ.[81] Expressions standing in contradistinction to it in the NM are, for instance, *vispaṣṭa* (see the above quotation), *nirupaplava* and *nirākāṅkṣā*.[82]

3.4. The passage in part C (table 2) ≈ part 2 (table 1), a portion ascribed by Vardhamāna to Jayanta and others (cf. §§ 2.2-3 above), calls for some explanation. The content is concerned with the operability of verbal testimony (*vākya*) and perception (*pratyakṣa*) if analogy is not approved as an independent means of valid cognition but is included in one or the other. It is possible to compare Vācaspati's formulation with certain passages of the NM as they are reproduced by Prabhācandra (ca. 11th c.) in his NKC with additional phrases, but also, stylistically, with Udayana's concise formulation. The renowned paṇḍit and editor Mahendra Kumar has already noted the relation of the passage in the NKC to the NM and NKus.[83] Let me compare the relevant passages:

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[81]   See, for instance, NM, vol. I, p. 378, ll. 10-11 (*sopaplavā... buddhir iti... upaplavo 'pi...*); p. 379, ll. 12 (*buddhyupaplavaḥ*) and 13 (*dadhāti śyāmalāṃ dhiyam*; the editor's *ṭippaṇī: sakalaṅkāṃ* "stained," *sopaplavām*); p. 380, ll. 5-7 (*na nivartata evopaplavaḥ*) and 9-10 (*sa upaplavo viraṃsyati*); p. 389, ll. 11-12 (*sopaplavā... upamānān nirupaplavībhavati*); cf. Kumar 1994, pp. 46-47. Cf. also NBhūṣ, p. 420, l. 25 (*ko 'yam upaplavaḥ*) and NVTP, p. 217, l. 5 (*kaḥ pariplavārthaḥ*). Cakradhara (ca. 11th c.) explains *sopaplavā* with *anirākāṅkṣā*; cf. NMGBh, p. 68, l. 13.

[82]   See NM, vol. I, p. 379, l. 6 (*na nirākāṅkṣatā puṃsas... upajāyate*; the BORI ms. [P] reads *puṃsas* instead of *-buddhis* given in the edition); p. 381, ll. 4-6 (*buddhir... nirupaplavā jāyate*). The editor of the NM paraphrases *vispaṣṭa* with *nirupaplava*; see his *ṭippaṇī* on NM, vol. I, p. 379, l. 14. For a similar position on the psychological transition from obscurity to clarity or settlement, as presented by an opponent of Bhāsarvajña, see NBhūṣ, p. 420, ll. 24-25: *nanu vākyād upaplutā pratipattir āsīt, upamānāt tu sañjñāviśeṣāvacchedena vyavasthitā bhavati*; see also n. 78 above, where the first half of the text has already been quoted.

[83]   See the editor's note in NKC, vol. II, p. 497, n. 1.

NVTṬ, p. 163, ll. 16-17: *na cāsau vākyamātrasahāyo 'pratyakṣīkṛtagosa-dṛśagavayatvajātimatpiṇḍaḥ "ayam asau gavayākhyaḥ" iti pratipattum arhati, na ca vākyaṃ vinā pratyakṣamātrāt.*[84]

NKC, vol. II, p. 497, ll. 4-6: *nāpy āgamasya tatphalam. na khalu nāgara-kaḥ pratipattā [sic] āraṇyakavākyād evāraṇyasthaprāṇinaṃ gavayaśab-davācyatayā pratipadyate, kintu sārūpyaṃ prasiddhena gavā tasya pa-śyan.*[85] ≈ NM, vol. I, p. 375, ll. 10-11.[86]

NKC, vol. II, p. 497, ll. 2-3: *na hi pratyakṣasya tatphalam, vanasthagava-yākāramātraparicchedaphalatvāt tasya.*[87] ≈ NM, vol. I, p. 376, ll. 10-11.[88]

NKus, p. 377, ll. 5-7: *seyaṃ na tāvad vākyamātraphalam, anupalabdha-piṇḍasyāpi prasaṅgāt. nāpi pratyakṣaphalam, aśrutavākyasyāpi prasaṅ-gāt.*[89]

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[84] Translation: "But that [cognizer], who is supported merely by a verbal state-ment, [but] has not yet perceived the thing which possesses the universal '*ga-vaya*-hood' and is similar to the cow, is not able to understand that 'this is that which is called *gavaya*.' And [this understanding does] not [occur to him, ei-ther,] due to mere perception, without the verbal statement."

[85] Translation: "Nor does its (the analogy's) result pertain to verbal testimony. As you should know, the city-dweller who is the subject of understanding does not understand the creature in the forest as designated by the word *gavaya* exclu-sively on the basis of the forester's statement, but rather [he can understand it thus only] as the one who is [actually] perceiving the similarity of this [*gavaya*] with the cow already known." In the NKC, the text is continued with a passage on *atiprasaṅga* that is not clearly identified in the NM; see NKC, vol. II, p. 497, ll. 6-7: *na hi gavayadarśane "ayaṃ sa gavayaśabdavācyaḥ" iti sañjñāsañjñi-sambandhapratītir yuktā, atiprasaṅgāt.*

[86] NM, vol. I, p. 375, ll. 10-11: *pratipattā hi*[a] *nāgarako*[b] *nāraṇyakavākyād eva taṃ prāṇinaṃ gavayaśabdavācyatayā budhyate, kintu sārūpyaṃ*[c] *prasiddhena gavā tasya paśyann*[d] *iti* (v.l.: a. *hi*] P; *'pi* ed., C, S – b. *nāgarako*] P, S; *nāgariko* ed., C – c. *sārūpyaṃ*] ed., C, P; om. S – d. *paśyann iti*] C, P; *paśyati* ed., S).

[87] Translation: "For, its (the analogy's) result does not pertain to perception, be-cause its (the perception's) result is the determination of the mere form of a *gavaya* in the forest."

[88] NM, vol. I, p. 376, ll. 10-11: *pratyakṣaṃ tāvad etasmin viṣaye na kṛtaśramam | vanasthagavayākāraparicchedaphalaṃ hi tat ||.* Cf. Kumar 1994, p. 35.

[89] Translation: "First, this [awareness (*mati*), i.e., 'This is that which is designated by the word *gavaya*'] here is not the result of mere statement, because it would [otherwise] occur, as an undesirable consequence, even to him who has not per-ceived the [target] thing. Nor is it the result of perception, because it would [otherwise] occur, as an undesirable consequence, even to him who has not heard the statement." For another English translation, see Dravid 1996, p. 264; see also Kumar 1994, p. 47.

3.4.1. From the viewpoint of the main assertion presented here, the passages all point out the theoretical insufficiency and restriction of a position that subsumes analogy either under verbal testimony or under perception. Vācaspati's justification is not as explicit as Jayanta's explanation or Udayana's unitary argument resorting to the two undesirable consequences (*prasaṅga*).

3.4.2. The position held by Jayanta's "contemporaries" is given a still more elaborate and broader description. Between the two passages quoted above from the NKC (cf. § 3.4), Prabhācandra inserts an argument against the reduction of analogy to inference, making again an unacknowledged citation from the NM.[90] A set of three counterarguments occurs in Jayanta's description. One of the Naiyāyikas' intentions in this controversy is to establish that analogy is distinct not only from perception and verbal testimony, but also from other candidates such as inference and recollection. Their emphasis on the specificity of analogy is densely expressed by such terms as *ananyajanya*, *ananyakāraṇaka*,[91] *upamānaikajanyā*, or *na pramāṇāntarodbhavā*.[92] The absence of the counterargument against

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[90] See NKC, vol. II, p. 497, ll. 3-4: *nāpy anumānasya, pakṣadharmānvayavyatire-kādisāmagrīm antareṇāpi sañjñāsañjñisambandhapratipatter utpādapratīteḥ.* ≈ NM, vol. I, p. 381, ll. 8-9 (*na caitāvatā*[a] "*anumānam evedam*" *ity āśaṅkanīyam, anapekṣitapakṣadharmānvayavyatirekādisāmagrīkasya tatpratyayotpādāt* [v.l.: a. *na caitāvatā*] C, P; *naitāvatā* ed., S]).

[91] There is a text-critical problem in the manuscript transmission of the NM with regard to *ananyajanya* ("something that does not arise from any other [means of cognition than analogy]") and *ananyakāraṇaka* ("something that does not have any other [cognitive] cause [than analogy]"). The printed editions do not record these important terms in Jayanta's description. The two most reliable manuscripts of the NM, one (BORI) written in Śāradā and the other (University of Calicut) in Malayalam script, retain the superior text which qualifies the resultant cognition of analogy (*upamānaphala* or *upamiti*). My reconstruction of the relevant portion, NM, vol. I, p. 376, ll. 8-10, is as follows: *tad etat sañjñā-sañjñisambandhavijñānam*[a] *ananyajanyam*[b] *ity upamānaphalam ucyate*[c]. *katham punar idam ananyakāraṇakaṃ jñānam ucyate*[d]. (v.l.: a. *-vijñānam*] C, P; *jñānaṃ* ed., S – b. *ananyajanyam*] C, P; *tajjanyam* ed., S – c. *ucyate*] C, P; *ity ucyate* ed., S – d. *kathaṃ... ucyate*] C, P [*-karaṇa-*]; om. ed., S). Prabhācandra's allusion to the first half of this text, especially, *pratyakṣādyajanya-*, confirms my reconstruction; see NKC, vol. II, p. 497, ll. 1-2: *tad etat sañjñāsañjñisam-bandhajñānaṃ pratyakṣādyajanyatvād upamānaphalam.* On Prabhācandra's quotation of the NM, see n. 96 below.

[92] On *upamānaikajanyā* ("something [i.e., the awareness] which arises exclusive-ly from analogy") and *na pramāṇāntarodbhavā* ("something [i.e., the aware-ness] which does not originate from any other means of cognition [than analo-

the reduction of analogy to inference in the NVTṬ renders doubtful the assumption that part C specifically alludes to Jayanta's text in the NM, unless it refers to Jayanta's NKal (cf. *pratyakṣāgamābhyām anyatarasmād api*).[93] In fact, Uddyotakara had already been confronted by some opponent unable to distinguish analogy from perception and verbal testimony.[94] With reservations, accordingly, the first half of part D (*āgamapratyakṣābhyām anyad evedam*) can be regarded as a generalizing echo of the theoretical and argumentative preoccupation observed in the NV on which Vācaspati comments.

3.4.3. In the description of the NVTṬ, the target animal *gavaya* is dealt with as something qualified by a specific qualifier, "possessing the universal *gavaya*-hood" (*gavayatvajātimant-*), whereas this component is not explicit in the NM. Rather, it is assumed that this additional component is required by Vācaspati's own theory of analogy (cf. §§ 2.10-2.10.2 above).[95]

3.4.4. It is worthy to note that the first passage quoted above from the NKC (cf. § 3.4) is not found in the theory of Jayanta's "contemporaries," whom Prabhācandra calls the "modern Naiyāyikas" (*abhinavanaiyāyika*).[96] It is rather found in Jayanta's presentation of

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gy]"), see NM, vol. I, p. 381, ll. 10-11: *tasmād ayaṃ sa gavayo nāmety evaṃvidhā matiḥ | upamānaikajanyaiva na pramāṇāntarodbhavā ‖*.

[93]   See NKal, p. 3, ll. 14-16 = NKal (K), p. 216, ll. 5-7: *gopiṇḍasārūpyaviśiṣṭagavayapiṇḍasya sañjñāsañjñisambandhapratīteḥ pratyakṣāgamābhyām anyatarasmād apy asiddheḥ*. The description in the NKal focuses on distinguishing analogy from perception and/or verbal testimony. This twofold alternative is not clearly identified in the NM; the fact that the dual case presumably expresses the duality of perception and verbal testimony reminds me of Udayana's presentation of the old Naiyāyika's theory about *vākyapratyakṣasamāhāra* ("aggregation of statement and perception"; cf. parts 3-5 in table 1 in § 2.5 above).

[94]   For Uddyotakara's opponent, see NV, p. 54, l. 6 on NS 1.1.6: *pratyakṣāgamābhyāṃ nopamānaṃ bhidyate*. The NS itself is preoccupied with rejecting the opinion that analogy is included in inference (NS 2.1.46: *pratyakṣeṇāpratyakṣasiddheḥ*). Cf. KUMAR 1994, p. 39.

[95]   In a gloss by Vācaspati on the NBh, a similar formulation (*gavayatvasāmānyaviśeṣavant-*) occurs; see NVTṬ, p. 162, ll. 6-7 on NS 1.1.6: *prajñāpanīyasya gavayaśabdavācyatayā pratyakṣadṛśyamānagosādṛśyasya gavayatvasāmānyaviśeṣavataḥ piṇḍasya prajñāpanam upamānam*. Cf. BIJALWAN 1977, p. 189.

[96]   NKC, vol. II, p. 497, l. 14: *atrocyate. yat tāvad abhinavanaiyāyikair abhihitam – śrutātideśavākyasyetyādi*. The *pratīka* "*śrutātideśavākyasya*" introduces the text of NKC, vol. II, p. 496, l. 8-p. 497, l. 2 (≈ NM, vol. I, p. 376, ll. 2-9) which Prabhācandra quotes after adducing the *upamāna-sūtra* (NKC, vol. II, p. 496, ll. 4-5 = e.g., NM, vol. I, p. 381, l. 14) as the tenet of Naiyāyikas on analogy, as well as its gloss made by Jayanta (NKC, vol. II, p. 496, ll. 6-8 ≈ NM, vol. I, p.

the theory of the elder Naiyāyikas (*vṛddhanaiyāyikāḥ*), more precisely, in the part beginning with *ucyate* as a response to the refutation of the elders' theory.[97] Why Prabhācandra does not refer to a relevant passage stated by Jayanta's "contemporaries,"[98] and how he analyzes the textual structure and relationship between these two groups of Naiyāyikas, deserves another, independent study.

3.5. Likewise, the remaining half of part D (*tasmād... āgamasmṛti-sahitaṃ sādṛśyajñānam upamānākhyaṃ pramāṇam āstheyam*) in the NVTṬ may be regarded as a corroborative justification of Uddyotakara's definition of analogy (*āgamāhitasaṃskārasmṛtyapekṣaṃ sā-rūpyajñānam upamānam*).[99] In a wider context, this justification may be implicitly connected with Vācaspati's terse gloss on Uddyotakara's definition and the subsequent division into two types of *prasiddhi* as one of the key concepts expressed in the analogy *sūtra* (cf. § 2.10 and n. 73 above). These two are presented before part A and may supply the whole complex of passages in question (parts A to C) with the larger framework of Vācaspati's exegetical strategy of supporting Uddyotakara. The above last line of part D is probably not forcibly associated with the views of Jayanta's "contemporaries." This analysis is different from the account by Vardhamāna, who unanimously ascribes parts B-D to the refutation by the Naiyāyikas beginning with Jayanta. Consequently it can be cautiously assumed that Vācaspati might have inserted the discussion undertaken by Jayanta's "contemporaries" as a corroborative proof of Uddyotakara's theory, inasmuch as the former's discussion fortifies the latter's theory.

CONCLUSION

The investigations conducted in the present paper have aimed at evaluating the historicity of Gaṅgeśa's reference to Jayanta, a topic

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382, ll. 4-6); cf. the editor's corresponding notes, where he refers to the NV and NVTṬ instead of Jayanta's gloss.

[97]   For the epithet *vṛddhanaiyāyika*, see NM, vol. I, p. 374, l. 1 = NKC, vol. II, p. 497, l. 9 = NKC, vol. II, p. 500, l. 14; for the response, see NM, vol. I, pp. 374-375, where the expression *ucyate* is used (p. 374, l. 14).

[98]   For instance, NM, vol. I, p. 376, ll. 14-15: *āgamād api tatsiddhir na vanecara-bhāṣitāt | tatkāle[a] sañjñino nāsti gavayasya hi darśanam ||* (v.l.: a. *-kāle*] C, P; *kālaṃ* ed., S).

[99]   On Uddyotakara's definition and Vācaspati's division, see nn. 72 and 73 above, respectively.

which so far had not been concretely clarified on a philological basis. I have also offered a preliminary investigation to clarify another largely unexplored issue, namely Udayana's identification of Jayanta as Vācaspati's source.

4.1. These two points of investigation are inseparably linked. A comparative analysis of the relevant textual materials written by Gaṅgeśa's predecessors such as Vācaspati and Udayana shows that Gaṅgeśa's presentation of what is allegedly Jayanta's theory is substantially biased by the texts of Vācaspati and Udayana. The present paper was initially based upon the explicit information given by Vardhamāna – Gaṅgeśa's son – about the structure in the NVTṬ, but the estimation presented here does not entirely agree with Vardhamāna's structural analysis.

If my hypothesis holds good, it is likely that Vardhamāna, and probably Gaṅgeśa as well, was not in a position to examine the relevant passages in the NM directly, at least regarding analogy, and thus drew upon Udayana's gloss. If they had had direct access to the NM, it is hardly imaginable that they would have overlooked the function of part D and, in the case of Gaṅgeśa, Udayana's addition of parts 3-7.

4.2. The analysis in this paper, in its attempt to find possible traces of the sources used by Vācaspati, gives Udayana's testimony a certain level of plausibility. Furthermore, Udayana's interpretation of Vācaspati's commentary is reflected in the various designations of his predecessors such as *jarannaiyāyika* including Jayanta, another *jarannaiyāyika* (in parts 3-7, which have not been investigated in this paper), *ādhunika* (controversial and as yet unidentified), and *abhinavanaiyāyika* referring to Vācaspati.[100] Udayana's clearly historicist consciousness as shown in his use of such labels stratifies the development and controversy of the theory of analogy (see §§ 2.9 and 2.10.3 above).

What Udayana has offered to his readers is a rather scanty and cryptic gloss on the issue of Vācaspati's allusion to Jayanta. Consequently, what Udayana recognizes as Jayanta's text remains hypothetical. However, if my analysis with regard to parts B-D in table 2

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[100] On the usage of expressions "indicative of the new intellectual climate of the period, in which one's own position within a scholarly tradition is conceptualized in a historicist manner," see PREISENDANZ 2005, pp. 71-72; see also POLLOCK 2001, pp. 5-15. For a critical review of Pollock's thesis, cf. PATIL 2013, pp. 102-105.

(cf. §§ 3.3-5 above) holds good, it follows that Udayana's description in his NKus basically does not touch on the psychological argumentation illustrated in part B (cf. §§ 3.1-2 above), which can be traced back to Jayanta's presentation. It remains undecided whether Udayana made a distinction between the theory as formulated by Uddyotakara and the Kashmiri philosopher's conspicuous presentation, choosing to adopt only the former for the sake of his own systematization. It also remains open how Udayana distinguished the theory of "old Naiyāyikas" from Jayanta's presentation. Due to the preliminary character of the present paper, an attempt to contextualize the treated materials in a wider perspective is still needed.

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TC

[*Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa] See TC (C), (D) and (V)

TC (C)

Tattvacintāmaṇau Upamānakhaṇḍam. Śrīmadgaṅgeśopādhyāyaviracitaṃ. Śrīkṛṣ-ṇakāntavidyāvāgīśaviracitadīpanyākhyaṭīkāsahitaṃ. (*The Tattva-Chintāmaṇi by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. Part III. Upamāna Khaṇḍa with the commentary of Kriṣṇa-kānta Vidyāvāgīça*), ed. K.N. Tarka-vāgīśa, Calcutta: The Baptist Mission Press, Bibliotheca Indica, New Series 844, 1897

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Realism and the Pratyabhijñā:

Influences on and Legacies of Somānanda's Conception of Materiality[*]

JOHN NEMEC

1. INTRODUCTION

Somānanda, who is the founding author of the Pratyabhijñā, makes the case for a thoroughly disembodied form of being, as I have argued elsewhere.[1] This is exhibited in his conception of the nature of apparently physical entities, which he describes as *amūrta* or as possessed of an *amūrtatva* – as ever and completely without a form.[2] Moreover, because all entities are in his view nothing but consciousness, they cannot but function as consciousness does, this being conceived by Somānanda as the capacity of the divine yogin – Śiva – to create phenomena at will, without any recourse to extrinsic means in doing so;[3] and, as such, his conception of causality

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[1] The nature and functioning of Śiva as consciousness, as Somānanda conceives of it, is the subject of a forthcoming essay and is detailed therein. See NEMEC forthcoming.

[2] Everything, in fact, is described as *amūrta*. See *Śivadṛṣṭi* (ŚD) 5.4cd-5: *icchāvantaḥ sarva eva vyāpakāś ca samastakāḥ ǁ amūrtāś ca tathā sarve sarve jñānakriyātmakāḥ | prabhavaś ca tathā sarva icchāmarśās tathākhilāḥ ǁ*. These and related passages are examined in NEMEC forthcoming.

[3] See ŚD 1.44-45ab: *yoginām icchayā yadvan nānārūpopapattitā | na cāsti sā-*

stands in clear contrast to those that take into consideration the real functioning of physical, material substances.[4]

Somānanda's discussion of *amūrta*(*tva*) calls into question the treatment in the ŚD of the realist ontology of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, as well as in the writings of those who follow Somānanda in the Pratyabhijñā lineage. Indeed, to explain the appearance and functioning of apparently distinct, material entities is a – perhaps *the* – fundamental philosophical challenge facing the non-dualist idealist; for the common-sense realist can claim that discrete, material phenomena are proven to exist externally to consciousness simply by dint of the fact that they appear as such in the ken.[5] In the present essay, I wish to suggest that Somānanda had precisely this type of concern in mind when articulating his theory of consciousness, and his associated asseveration of the formlessness of all entities.

Indeed, Somānanda measures his own ontological formulations against the realists' views of the nature of substances (*dravya*s), as they are articulated by various Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors and works; and it is in opposition to them (in part, at least) that he fashions his own ontology, for he can be understood to take the *ātmadravya* as the model for his ubiquitous agent, Śiva, though he significantly modifies the Vaiśeṣika formulation by in effect collapsing all the various *padārtha*s into a singular entity in doing so. This also leads him to challenge notions of agency in a radical manner (as is by now well known[6]), and in doing so he invokes, in perhaps a playful manner, a discussion of figurative uses of the desiderative found in grammatical works and in Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* (TV).

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dhanaṃ kiñcin mṛdādicchāṃ vinā prabhoḥ ‖ tathā bhagavadicchaiva tathātvena prajāyate ‖. This passage is also examined in NEMEC forthcoming.

[4] See ŚD 2.53-54, which suggests that a unitary consciousness cannot function as would a fully embodied, physical agent – Devadatta – who is an *avayavin*: *ātmānam ātmanā hanti devadatto yathā tathā ǀ bhaviṣyaty atra tatrāsya svāṅgair eva vibhāgitā ‖ hastādeḥ karaṇatvaṃ hi mastakādeś ca karmatā ǀ kartā manaḥsvāvayavī nāmūrtāyā idaṃ punaḥ ‖.* (This passage is also examined in NEMEC forthcoming.) Consider the same in light of *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (VS) 10.11, which allows for the existence of distinct components of the individual body: *śiraḥ pṛṣṭam udaraṃ pāṇir iti tadviśeṣebhyaḥ.*

[5] In fact, something similar to this is suggested in the first *pāda* of the third *adhyāya* of the VS, for which see n. 16, below.

[6] See, e.g., NEMEC 2014, especially pp. 104ff.

In what follows, I will first offer an analysis of the ways in which Somānanda apparently modifies – or at least has in mind – Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology in the formulation of his theory of the self or *ātman*, conceived of as conterminal with Śiva in the form of consciousness, after which I will illustrate the ways in which Somānanda's simple denial of the existence of materiality is qualified and transformed in Utpaladeva's articulation of the Pratyabhijñā. This Utpaladeva accomplishes by explicitly incorporating the *padārtha*s into Pratyabhijñā ontology, albeit in a subordinated position in the hierarchy of being. Specifically, he suggests that the *padārtha*s are dependent on the prior existence of the *ātman*, who serves as their basis, and who stands as the preeminent *dravya* in a manner that mirrors Somānanda's apparent view of the same; and in doing so Utpaladeva adopts an approach that is clearly influenced by the *Vākyapadīya* (VP) and its commentaries, even while Somānanda's views of immateriality were first directed against Bhartṛhari.

Finally, I will briefly examine selected passages of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* (ĪPV) and *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (ĪPVV), where one finds Abhinavagupta not only clarifying the views of his *paramaguru*, but also synthesizing them with those of his *parameṣṭhiguru*.

2. SOMĀNANDA'S *AMŪRTATVA* IN LIGHT OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA FORMULATIONS

Though he refers by name to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools only occasionally in the ŚD,[7] it is evident that Somānanda has their ideas in mind when formulating his understanding of Śiva's nature as consciousness. One can know this, firstly, because Somānanda signals his concern with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika lines of thinking at the opening of the sixth chapter of the ŚD, where he suggests that his system must account for the nature of agency and action without distinguishing *dravya* from *karman*:

> 6.1. *atha śakteḥ śaktimato na bhedo dravyakarmavat* |
> *sthāpito dravyato bhinnā kriyā no na ca nāsti sā* ‖

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[7]   See ŚD 6.28cd: *nyāyavaiśeṣikāṇāṃ tu bandhamokṣau pṛthaksthitī*. Somānanda's criticism is here limited, as is evident, to the fact that Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas draw a sharp distinction between bondage and liberation, a duality proscribed in the ŚD (at, e.g., 3.72). See also ŚD 4.38c, where the Vaiśeṣikas are named; and ŚD 1.28a, where reference is made to the Nyāya, etc.

6.2. *evaṃ tathā śaktimataḥ śaktasya samavasthitā* |
jagadvicitratā śaive na punar darśanāntare ‖

> Now, no [ontological] distinction is established [in our view] between
> the power and the possessor of the power just as [we make no such dis-
> tinction] between substance (*dravya*) and action (*karman*). Action (*kriyā*)
> is not different from substance (*dravyatas*), nor is it the case that [action]
> does not exist. And in this way the variegation of the world is fully esta-
> blished for the empowered possessor of power in Śaivism [alone], but
> not in any other philosophical system.

The mutual distinction of *dravya* and *karman* is of course a basic
feature of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, as is well known.[8] Somānan-
da, however, denies the possibility of distinguishing the agent of
action (viz., the *ātman* or *ātmadravya*) from the action itself (*kar-
man*), this in his affirmation of the Śaiva identification of the pow-
er or *śakti* and the possessor of the power in question (*śaktimat*).

The context in which this statement is found further suggests
that Somānanda, implicitly or self-consciously, measured his for-
mulation of the individual agent, of Śiva-as-consciousness, against
the Vaiśeṣika categories that undoubtedly would have been known
to him, and his response to them (for I would argue that one of the
projects of the ŚD is indeed to respond to – to reformulate – preci-
sely such a realist ontology) involves a rather more comprehensive
intervention than merely to deny the distinction of *dravya* from
karman. Indeed, to read Somānanda in light of the *padārtha*s is to
understand him in effect to identify everything with a single entity,
the *ātman*, the agent *par excellence* that is (in his well-known

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8   *Dravya* and *karman* are of course counted as two among the six mutually dis-
    tinct *padārtha*s. See, e.g., Kaṇāda's VS 1.1.4-6. See also, e.g., Praśastapāda's
    Padārthadharmasaṃgraha (PDhSaṃ) in its opening lines: *dravyaguṇakarma-
    sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmyavaidharmyatat-
    tvajñānaṃ niḥśreyasahetuḥ.* HALBFASS 1992 (pp. 69-87, esp. 75-76) outlines
    why it might be the case that the six-fold schema of *padārtha*s was not at first
    to be found in Kaṇāda's text, however, suggesting as he does that it possibly
    was a subsequent addition thereto; and, as is well known, Bhāsarvajña (him-
    self a Kashmiri who possibly was an early contemporary of Somānanda's but
    who could also possibly have lived at a time closer to Abhinavagupta than to
    him) rather counts *karman* as another of the *guṇa*s. Somānanda seems to have
    the VS, perhaps along with the commentary on it by Candrānanda, and proba-
    bly the PDhSaṃ in mind when formulating his position. On the other hand,
    there is a Vaiśeṣika precedent to the identification of *śakti* and *śaktimat*, for
    which see FRANCO 1987, pp. 325-326.

view) identical with Śiva.[9] He does so, of course, in an effort to id-
entify all entities as entirely and utterly singular in nature, this in
pursuit of a strategy of understanding consciousness, also conter-
minal with Śiva, as *the* foundational entity, the singular type of
dravya, as it were, one that is fully active and, indeed, volitional.

The context in which the first and third of the six *padārtha*s
were mentioned is therefore of no coincidence. For, Somānanda
mentions *dravya* and *karman* immediately following an astounding
passage at the close of the fifth chapter of the ŚD, in which all the
world's various entities and agents, both apparently animate and
inanimate, are mutually identified.

> 5.105. *sarve bhāvāḥ svam ātmānaṃ jānantaḥ sarvataḥ sthitāḥ |*
> *madātmanā ghaṭo vetti vedmy ahaṃ vā ghaṭātmanā ||*
> 5.106. *sadāśivātmanā vedmi sa vā vetti madātmanā |*
> *śivātmanā yajñadatto yajñadattātmanā śivaḥ ||*
> 5.107. *sadāśivātmanā vetti ghaṭaḥ sa ca ghaṭātmanā |*
> *sarve sarvātmakā bhāvāḥ sarvasarvasvarūpataḥ ||*
> 5.108. *sarvasya sarvam astīha nānābhāvātmarūpakaiḥ |*
> *madrūpatvaṃ ghaṭasyāsti mamāsti ghaṭarūpatā ||*
> 5.109. *nānābhāvaiḥ svam ātmānaṃ jānann āste svayaṃ śivaḥ |*
> *cidvyaktirūpakaṃ nānābhedabhinnam anantakam ||*
> 5.110. *evaṃ sarveṣu bhāveṣu sarvasāmye vyavasthite |*
> *tena sarvagataṃ sarvaṃ śivarūpaṃ nirūpitam ||*

All entities, being aware of their own nature, exist as all others. The pot
knows by way of my nature, or I know by way of the pot's. I know by
dint of Sadāśiva's, or he by mine, Yajñadatta by Śiva's, [and] Śiva by
Yajñadatta's. The pot knows by dint of Sadāśiva's nature, and he by the
pot's. All entities consist of everything, since everything is of the nature
of everything. Everything exists here as everything by having the nature
and form of [all] the various entities. The pot has my nature, and I have
that of the pot. Śiva exists autonomously as one who is aware, by way of
the various entities, of his own nature as the form of the manifestation of
consciousness, which is differentiated by the various entities, [and] is
endless. Thus, given that all [entities] are equally present in all entities, it
therefore follows that we have ascertained that Śiva's form is omnipres-
ent, is [itself] everything.

The passage in question, first noted and paraphrased (in a manner
that is reflected in the translation here offered) by Torella, certain-

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9   So much is articulated explicitly in, e.g., ŚD 1.2 and the ŚDVṛ thereon.

ly offers what that scholar has labeled a "visionary crescendo," a culminating point in Somānanda's description of the nature of self.[10]

Yet, the author of the ŚD very possibly also had a more specific, and technical, concern in mind when he composed this passage. For, with it he explicitly eliminates the very distinctions that serve to distinguish the Vaiśeṣika *padārtha*s in their various forms. To wit, no distinction is here permitted between entities that act and those that do not, or between material and immaterial entities;[11] nor is a distinction drawn between sentient agents and insentient entities.[12] Neither is any distinction permitted between omnipresent and spatially delimited entities (about which, see below),[13] nor apparently is any absolute distinction of *nitya* from *anitya* evinced.[14] All entities are ubiquitous (*sarve bhāvāḥ... sarvataḥ sthitāḥ*), Somānanda here declares, in an affront to both the realism

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[10] See TORELLA 1994, pp. xv-xvi, who also links it to the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* (alluded to most explicitly at ŚD 5.107cd).

[11] The distinction is drawn in numerous places in the VS, and a full survey of the matter lies beyond the scope of the present essay. See VS 5.2.23, to offer but one example, where three *dravya*s – *dik*, *kāla*, and *ākāśa* – are said to be inactive, because they differ from those entities that do have *karman*s associated with them: *dikkālāv ākāśaṃ ca kriyāvadbhyo vaidharmyān niṣkriyāṇi*. Candrānanda's commentary on the same reads as follows: *ākāśakāladiśo 'mūrtāḥ kriyāvataḥ pṛthivyāder amūrtatayā vaidharmyān niṣkriyāḥ, caśabdād ātmāpi niṣkriyaḥ*. See also, e.g., VS 7.1.24, where actions (*karman*s) themselves are said to be devoid of actions, and qualities (*guṇa*s) of qualities: *karmabhiḥ karmāṇi guṇair guṇāḥ*. (Cf. VS 7.2.5.)

[12] These types of distinctions are made in VS 3.1.1ff., where the agency of the *ātman* is established insofar as it is distinguishable from both the *indriya*s and the objects known by them. A real object is said to exist, and instruments are known to perceive them, and thus there must be an agent who is distinguishable from and who deploys the instruments in coming to know the objects. This is the *ātman*, and not some material entity like the body, or the senses themselves, or some inanimate object, like a pot. See n. 16, below.

[13] See, e.g., VS 7.1.28-29, where *ākāśa* and *ātman* are said to be infinitely large: *vibhavād mahān ākāśaḥ. tathā cātmā*. Cf. VS 7.1.30, where the *manas* is said to be atomic in size, because it is unlike *ākāśa* and *ātman*: *tadabhāvād aṇu manaḥ*.

[14] VS 4.1.1 defines *nitya* as that which is existent (*sat*) and without a cause (*akāraṇa*): *sad akāraṇavat tan nityam*. The non-eternal (*anitya*) is defined as its opposite at VS 4.1.4: *anityam iti ca viśeṣapratiṣedha-bhāvaḥ*. The question of the eternality or non-eternality of various *padārtha*s is dealt with throughout the text. VS 7.1.4-9 identify which of the *guṇa*s are *nitya* and which *anitya*, for example.

and dualism mapped by the *padārtha*s, and everything is "equally present in all entities" (*sarveṣu bhāveṣu sarvasāmye vyavasthite*). This is to say that Śiva's form is omnipresent – *sarvagata* –, identical with everything that exists in or as the universe.

Thus, what is offered here is precisely the mirror opposite of the ontological account found in VS 3.1.4-6, where we are told that the consciousness that can be aware of the objects of sense must belong to the *ātman* and not to the senses or the body – the material entities associated with individual persons –, because otherwise the effects, which like the body are held to be comprised of material *paramāṇu*s, would also have to be understood to be conscious, a phenomenon that Kaṇāda suggests is unknown in the world. Candrānanda's *Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti* (VSVṛ) ad VS 3.1.5,[15] moreover, offers the pot (*ghaṭādivat*) as an example of an entity that is comprised of the *aṇu*s and is clearly insentient.[16] Clearly, this is precisely

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[15] POTTER 1977 (p. 685) lists Candrānanda as an "undatable writer," noting Sandesara's suggestion of the 7th century along with Hattori's suspicion that he postdates Gaṅgeśa (and the period covered by the volume in which Potter reports this assessment). While some questions remains as to precisely when Candrānanda lived and wrote, he is by no means an undatable writer. Indeed, the VSVṛ is, according to Halbfass, a work probably of 900 C.E. or earlier. See HALBFASS 1992, pp. 79-80 and, especially, 237. Halbfass, furthermore, isolates (ibid., pp. 237 and 262, n. 2) the *terminus post quem* by identifying a passage (at VSVṛ ad VS 3.2.4) that shows Candrānanda knew Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* (a "probably seventh century" product), and, following AKLUJKAR 1969-1970, he notes that Helārāja probably knew the VSVṛ. (Aklujkar identifies four places where Helārāja quotes Candrānanda's *vṛtti* in his commentary ad VP 3.6.2-3. Isaacson, in turn, accepts 600 C.E. as the *terminus post quem* and, while he is not fully confident in the evidence, accepts the tenth century as the *terminus ante quem*, noting along the way Aklujkar's evidence, even as he suggests that it is possible that both Candrānanda and Helārāja were drawing from a common source, rather than the former from the latter. See ISAACSON 1995, pp. 140-143.

[16] The *sūtra*s in question are, as noted above, found at VS 3.1.4-6. These explain why the *indriya*s and the body cannot be the agent of perception. The context is as follows: VS 3.1.1 suggests that the existence of the objects of sense are well known: *prasiddhā indriyārthāḥ* ("The objects of the senses are well known"). VS 3.1.2 suggests that it must be the *ātman*, viz., some agent apart from the *indriya*s and their objects, who knows the perceptions furnished by the *indriya*s: *indriyārthaprasiddhir indriyārthebhyo 'rthāntarasya hetuḥ* ("That the objects of the senses are well known is the reason [for inferring the existence] of an object that is different from the *indriya*s and their objects"). VS 3.1.3 denies the possibility that the experience of the objects of the senses can be attributed to the body or the *indriya*s themselves. Following this are the reasons. VS 3.1.4 states that there is no consciousness in the causes of the per-

the argument rejected by Somānanda, and I would propose that the example in the ŚD of the knowing pot is self-consciously offered to counter precisely the line of argument found in the VS, and the other works that are related to it. Perhaps Somānanda even had Candrānanda's VSVṛ in mind, for if Isaacson's suspicions are justified, this Vaiśeṣika author was himself a Kashmiri, as of course was Somānanda.[17]

That we are to take Somānanda literally when he both identifies individual human agents with one another – Devadatta *is* Yajñadatta, and vice versa – *and* with apparently inanimate enti-

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ceptions: *kāraṇājñānāt* ("Because there is no consciousness in the causes [of the perceptions, i.e., the *indriya*s, or the body]"). VS 3.1.5 explains why this must be so. This is so, because if it were otherwise, the effects would similarly be conscious, this because both are made up of the same material *dravya*s, earth, water, fire, and air: *kāryeṣu jñānāt* ("Because [there would be] consciousness in the effects [as well]"). Finally, VS 3.1.6 closes the argument by suggesting that such awareness does not exist in the effects: *ajñānāc ca* ("And [this cannot be so,] because so much is not known [in the world]"). The VSVṛ clarifies the concern here addressed as follows: (ad 3.1.4:) *bhūtānām indriya-kāraṇānām ajñatvāt tat kāryāṇīndriyāṇy apy ajñāni.* (ad 3.1.5:) *anyasya bhū-takāryasya ghaṭāder ajñatvād bhūtāny apy ajñāni.* (ad 3.1.6:) *bhūtānām ajñā-nād indriyāṇy apy ajñāny ity upasaṃhārārtham idaṃ sūtram.* Similarly, one may find reference in the germane context to the lack of such agency in the operative example – the *ghaṭa* – in the PDhSaṃ, where in describing the nature of the *ātman* Praśastapāda (see PDhSaṃ, pp. 167ff.) offers the mundane pot as a contrasting example to it, this insofar as it is insentient: *ātmatvābhi-sambandhād ātmā. tasya saukṣmyād apratyakṣatve sati karaṇaiḥ śabdādyupa-labdhyanumitaiḥ śrotrādibhiḥ samadhigamaḥ kriyate. vāsyādīnāṃ karaṇānāṃ kartṛprayojyatvadarśanāc chabdādiṣu prasiddhyā ca prasādhako 'numīyate. na śarīrendriyamanasām ajñatvāt. na śarīrasya caitanyaṃ ghaṭādivadbhūta-kāryatvāt, mṛte cāsambhavāt. nendriyāṇāṃ karaṇatvāt...* See also VS 3.1.13, which indicates that contact of the *ātman*, the senses, and the objects of sense produces knowledge different from what was previously described, that is, it produces valid knowledge: *ātmendriyamano 'rthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat.* Finally, cf. NS 2.1.22: *nātmamanasos sannikarṣābhāve pratyakṣot-pattiḥ.* (Note, however, that this *sūtra* comes in the form of an objection to the definition of perception offered at NS 1.1.4, which reads: *indriyārthasanni-karṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratya-kṣam.* The reply to this objection, however, suggests that contact with the *āt-man* is presumed in the definition offered at 1.1.4, invalidating the objection thereby. See NS 2.1.24: *jñānaliṅgatvād ātmano nānavarodhaḥ.*)

[17] While ISAACSON 1995 (p. 141) suggests the Candrānanda may well have been a Kashmiri, he does not insist unequivocally that he must have been so, due to a lack of conclusive evidence: "As to the geographical region in which Can-drānanda lived and wrote, the indications, admittedly not conclusive, that we have point clearly to Kashmir."

ties, such as the simple water-pot, is further underscored by the fact that the ŚD also makes reference in the fifth chapter to a discussion regarding the figurative use of the desiderative, a discussion that is first found in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (MBh) and subsequently is adopted by Kumārila. The passage of the ŚD in question again invokes the agency and self-awareness of a pot, and goes on to suggest that even the apparently inanimate bank of the river has volition, may "wish" to collapse.

> 5.16. *jānan kartāram ātmānaṃ ghaṭaḥ kuryāt svakāṃ kriyām |*
> *ajñāte svātmakartṛtve na ghaṭaḥ sampravartate ‖*
> 5.17. *svakarmaṇi mamaitat tad ity ajñānān na ceṣṭanam |*
> *kūlaṃ pipatiṣati...*

> Cognizing itself as the agent, the pot may perform its own action. If it were not aware of its own agency, the pot would not undertake an action. There would be no performance of its own action if it were not aware that it was its own.[18] The bank [of the river] wishes to collapse...[19]

We here are told not only that the apparently inanimate *ghaṭa* is in fact a conscious agent, but something else is also added in the suggestion that "the bank [of the river] wishes to collapse," for with this expression, Somānanda evokes the aforementioned discussions of the use of the desiderative in a figurative manner of speech.

The expression – *kūlaṃ pipatiṣati* – first appears (with the word order reversed) in the MBh ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.1.7, and in the corresponding passage of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (KāVṛ). The Pāṇinian *sūtra* in question of course falls within the (vast) section of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* that deals with suffixation (beginning with A 3.1.1: *pratyayaḥ*) and allows for the use of the suffix *saN* following verbal roots that refer to an object of an action that is wished for by the agent of the action in question.[20] This results in the production of the desidera-

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[18] That is, it would not be able to do its own work, of carrying water, for example, if it were not aware of itself as the agent of the action in question. This is how Chaturvedi understands the passage, as well, for which see CHATURVEDI 1986, p. 180.

[19] See also ŚD 1.23 and the *Vṛtti* on the same, as well as ŚD 3.62.

[20] A 3.1.7, which reads *dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samānakartṛkād icchāyāṃ vā*, may be translated as follows: "Optionally (*vā*), [the affix *saN* is applied] in the sense of a wish (*icchāyāṃ*) following a verbal root (*dhātoḥ*) that refers to the object [that is wished for] (*karmaṇaḥ*) and has the same agent of action [as the agent who wishes for the object in question] (*samānakartṛkād*)." The KāVṛ on this passage reads, in part*: iṣikarmako yo dhātur iṣiṇaiva samānakartṛkaḥ, tasmād*

tive, as in *cikīrṣati* (optionally) for *kartum icchati*, or *jihīrṣati* (optionally) for *hartum icchati*.

Following this is a pair of *vārttika*s that further define the scope of the *sūtra*, and it is the first of these that is of concern here. It reads: *āśaṅkāyām upasaṃkhyānam* ("there is [optionally] the addition [of the affix *saN*] when there is fear/apprehension"), suggesting thereby that the affix *saN* can optionally be used when there is an immanent danger of the action in question occurring. Three examples are given. The first pair includes the one that is here in question (as Vāmana and Jayāditya telegraph it): *śaṅke patiṣyati kūlam. pipatiṣati kūlam*. That is, one can say that the bank of the river "wishes" to collapse in instances in which there is a fear of the event occurring, as opposed to on occasions when the agent of the action desires as much. The line thus would better be rendered "the bank [of the river] is in danger of collapsing" or "the bank [of the river] is about to collapse." (Similar expressions, of course, are found in English – one may say that "the wall threatens to collapse," for example – as well as in a host of other languages.) Patañjali further clarifies that the meaning of *pipatiṣati kūlam* is not to be taken literally, this by underscoring that a riverbank, being insentient, cannot wish for any particular action or result.

> *āśaṅkāyām acetaneṣūpasaṅkhyānaṃ kartavyam. aśmā luluṭhiṣate. kūlaṃ pipatiṣatīti. kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ na sidhyati. evaṃ manyate. cetanāvata etat bhavatīccheti. kūlaṃ cācetanam. acetanagrahaṇena nārthaḥ. āśaṅkāyām ity eva.*

It [i.e., the desiderative] may be deployed when there is fear/apprehension as regards insensible entities (*acetana*). One says (*iti*): "The stone is on the point of rolling" (*aśmā luluṭhiṣate*); "the bank [of the river] is about to collapse" (*kūlaṃ pipatiṣati*). [Objection:] But why does the cause [for the use of the desiderative] not [otherwise] avail itself [in these instances]?[21] [Reply:] Think of it this way: this [i.e., the cause of the use of the desiderative] comes to fruition for one who is conscious; [and] it is referred to as (*iti*) will (*icchā*); yet, the bank [of the river] is not conscious. No meaning [of the desiderative] is yielded by mentioning an unconscious [entity]. This is precisely why [the *vārttika*] says

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icchāyām arthe vā san pratyayo bhavati. "A verbal root that is associated with the object of wishing and has the same agent as that of the act of wishing optionally may take following it the suffix *saN* when its meaning is the wish."

[21] This is to ask why a *vārttika* is here called for. What does it do to clarify the scope of the *sūtra*?

[that the desiderative affix *saN* may optionally be affixed] "when there is fear/apprehension."

Patañjali, in a manner that reflects the sort of common-sense (or, if one prefers, naïve) realism that is evident in the VS (and NS), thus takes it as obvious and axiomatic that an apparently inanimate entity has no volition whatever (not entirely without reason, it may be added), and it is on the basis of this presumption that Kātyāyana furnishes the *vārttika* in question. What the *vārttika* adds, that is, is precisely the occasion for using the desiderative when insentient entities are involved, a use not made evident by the *sūtra* itself given its reference to the wishing or volition of the (sentient) agent of the verbal action in question.[22]

It is quite likely that Somānanda had precisely the present passage of the MBh in mind when deploying the example of the riverbank, for, to reiterate, he offers the line in a context that demands we read it as a direct repudiation of the position explicitly articulated by Patañjali (as well by Kaṇāda), namely, that inanimate entities have no consciousness or volition of their own, requiring thereby that the meaning of the expression in question be taken figuratively.

It is also possible that Somānanda had in mind another occurrence of the same expression, once again offered by a realist, this time the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila, who utters precisely the same line in his TV ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 3.1.13.[23] There, Kumārila adduces three ways one can speak of the intention (*vivakṣā*) expressed by a Vedic injunction. Such utterances can be taken metaphorically, or the intentionality may be ascribed to Mīmāṃsakas and practitioners of the ritual, or, finally, one could even maintain that the Vedic texts themselves are literally conscious, able to hold their own intentions.[24] In charting the first of these options, Kumārila quotes the expression under consideration – *kūlaṃ pipatiṣati* – exemplify-

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[22] Patañjali offers yet another example: *śvā mumūrṣati*. Meaning literally "the dog wishes to die," one should understand the utterance to suggest "the dog is about to die," for while being conscious, no dog would have the desire to see its own demise. This, at least, is how the *Pradīpa* explains the example: *śunaś caitanye 'pi jīvitasya priyatvād vyādhyādyabhibhave 'pi tiryaktvān martum icchā nāsti.*

[23] See TV ad MS 3.1.13, vol. IV, pp. 65-70. I am grateful to Larry McCrea for referring me to the passage in question.

[24] Lawrence McCrea reviews the relevant passage in MCCREA 2000, p. 456, n. 61. A more detailed discussion is also found in YOSHIMIZU 2008, pp. 53-58.

ing thereby the metaphorical use of language in expressing the intention of the agent in question. Again, we see that the very unconsciousness of the agent renders the expression of necessity a metaphorical one. Yet, Somānanda deploys the selfsame expression in a context that demands we rather take it literally, as we have seen. In a perhaps playful manner, then, Somānanda seems to wish to suggest that his interlocutors simply err in what he would undoubtedly deem to be their naïvely and erroneously conceived realism.

Returning now to the passage that closes the fifth chapter of the ŚD, I would add that one should perhaps further understand Somānanda's reference to Śiva as *sarvagata* (ŚD 5.110c) not as so much of a boiler-plate description of the ubiquity of an omnipresent deity as it is an effort to differentiate the view of the ŚD from that of the realists, who distinguish omnipresent from spatially circumscribed entities in the VS, NS, and elsewhere. For, not only is it the case that the VS understands only spatially limited entities to be capable of performing actions (*karman*s)[25] – precisely not the position taken in the ŚD, which not only identifies *karman* with *dravya*, as we have seen, but also identifies both with an *ubiquitous* agent, Śiva, conterminal with the *ātman* and existing in the form of consciousness –, but Somānanda elsewhere explicitly challenged the notion that consciousness is spatially delimited, and he did so precisely in the context of denying the very existence of material entities, that is, in describing all of existence as *amūrta*:[26]

> 2.76cd. *asarvagapramāṇaṃ hi mūrtir no lakṣyate citaḥ* |

> For, consciousness does not appear as having a limited measure,[27] or as having a form (*mūrti*).

In glossing this passage, itself offered in the context of Somānanda's critique of the description of Brahman found in the *maṅgala* verse of what Somānanda identifies as the (*Śabdadhātu*)*samīkṣā*,[28]

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[25] This is of necessity so, given the purely physical nature of action as it is defined in the VS. See VS 1.1.6: *utkṣepaṇam avakṣepaṇam ākuñcanaṃ prasāraṇaṃ gamanam iti karmāṇi* ("The actions are: moving upward, moving downward, bending, extending, and moving").

[26] See ŚD 2.73cd and following for the beginning of this critique.

[27] Note that Utpaladeva glosses °*pramāṇa* in ŚD 2.76c with °*parimāṇa*, and my translation here follows his gloss.

[28] Torella has suggested that one should rather understand the title of this work

a *maṅgala* that is identical to that of the *Nītiśataka*,[29] Utpaladeva further clarifies that consciousness cannot be understood (as Somānanda says Bhartṛhari wrongly does) in terms that suggest it is something that has a form, is something solid:[30]

> *upacāre ca kiṃ prayojanam. asarvagatadravyaparimāṇaṃ mūrtiḥ kāṭhinyaṃ vā na cid bhavati, tat kathaṃ cinmūrtaya iti.*

> What, moreover, is the motivation for using figurative speech? Consciousness is not a substance of a limited measure, nor is it that which has a form, i.e., a solid entity. So, why does [Bhartṛhari] say "[homage] to the one whose form is [pure, endless] consciousness"?

In doing so, one can well see that the language used to describe materiality in the ŚD (*asarvagapramāṇa*) and the ŚDVṛ (*asarvagataparimāṇa*) echoes that of Praśastapāda's PDhSaṃ (which reads, in part: *mūrtir asarvagatadravyaparimāṇam*), for we are told that four of the nine *dravya*s – *ākāśa*, *kāla*, *diś*, and *ātman* – are possessed of an *amūrtatva*, this insofar as they cannot be said to be *dravya*s of circumscribed size:[31]

> *ākāśakāladigātmanāṃ saty api dravyabhāve niṣkriyatvaṃ sāmānyādivad amūrtatvāt. mūrtir asarvagatadravyaparimāṇaṃ tadanuvidhāyinī ca kriyā sā cākāśādiṣu nāsti tasmān na teṣāṃ kriyāsambandho 'stīti.*

> Even though ether (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*), space (*diś*), and self (*ātman*) are *dravya*s, they are devoid of action, as are *sāmānya*, etc., this due to their not having a form (*amūrtatva*). That which has a form (*mūrti*) has the measure of a non-ubiquitous substance (*asarvagatadravyaparimāṇa*), and action conforms to that; and since [action] does not exist in ether and the rest, it follows that they are not connected to action.

Here, and elsewhere,[32] the *dravya*s in question are said both not to have a form and to be omnipresent.

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to be the *Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā*. (See TORELLA 2008, p. 513, nn. 7 and 8; cf. TORELLA 1994, pp. xxvi-xxvii, n. 39).

29 On this identification, and the question of the attribution of the authorship of the three *śataka* works to Bhartṛhari, see IYER 1969, pp. 10-13, esp. p. 13.

30 See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.74cd-76.

31 See PDhSaṃ, pp. 734ff.

32 See also, e.g., NS 4.2.19, where the omnipresence of *ākāśa* is again noted: *ākāśāsarvagatatvaṃ vā* ("Otherwise, the ether would not be omnipresent"). The context of the statement involves an objection by an opponent who denies the possibility that *aṇu*s can be infinitesimally small in size, because if they were, the Naiyāyika could not claim that *ākāśa* is *sarvagata/vibhu*. This is so,

Moreover, while as an idealist he understands apparently external, material entities to be of a nature that is rather different from what his realist counterparts would suggest it is, what is here offered is something that Somānanda, too, accepts. That is, Somānanda, too, holds that an immaterial entity – indeed, the one and only immaterial entity, Śiva-as-consciousness – is omnipresent and is thus not moved by any sort of *physical* activity. Further, he quite willingly accepts the definition of materiality here offered – that that which is *mūrta* is circumscribed, is *asarvagata* –, even though it is on the basis of this definition that he denies, *tout court*, the very existence of materiality, this on the grounds that consciousness – the one and only form of existence, in his view – is by nature precisely not such a circumscribed and discrete entity.[33]

To sum up: one can see that while Somānanda diverges from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (and related realist views) in understanding *dravya* and *karman* to be mutually identifiable, in understanding an ubiquitous and not a spatially delimited entity to act, and in under-

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the objector claims, because to have the ether reside within the *aṇu*s requires them to have parts – a "within" and a "without" – and so the Naiyāyika must either maintain that the *aṇu*s are divisible in this manner, or they must forego their claim that *ākāśa* is omnipresent. The objection begins at NS 4.2.18: *ākāśavyatibhedāt tadanupapattiḥ* ("There is an impossibility of that [i.e., of the indivisibility of the atom], because it is penetrated by the ether"). The *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* (NSBh) of Vātsyāyana (a.k.a. Pakṣilasvāmin) ad NS 4.2.18 clarifies the objection: *tasyāṇor niravayavasya nityasyānupapattiḥ. kasmāt. ākāśavyatibhedāt. antar bahiś cāṇur ākāśena samāviṣṭo vyatibhinnaḥ, vyatibhedāt sāvayavaḥ sāvayavatvād anitya iti*. "It is not possible for an eternal, partless *aṇu* to exist. Why? Because it is penetrated by the ether. The *aṇu* is penetrated (*samāviṣṭa = vyatibhinna*) internally and externally by the ether; because it is penetrated, it has parts; [and] because it has parts, it is not eternal." Cf. NSBh ad 4.2.19, which reads in part: *paramāṇor antar nāsty ākāśam ity asarvagatatvam prasajyata iti*. "The unwanted consequence that *ākāśa* is not omnipresent results from it not existing within the *paramāṇu*." By contrast, material entities are said to be tangible and divisible – not omnipresent. See NS 4.2.23, where the opponent suggests that *aṇu*s must have parts, because they have a material form, which by definition means they must have some sort of physical shape: *mūrtimatāñ ca saṃsthānopapatter avayavasadbhāvaḥ* ("[Atoms] really do have parts, moreover, because that which has a form (*mūrtimat*) must have a physical shape").

33   This may be seen in the fact that he criticizes Bhartṛhari for, he suggests, understanding the agent to function as if he were an *avayavin*, performing discrete actions with discrete parts of his body, each part independent of the other. See ŚD 2.53-54, found in n. 4, above. This and related passages are also examined in more detail in NEMEC forthcoming.

standing apparently inanimate entities to be fully conscious and
volitional – indeed to be identified with Śiva, and the *ātman* – it is
nevertheless the case that the *dravya*s, and the *ātmadravya* in parti-
cular, can be read as a model, a key point of reference, in Somā-
nanda's construction of his notion of being and agency. For, to put
matters negatively, the very realist principles that he challenges –
those regarding the existence of insentient, discrete, material enti-
ties – are precisely those articulated in the VS (and NS), and con-
firmed by Patañjali, and Kumārila; and, to put matters positively,
much can be said for taking the *dravya* of the same name in the
standard Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika formulation as an important point of ref-
erence for Somānanda's understanding of the *ātman*, because his
notion of the self – identical as it is with Śiva – is similar to its
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika counterpart in being conceived of as eternal (*ni-
tya*), all pervasive (*vibhu*, *sarvagata*), immaterial (*amūrta*), and –
what is key – as the volitional agent.[34] Indeed, to fuse the natures
of *dravya* and *karman* is precisely the move by which Somānanda
could logically conceive of a volitional agent who is at the same
time active and ubiquitous. The ubiquitousness and volitional qua-
lity of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *ātman* is thus preserved in Somānan-
da's view, though it is combined with a capacity for action (*kar-
man*s), while simultaneously understood to stand as the basis for
the appearance of the various phenomena appearing in the world,
this perhaps in a manner that is analogous to the role of *dravya*s in
the VS, where the balance of the *padārtha*s are said to appear in
consonance with the first among them.[35]

Somānanda's apparent, deep criticism of the realists simulta-
neously evinces an accommodation of a basic feature of their sys-

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[34]   On this formulation, see, e.g. POTTER 1977, p. 99: "There is practical unanimi-
ty among our philosophers that the self is the agent of our actions. There is no
question that selves do not move. The theory is rather that agency does not re-
quire mobility. Kaṇāda, for a start, in inferring the existence of other selves
from their bodies' activity, suggests that selves are agents of their bodies' ac-
tions. Vātsyāyana is quite explicit: he argues that moral responsibility requires
a locus which persists, and that the self is the locus. Thus selves are respons-
ible agents of the activities which breed *karma* and bondage. Vātsyāyana by
no means limits the function of the self to a witnessing consciousness. Praśa-
stapāda also speaks of selves as agents." So much is precisely what we find in
Pratyabhijñā theology: a self that does not (physically) move, it being cons-
ciousness only, but which is ever and always the (albeit fully active) agent of
action.

[35]   See reference to Śaṅkara's critique of the Vaiśeṣika, below, and n. 37.

tem, therefore, this in the form of the recognition of the existence of a ubiquitous agent who interacts with an apparently diverse universe, but without compromising its ubiquity in doing so. For, indeed, while Somānanda clearly would have had access to other models of the self – in scriptural sources, for one, and in the Sāṅkhya,[36] which had a profound influence on Śaiva philosophy and their understanding of the order of the *tattva*s in particular – there can be little doubt that he measured his own conception of the *ātman* in relation to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika formulations, and was concerned with refuting their views in the course of articulating his own. It therefore requires perhaps no great stretch of the imagination to conjecture that Somānanda modelled his notion of (a ubiquitous, volitional) self in part on – and in opposition to – that of his realist counterparts.

3. THE CATEGORIES (*PADĀRTHA*S) AS A MEASURE OF BEING, AND AGENCY

Somānanda is not alone either in his manner of critiquing Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology or in measuring his view of agency and external reality against Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika formulations. For, not only were these philosophical schools highly influential in premodern South Asia – we know of the significant presence of the Nyāya (and Vaiśeṣika) in the Kashmir Valley at the time when Somānanda, Utpaladeva, and Abhinavagupta were active, for example, this being one of the key philosophical traditions that can be found to have flourished "around Abhinavagupta" –, but other philosophical idealists also took up, and took issue with, the realists' ontology. Śaṅkara, for example, challenges the Vaiśeṣika in a manner that is similar to Somānanda's apparent critique: he suggests that all the *padārtha*s may be subsumed under the first among them – *dravya* – insofar as the others only appear when the former is present and never in its absence. He further argues that the differ-

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[36] Of course, the *puruṣatattva* of the Sāṅkhya is incorporated into Śaiva ontology as the twelfth of thirty-six *tattva*s. Somānanda's understanding of the nature of the *ātman* also shares many qualities (though not all of them, as has been made evident) with the eternal, all-pervasive, independent, partless, unchanging, and utterly inactive *puruṣa* of the Sāṅkhya. This is to say that the Sāṅkhya formulation, too, would have been a point of reference for Somānanda and the authors of the Pratyabhijñā, even if the relationship of *puruṣa* to *prakṛti* in the Sāṅkhya is one of proximity rather than direct interaction and even while the Sāṅkhya, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, presents a dualistic philosophical model.

ences among the *padārtha*s amount only to a difference of nomen-
clature, leading thereby to an accordion-like collapsing of the Vai-
śeṣika ontological categories into the first of the six *padārtha*s.[37]

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[37] See Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* ad BS 2.2.17 (*aparigrahāc cātyantam an-
apekṣā)*, p. 235, ll. 24 to p. 236, l. 12ff.: *api ca vaiśeṣikās tantrārthabhūtān
ṣaṭpadārthān dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyākhyān atyantabhinnān
bhinnalakṣaṇān abhyupagacchanti. yathā manuṣyo 'śvaḥ śaśa iti. tathātvaṃ
cābhyupagamya tadviruddhaṃ dravyādhīnatvaṃ śeṣāṇām abhyupagacchanti.
tan nopapadyate. katham. yathā hi loke śaśakuśapalāśaprabhṛtīnām atyanta-
bhinnānāṃ satāṃ netaretarādhīnatvaṃ bhavati, evaṃ dravyādīnām atyanta-
bhinnatvān naiva dravyādhīnatvaṃ guṇādīnāṃ bhavitum arhati. atha bhavati
dravyādhīnatvaṃ guṇādīnāṃ tato dravyabhāve bhāvād dravyābhāve 'bhāvād*
<u>*dravyam eva saṃsthānādibhedād anekaśabdapratyayabhāg*</u> *bhavati. yathā de-
vadatta eka eva sann avasthāntarayogād anekaśabdapratyayabhāg bhavati
tadvat. tathā sati sāṅkhyasiddhāntaprasaṅgaḥ svasiddhāntavirodhaś cāpadye-
yātām. nanv agner anyasyāpi sato dhūmasyāgnyadhīnatvaṃ dṛśyate. satyaṃ
dṛśyate. bhedapratītes tu tatrāgnidhūmayor anyatvaṃ niścīyate. iha tu śuklaḥ
kambalo rohiṇī dhenur nīlam utpalam iti dravyasyaiva tasya tasya tena tena
viśeṣaṇena pratīyamānatvān naiva dravyaguṇayor agnidhūmayor iva bheda-
pratītir asti.* <u>*tasmād dravyātmakatā guṇasya. etena karmasāmānyaviśeṣasama-
vāyānāṃ dravyātmakatā vyākhyātā.*</u> "The Vaiśeṣikas assume six categories,
which constitute the subject-matter of their system, viz. substance, quality, ac-
tion, generality, particularity, and inherence. These six categories they main-
tain to be absolutely different from each other, and to have different character-
istics; just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another. Side by side with
this assumption they make another which contradicts the former one, viz. that
quality, action, &c. have the attribute of depending on substance. But that is
altogether inappropriate. How so? Well, just as ordinary things in the world,
such as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being absolutely different from each
other do not depend on each other, so the qualities, &c. also being absolutely
different from substance, cannot depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities,
&c. depend on substance; then it follows that, as they are present where sub-
stance is present, and absent where it is absent, <u>substance only exists</u>, and, ac-
cording to its various structures, etc., becomes the object of different terms
and conceptions (such as quality, action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for instance,
[although] being absolutely unitary is the object of various conceptions and
names according to the conditions in which he finds himself. But this latter al-
ternative would involve the acceptance of the Sāṅkhya doctrine and the con-
tradiction of their own (i.e., the Vaiśeṣika) standpoint. – But (the Vaiśeṣika
may say) smoke also is different from fire and yet it is dependent on it. –
True, we reply; but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire from the fact
of their being apperceived in separation. Substance and quality, on the other
hand, are not so apperceived; for when we are conscious of a white blanket, or
a red cow, or a blue lotus, the substance is in each case cognized by means of
the quality; <u>the latter therefore has its Self in the substance. The same reason-
ing applies to action, generality, particularity, and inherence.</u>" (Transl. a mo-
dification of Thibaut's, emphasis mine.) See THIBAUT 1890, pp. 394-396.
HALBFASS 1992, pp. 79 and 86, n. 47 also makes reference to the passage in

Returning now to the Pratyabhijñā: as is not infrequently the case,[38] what is somewhat inchoate in the ŚD is rather more clearly and fully articulated in the ĪPK. So much is the case with the Pratyabhijñā's treatment of the self, for we find explicit evidence in Utpaladeva's writings for precisely what is apparently evident in the ŚD, namely, the apparent modelling (not without significant modifications) of the Śaiva notion of the *ātman* on the Vaiśeṣika *ātmadravya*. Indeed, while Somānanda is often indirect in his manner of engagement with the realists, Utpaladeva is rather more direct and open in identifying the *ātman* with the *dravya* of the same name.

I note, firstly, that Utpaladeva suggests that the activity of consciousness is found precisely in, or rather as, the very nature of the *ātman*:[39]

> *ātmāta eva caitanyaṃ citkriyācitikartṛtā |*
> *tātparyeṇoditas tena jaḍāt sa hi vilakṣaṇaḥ ‖*

> Precisely for this reason the self has been defined as "sentience" (*caitanyam*) meaning by this the activity of consciousness in the sense of being the subject of this activity. It is thanks to sentiency, in fact, that the self differs from insentient reality. (Transl. Torella.)

One here sees reiterated Somānanda's identification of the agent of action with the action itself, though the matter is expressed in different terms (for no reference to the *śakti* and the *śaktimat* are here offered). This of course signals a marked departure from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika formulations; and yet, the *svopajñavṛtti* associates the

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question. What Śaṅkara had in mind is exemplified in, e.g., VS 1.1.14, where the nature of the *dravya*s (apart from *ākāśa*, *diś*, *kāla*, and *ātman*) is defined as being endowed with actions (*kriyā* = *karman*) and qualities (*guṇa*), and where it is defined as a *samavāyikāraṇa*: *kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam*. VS 1.1.15, in turn, marks the *guṇa*s as inhering in substances (i.e., as being *dravyāśrayin*s), while VS 1.1.16 suggests that an action has a single *dravya* as its *āśraya*; and, finally, VS 1.1.17 (*dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānyam*) states that *dravya*, *guṇa*, and *karman* equally are caused by substance.

[38] See NEMEC 2012 for an example of this, where we see Utpaladeva articulating in greater detail a critique of the Buddhist epistemologists that is found in a telegraphed and truncated form in the ŚD.

[39] See ĪPK 1.5.12.

present formulation with the Vaiśeṣika categories, this by identifying the *ātman* with the *ātmadravya*:[40]

> *ātmadravyasya bhāvātmakam apy etaj jaḍād bhedakatayā vimarśākhyaṃ mukhyaṃ rūpam uktaṃ caitanyaṃ dṛśiśaktiś citir iti. sā cetanakriyā citikartṛtaiva.*

> Sentience – that is, the power of consciousness, perceiving – though an abstract (*bhāva°*), has been said to be the primary nature – the reflective awareness (*vimarśa°*) – of the substance self, being that which distinguishes it from insentient reality. This activity of being conscious means precisely being the subject of such activity. (Transl. Torella.)

Abhinavagupta, quoting both the *Śivasūtra*s and Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*s in supporting the identification of consciousness with the *ātman*, makes it clear that the entity in question – the *ātmadravya* – is modelled on the Vaiśeṣika formulation, though the Pratyabhijñā view of the *ātman* differs from the Vaiśeṣika counterpart insofar as the Śaiva *ātman* is held to be the source or basis of all entities:[41]

> *yato vimarśa eva pradhānam ātmano rūpam amum eva hetuṃ prayojanarūpam uddiśya ātmā dharmisvabhāvo dravyabhūto 'pi, caitanyam iti dharmivācinā śabdena sāmānādhikaraṇyam āśritya uditaḥ kathitaḥ, bhagavatā śivasūtreṣu "caitanyam ātmā" (ŚSū 1.1) iti paṭhitam, caitanyam iti hi dharmavācakopalakṣaṇam, "citiśaktir apariṇāminī" "... taddṛśeḥ kaivalyam" (YS 2.25) "draṣṭā dṛśimātraḥ..." (YS 2.20) ityādāv api hi dharmaśabdena sāmānādhikaraṇyam ātmano darśitaṃ guruṇānantena, dravyaṃ hi tad ucyate – yadviśrāntaḥ padārthavargaḥ sarvo bhāti cārthyate cārthakriyāyai tad yadi na kupyate tat sakalo 'yaṃ tattvabhūtabhāvabhuvanasaṃbhāraḥ saṃvidi viśrāntaḥ tathā bhavatīti. sa eva guṇakarmādidharmāśraya-bhūtapadārthāntarasvabhāvaḥ tām eva mukhyadravyarūpām āśrayata iti saiva dravyam.*

> Because free consciousness (*vimarśa*) is itself the chief nature of self; therefore, with a view to represent it as such, the Self, though a substance and substratum of attributes, is put in the same case as that of sentiency (*caitanya*), though the latter stands for an attribute, in the *Śivasūtra* "caitanyam ātmā" by the glorious one (sic). The word "sentiency" (*caitanya*) stands for any word, which means the essential characteristic

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[40] TORELLA 1994 (pp. 119-120, nn. 24 and 25) makes no reference to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in his extended notes on the present passage of the ĪPKVṛ, though he does refer (in n. 25) to the *ātmadravya* as being "the *dravya par excellence*, because everything without distinction rests on him."

[41] See ĪPV ad ĪPK 1.5.12, vol. I, p. 200, l. 7-p. 201, l. 9.

[of self]. For, the teacher [Patañjali], in (I) "the power of sentiency is un-changing," (II) "that is the perfect isolation (*kaivalya*) of consciousness (*dṛśi*) (YS 2.25), and (III) "the subject is nothing more than conscious-ness" (YS 2.20), has put the Self in the same case as that of the word, which stands for the essential nature. The substance is that, resting on which everything shines and is desired for practical purposes. Therefore, if you do not get angry [I would say that] the entire mass of categories, elements, objects and worlds shines as such only resting on the universal consciousness (*saṃvid*): and because this mass, including the categories, such as quality, action, etc., essential nature and such other categories are the substrata, rests on that (*saṃvid*) which is the most important of all substances; therefore, that (*saṃvid*) alone is the true substance. (Transl. Pandey.)

Here, one is witness to Abhinavagupta's effort definitively to rede-fine the nature of the *dravya* in question in a Śaiva mold, suggest-ing that consciousness (*saṃvid*) alone is the primary substance (*mukhyadravya*) in doing so, because, he says, the mass of *padā-rtha*s (*padārthavarga*), including qualities, action, etc., rests on it. This is to say that Abhinavagupta's sub-commentary confirms that, in his view at least, the Pratyabhijñā view of the *ātman*, itself exist-ing as or in the form of consciousness, is the preeminent *dravya*, that on which all entities depend – Abhinava says: *ātmā dharmi-svabhāvo dravyabhūto 'pi caitanyam –*, a view that parallels Śaṅ-kara's critique of the Vaiśeṣikas and confirms that the Pratyabhijñā theory of self is, if not modeled on, at the least measured against the realists' formulations (or at least this is so in Abhinavagupta's view of the matter). This is so even as he and Utpaladeva part ways with the view of material entities propounded by the found-ing author of the Pratyabhijñā, as we shall see, when they show themselves to be more amenable to acknowledging the (relative) existence of (apparently) material entities than was Somānanda.

4. A Comparison of Utpaladeva's Approach to Materiality with Somānanda's

Turning now to a comparison of Utpaladeva's treatment of materi-ality with Somānanda's, we find the two authors pursuing differing strategies for explaining the appearance in the world of apparently distinct, material entities. Somānanda is entirely dismissive of the very possibility of the existence of any material entity, as has been shown; Utpaladeva's treatment of the matter is rather more nuanc-

ed. This is not to say that Utpala discards the basic framework offered by the ŚD, for he does not: like Somānanda (and as is well known) Utpaladeva, too, identifies Śiva with the *ātman* and both with consciousness, and sees this divine agent as the primary, indeed the only, entity in existence, the one from which all others are derived and on which they all rest.[42] Yet, Utpaladeva also simultaneously allows greater scope for the existence of apparently material entities than does Somānanda, and in doing so he largely adopts the model of another idealist, that of Bhartṛhari, against whom Somānanda directed his vociferous arguments opposing the very existence of materiality.

I note, firstly, that Utpaladeva incorporates realist categories, and the *padārtha*s in particular, into his system, albeit by placing them in a subordinated position in his overarching ontology:[43]

> *kriyāsaṃbandhasāmānyadravyadikkālabuddhayaḥ |*
> *satyāḥ sthairyopayogābhyām ekānekāśrayā matāḥ ‖*

> The ideas of action, relation, universal, substance, space and time, which are based on unity and multiplicity, are to be considered real (*satyāḥ*), because of their permanence and efficacy (*sthairyopayogābhyām*). (Transl. Torella.)

Note that the list here offered is not precisely that of the six *padārtha*s, which should include *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karman*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, and *samavāya*. *Dik* and *kāla*, moreover, are of course counted as two of the nine *dravya*s in the Vaiśeṣika formulation. What is offered here is something of a hybrid list, then, one that I suspect shows the influence of Bhartṛhari's formulations, which also influenced Utpaladeva, as we shall see momentarily. (*Dik* and *kāla* are important categories in the VP and its commentaries.) Nevertheless, it is probably safe enough here to agree with Torella, who summarizes the contents of ĪPK 2.2 as follows: "This second *āhnika* aims at establishing that the categories acknowledged by the *bāhyavādin*s (the reference is particularly to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) are acceptable only if seen from the Śaiva viewpoint."[44]

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[42] Guided by Abhinava's ĪPV ad ĪPK 1.5.12, reviewed above, I mean by this in particular that Utpaladeva understands the *ātman* to be the *dravya* par excellence, that on which all other entities depend and from which they can emerge.

[43] See ĪPK 2.2.1.

[44] See TORELLA 1994, p. 157, n. 1. It may be worth reiterating that Abhinavagupta makes explicit reference to the six *padārtha*s (and their inherent, though

If the *padārtha*s, or the bulk of them anyway, are explicitly in-
corporated into the ĪPK and ĪPKVṛ, it stands to reason that they
must have some real ontological standing in Utpaladeva's system,
even if they are comprehensible only in the context of a Śaiva idea-
lism. And, indeed, this is precisely what is found in his writings,
where one witnesses Utpala following Bhartṛhari in incorporating
materiality into his ontology. This he does by explicitly acceding
to the existence of *mūrti*s, entities with form, at ĪPK 2.1.5:

> *mūrtivaicitryato deśakramam ābhāsayaty asau* |
> *kriyāvaicitryanirbhāsāt kālakramam apīśvaraḥ* ‖

> Through the variety of physical forms he causes spatial succession to a-
> ppear; through the manifestation of the variety of actions the Lord also
> causes temporal successions to appear. (Transl. Torella.)

Since the "variety of physical forms," as Torella translates *mūrti-
vaicitrya*, serves as a means for manifesting differences in spatial
location, they of necessity appear in a form real enough to validate
the existence of spatial extension. So much is also confirmed in the
svopojñavṛtti, where Utpaladeva states that *deśakrama* exists as a
result of the appearance of the mutual distinction of many entities
(*anekasyānyonyabhedābhāsād deśakramaḥ*). Not incidentally, as
we shall see presently, Utpaladeva also indicates in both the *mūla*
and the *Vṛtti* that temporal sequence (*kālakrama*) is dependent on
action (*kriyā*).[45]

Of course, the context for such statements is clearly that of the
appearance of mundane existence, the actions and entities of the
everyday world, as is made clear in the present *āhnika* itself:[46]

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subordinated, place within the hierarchy of being) in his ĪPV ad ĪPK 1.5.12, as
was shown, above.

[45] See ĪPKVṛ ad ĪPK 2.1.5: *anekasyānyonyabhedābhāsād deśakramaḥ kriyāmu-
khena kālakramo 'pi. ekasya tu bhāvasya tattajjanmasattāvipariṇāmādikriyā-
bhedāt kālakrama eva.* "In the case of many entities, there is spatial succes-
sion through the manifestation of mutual diversity and temporal succession
through actions. However, with reference to a single entity there is only tem-
poral succession due to different actions such as birth, existence, change, etc."
(Transl. Torella.)

[46] See also the *svopajñavṛtti* on the same verse (ĪPK 2.1.2): *māyāśakter bhinna-
bhāvāvabhāsānāṃ kriyā kālaśaktivaśāt sakramā na tv ātmavimarśarūpānādi-
nidhanā prabhoḥ svabhāvabhūtā.* "The action of entities that, due to the power
of *māyā*, appear differentiated, is successive, being dependent on the power of
Time; but that action, informed by the awareness of the self, without beginn-
ing or end, which is the very essence of the Lord, is not." (Transl. Torella.)

2.1.2. *sakramatvaṃ ca laukikyāḥ kriyāyāḥ kālaśaktitaḥ |*
ghaṭate na tu śāśvatyāḥ prābhavyāḥ syāt prabhor iva ‖

Succession pertains to ordinary action, which is dependent on the power of Time; it is not, however, admissible for divine eternal action, as it is not for the Lord. (Transl. Torella.)

There is a distinction to be made between worldly (*laukikī*) action, on the one hand, and the "eternal (*śāśvatī*) action" of the Lord, on the other. Indeed, Utpaladeva surely would not wish to suggest that the objects of cognition exist as they are conceived by the naïve realist: fully real, material entities that exist outside of consciousness and entirely independently of the agent's capacity to cognize them. As an epistemic and metaphysical idealist, he of course understands them rather to be the very contents of consciousness and as such entirely dependent upon it.[47]

Utpaladeva nevertheless does allow scope for the manifestation of *mūrti*s at this subordinated level, and he does so in a manner that is not expressed in the ŚD: there is no denial of their very existence in the ĪPK as there is asseverated in the ŚD. Utpaladeva further parts ways with his teacher in making reference to the *deśa-* and *kāla-krama*s, corresponding as they do with *mūrti* and *kriyā*, respectively, allowing thereby for the appearance of (real) temporal and spatial distinctions at the mundane level of existence. In doing so, he again follows the model of the grammarians, this being evident because a closely similar formulation to Utpaladeva's is found in Harivṛṣabha's *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* (VPVṛ), where two types of *vivarta* are described, one related to *mūrti*, the other to *kriyā*:[48]

mūrtikriyāvivartāv avidyāśaktipravṛttimātram. tau vidyātmani tattvānya-tvābhyām anākhyeyau. etad dhy avidyāyā avidyātvam.

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[47] Utpaladeva is of course equally the non-dualist as is his teacher, and he wishes his view of materiality to be contextualized by the fact that it pertains only to the apparent diversity of a subordinated, merely mundane or worldly, level of being. On the other hand, Somānanda nowhere deals with matters in this way, by distinguishing worldly from transcendent forms of action. He rather imagines all entities and beings equally to function in the same manner, as is evident in his mutual identification of Yajñadatta, Devadatta, and the *ghaṭa*. See NEMEC forthcoming for a further description of the nature of Śiva's action as the agent *par excellence*. Cf. NEMEC 2011, pp. 31-34 and 100-104. See also TORELLA 1994, p. xxvii.

[48] See VPVṛ ad VP 1.1, vol I, p. 9, ll. 1-3.

> Spatial (*mūrti*) and temporal (*kriyā*) manifestations are nothing but the functioning of the powers of nescience (*avidyā*). The two cannot be expressed as either identical with nor different from the one whose nature is *vidyā*. For, the fact of being nescience consists in just that. (Transl. an adaptation from Iyer's.)

Elsewhere, in the commentary of Helārāja on verse 14 of the *dravyasamuddeśa* (=VP 3.2.14), *kriyā* is associated with the power of time (*kālaśakti*), while *mūrti* is associated with the power of space (*dikśakti*):[49]

> *kālaśaktyavacchinno hi kriyāvivartaḥ dikśaktyavacchinnaś ca mūrtivivarta iti mūrtikriyāvivartarūpaṃ viśvaṃ pratipāditam.*

> For, the transformation of action (*kriyāvivarta*) is circumscribed by the power of time (*kālaśakti*), while the transformation of form (*mūrtivivarta*) is circumscribed by the power of space (*dikśakti*). Therefore, the universe (*viśva*) is taught to have the transformation of form and of action as its nature.

Of course, this offers a formulation that is very close to the one propounded by Utpaladeva and stands, I propose, as the model for what is stated in the ĪPK. Somānanda, on the other hand, never so much as utters the term *kālaśakti* (nor *dikśakti*) and nowhere mentions their relation to *kriyā* and *mūrti*, respectively; nor even does he anywhere offer *kriyā* and *mūrti* as a paired concept.[50] What is instead presented, as we have seen, is a single model for being, and for agency, one that renders the activity of the mundane (apparently material) water-pot identical both to that of the monadic agent – Devadatta or Yajñadatta – *and* to that of the divine agent, Śiva.

It is evident, then, that while Somānanda bluntly dealt with the idealist's challenge – that of explaining the apparent existence of apparently distinct, material entities –, Utpaladeva, following the VP and its commentaries, finessed the question: for, while he placed the *ātman*, conterminal with Śiva, at the top of his ontological hierarchy, he did not simply deny the existence of discrete, materi-

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[49]　See Helārāja's commentary on VP 3.2.14 (in the *dravyasamuddeśa*), vol. III.1, p. 117, ll. 8-11.

[50]　Utpaladeva, in turn, nowhere in the ĪPK speaks of Somānanda's rather detailed treatment of the immaterial nature of the *functioning* of Śiva's powers (for more about which see NEMEC forthcoming). So, different approaches are here offered in treating the nature of physical, material entities, even if (I would reiterate) they are philosophically compatible and theologically consonant.

al entities (remembering here that by definition a *mūrti* is *asarva-gataparimāṇa*, the very measure of a delimited entity), but rather subordinated and relativized them, rendering them merely mundane (yet nevertheless extant) phenomena – and (distant) derivatives of the *ātman*, the preeminent *dravya*, at that.

5. ABHINAVAGUPTA'S SYNTHESIS

Finally, I turn very briefly to Abhinavagupta's treatment of materiality, or more specifically to a single instance thereof, found in his ĪPV and ĪPVV as they comment on ĪPK 2.1.5 (which itself was reviewed above). First, the relevant passage of the ĪPV:[51]

> *padārthasya svaṃ rūpaṃ mūrtiḥ tasyā yat vaicitryaṃ vibhedaḥ tadyathā gṛham iti anyat svarūpaṃ prāṅgaṇam iti anyat vipaṇir iti anyad devakulam ity aparam udyānam ity anyad araṇyam iti taditarat; tasmād vaicitryād ābhāsyamānād deśarūpo dūrādūravitatatvāvitatatvādiḥ kramo bhagavatāvabhāsyate. yadā tu gāḍhapratyabhijñāprakāśabalāt tad evedaṃ hastasvarūpam iti pratipattau mūrter na bhedo 'tha cānyānyarūpatvaṃ bhāti tadaikasmin svarūpe yad anyat anyat rūpaṃ tad virodhavaśād asahabhavat kriyety ucyate. tasyā yat vaicitryaṃ parimitāparimitarūpatātmakaṃ tadekānusaṃdhānena phalasiddhyādinibandhanavaśād yathāruci carcitena nirbhāsayan kālarūpaṃ kramam eva bhāsayati.*

Here the word "*mūrti*" means the body of the object; and *vaicitrya* means variety. Thus, by means of manifestation of the variety of external bodies such as house, courtyard, market, temple, garden and forest, each of which is different from the rest, the spatial successions such as distant and near, wide and narrow, etc., are made manifest by the Lord. But when, because of the strong recognition, the experience, "this is essentially the same hand," arises and though there is no essential change in the body, yet formal differences appear; then the variety of forms, which cannot coexist in the same body, because the forms are contrary to one another, is spoken of as action. He makes the temporal succession manifest, through manifestation of variety of forms, involved in action, limited or unlimited in their nature, as related to one, that is freely constructed in imagination, because the fruition, etc., of action are related to it. (Transl. Pandey.)[52]

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[51] See ĪPV, vol. II, p. 13, ll. 9-p. 15, l. 3 (the same appears in PANDEY 1954, vol. II, p. 17, ll. 1-10).

[52] See also the translation of Isabelle Ratié, found at RATIÉ 2011, p. 202, n. 67.

Much is embedded in the present passage (including, e.g., the *vigraha* of *mūrtivaicitryatas*, found at ĪPK 2.1.5a), and Abhinavagupta's commentaries engage many concerns that lie beyond the scope of the present essay. They deal, for one, with the issue of *anusaṃdhāna*,[53] discussed also by Utpaladeva (though elsewhere), but not by Somānanda, who never uses the term; for another, Abhinavagupta here articulates, in a formulation that is to my knowledge unattested in the surviving writings of Utpaladeva, a sophisticated understanding of action (*kriyā*), envisioning it as depending on the manifestation of a marked recognition (*gāḍhapratyabhijñāprakāśabalāt*) of the identity of a single entity that appears, nevertheless, in distinguishable, nay contradictory, forms. Yet, apart from these notable flourishes, Abhinavagupta here offers what is ultimately a sophisticated reiteration of the ideas expressed in the passages of the ĪPK and ĪPKVṛ with which the present excerpt corresponds. In fact, Abhinavagupta's ĪPV ad 2.1.5 limits itself to an affirmation of the place of *mūrtivaicitrya* in the manifested universe, an affirmation that fully reflects the fact that Utpaladeva adopted the formulation of the VP and its commentaries.

The ĪPVV, too, reflects the same position, as well as the influence of the Grammarians.[54] Yet, it adds something to it, as well, and in noting as much I wish to indicate that the selected commentarial excerpts illustrate Abhinavagupta's synthetic method, his capacity fluidly to synchronize the sometimes differing (not to say contradictory) philosophical formulations found in the writings of his *paramaguru* and his *parameṣṭhiguru*, Utpaladeva and Somānanda. For, if one looks across the extensive commentary of the ĪPVV ad 2.1.5, one notices Abhinavagupta incorporate, subtly and

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[53] This concept is dealt with at length in, e.g., RATIÉ 2011, pp. 143-168, 184-212, 265-270, and *passim*.

[54] See, e.g., ĪPVV ad ĪPK 2.1.5 (vol. III, p. 12, ll. 4-7 and 9-13 of the KSTS edition): *mūrtīnāṃ saṃvedyarūpāṇāṃ bhāvānāṃ yat vaicitryaṃ gṛhaprāṅgaṇavipaṇidevakulārāmāraṇyādibhedena, tato hetos tat vaicitryam ābhāsayan parameśvaro deśakramaṃ vaitatyāvaitatyātmakam avabhāsayati. ekapratyabhijñābalāt tu yat svarūpeṇābhinnaṃ hastādi... tasya yad anyānyadeśatvam anyānyadharmatvaṃ svarūpaikatām abādhamānaṃ – gacchati caitraḥ, pacyate phalam, – ityevaṃbhūtaṃ kriyāvaicitryam, tasya nirbhāsanād hetor īśvaro virodham avirodhaṃ ca svātantryāt nirbhāsayan kālākhyaṃ kramam ekasya viruddharūpatayānucitam api avabhāsayatīti sūtrārthaḥ.*

without comment, the language found in the ŚD the ŚDVṛ describing the nature of a material entity or *mūrti*:[55]

> ... *na tv asarvagatadravyaparimāṇam iha mūrtiḥ kāṭhinyaṃ vety āśayaḥ.*

Here we find the material entity, the *mūrti*, described as it is in Somānanda's masterwork and in the ŚDVṛ, as *asarvagatadravyaparimāṇa* and as *kāṭhinya*, for the language here deployed precisely reflects the description of material entities found at ŚD 2.74cd-76 and the *Vṛtti* thereupon.

More generally, the spirit of the ĪPVV ad 2.1.5, when viewed in a more comprehensive manner, may be said to offer a rather thoroughgoing synthesis of the two ideas – of *mūrti* as being the product of nothing but consciousness itself – that is, as it being an entity entirely dependent on the *ātmadravya* as its basis or source – and of *mūrti*s as apparently physical entities that exist on a mundane level and serve as the very measure of what appears to be real physical extension.

To reiterate, the views are by no means incompatible; but they are distinguishable. And Somānanda nowhere shows any cognizance of, or interest in supporting, the position (articulated first in the ĪPK and ĪPKVṛ) that shows itself to be influenced by the writings of the VP and its commentaries, favoring instead the view that all that appears to be material is in fact nothing but consciousness. The point, then, is not merely to note that the ĪPVV explicitly engages the views found in both the ŚD and ŚDVṛ, on the one hand, and the ĪPK and ĪPKVṛ, on the other; it is further to suggest, albeit in the telegraphed form here offered, that to do so is a sort of hallmark of the longer of Abhinavagupta's two sub-commentaries. Whether so much reflects a practice of synthesis found in Utpaladeva's *Īśvarpratyabhijñāvivṛti* I cannot say, since the vast majority of this work is lost. Yet, the present offers, I submit, but one example of many acts of integration found in the longer of Abhinavagupta's two sub-commentaries.[56]

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[55] See ĪPVV ad ĪPK 2.1.5 (vol. III, p. 13, ll. 4-5). There is much else in the ĪPVV that refers to the formulations of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, often in a manner that serves more fully to flesh out the accommodation by Utpaladeva of *mūrti*s, as conceived by the realists, at a subordinated ontological level. See, e.g., ĪPVV ad ĪPK 2.1.5, vol. III, p. 13, ll. 20ff.

[56] One may also add that, from an emic perspective, a difference in perspective on the divine defines the differences of expression of the ŚD, on the one hand, and the ĪPK (and ĪPKVṛ), on the other. The former speaks the language of id-

6. CONCLUSION

The materials here reviewed evince a complex history of engage-
ment by Pratyabhijñā authors with the realist *āstika* schools and
the Vaiśeṣika in particular. They present on the one hand an in-
stance of philosophical continuity, for while Somānanda's critique
is in various places implicit or indirect, it is evident that he both
formulated his theory of Śiva-as-consciousness with the measure
of the Vaiśeṣika *padārtha*s in mind and that he likely modelled, in
part at least, his conception of the *ātman* on the Vaiśeṣika *dravya*
of the same name. Precisely the same is evident in the ĪPK (and es-
pecially the ĪPKVṛ) and is confirmed in the corresponding passa-
ges of the ĪPV and ĪPVV. We have, then, a continuity of approach
in dealing with realist ontology from roughly 900-950 C.E. (when
Somānanda flourished) to Abhinavagupta's day (c. 975-1025
C.E.).

On the other hand, the texts evince a real development in the
Pratyabhijñā treatment of the basic question to hand –namely, the
reality or otherwise of apparently discrete, material entities. This is
evident first and foremost in the form of Utpaladeva's reorienta-
tion of the Pratyabhijñā treatment of material entities (*mūrti*s),
which sets aside the more extreme implications of Somānanda's
vociferous, even truculent, denial of their very existence – a posi-
tion that might aptly be described as a sort of naïve idealism –, opt-
ing instead for a moderated position admitting of a worldly or rela-
tive reality of *mūrti*s while borrowing substantially from the VP
and its commentaries in formulating such a view. As is to be ex-
pected, Abhinavagupta offers a scholastic, inclusive account of the
matter to hand, and it is one that synchronizes the arguments of his
parama- and *parameṣṭhi-guru*s while serving more clearly to de-

entification with Śiva from the first lines, while the latter speaks of Utpala
"somehow" coming to recognize his identity with the divine. (Compare ŚD
1.1, and 1.2, with ĪPK 1.1.1.) Utpala, in other words, shows a perspective of
climbing to the transcendent, Somānanda of standing within it, or, perhaps, of
being aware of it from the first. Abhinavagupta moves fluidly between such
positions. Finally, I note that it is possible that Utpaladeva's perspective is im-
plicitly exemplified in the patterned organization of the *āhnika*s of the ĪPK,
which ascend, as it were, toward oneness: the four *adhikāra*s of the ĪPK show
a regular pattern of successively reducing the number of *āhnika*s found in
each by half: there are 8 *āhnika*s in the first *adhikāra*, four in the second, two
in the third, and a single *āhnika* in the last *adhikāra*. One may speculate that
so much is symbolic of the movement toward unity for which Utpaladeva pro-
mises to offer assistance in ĪPK 1.1.1.

fine and elaborate upon Utpaladeva's account, exhibiting a significant fidelity to that author's philosophical formulations along the way. All of this is accomplished in a manner that exhibits the possibility of philosophical innovation in the context of a certain continuity of tradition, even, it must be noted, where Utpaladeva adopts the thinking of the very opponents against whom Somānanda argues most vociferously, Bhartṛhari and the grammarians.

It should come as no great surprise that a competing Hindu school that held currency in the Kashmir Valley at the time of the flourishing of the Pratyabhijñā held the attention of these authors. Indeed, that the authors of the Pratyabhijñā would adopt elements of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology for their own purposes, despite the fact that these opponents were both philosophical realists and dualists, involves them in perhaps no greater a philosophical accommodation than what was needed to incorporate major elements of the idealist, but *nāstika*, epistemology of the Vijñānavāda, as well it is known they did (Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta in particular). The dualism of the former is rejected and the ontology modified, adapted, while the theory of agency (one involving the denial of the existence of the *ātman*) of the latter is rejected while the epistemology is modified, adapted, to the theistic and Self-affirming position of the Śaivas. Vaiśeṣika ontological categories, moreover, were similarly of concern to other idealists, such as Śaṅkara. The present study thus may stand as but one exemplar not only of the complex patterns of influence among the various śāstric schools of learning in premodern South Asia, but also of the extensive work that remains to be completed in the course of developing a thoroughgoing intellectual history of Kashmir in and around the time of Abhinavagupta.

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Some Hitherto Unknown Fragments
of Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti* (III):

On Memory and Error[*]

ISABELLE RATIÉ

FRAGMENTS OF UTPALADEVA'S *VIVṚTI*
IN MARGINAL ANNOTATIONS

As is now well known, Utpaladeva's detailed commentary (the *Vivṛti* or *Ṭīkā*) on his own Pratyabhijñā treatise (the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*s, hereafter ĪPK) was certainly the most important philosophical text of the Pratyabhijñā corpus;[1] yet unfortunately, to date we only have access to a few fragments of this work. A particularly lengthy one was edited and translated by Raffaele Torella[2] on the basis of a unique, very incomplete manuscript[3] now preserved in the National Archives of India (Delhi). But more *Vivṛti* fragments have recently come to light. The latter do not come, however, from any newly discovered *Vivṛti* manuscript, but from annotations written in the margins of manuscripts containing other Pratyabhijñā texts.[4] The present article is the continuation of a series of papers devoted to the edition, translation and explanation of

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[1] See TORELLA 2014.

[2] See TORELLA 1988, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d and 2012. The following pages owe much to these remarkable studies.

[3] It covers 13 verses out of the 190 that constitute the ĪPK.

[4] For a diplomatic edition of a few brief fragments found in a manuscript of Utpaladeva's short commentary (*Vṛtti*) see KAWAJIRI 2015. For an edition, translation and analysis of lengthier fragments found in the margins of manuscripts containing Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* (hereafter ĪPV), see RATIÉ 2016 and RATIÉ forthcoming a. On the recent discovery of what could be the lengthiest *Vivṛti* fragment known to date in the margins of a manuscript of Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (hereafter ĪPVV), see RATIÉ forthcoming c.

fragments found in the margins of manuscripts containing Abhina-vagupta's commentaries on the Pratyabhijñā treatise.[5] So far I have dealt with fragments commenting on ĪPK 1.5.4-9 and 1.8.10-11, that is, with passages that originally came after the part of the text edited by Raffaele Torella (which covers ĪPK 1.3.6 to ĪPK 1.5.3). This paper deals with a fragment of Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti* on ĪPK 1.3.5 that came immediately before the beginning of the *Vivṛti* codex unicus in its current state.

THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT FRAGMENT
AND THE GOAL OF UTPALADEVA'S ARGUMENT

In the previous verses, Utpaladeva has endeavoured to show that memory can be satisfactorily explained only provided that we accept the existence of the Self (*ātman*), that is, an enduring conscious substance that ensures our continuous existence as sentient entities despite the constant changes undergone by our body and mind.[6]

The soundness of this argument is contested by a Buddhist opponent who sees consciousness as a series of discrete, purely momentary events rather than as a unitary, lasting entity. This Buddhist interlocutor claims that memories can be accounted for even if there is no such thing as an *ātman*. According to him, memories arise through a causal mechanism of residual traces (*saṃskāra*) or imprints (*vāsanā*). Such traces, left by past experiences, remain latent in the conscious stream until their "awakening" (*prabodha*) is triggered by the perception of an object related to the one perceived in the past (we remember seeing a pot yesterday if this memory is occasioned for instance by the sight of a similar pot). And this imprint theory does not necessarily lead to acknowledging the existence of a permanent substrate (the Self) in which the imprints would need to be stored, since we can understand the conscious stream as made of purely momentary events that are all different from each other but also causally linked to each other. A cognition X bearing a certain latent trace exists for a single moment, but

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[5]   On the manuscripts bearing these marginal annotations and the difficulties involved in their edition see RATIÉ 2016 and RATIÉ forthcoming c.

[6]   The following lines only provide a very sketchy outline of Utpaladeva's position in the Indian debate over the Self's existence and role in memory (*smṛti*). For detailed accounts of this issue see RATIÉ 2006, TORELLA 2007b, RATIÉ 2011 (Chapters 1-4) and RATIÉ forthcoming b.

within that moment it contributes to the production of a momentary cognition Y. This cognition Y comes to exist a moment later, bears a latent trace similar to that of X because its nature has been causally determined to contain such a trace by X, and contributes to the production of a cognition Z – and so on.

Now, Utpaladeva has just shown that this well-known Buddhist explanation of memory makes no sense. According to him, the imprint theory might very well account for the fact that the remembered object bears some resemblance to the object that was perceived in the past (this likeness is insured by the residual trace); but it cannot explain the very nature of memories. For memories are not just cognitions of an object: what differentiates them from perceptions, imaginations, etc., is the fact that when remembering, we are aware not only of an object, but also of having perceived that object in the past. Remembering a pot is not just being aware of a pot, but rather, being aware of a pot *as something that we saw yesterday*. Memories involve the subjective awareness that the remembered object has already been experienced; but how can the Buddhist account for this? When remembering, we do not simply take our own past experience as the object of our cognition, since the object of our cognition is nothing but the object that we remember – that is, the pot. So how are we aware not only of the pot, but also *of the fact that we did perceive the pot in the past*?

According to Utpaladeva's Buddhist opponent, we are not aware of our own perceptions as we are aware of objects such as pots: we do not grasp cognitions as we grasp objects in perception, through a separate cognitive act. We become aware of our own consciousness in a much more immediate way, since any cognitive event involves a self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) through which we instantly know that we know a certain object without having to posit our own knowledge as a distinct entity to be known. And since the Buddhist must acknowledge that the awareness of our past experience cannot simply be the *object* of our memory, according to Utpaladeva, he can only explain this awareness if he concedes that we are aware of having experienced the object in the past through mere self-awareness. But by accepting such an explanation he seals his fate. For if we are aware of having previously perceived something through mere self-awareness, it must be the *same* lasting consciousness that experienced the object in the past and remembers it now: memory is nothing but the self-awareness of an enduring sentient entity that is aware of itself as having perceived

something in the past. In other words, if the Buddhist is willing to give a rational account of memory, he must acknowledge the existence of the Self.

The Buddhist tries to escape the uncomfortable position in which the Śaiva has just put him by arguing that memories are not really about objects that have been previously perceived. They only *seem* to faithfully recall such things to consciousness because instead of being, as perception, the immediate experience of a given, they build or construct their object (which is absent since it belongs to the past) by shaping or determining (and thus distorting) the past perception and its objective content. Because memories consist in such a mental elaboration or determination (*avasāya*, *adhyavasāya*), they are in essence errors (*bhrānti*, *bhrama*).[7]

Utpaladeva replies that if such is the case, then the very essence of memory – which is traditionally defined as what prevents us from being entirely deprived of what we perceived before –[8] is completely lost. And this is a consequence that the Buddhist cannot afford, since he himself considers that only memory enables us to know which objects should be sought or shunned. Thus according to Dharmakīrti, the establishment (*vyavasthā*, *vyavasthiti*) of ob-

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7   See ĪPK 1.3.3: *athātadviṣayatve ’pi smṛtes tadavasāyataḥ | dṛṣṭālambanatā bhrāntyā tad etad asamañjasam* ‖. “[– The Buddhist:] But even though memory does not [really] have as its object the [past perception and its object], it erroneously (*bhrāntyā*) [appears] to have as its objective support the [previously] perceived [object], because [memory consists in] a determination (*avasāya*) of the [past perception and its object]. – The Śaiva:] This [thesis of yours] is not consistent.” Cf. ĪPV, vol. I, p. 98: *na tad darśanaṃ nāpi tadviṣayaḥ smṛter viṣayaḥ, tathāpi tūbhayam adhyavasīyate, bhramarūpatayā smṛteḥ.* “The object of memory is neither the [past] perception nor the object of that [past perception]; rather, both are [merely] determined [and not grasped as they really are], since memory consists in an error.”

8   The Śaivas thus quote the definition of memory in *Yogasūtra* 1.11: *anubhūta-viṣayāsampramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ.* “Memory is not being deprived of the object [previously] experienced.” See TORELLA 2007b, p. 540, and RATIÉ 2011, pp. 132-133. In fact the term *sampramoṣa* was borrowed from a Buddhist context where it simply meant “forgetfulness” (see WUJASTYK forthcoming) and it is very likely that the *sūtra*’s original meaning was rather something along these lines: “Memory is not forgetting the [previously] experienced object.” Nonetheless, the Śaivas (as well as other rather late authors such as Śaṅkara or Vācaspatimiśra) understand the term as meaning “taking away” or “stealing” (*apahāra*, *steya*), an interpretation according to which the *sūtra* basically means that memory consists in not being robbed or deprived of one’s previous experiences.

jects, that is, our ability to ascertain that something exists as an object capable of bringing about a specific, desirable or undesirable effect, entirely rests on memory, so that all our wordly activities are grounded in our capacity to remember.[9] Besides, Utpaladeva remarks that considering memory as mistaken in essence is at odds with the Buddhist's contention that memory is based on residual traces:[10] the very purpose of this explanation is to account for memory's faithfulness,[11] so that doubting this faithfulness betrays a major inconsistency in the Buddhist's discourse.

Utpaladeva then turns to the notion of determination and shows that if memory is an error consisting in such a determination, it cannot tell us anything regarding the object (it is perfectly mute, *tūṣṇīka*,[12] with respect to that object), and as a consequence it cannot help us deal with objects in our everyday lives.

Admittedly, in the Buddhist perspective, an erroneous cognition is not entirely mute or unconscious. As any cognition, it is imme-

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[9] See e.g. *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (hereafter PVin) 1. 18: *taddṛṣṭāv eva dṛṣṭeṣu saṃvitsāmarthyabhāvinaḥ | smaraṇād abhilāṣeṇa vyavahāraḥ pravartate ||.* "Wordly activity (*vyavahāra*) occurs due to the desire of [things] that have been [previously] perceived; [this desire in turn arises] thanks to the memory [of these things] that takes place only once they have been perceived, thanks to the power [i.e. the imprint left by a former perceptual] cognition." On this passage see KELLNER 2001, p. 504 and ELTSCHINGER AND RATIÉ 2013, pp. 180-181.

[10] See ĪPV, vol. I, p. 100: *na ca tadaprakāśane saṃskārajatvena kiṃcit kṛtyam. tad dhi sādṛśyaṃ labdhum avalambyate. na cānubhavena viṣayaprakāśanāt-manā smṛtyabhidhānāyā bhrānteḥ kiṃcid api sādṛśyam asti, sarvathā viṣayam aspṛśyantyāḥ.* "And if[, as the Buddhist contends,] there is no manifestation of the [previously perceived object in memory, the Buddhist's assumption] that [memory] arises from a residual trace is perfectly useless! For [the Buddhist] clings to this [theory] so as to explain the similarity [of the remembered object with the previously perceived object]. But there is no similarity whatsoever between the [past] experience – which consists in the manifestation of the object – and the error that[, according to the Buddhist, we] call memory, since [an error can] have no contact at all with a [real] object."

[11] See ĪPK 1.3.4: *smṛtitaiva kathaṃ tāvad bhrānteś cārthasthitiḥ katham | pūrvānubhavasaṃskārāpekṣā ca kim itīṣyate ||.* "To begin with, how could the very essence of memory [be preserved then]? And how could the object be established [in our worldly activities] thanks to an error? And [if memory is nothing but an error,] why does [the Buddhist] consider that [memory] depends on a residual trace [left] by some previous experience?" On my understanding of *tāvat* here, which follows Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's commentaries, see RATIÉ 2011, p. 131, n. 48.

[12] ĪPV, vol. I, p. 102; ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 250.

diately aware of itself (*svasaṃvedana*), so that at least it reveals its own conscious nature. Besides, as an erroneous cognition, it manifests what is in fact a mere aspect of itself (*svākāra*) as if it were an external object – so even an error can be said to be conscious both of itself and of its subjective aspect wrongly apprehended as an object.[13] For example, when we mistake mother-of-pearl for a piece of silver, our determination of mother-of-pearl as being silver involves the awareness of silver (which is in fact an internal aspect of our own consciousness wrongly considered as existing outside of us) as well as the awareness that we are conscious of silver (i.e. the self-awareness that characterizes any cognition). So the Buddhist might argue that although memory is in essence an error, it enables us to establish the objects of our daily activities, because contrary to what the Śaivas claim, even an error is not entirely unconscious (*jaḍa*) and can tell us something about reality.

To this objection, Utpaladeva replies that the erroneous cognition of mother-of-pearl mistaken for silver tells us absolutely nothing of the real object erroneously determined as silver: it is perfectly "mute" as regards the mother-of-pearl, it includes no awareness whatsoever of it. And if all memories amount to erroneous cognitions, they are in the same way incapable of helping us establish the existence and nature of the objects around us.

This Śaiva line of argument is summed up in ĪPK 1.3.5:

> And if the determination (*avasāya*) [in which memory supposedly consists] is an error, the establishment of the object cannot result from this [determination], which is unconscious [with respect to the real object; but even] if [one objects that this determination] is not unconscious [in all respects, then] the establishment of the object cannot result from the

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[13] See e.g. ĪPV, vol. I, pp. 102-103: *atha tu tam avasāyarūpaṃ svasaṃvedanā-ṃśaṃ svākāraṃ vāvalambyājaḍatvam asyāḥ, evam apy ajāḍye nijaṃ svasaṃ-vedanam ullekhaś ca svākāra itīyaty eṣā pariniṣṭhitā smṛtiḥ.* "But [if the Buddhist replies that] the [memory cognition] is conscious with respect to what consists in determination [itself, that is], with respect to the part [of determination] that is aware of itself or the subjective aspect [of determination that is mistaken for an external object]; even so, [or, as Utpaladeva puts it in the verse, even] if [the Buddhist objects that in his system determination] 'is not unconscious,' this memory is confined to this only: its own self-awareness, and the representation [of itself] that is an aspect of itself [mistaken for an external object]."

[conscious part of determination,] which is confined to itself and the re-presentation[14] [of itself as the external object].[15]

The *Vivṛti* fragment begins with an allusion to two theories of error that are traditionally regarded as Buddhist, namely the *asatkhyāti-vāda* and the *ātmakhyātivāda*, often respectively ascribed to Mā-dhyamikas and Vijñānavādins.[16] According to the first theory, in error consciousness manifests something nonexistent (*asat*), whereas according to the second, it manifests itself (*ātman*). Utpa-ladeva does not take the trouble of examining the first theory here. The reason for this is probably that if the Buddhist opponent ad-opts the *asatkhyātivāda*, he must admit that the remembered object is simply nonexistent,[17] which (at least in the Śaivas' eyes) renders null and void his claim that we constantly have recourse to memo-ry so as to establish the existence and causal efficacy of currently existing wordly objects. The fragment therefore focuses on the Buddhist *ātmakhyātivāda*, that is, on the thesis that when we mis-take a piece of mother-of-pearl for silver, silver is not a mere non-being, but rather, a subjective aspect (*svākāra*) of consciousness that consciousness mistakes for an objective entity existing outside of itself.

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[14]   See ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 242: *nijollekha iti svātmollekha iti sūtravṛttyor dvandva-samāsaḥ.* "*nijollekha* means[, as specified in the *Vṛtti*,] 'itself and the repre-sentation'; in both the verse and the *Vṛtti*, it is a *dvandva* compound."

[15]   *bhrāntitve cāvasāyasya na jaḍād viṣayasthitiḥ | tato 'jāḍye nijollekhaniṣṭhān nārthasthitis tataḥ ||.* On Abhinavagupta's commentaries on this verse see RA-TIÉ 2011, pp. 130-142. Cf. *Vṛtti*, p. 13: *adhyavāsya eva bhrāntyā viṣayavyā-vasthāpako na tu svasaṃvit, sa ca jaḍaḥ katham arthavyavasthāyā hetuḥ. cid-rūpo 'py atītārthamātram ābhāsayed abāhyasvātmollekhamātraprakāśo vā na taddhetuḥ.* "It is determination that[, according to you Buddhists, must] erro-neously establish objects, and not self-awareness. And [since] this [determina-tion] is unconscious [with respect to the object,] how could it be the cause of [our] establishing objects? Even [if you consider it as] having a conscious na-ture, [as a memory] it may only manifest the past object [that no longer exists according to you, and not the existing external object]; or it is the manifesta-tion of a purely internal [reality, i.e.] itself and a representation [of an aspect of itself as being the object; so] it [can]not be the cause that [establishes the objects of our daily activities]." On this passage see TORELLA 1994, p. 102.

[16]   On these see e.g. BHATT 1962, pp. 98-101, SCHMITHAUSEN 1965, pp. 121-125 and MATILAL 1986, pp. 183-190. In fact a form of *asatkhyātivāda* was pro-pounded in Advaita Vedānta too (see SCHMITHAUSEN 1965, pp. 234-239), but this is irrelevant here: Utpaladeva is merely mentioning his Buddhist oppo-nent's two options when defining error.

[17]   See e.g. ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 236, quoted below, n. 58.

As emphasized by Utpaladeva in the fragment, this theory is based on the principle that error cannot consist in the *perception* of something as being different from what it really is.[18] According to the Buddhist this is impossible because perception, which immediately manifests a given, cannot distort what it manifests: faithful to Dignāga's classical dichotomy between perception and concept, Utpaladeva's opponent claims that only conceptual cognitions can be erroneous (*bhrānta*). And for this Buddhist this is true even in the case of so-called perceptual errors: even when, due to some eye disease, we *see* two moons instead of one, the error does not lie in the phenomenon of the double moon (since we are indeed aware of the double moon, which is immediately manifest to us and therefore really exists as a conscious manifestation). The mistake rather lies in the conceptual process through which we *judge* that this manifestation exists outside of us instead of being a mere internal aspect of our consciousness. It is this "determination as being external" (*bāhyatāvasāya*) that constitutes error. And that this is the very essence of error is shown by the fact that somebody afflicted with an eye disease ceases to be mistaken not when (s)he no longer *sees* the double moon, but rather, when (s)he, reflecting on his/her condition, understands that the double moon has no external existence.[19] This point was obviously defended at length by the Buddhist Vijñānavādin Śaṅkaranandana,[20] whom Abhinavagupta repeatedly mentions in the ĪPVV while explaining this *Vivṛti* passage.[21]

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[18] This criticism of the thesis that error might be a distorted perception (*anyathā-pratīti*) might be directed against the Naiyāyikas' *anyathākhyātivāda*. According to the latter, in error we do not just conceptually construct an object that would be either nonexistent or a mere internal aspect of consciousness; rather, we *perceive* that object, which is real and belongs to the external world, although we do not perceive it as it really is, that is, in the place and time where it rightly belongs. On *anyathākhyātivāda* see e.g. MATILAL 1986, pp. 201-208. Note that the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas' theory (often designated as a *viparītakhyā-tivāda*) is very close (see e.g. BHATT 1962, pp. 96-98) and that Maṇḍanamiśra defends a version of the *anyathākhyātivāda* (see SCHMITHAUSEN 1965, pp. 100-137).

[19] Cf. Abhinavagupta's commentary quoted below, n. 65.

[20] On Śaṅkaranandana's commitment to the Vijñānavāda see ELTSCHINGER 2015 and Lawrence McCrea's contribution to the present volume.

[21] See below, n. 66.

As the rest of the fragment makes clear, this is not Utpaladeva's own theory regarding error,[22] and the whole point of thus expounding the Buddhist position is to show that given the way the Vijñānavādin understands error, if he defines memories as errors, he ends up contradicting his own principles. Utpaladeva thus quotes Dharmakīrti (and this is a particularly interesting aspect of this fragment, since verbatim quotations are quite rare in the *Vivṛti* passages known to date)[23] to the effect that only consciousness can es-

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[22] See the translation below and n. 66. As for the theory of error defended by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, see RASTOGI 1986 and NEMEC 2012, although the findings of these studies are somewhat debatable. This is the case in particular of the main thesis in NEMEC 2012, namely the idea that Abhinavagupta introduced the *apūrṇakhyāti* theory so as to unify two incompatible theories developed in two distinct works by Utpaladeva (i.e. his commentary on Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi* and his Pratyabhijñā treatise). It seems to me that the hypothesis, presented as a fact, lacks textual support and is actually very unlikely, because (1), we do not possess the greater part of Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti* (where Utpaladeva may well have expounded and united the various aspects of his doctrine regarding error); (2), I cannot think of any other conceptual gap of this magnitude in Utpaladeva's otherwise so tightly organized system; (3), Abhinavagupta's developments on *apūrṇakhyāti* occur precisely in the context of an explanation of the *Vivṛti*, and comparisons between known fragments of the *Vivṛti* and the corresponding ĪPVV passages have shown that ideas which might be considered at first sight as innovations on Abhinavagupta's part are in fact already found in Utpaladeva's magnum opus (see TORELLA 1994, p. xliii and RATIÉ 2016, p. 222). Besides, one should also be wary of assuming that it was a mere coincidence if the Śaivas used the term *akhyāti* that traditionally designates the Prābhākaras' definition of error (on this "apparent similarity of names" see RASTOGI 1986, p. 4; cf. NEMEC 2012, p. 241, who considers that "despite the similarity in nomenclature," Utpaladeva had "apparently no intention of referring explicitly" to Prabhākara's theory). The Śaiva nondualists demonstrably had in-depth knowledge not only of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka literature but also of the Prābhākara tradition (see RATIÉ 2011, pp. 326-337; note also that Abhinavagupta explicitly mentions the Prābhākaras in the ĪPVV: see e.g. vol. I, pp. 219-220), and I can see no good reason allowing to consider that the use of such a specific and well-known terminology is purely coincidental, especially since Abhinavagupta clearly alludes to the Prābhākaras' peculiar definition of error in the ĪPVV (see e.g. vol. III, p. 154 on *smṛtitvākhyāti*).

[23] Apart from the quotation of a Śaiva source that Abhinavagupta identifies as two (now lost) commentaries on the *Śivasūtra*s by Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa (ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 30, see TORELLA 2007b, n. 112, p. 561), the only quotations known so far in the *Vivṛti* were *Bhagavadgītā* 15.15 (in fact quoted in the *Vṛtti* on ĪPK 1.3.7 but partially repeated in the *Vivṛti* ad loc., see TORELLA 2007a, p. 480), *Bhagavadgītā* 7.12 (see TORELLA 2007d, p. 928) and the PVin (see ibid., p. 937).

tablish the existence of an object. But if memory is a mere error, according to the *ātmakhyātivāda* it is only conscious of itself and of its own internal appearance in the form of an object, so that it can tell us nothing of external reality. The conclusion (which remains implicit in the fragment) is that our ability to remember, which makes all our worldly activities possible, would remain inexplicable if there were no enduring Self.

THE *VIVṚTI* FRAGMENT ON ĪPK 1.3.5: TEXT[24]

[§ A][25] **asato** *vātmano vā*[26] *prathamānasyānyathā* **sattvenārthatve-na** *vā*[27] *pratītir* **bhramaḥ**. **na ca**[28] *niyatākārasya prathamānasyā-nyathāpratītiḥ*[29] *sambhavatīti prathamānarūpātiviparītāvasāya***pra-tītyantaram** *eva bhrāntaṃ vaktavyam.* **tac ca** *vikalparūpam eva, nirvikalpakasyābhāsamātraniṣṭhatvād aparārthapātitvam ayuktam.* **vikalpanātmanas tv**[30] *avabhāsena*[31] *saha vikalpyaikīkāriṇaḥ parā-*

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[25]   § A is found in S2 (folio 14b, top margin), S3 (folio 23a, bottom and right margins), S7 (folio 15b, bottom margin), S9 (folio 29a, bottom margin) and J^R (folio 50b, bottom margin). It is found neither in SOAS nor in D2 (which are now known to bear marginal annotations containing *Vivṛti* fragments: see RA-TIÉ 2016 and RATIÉ forthcoming a). The corresponding *pratīka*s are found in ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 246.

[26]   *vā* S2, S3, S7, J^R : om. S9.

[27]   On the basis of Abhinavagupta's commentary (ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 246, quoted below, n. 58), which bears *yā pratītiḥ sa bhrama iti*, one could suspect that this *vā* is a corruption for *yā.* This would conveniently solve the difficulty involved in the sentence (see below, ibid.). However, not to mention that the use of a relative without a correlative in the *Vivṛti* seems somewhat odd, all the consulted manuscripts (S2, S3, S7, S9, J^R) read *vā,* and Abhinavagupta seems to interpret this third *vā* in the sentence as expressing a disjunction between *sattvena* and *arthatvena.* In other words, as far as I understand, according to him this *vā* means that the object presented in an erroneous cognition is manifest *either* as an existing entity (according to the *asatkhyāti* theory) *or* as an object (according to the *ātmakhyāti* thesis). See below, n. 58.

[28]   The words **tataś ceti** given as a quotation by the ĪPVV editors and not found in this passage could arouse the suspicion that a sentence is missing here, but in fact they belong to the sentence that preceded the beginning of this fragment, as is obvious from Abhinavagupta's commentary (ibid, vol. I, p. 246).

[29]   S2 bears two dots after *prathamānasyānyathāpratītiḥ.*

[30]   **vikalpanātmanas tv** S3, S7, J^R : *vikalpātmanas tv* S2, ĪPVV. The words °*pāti-*

rthābhipātād[32] **bhrāntitvaṃ yuktam**...[33] *arthe dvicandre bāhyatāvasāya eva bhrāntir na dvicandrābhāso nāpi dvicandrāvasāyaḥ.* **bāhyatāvasāyo 'pi ca** *timirakāraṇatvāvicārasamutthas*[34] *tadvicārān nivartata iti* **tāvad** *bhrāntitattvaṃ*[35] **bhavatām**, *tad āha vṛttau.*[36]

[§ B][37] **smṛtijñānaṃ hi**[38] *pratibhāsamānarūpe svasaṃvedanam, adhyavasīyamāne punar pūrvānubhūte 'rthe*[39] *vikalpa iti* **sa** *svasaṃvedanāṃśo 'ya*[40] *na bhrānto nāpy anubhūtārthavyavasthāhetus tasyābhinnatvāt, vikalpādhyavasāyas*[41] *tu syād arthavya-*

tvam ayuktam and **vikalpanātmanas tu** are illegible in S9 (the lower edge is damaged). Note also that at this point a blank space was left in S3 and S7 bears 3 dots. S2 has no such dots, but the scribe had to go on with the rest of the text somewhat further up and on the right (to avoid writing on a gloss of the ĪPV), and traced a line to indicate the continuity of the text.

[31] *avabhāsena* conj. : *avasāyena* S3, S7, S9, J^R : *ayasāyena* S2. The word *avasāyena* is odd here given the context, and in light of Abhinavagupta's explanation of the passage (see below, n. 64) one would rather expect *dṛśyena*, but I cannot see how the latter could have been corrupted into *avasāyena*.

[32] *parārthābhipātād* S3, S7, S9, J^R : *paramārthābhipātād* S2.

[33] It seems that a part of the text is missing here since Abhinavagupta gives several *pratīka*s not found in marginal annotations (ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 247: **dṛśya** *iti...* **viparīta** *iti...* **ata** *iti...*). Nothing in the marginal annotations indicates that there might be a lacuna.

[34] *timirakāraṇatvāvicārasamutthas* S3, S7, S9 : *timirakāraṇatvāvicarasamutthas* S2 : *timirakāraṇatvāvicārāsamutthas* J^R.

[35] *bhrāntitattvaṃ* S3, S7, J^R : *bhrāntitvaṃ* S2, S9.

[36] From this point onwards the marginal annotations quote the *Vṛtti* on ĪPK 1.3.5 (see above, n. 15). S3 and J^R quote it entirely; S7 quotes it up to *saṃvit*, while S2 and S9 only give the first word (*adhyavasāya ity ādi*).

[37] § B is found in S3 (folio 23a, top and right margins), S7 (folio 15b, top margin), S9 (folio 29a, left, bottom and right margins), J^R (folio 50a, left margin) and in nn. 17 and 18 of the ĪPV edition, p. 101, vol. I. It is not found in D2, SOAS and S2 (although the latter bears § A). In S3, S7 and J^R, the passage is introduced with the words *asya vṛttipadānāṃ ṭīkā* (not found in S9 or in ĪPV, vol. I, n. 17, p. 101; the words *asya vṛtti°* are no longer legible in J^R). The corresponding *pratīka*s are found in ĪPVV, vol. I, pp. 249-251, and it can be assumed from Abhinavagupta's commentary that § B followed § A.

[38] **hi** S3, S7, J^R : om. S9, n. 17 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 101).

[39] *pūrvānubhūte 'rthe* S7 : *pūrvānubhūto 'rtho* S3, S9, J^R : *pūrvānubhūtārtho* n. 17 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 101).

[40] *svasaṃvedanāṃśo 'ya* conj. : *svasaṃvedanaṃ so 'ya* S3, S7, S9, n. 17 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 101). The *akṣara* preceding *sya* is no longer legible in J^R. Cf. ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 249 : **sa** *iti – yo 'ṃśo...*

[41] *vikalpādhyavasāyas* S7, S9 : *vikalpo 'dhyavasāyas* J^R : *vikalpe adhyavasāyas* n. 17 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 101). The *akṣara*s *°lpādhya°* are illegible in S3 (damaged

vasthāpanaṃ[42] **_yāvatā_** *bhrāntir asau,* **_bhrāntasyāpy_** *avasāyasya vi-*
ṣayavyavasthā na yuktety āha[43] *bhrāntitve ceti. bhrāntasyādhyava-*
sāyasya[44] **_jaḍatvād_** *viṣayavyavasthāpakatvaṃ na yujyate.* **_vyava-_**
sthāpanaṃ hi *vastunaḥ*[45] **_saṃvedanam_** **_ātmani_** *tadvācakaśabdodī-*
raṇe **_ca_** *śrotṛṣu tathābhūtārthākārasaṃvedanotpādanārtham.*[46] *ta-*
thācāryadharmakīrtiḥ:[47]

> *saṃvinniṣṭhā hi viṣayavyavasthitayas tāḥ katham acetano 'rtho vyava-*
> *sthāpayed*[48] *iti.*[49]

pratipramātṛ *vyavasthitatvaṃ tāvad*[50] *bhidyate, tasya bhāvasvarū-*
patve bhedo na syāt,[51] *pramātrā vyavasthāpito 'rthaḥ sarvān pra-*

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upper right corner). Cf. ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 250: *yas tu vikalpanavyāpārātmādhy-*
  avasāyaḥ...

[42] *arthavyavasthāpanam* S3, S9, J^R, n. 17 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 101) : *arthavyasthāpa-*
  naṃ S7.

[43] In S3 the words *'dhyavasāyas tu syād arthavyavasthāpanaṃ* **_yāvatā_** *bhrāntir*
  asau, **_bhrāntasyāpy_** *avasāyasya viṣayavyavasthā na yuktety āha* were first
  omitted and then added in the top right corner and right margin.

[44] *bhrāntasyādhyavasāyasya* S3, S7, S9, J^R : *tathā bhrāntasyāpy adhyavasāyasya*
  n. 17 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 101). °*dhyavasāyasya* is no longer legible in J^R.

[45] *vastunaḥ* S3, S7 [but *na* and *ta* are virtually homographs in this *nāgarī*], S9,
  J^R : *vastutaḥ naḥ* n. 17 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 101).

[46] *tathābhūtārthākārasaṃvedanotpādanārtham* S9 : *tathābhūtārthākāre saṃve-*
  danotpādanārtham S3, S7, J^R, n. 17 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 101). Cf. the gloss in ĪPVV,
  vol. I, p. 250: *tatsadṛśasyārthākārasyādhyavasāyasya... jananārtham.*

[47] Due to the *sandhi* ambiguity one could understand this passage either as *tathā*
  ca+āryadharmakīrtiḥ or as *tathā+ācāryadharmakīrtiḥ*, and I have no certainty
  as to which interpretation is to be preferred. The other known quotation from
  the PVin in the *Vivṛti* (see TORELLA 2007d, p. 937) is introduced with *tathā*
  cācāryadharmakīrtiḥ, which makes the second hypothesis more likely – hence
  my choice here (which has no bearing on the meaning of the passage anyway).
  Note, however, that if at least one passage in the ĪPVV involves a similar am-
  biguity (see ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 279: *tathācāryadharmakīrtiḥ*, understood as *ta-*
  thā+ācāryadharmakīrtiḥ by the KSTS editors), the other ĪPVV mentions of
  Dharmakīrti's name that I know of unambiguously refer to the Buddhist phi-
  losopher as *āryadharmakīrtiḥ* (see ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 46, pp. 111 and 174).

[48] *vyavasthāpayed* S3, S7, J^R, n. 17 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 101) : *vyavasthāyed* S9.

[49] PVin 1, pp. 24-25 (the edition has *saṃvinniṣṭhāś ca* instead of *saṃvinniṣṭhā*
  hi). Note that STERN 1991 had already spotted this quotation in n. 17 of ĪPV,
  vol. I, p. 101, and had remarked that the footnote was a passage from Utpala-
  deva's *Vivṛti* (see STERN 1991, p. 158 and n. 55).

[50] *tāvad* n. 18 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 101) : *tā* S3 (with a blank left after *tā*), S7 (with 4
  dots), S9 (with no mark indicating that something is missing), J^R (something
  seems to have been deleted after *tā*).

mātṝn prati vyavasthitaḥ[52] *syāt. na caivam. tadā tathābhūta***vastu-***
saṃvedanarūpatvalābhaḥ[53] ***pramātur*** *vyavasthāpanam. ato jaḍo*
'dhyavasāyas tathā syāt tad āha na jaḍād viṣayasthitir iti.[54]

[§ C][55] *nanu kenaivam uktaṃ jaḍo 'dhyavasāyaḥ, saṃvitsvabhā-*
vo hy asau jñānāvyatirekāt.[56] *tad āha tato 'jāḍya iti.*[57]

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[51]   After *syāt* S3 has 3 dots, S7 has 5 dots, J[R] has 4 dots. In S9, the sentence from
pramātrā... was first omitted and the text went on directly with *na caivaṃ...*,
but the missing text was added (with a mark indicating it) between lines of the
ĪPV text.

[52]   *vyavasthitaḥ* S3, S7, S9, n. 18 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 101) : *vyavasthāpitaḥ* J[R].

[53]   The compound ***vastusaṃvedanarūpatvalābhaḥ*** is not quoted in the ĪPVV
while Abhinavagupta is commenting on this passage (vol. I, p. 251). However,
it is quoted earlier (vol. I, p. 250), and in that previous passage Abhinavagupta
specifies that the compound only appears later in the *Vivṛti* by explaining that
Utpaladeva will sum up (*upasaṃhariṣyati*) this point later.

[54]   *na jaḍād viṣayasthitir iti* S3, J[R], n. 18 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 101) : *na jaḍād ityādi* S9 :
na jaḍād viṣayavyavasthitir iti S7.

[55]   § C is found in D2 (folio I 121, as an interlinear annotation that goes on in the
right margin), S2 (folio 14b, top margin), S3 (folio 23a, left margin), S5 (folio
39b, as an interlinear annotation that goes on in the right margin), S7 (folio
15b, left margin), S9 (folio 29a, bottom margin), J[R] (folio 50b, right margin)
and in n. 21 of ĪPV, vol. I, p. 102. In S3 and S7 it is followed by the words *iti*
pratyabhijñāṭīkāyāṃ sūtrakārakṛtāyām; these words are omitted in S2, S9 and
the ĪPV n., and they are only partly legible in J[R]. Determining the place of this
passage with respect to the two others is no easy task because Abhinavagupta
does not quote any word from it and because S3, S7 and S9 give a sequence
(B-C-A) that is contradicted by Abhinavagupta's commentary, according to
which § A clearly preceded § B (S2 only has C-A, and the ĪPV footnotes, B-
C). Given Abhinavagupta's explanations immediately before § A, it also
seems very unlikely that § C preceded § A. So we are left with two possible
sequences: either A-C-B or A-B-C. The sequence A-C-B is neither infirmed
nor confirmed by Abhinavagupta's commentary (which does not quote any
word from the *Vivṛti* while making the transition from § A to § B), but the op-
ponent in C criticizes the expression *jaḍo 'dhyavasāyaḥ* used by Utpaladeva in
B, so it seems probable that § C originally followed § B, all the more since in
the ĪPVV, immediately after commenting on § B, Abhinavagupta explains the
passage of the *Vṛtti* beginning with *cidrūpo 'pi* (which is precisely an explana-
tion of the words *tato 'jāḍye* in the verse) in the following way (ĪPVV, vol. I,
p. 251): *apiśabdo vṛttau parābhyupagamasyāyuktatādyotakaḥ. yady api tvayā*
cidrūpo 'ṅgīkṛtas tathāpi na nirdoṣatvam iti. "The word[s] 'even [if]' in the
Vṛtti indicate that accepting the [Buddhist] opponent['s objection] is not
sound. [It means the following:] 'Even if you[, our Buddhist opponent,] admit
that [determination] consists in consciousness, [your position] is not without
defects.'" So it seems likely that the original order of the fragment was A-B-
C, and that the purpose of § C was to introduce the meaning of the second half
of the verse after explaining the meaning of the first half at the end of § B.

THE *VIVṚTI* FRAGMENT ON ĪPK 1.3.5:
ANNOTATED TRANSLATION

Error is the cognition of [something] that is being manifest as different [from what it really is; that is,] either [error is the cognition] of [something] nonexistent [that is being manifest] as if it existed, or [it is the cognition of the cognition] itself [that is being manifest] as if it were an object.[58] And there can be no cognition of a

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[56] *jñānāvyatirekāt* D2, S3, S7, J^R, n. 21 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 102) : *jñānātirekāt* S2, S9.

[57] *tad āha tato 'jāḍya iti* S2, S7, S9 : *tad āha tato 'jāḍye i iti* S3 : *ity āha tata ity-ādi* D2, S5 : *ity āha tata ityādi* n. 21 ĪPV (vol. I, p. 102)*. In J^R *āha tato 'jā°* is illegible, and followed by *°ḍye iti.* The text that follows in the ĪPV footnote (*nijaṃ collekhaś ceti dvandvaḥ, niṣṭhād iti tyablope pañcamī, tataḥ smṛtyadhyavasāyata iti*) is in fact made of short glosses explaining the ĪPV.

[58] This first sentence is difficult. At first sight one might assume that Utpaladeva is presenting here three rival definitions of error instead of two, namely the Mādhyamikas' (error is the cognition "of [something] nonexistent," *asataḥ*), the Vijñānavādins' (error is the cognition "of [the cognition] itself," *ātmanaḥ*), and the Naiyāyikas' (error is the cognition "of [something] that is manifest as being different [from what it is], as an object," *prathamānasyānyathāsattvenārthatvena*). Such an interpretation, however, is problematic for several reasons. First, the word *arthatvena* does not fit with this understanding, since according to the Naiyāyikas, in error what appears as being different from what it really is is not a subjective aspect of cognition: for them, when we mistake a piece of mother-of-pearl for silver, the silver of our erroneous cognition is not a purely internal aspect of our cognition that we would mistake for an object (as the Vijñānavādins believe), but a real object that we mistake for another real object, so that *arthatvena* would be at best pointless if Utpaladeva had the Naiyāyikas' theory in mind here. Besides, Abhinavagupta (who does not take *anyathā* and *sattvena* as forming a single compound) clearly understands the passage as an alternative between two options only. See ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 246: **asata** *ity anantarbahīrūpasya dvicandrasya prakāśamānasyaiva* **sattvene***ti bahīrūpeṇa jñānākārasya* **vārthatvenā***nātmatvena yā pratītiḥ sa* **bhrama** *iti*. "Error is the cognition of [something] nonexistent[, that is,] of a double moon [for instance] that is neither internal nor external [to consciousness, and] that is nonetheless being manifest as if it existed, i.e. as external [to consciousness]; or [error is the cognition] of an aspect of cognition [that is nonetheless being manifest] as [if it were] an object, [that is,] as [if it were] not [consciousness] itself." So according to Abhinavagupta, here Utpaladeva is simply mentioning the two alternative Buddhist views on error so as to show that given these views, the Buddhist cannot define memory as a mere error. See also ĪPV, vol. I, p. 100 (commenting on ĪPK 1.3.4): *kiṃ ca bhrāntāv asad vātmākāro vā prakhyāti, na tu tayārthaḥ svīkriyate tasyāprakāśanād iti tayārtho na vyavasthāpita eva. prakāśanātmā hi vyavasthāpanā, tataś ca smaraṇād abhilāṣeṇa* katham arthaviṣayo vyavahāraḥ.* [*abhilāṣeṇa corr. RATIÉ 2011, p. 133 : *abhilāpena* ĪPV.] "Moreover, in an error, [what] is manifest (*prakhyāti*) is either

[given] specific aspect as being different [from what it really is] (*anyathāpratīti*) while [this specific aspect] is being manifest.[59] Therefore [we] may call "erroneous" only a cognition that is different [from nonconceptual cognition[60] and consists in] an entirely distorted (*ativiparīta*) determination of [something] whose form is being manifest.[61] And this [erroneous cognition can] only consist in a concept:[62] since a nonconceptual [cognition] exclusively rests

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[something] nonexistent or an aspect [of the cognition] itself; but this [error] cannot appropriate the [real] object since it does not manifest this [object] – therefore [memory, if it is erroneous, can]not establish the object at all. For establishing [an object] consists in manifesting [it]; and therefore how could any wordly activity regarding objects [occur, as the Buddhists contend,] due to the desire [of previously perceived objects,] thanks to the memory [of these objects]?" This is an allusion to PVin 1.18 (see above, n. 9). See also ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 236 (commenting on ĪPK 1.4.3): *smṛtir asad eva asatkhyātipakṣa ālambate, vāsanopakalpitaṃ vā jñānākāram ātmākhyātipakṣa ābhāsayati...* "[If] memory [is an error, it] has as its objective support (*ālambate*) [something] purely nonexistent, according to the thesis of [error as] the manifestation of [something] nonexistent (*asatkhyāti*); or, according to the thesis of [error as] the manifestation of [cognition] itself (*ātmakhyāti*), it manifests an aspect of cognition that is conceptually constructed due to some imprint."

59   That is, if something is being immediately manifested – as in the first moment of perception, when we experience the mere presence of a given without any conceptual mediation – then this thing cannot appear as other than what it is; which means that pure perception cannot be erroneous.

60   See ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 246: *pratītyantaraṃ nirvikalpapratītivyatiriktam.* "Another cognition, [that is, a cognition] distinct from nonconceptual cognition."

61   See ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 246: *yat prathamānaṃ prakāśamānaṃ tad vastu. tan niyatākāraṃ yathaiva prakāśate tathaiva tat, anyathābhūtaṃ tan na bhavati. tatas tasya yā pratītir avikalpā prakāśarūpā sā sarvathaivānyathātvaṃ viparītavedanarūpatvaṃ na sahate...* "That which is being manifest, [i.e.] that which is appearing, is something real. That [real entity], which has a specific aspect, exists exactly in the way in which it is being manifest – it does not exist in a different way. Therefore the cognition of this [immediately manifest aspect], which is nonconceptual [and] consists in [nothing but] manifestation (*prakāśa*), cannot bear in any way to be other [than it is – that is, it cannot] consist in a distorted awareness."

62   See ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 246: *nanu nirvikalpakāntaram eva tathāstu. nety āha **tac ce**ti. avikalpakatvam etad eva yat prathāmātrarūpatvam, saṃyojanaviyojanādivyāpāras tu vikalpanam.* "[– Objection:] 'But [then] let [us admit] that another [type of cognition, i.e. the] nonconceptual [one], is in the same way [entirely distorted].' [To this objection Utpaladeva] replies that it is not [the case] with [the sentence beginning with] 'And this...' [That is to say:] being nonconceptual means nothing but consisting in a pure phenomenality (*prathā*), whereas conceptualization is an activity of uniting, separating, etc."

on a phenomenon, it cannot be aimed at[63] another object. On the
contrary, [a cognition] that consists in conceptualization can be an
error, because [such a cognition], which identifies a conceptualized
object with a [perceived] phenomenon, can] be aimed at another
object [...].[64] With respect to the object that is a double moon [seen

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63   Literally, it cannot "fall" (*pātin*) to another object. Cf. Abhinavagupta's expla-
     nation of the word *pātin* in a different context (see ĪPV, vol. I, p. 286, com-
     menting on ĪPK 1.7.4): *pātir jñāpanavācī patiś ca viśrāntivācī prayuktas tan-
     treṇa*. "[The root] *pat-* in the causative expresses the act of making [some-
     thing] known, and the root *pat* in its simple form, which expresses the fact of
     resting [on something], is [to be understood as] simultaneously employed [in
     the word *pātin*]."

64   The passage is difficult because there is a lacuna (see above, n. 33) and be-
     cause the sentence seems to be somewhat corrupted (see above, n. 31). For the
     idea that determination identifies (literally, unites) a perceived object (*dṛśya*)
     with a conceptualized object (*vikalpya*), see e.g. ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 248, which
     defines the error sublated by a correcting awareness as "the determination of
     the identity of a perceived object with a conceptualized object" (*dṛśyavikal-
     pyābhedādhyavasāya*). Abhinavagupta gives two different interpretations of
     this definition of erroneous determination (from ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 247, we may
     surmise that at least the second was summed up in the missing *Vivṛti* passage:
     *etad upasaṃharaty **ata** iti...*). According to the first one, determination is erro-
     neous only insofar as the perceived object is identified with a conceptualized
     object *that differs from it* (e.g. when the perceived mother-of-pearl is identi-
     fied with the object of the "silver" concept), whereas when the perceived ob-
     ject really corresponds to the conceptualized object, there is no error (ĪPVV,
     vol. I, p. 247): *śuktau dṛśyāyāṃ taddṛśyaviparītena rajatenādhyavasāya ai-
     kyaṃ yadā karoti tadā bhrāntatvam, nīle tu dṛśye nīlenaiva vikalpyenaikye kā
     bhrāntatā*. "When, whereas mother-of-pearl is the perceived object (*dṛśya*), a
     determination identifies [it] with silver, which is distorted with respect to that
     perceived object, there is an error. But when, whereas blue is the perceived
     object, [it] is identified with a conceptualized object (*vikalpya*) that is nothing
     but blue, what error could there be [in that identification]?" According to the
     other explanation, in fact every determination is erroneous insofar as it illegi-
     timately identifies the content of a perception with a mentally constructed ob-
     ject, although in our worldly activities, we consider as pragmatically valid
     some of these determinations (i.e., those which enable us to reach our goals):
     *anye tu vyācakṣate dṛśye spaṣṭe vikalpyenāspaṣṭena yad aikyaṃ tad adhyava-
     syan sarvo vikalpo bhrāntaḥ, vastumūlatvena tu prāpakatvān na bhrāntitayā
     vyavahriyate, nīlasyaiva prāpyatvād arthakriyākāritvenābhimānāt spaṣṭāspa-
     ṣṭatādyavāntarānādaraṇāt. yas tu dṛśyenaikyaṃ nādhyavasyati, sa vikalpyarū-
     pasvaviṣayamātraniṣṭhaḥ sarvathaivābhrānta iti*. "Others, however, explain
     that every concept is erroneous insofar as it determines the identity of a per-
     ceived [object] that is vivid[ly manifest] with a conceptualized object that is
     not vivid[ly manifest]. Nonetheless, [we] do not treat (*vyavahriyate*) [a given
     concept] as an error on the grounds that it [enables] us to reach [what we de-
     sire], since it is based on the real thing [although it does not grasp it directly];

by someone afflicted with an eye disease], the error is nothing but the determination [of the double moon] as being external: it is not the phenomenon of the double moon, nor is it the determination [of that phenomenon as being] the double moon. Moreover, the determination [of the double moon] as being external arises from a lack of reflection on the fact that [the double moon phenomenon] results from [the eye disease called] *timira*; [and] reflecting on this makes [this determination as an external entity] cease.[65] This,

because the [object that we] are trying to reach is precisely the blue, because [we] consider [that the concept of blue] has the efficacy [of enabling us to reach it, and] because [we] disregard the fact that [the perception and the concept of blue] are respectively vivid and not vivid, etc. On the other hand, a [concept] that does not determine the identity [of the conceptualized object] with a perceived [object and] exclusively rests on its own object, namely the conceptualized object, is absolutely devoid of error." This second Buddhist position is clearly reminiscent of Dharmakīrti's explanation of the error through which we come to wrongly identify mental constructs resulting from a process of exclusion (*apoha*, *vyāvṛtti*) with actually perceived entities. See *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, p. 39: *nanu bāhyā vivekino na ca teṣu vikalpapravṛttir iti kathaṃ teṣu bhavati. vyākhyātāraḥ khalv evaṃ vivecayanti na vyavahartāraḥ. te tu svālambanam eva arthakriyāyogyaṃ manyamānā dṛśyavikalpyāv arthāv ekīkṛtya pravartante.* "[– Question:] But external [objects all] differ [from each other], and concepts[, which have universals as their objects, can]not apply to [them]; so how [is it that concepts] are [nonetheless said to apply] to them? [– Answer:] It is philosophers (*vyākhyātṛ*) who thus distinguish [particulars from conceptual objects], not the agents of everyday activity (*vyavahartṛ*). Rather, the [latter], believing that it is their [conceptual] object that is capable of the causal efficacy [which in fact belongs to the particular], act [on particulars] after identifying (*ekīkṛtya*) two [different] objects, [namely] the perceptible (*dṛśya*) and the conceptualized (*vikalpya*)." Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā*, p. 222, where someone asks: *yadi sāmānyabuddhir na svalakṣaṇapratibhāsinī, kathaṃ svalakṣaṇe lokaṃ pravartayati.* "If the [conceptual] cognition of a universal does not manifest a particular, how does it make people act on the particular?" Here is Dharmakīrti's answer according to Karṇakagomin: *asvalakṣaṇapratibhāsiny api svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyavibhramād dhetor vyavahārayati lokaṃ dṛśyavikalpyāv ekīkṛtya pravartayatīti yāvat.* "Although [a conceptual cognition] does not manifest the particular, due to an error (*vibhrama*) [consisting in] determining (*adhyavasāya*) as an object a manifestation of [consciousness] itself [whereas the latter] is not an object, it prompts people to act in their everyday activities (*vyavahārayati*) – that is, it prompts them to act after [wrongly] identifying a perceptible [object] with a conceptualized [one]."

65   See *ĪPVV*, vol. I, pp. 247-248: *tena dvicandranirvikalpakaṃ tathāvidhavikalpyamātraniṣṭhaś ca tadadhyavasāyo na bhrāntiḥ. na hy atrobhayatrāpi bādhakaṃ prabhavati. na hi nivṛtte 'pi timira evaṃ pratipattiḥ: na me dvicandraḥ pratibhāta iti. tatpratibhānād eva hi timiracikitsitādi*. yas tu dvicandro 'yaṃ bāhyaḥ sarvasādhāraṇa ity adhyavasāyaḥ, sa eva bhrānto bādhakena tathāve-*

[which is expounded] for now[, at this point of the treatise], is the essence of error for you [Buddhists][66] – this is what is said in the *Vṛtti.*

Since [it is so],[67] the memory cognition is a self-awareness (*sva-saṃvedana*) with respect to [its own] form that is being [imme-

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danāt. nivṛtte tāvat timira evaṃ pratipattiḥ: yo mayā dvicandro bāhyatvena sarvasādhāraṇyenādhyavasitaḥ sa tathā na pratibhātaḥ, pratibhātas tv abāhya evāsādhāraṇas timirādikāraṇāntarotthāpitas tadasādhāraṇapṛṣṭha eva tv abhyamaṃsi bāhyo 'yaṃ sarvasādhāraṇa iti na cāsau tatheti. [**timiracikitsitā-di* corr. : *timiracikitsitādiḥ* ĪPVV.] "Therefore the nonconceptual [cognition] of the two moons is no illusion; neither is the determination of this [nonconceptual cognition insofar as it] exclusively rests on a conceptualized object of the same sort[, i.e. on a conceptualized object that is 'the double moon.'] For in these [two cases, namely perceiving a double moon and determining it as being a double moon], no refuting [means of knowledge] can prevail over any of the two [cognitions]. For even when the *timira* [condition] ceases [to affect someone, this person] does not think: '[While I was affected by this condition,] the double moon was not manifest to me'; for [we] administer some medicine against *timira* precisely because the manifestation of this [double moon indeed occurs to those who have this condition]. Rather, what is erroneous is the determination 'this double moon is external [to me and] common to all [perceiving subjects]'; because [later] one becomes aware that [this determination] is thus [erroneous] thanks to a [means of knowledge] that refutes it. Indeed, when the *timira* [condition] ceases [to affect someone, this person] thinks: 'The double moon that was determined by me as being an external [object and] as being common to all [perceiving subjects] was not manifest in that way; rather, it was manifest [as being] perfectly internal [and] not common [to other perceiving subjects]; it sprung from causes different [from those resulting in the perception of an external object,] such as the *timira* [condition]; but although it was not common [to any other perceiving subject], I considered that it was external [and] common to all, whereas it is not so.'"

66 See ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 249: ***tāvad*** *iti, iha tāvad upayogi darśitam, anyat tu darśayiṣyate.* ***bhavatām*** *iti svadarśane bhrāntitattvaṃ yat tad iha na tāvad darśitam iti yāvat.* "'For now' – [that is,] up to this point [this theory,] which is useful [to Utpaladeva's argumentation,] has been expounded, but a different [theory] will be expounded [in the sequel]. The implicit meaning with 'for you [Buddhists]' is that for now [Utpaladeva] has not shown what constitutes the essence of error according to his own system." Note that while commenting on this Buddhist theory of error Abhinavagupta mentions and quotes Śaṅkara-nandana three times. See ĪPVV, vo. I, p. 247 (*tad vijñānaśūnyatā nītibāhyai-veti bhadraśaṅkaranandanaḥ*) ibid., p. 248 (*yad āha bhaṭṭaḥ: asaty asyābahir-bhāvo bādhaḥ sattvam ato dvidhā | iti*) and ibid. (*āha: ābhāsabhede tv arthaḥ kas tatrābhedo bhramo 'vapuḥ | iti*). BÜHNEMANN 1980, p. 195, identifies the source of the last two quotations as the *Prajñālaṅkāra.*

67 On Abhinavagupta's explanation of *hi* here see ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 249: ***hī***ti *yas-mād evambhūto 'tra vibhāgo 'stīti* tasmād viṣayavyavasthāpakatvam adhy-*

diately] manifest [when we remember]; but with respect to the object that was previously experienced and is being determined [when we remember], it is a [mere] concept. Therefore the part of it that is a self-awareness is not erroneous, [but] neither is [this part] the cause [enabling us] to establish the [previously] experienced object, because it is not distinct from the [cognition itself].[68] As for conceptual determination, it might be [considered at first sight as the cause of] the establishment of the object, but in fact (*yāvatā*) it is an error,[69] and establishing an object is not possible for an erroneous determination. This is what [the author of the verses][70] says with "And if [the determination] is an error..." An erroneous determination cannot be what establishes the object because it is not conscious[71] [with respect to that object]. For establishing

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avasāyasya na yujyate yathā prakṛtasya smṛtijñānasyeti. [**vibhāgo 'stīti* conj. : *vibhāga itīti* ĪPVV.] "[The word] *hi* [means:] since in a[ny determination], the part [regarding which determination is conscious] is such, [i.e., is not external to consciousness], a determination such as the memory cognition, which is the subject at hand, cannot establish the object."

[68] See Abhinavagupta's explanation of *tasyābhinnatvāt* in ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 249: *yato so 'ṃśaḥ pratibhāsamānaḥ svarūpasvābhāsasvabhāvas tasmāt smṛtijñānād abhinno na vyatirikto na bāhyasvabhāvaḥ...* "Since the part [of determination] that is being manifest consists in its own nature and in an aspect of itself [erroneously represented as external], it is not different – i.e. not distinct – from the memory cognition – [that is,] it does not have the nature of an external [object]."

[69] See ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 250: *yas tu vikalpanavyāpārātmādhyavasāyaḥ, sa yady api svāṃśād avatīrṇa iva lakṣyata ity ato 'rthe vyavasthāpakatayā sambhāvayitum ārabdhaḥ, tathāpi na nirvahaty asya sambhāvanā. tad āha **yāvatā**ti pūrvaprakrāntasambhāvanānirvāhābhāvadyotakam avyayam.* "As for the determination consisting in an activity of conceptualization, even though at first one may suppose that it establishes the object because it seems to reach beyond a [mere] part of itself, this supposition is doomed. This is what [Utpaladeva says with] *yāvatā*: the word [functioning here as an] indeclinable term indicates that the possibility first entertained is doomed." For a similar use of *yāvatā* in Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti* see RATIÉ 2016, p. 236.

[70] In the known *Vivṛti* fragments, Utpaladeva systematically adopts the convention (widely followed among Sanskrit writers) of referring to himself in the third person.

[71] See ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 250: *nanu bhrāntaṃ ca bhaviṣyati vyavasthāpakaṃ ca bhaviṣyati, duṣyati kiṃ hi tata iti bhrāntatvena saha samuccīyamānaṃ vyavasthāpakatvam āśaṅkitaṃ niṣedhati **bhrāntasyāpī**ti. atra hetur **jaḍatvād** iti.* "'[– Objection:] But [this determination] can be erroneous while also being what establishes [the object]; what problem could arise from this?' [With the passage beginning with] *bhrāntasyāpi*, [Utpaladeva] refutes this objection that being what establishes [the object] might be compatible with being erroneous.

[an object] is being conscious (*saṃvedana*) of a real thing[, and this consciousness occurs] in oneself as well as in those who hear [us] when [we] utter words denoting this [thing] so as to produce [in them too] a consciousness having the aspect of such an object.[72] Thus the master Dharmakīrti [has said]:

> For the objects' [various] states (*vyavasthiti*) rest on consciousness: how could an unconscious thing establish them?[73]

To begin with, [for a given object,] being established [or not] varies according to each knowing subject. [Now,] if this [property of being established] belonged to the [very] nature of [objective] enti-

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Here is the [logical] reason [for this refutation]: 'because it is not conscious.'"

[72] See ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 250: *nanu viṣayasya vyavasthāpaka iti ko 'rtho viṣayasya* vyavasthāṃ karoti. tatra yathā kāṣṭhasya ploṣaṃ karoty agnir ity ukte jāḍyam agner na pratibandhakam, tathaivāvasāyo vyavasthāṃ viṣayasya karotīti kim asya jāḍyājāḍyacintayety āśaṅkyāha **vyavasthāpanaṃ hī**ti.* [**'rtho viṣayasya* conj. : *'rthaviṣayasya* ĪPVV.] "[– Objection]: 'But what is this thing that establishes the object and [is said to be] what causes the establishment of the object? In that regard, just as when one says that fire causes the combustion of wood, the fact that fire is not conscious does not prevent [fire from causing this combustion], in the same way, determination causes the establishment of the object, therefore what is the point of this quibble over [determination] being conscious or not?' Having anticipated this [objection, Utpaladeva says] 'For establishing...'." Utpaladeva's definition of the establishment of the object here is thus meant to show that it cannot be compared to a mere material transformation (undergone by the object) since this transformation rather affects the conscious subjects who are aware of it. See ibid.: *ity etad vyavasthā-śabdavācyam, na tv arthasyāsau kāṣṭhasyeva kaścid vikāraḥ.* "This is what is expressed by the word 'establishment' [in this context], and [such an establishment] is not [just] some [material] transformation [within the object itself] as in the case of wood [being combusted by fire]."

[73] From ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 144, which glosses this quotation, it seems that Utpaladeva had already quoted this PVin passage earlier in the *Vivṛti*. My translation here follows Abhinavagupta's interpretation (ibid.): *saṃvidy anubhavaniścayarūpāyāṃ niṣṭhānyānapekṣiṇī viśrāntir yāsāṃ tā viṣayāṇāṃ nīlādīnāṃ vyavasthitayo vividhenāsaṅkīrṇenātmanāvasthānāni, tā vyavasthitīḥ katham acetano 'rtho nīlādiprāyaḥ prayuñjīta vyavasthāpayet...* "The [various] states of objects such as blue – [that is to say,] their existence as various distinct natures – rest on consciousness, which consists in experiences and [their] ascertainment, without being in need of any other [substratum; so] how could an unconscious thing, which is nothing more than [insentient objects] such as blue, establish these states?" This quotation seems to have been particularly in favour among Śaiva authors: it appears in shorter forms (and with slight variations) e.g. in works by Abhinavagupta (ĪPV, vol. I, p. 281; ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 341), Jayaratha (*Tantrālokaviveka* on *Tantrāloka* 4.185b, vol. III, p. 832) and Yogarāja (*Paramārthasāravivṛti* on *Paramārthasāra* 43, p. 62).

ties, there would be no [such] difference: an object established by one knowing subject would be established for all of them. But this is not the case.[74] So the establishment [of objects] is the fact that a knowing subject becomes conscious of[75] a real thing that is such[, i.e. that consists in a specific object]. Therefore the determination [in which memory supposedly consists] must be unconscious in this way[, i.e. with respect to the external object, which it cannot establish] – this is what [the author of the verse][76] expresses [in the first half of the verse] with [the words] "the establishment of the object cannot result from this [determination], which is unconscious [with respect to the real object]."

[– Objection:] But who is thus claiming that determination is unconscious? For [according to us Buddhists,] this [determination] has consciousness as its nature, since it is not distinct from a cogni-

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[74] In other words, according to Abhinavagupta, a given object is established by some subjects and not by others (who happen not to perceive or notice it), which means that being established is not a mere property inherent in objects and must be grounded in subjectivity. See ĪPVV, vol. I, pp. 250-251: *nanu viṣayadharma eva vyavasthāstu bhāṭṭanyāyena. atrāha **pratipramātṛ** iti. viṣayadharmo hi pratipramātṛ na bhidyate. na hy ekasya śuklaḥ paṭaḥ, anyasya pītaḥ, anyasya na śuklo na pīta iti bhavati. iha punar ekasya spaṣṭaṃ pratibhāto 'parasyāpratibhāta eveti dṛṣṭam. viṣayadharmatāyāṃ tv idaṃ na ghaṭate. yaḥ pratipramātṛ bhidyate dharmaḥ, sa viṣayadharmo na bhavati sukhādir iva.* "[– Objection:] 'But let [us admit] that the establishment [of objects] is nothing but a property belonging to objects[, namely being manifest], according to the reasoning [put forward] by the followers of the [Mīmāṃsaka] master [Kumārila].' [Utpaladeva] responds to this [objection] with [the sentence beginning with] *pratipramātṛ...* For a property belonging to objects does not vary according to each knowing subject: it is not the case that a cloth is white for one [subject,] yellow for another [subject and] neither white nor yellow for [yet] another [subject]! On the contrary, in this [case, namely establishing objects, we] observe that what is vividly manifest for one [subject] is not manifest for [someone] else; but this is not possible if [the manifestation of objects to subjects is nothing but] a property belonging to objects. [Now,] a property that varies according to each knowing subject is not a property that belongs to objects, just as pleasure and so on [belong to subjects and not to objects]." On the Śaiva criticism of the *bhāṭṭa*s' theory of "manifestedness" (*prakaṭatā*) as a property belonging to objects, see RATIÉ 2011, pp. 316-325.

[75] Literally, it is the fact that the knowing subject "gets to consist in the consciousness of..."

[76] See above, n. 70.

tion. This is what [the author of the verse][77] expresses [in the second half of the verse] with [the words] *tato 'jāḍye...*[78]

APPENDIX:

A LIST OF ANNOTATED ĪPV MANUSCRIPTS
KNOWN TO CONTAIN *VIVṚTI* FRAGMENTS[79]

- D2: *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī manuscript*, Delhi, National Archives of India (Manuscripts belonging to the Acheology and Research Department, Jammu and Kashmir Government, Srinagar, in "List of Gilgit Manuscripts and Sanskrit Mss"), no. 5, vol. II [paper, *śāradā* script]

- J[R]: *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* manuscript, Jammu, Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, no. 47 (formerly no. 52A) and no. 70 (formerly no. 52B) [paper, *śāradā* script, incomplete]

- S2: *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* manuscript, Śrinagar, Oriental Research Library, no. 1035 [paper, *śāradā* script]

- S3: *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* manuscript, Śrinagar, Oriental Research Library, no. 838 ("*Īśvarapratyabhijñākaumudī*") [paper, *śāradā* script]

- S5: [*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* manuscript, catalogued as] *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* by Vācaspati Miśra [Abhinavagupta's text is copied after the latter], Śrinagar, Oriental Research Library, no. 1212 [paper, *śāradā* script]

- S7: *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* manuscript, Śrinagar, Oriental Research Library, no. 2250 [paper, *nāgarī* script]

- S9: *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* manuscript, Śrinagar, Oriental Research Library, no. 1161 [paper, *śāradā* script]

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[77] See above, n. 70.

[78] On this last paragraph see above, n. 55. Cf. the very similar objection mentioned by Abhinavagupta while he is summing up the meaning of the verse (ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 242): *nanu prakāśarūpatvam asti smṛtyadhyavasāyasya svasaṃvedane svākāre ca, tat katham asya jaḍatvam.* "[– The Buddhist:] But the determination that is memory consists in [a conscious] manifestation with respect to self-awareness and the aspect of itself [that it presents as an object]; so how can it [be said to] be unconscious?"

[79] Note also that what appears to be a particularly lengthy *Vivṛti* fragment has recently been found in the margins of an ĪPVV manuscript (see RATIÉ forthcoming c).

- SOAS: *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* manuscript, London, School of Oriental and African Studies Library, no. 207 in R.C. Dogra, *A Handlist of the Manuscripts in South Asian Languages in the Library*, London: SOAS, 1978/no. 44255 ["*Pratyabhijñāsūtra* with Abhinavagupta's *Sūtrārthavimarśinī*," *śāradā* script]

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[*Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*] See TORELLA 1994

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Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta on the Limits of *Rasa-Dhvani*:

A Reading of DhvĀ 3.43

DAVID SHULMAN

1. *GUṆĪ-BHŪTA-VYAṄGYA* REVISITED: "MIXING IN" AND "COMBINING"

Any ramified system of classification will, if extended far enough, sooner or later hit its limit. Something always turns up to challenge the implicit axiology, or the systematicity, of the applied categories – something that eludes classification in the terms at hand. Such cases, as we know from Bateson and Russell, are often the most interesting and revealing for an observer not imprisoned by the categories in question. Subtle classificatory schemes may be resilient enough to survive such a challenge, but a residue of doubt or ambiguity, once articulated, never vanishes. Extreme cases may lead to apparent paradox: what, for example, are we to do with a set that is a member of itself?

One salient locus for such limit-cases in Kashmiri poetics is the remarkable, though at times neglected, third *uddyota* of the *Dhvanyāloka* (together with Abhinavagupta's commentary). I might as well confess at the outset that I find the third and fourth *uddyota*s more compelling, in many ways, than the first two. This short essay may explain why. There are both relatively superficial and even obvious reasons as well as some that may, I hope, have a certain complexity and depth. I'll begin with the former.

Kārikā 3.35 opens Ānanda's major discussion of *guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya-kāvya*, that is, poetry in which suggestion, *dhvani* or *vyañjanā*, is theoretically less powerful, or less beautiful (*cāru*), than the openly expressed meaning.[1] One particularly good kind of poe-

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[1] *prakāro 'nyo guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgyaḥ kāvyasya dṛśyate | yatra vyaṅgyânvaye vācya-cārutvaṃ syāt prakarṣavat ||.*

try, according to Ānanda, embodies suggestion as a primary aim
and thus generates the *rasa*-experience. And yet we can confident-
ly state, on empirical grounds, that poems of "subordinate sugges-
tion" (PSS) are actually far more widespread in the Sanskrit litera-
ry corpus than Ānanda's preferred type of "dominant suggestion";
and aside from such statistical considerations, Ingalls is certainly
right to say that PSS verses are "among the most beautiful stanzas
in the whole book [that is, the *Dhvanyāloka*]."[2] Ingalls also correct-
ly states that PSS verses are not, in Ānanda's view, inferior to the
type he prefers, despite a long tradition, beginning with Mammaṭa[3]
and continuing into modern commentators, that insists that PSS are
indeed second-rate poems.[4] In any case, it is clear that PSS consti-
tute a test-case for the *dhvani* theory in general; we shall see that
Ānanda finds it necessary to assert the validity of his theory, in-
deed to strengthen his theoretical claim, precisely in the context of
attempting to incorporate PSS in his wider scheme of poetic ef-
fects. At the same time, he is, one might say, driven to reflect, in
an indirectly autobiographical and personal way, on the problem
that has emerged. McCrea lucidly formulates the difficulty as fol-
lows:

> The great strength of Ānandavardhana's model of poetry is its ability to
> provide a general criterion for aesthetic value in literature, in terms of
> which particular prescriptions regarding composition may be explained
> and justified and existing compositions may be evaluated. But... in the
> case of poetry which does not have *rasa* as its telos, this explanatory and
> evaluative power simply evaporates.[5]

One can assume that Ānanda himself knew this and did what he
could to stem the evaporation. We could also posit a related ques-
tion that may have troubled him specifically: did Ānandavardhana
feel that his sophisticated new theory was capable of explaining the
expressive force of some (perhaps most) of his own poems?

There is no space, and no need, for us to re-examine here the
entire gamut, or to restate the typology Ānanda offers and Abhina-
vagupta explains of *guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya-kāvya*. The discussion in
uddyota 3 culminates, in my view, in the very striking verse *yā*

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[2]   INGALLS ET. AL 1990, p. 23.

[3]   *Kāvya-prakāśa* 1.4-5.

[4]   INGALLS ET. AL. 1990, pp. 22-23.

[5]   MCCREA 2008, pp. 231-232.

vyāpāravatī inserted into the discussion of *kārikā* 43. In order to understand the full force of this autobiographical verse – which, I will argue, simply cannot be adequately defined or even addressed by *rasa-dhvani* theory, despite Abhinavagupta's valiant attempt to do just that – we will have to move backwards and forwards a bit through Ānanda's theoretical discussions, including early analyses of figuration in relation to suggestion in the second *uddyota*, which resurface in *uddyota* 3. One convenient point of departure is the distinction between types of suggestion that are "combined" or "associated" (*saṃsṛṣṭa*)[6] and those that are "mixed in" or "fused" (*saṅkīrṇa*).[7] This typological division is the substance of *kārikā* 3.43.

We are dealing not with the figure "Mixing" (*saṅkara*) but with a more general classificatory principle. "Combination" is often said to be like an assortment of sesamum and paddy (*tila-taṇḍula-vat*) – that is, one can still, with some effort, separate out the different grains. "Mixing in" is like water mixed with milk (*kṣīra-nīra-vat*); only a goose has the miraculous, inborn ability to distinguish the two components. The basic typology of *saṅkara*, the more important and far-reaching of the two terms, goes back to Udbhaṭa who, however, is primarily concerned with the figure.[8] Taken together, the two modes allow for a considerable proliferation of analytic types, as we will see. The third *uddyota* expands this earlier analytical frame exponentially. We will look at one of Ānanda's major examples of *saṅkara* and two particularly interesting ones of *saṃsṛṣṭi*.

Note, first, how 3.43 sets out the parameters of the discussion.

saguṇībhūta-vyaṅgyaiḥ sâlaṅkāraiḥ saha prabhedaiḥ svaiḥ |
saṅkara-saṃsṛṣṭibhyāṃ punar apy uddyotate bahudhā ||

> It [= *dhvani*] operates in various ways by mixing in and combining with subordinate suggestion, with figures, and with its own sub-categories.

If we read the DhvĀ in linear sequence, as a long, coherent essay in which certain themes and ideas develop and recur, then 3.43 can be seen to be a refinement and extension of 1.13, where the figure *saṅkara* is partially defined and only rather tentatively admitted

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6   "Associated" is Ingalls' term.

7   Again, the latter translation is Ingalls'.

8   Discussion in DhvĀ 1.13 (see Ingall's discussion). See KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979.

into the overall category of potential suggestion. There, in *uddyota* 1, suggestion that counts has to be predominant within a given verse (and this can happen in *saṅkara* when a striking figure gives rise to suggestion that goes far beyond the literal sense). Here Abhinavagupta, citing Udbhaṭa, exemplifies four major types of *saṅkara* and effectively allows only instances of *alaṅkāra-dhvani*, where a figure is suggested, to be *saṅkara*-based *dhvani*. But by the time we reach 3.43, *saṅkara* as a poetic and analytical mode has been re-integrated into the domain of *dhvani*, which turns out to be far more flexible, comprehensive, and diverse than we might have suspected on the basis of earlier discussions in this same work. The *kārikā* tells us that we can find *dhvani* operating through both "mixing in" and "combination" in three major ways, depending upon whether the basis for either of these modes is a PSS, one or more figures of speech, or a sub-category of suggestion itself. Given this tripartite typology, Ānanda then spells out what he considers to be the three major categories of "mixing in." We need to take a moment to consider these, as they relate directly to Abhinavagupta's discussion of the verse that interests us most.

Again, let me emphasize that the types of "mixing in" are not new to the DhvĀ but rather derived from Udbhaṭa. What is important in this context is the fact that they have been upgraded to useful analytical descriptions of *dhvani* that falls outside, or on the margins, of the more clear-cut types that directly and unequivocally trigger the *rasa*-experience. These examples of "mixing in" thus include: 1) cases where one variety of suggestion feeds into and enhances another one and is in turn enhanced by the latter (*anugrāhyânugrāhaka-bhāva*), 2) instances where there is doubt as to which of two varieties of suggestion, or two suggestive figures, is primary (*sandehâspadatva*) and 3) the compounding of suggestiveness when two varieties are crammed together in the same, usually tightly compressed locus (*ekapadânupraveśa*). Note that there is a difference, in Ānanda's view, between the beauty that derives from the mutual enhancement of two distinct types flowing into or through one another and the vastly compounded and intensified state that comes from tasting two completely fused forms of *rasa*, especially if one of them is the kind that leaves no interval or space for reflection but rather floods the listener/spectator with immediate sensation (*asaṃlakṣya-krama*).[9] This third type of *saṅkara*,

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[9]   All this is spelled out in the *vṛtti* to 3.43.

by the way, can coexist with *saṃsṛṣṭi*, "combination," in the same verse, as Ānanda demonstrates through a well-known poem.[10]

It is not this scholastic classification per se that deserves our attention. What is striking is the language of intensification and enhancement precisely in the typological boundary zone where subordinate suggestion, along with other rather suspect poetic means and devices (perhaps even what Ānanda calls *citra*), struggles to be deemed effective *dhvani* – and even for that matter, *rasa-dhvani* – after all. The always present metaphorical register of cooking and tasting remains useful: a good poem tastes good, and the taste can be fully brought out by the skillful cook as he combines distinct condiments and flavors. At the same time, another set of images comes into play – images of suggestion as first enveloping or pervading all real poetic expression from within and then of turning or spinning inwards and moving through itself and its own parts and pieces (*aṅga*). In fact, Ānanda has explicitly stated the overwhelming accessibility of *rasa-dhvani* – for nearly all kinds of poetry – in the prose passage that immediately precedes *kārikā* 3.43: "There is simply no such thing as something that a poet entirely intent upon *rasa* cannot use as a component in generating the *rasa* he has chosen out of his desire for that *rasa* – and that will not, when so used, intensify the charm of the poem" (*tasmān nâsty eva tad vastu yat sarvātmanā rasa-tātparyavataḥ kaves tad-icchayā tad-abhimata-rasângatāṃ na dhatte tathopanibadhyamānaṃ vā na cārutvâtiśayaṃ puṣṇāti*). He goes on to say, pointedly, that his own poetic works substantiate this claim here and there (*yathāyatham*).

But wait a minute. Haven't we been told already in *uddyota* 2 that an accomplished poet needs to exercise a certain caution or care (*samīkṣā*) if he wants to turn the various means at his disposal, in particular the figures of speech, to the purpose of producing *rasa-dhvani*?[11] What kind of care is Ānanda talking about? What actually allows a figure of speech to contribute to the emergence of *rasa*? (The context in these *kārikā*s is specifically *śṛṅgāra-rasa*, a test-case for the theory more generally.) A whole set of features are cited to qualify *samīkṣā*, including, first of all, the insistence that the figure itself never assume the foreground in the poem (*nâṅgitvena kathaṃ cana*). But the easiest way to follow Ānanda's

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[10]   *Snigdha-syāmala**, first cited in 2.1 and beautifully analyzed by Abhinavagupta there.

[11]   DhvĀ 2.17-19.

line of thought is to study the first example he cites, the famous verse from *Abhijñānaśākuntala* 1.20, which we will have occasion to mention later as well:

> *calâpāṅgāṃ dṛṣṭiṃ spṛśasi bahuśo vepathumatīṃ*
> *rahasyâkhyāyîva svanasi mṛdu karṇântikacaraḥ |*
> *karaṃ vyādhunvatyāḥ pibasi rati-sarvasvam adharaṃ*
> *vayaṃ tattvânveṣān madhukara hatās tvaṃ khalu kṛtī ||*

> Again and again you touch the tremulous edges
> of her eyes. You murmur softly
> in her ear, as if sharing some deep secret,
> and though she waves her hand wildly,
> you gobble up every bit of goodness
> from her lips. You're just a bee, god damn it,
> but you've got everything
> you wanted, while I'm still busy trying
> to figure things out.

Ānanda tells us that this poem is built around the figure of *svabhā-vokti*, "naturalistic description," which, he says, is entirely in harmony with the rasa (*rasânuguṇa*).

Before we see what Abhinavagupta has to say about this verse, we should perhaps contextualize it rather than taking it as an isolated exemplum (like so many of the verses cited by the poeticians). This poem comes at a critical moment in the first act of the play. Duṣyanta, still hidden but already in love with the enchanting Śakuntalā, whom he has just seen for the first time, has overheard her girlfriends' teasing banter, which suggests that Śakuntalā would very much like to find a husband. This is good news. He is, however, slightly tormented about the question of her social origins – living in the ashram, she might be a Brahmin girl, thus ruled out as a possible wife for a king. On the other hand, he wants her, and he conveniently assumes that this fact alone probably means that she's available. While he's deliberating with himself in this vein, the bee closes in on her; in some distress, she calls for help, and now the king has the perfect entrance cue. With evident irony, on the verge of self-parody, he suddenly reveals himself as the great protector of the realm who is thus perfectly cast as this girl's savior. From this point on, their love can begin to develop openly. Note that from the point of view of emergent *śṛṅgāra-rasa*, this transition from a state of hidden desire to a tangible, visible presence signals a necessary development, thickening and intensifying

the erotic mood by establishing mutuality and a whole series of immediate verbal and non-verbal effects.

Ānanda has nothing more to say about the verse, but we need to pay attention to Abhinavagupta's initial comments about it. He focuses, somewhat characteristically, on the particle *khalu*, the penultimate word in the verse. This *khalu*, he says, tells us that the bee has achieved his goal effortlessly (*ayatna-siddhaṃ tavaiva caritârthatvam*), in telling contrast to Duṣyanta, who is observing his rival rather helplessly – so that we have, on this level of deliberate semantic choice, a suggestiveness that requires a small gap for thought (*saṃlakṣya-krama*), though Abhinavagupta does not spell this out. In a world of continually compounded resonances such as that embodied in a good Sanskrit verse, no word, indeed no syllable, is likely to be entirely innocent. A further cognitively charged suggestion is noted in Abhinavagupta's comment on *pāda* 2: the fact that the bee keeps on buzzing around her ear (*karṇântika-caraḥ*) shows that it is caught up in the illusion that Śakuntalā's eyes are elongated blue nympheas (*nīlotpala*), that is, her eyes must reach all the way to her ears (*śravaṇâvakāśa-paryantatvāt*), as should be the case for every beautiful woman. Interestingly, Abhinavagupta has nothing explicit to say about the figure *bhrāntimat*, "cognitive error," which, if his reading is correct, must be active here.

However, on one level the identification of the various figures involved doesn't much matter, since the real point is that whatever they may be – and Ānanda has already pointed to the figure *svabhāvokti* as central – they are entirely at the service of the *rasa* of refined desire. Figuration, that is, helps primarily to enhance the *rasa* as it begins to rise and overflow (this is a paraphrase of Abhinavagupta's way of talking about *rasa*, not Ānanda's). But on another level, the definition of the figures involved does make a difference. Abhinavagupta concludes his comment on the verse by saying that some unspecified "others" read Ānanda's comment as pointing to a *rūpaka-vyatireka*, that is, the bee is metaphorically identified as a lover, and as such he obviously and, as Abhinavagupta has just told us, effortlessly supersedes the clumsy and hesitant human lover Duṣyanta. We thus have two perhaps not entirely incongruent readings: one in which the figure *svabhāvokti*, giving us the naturalistic observation of the bee's way of being and acting, "mixes in" with the dominant *rasa*, enveloping the entire verse and thus occupying the same locus as the *rasa* (*saṅkara* of type 3, as

defined above), and one in which the figuration, specifically the *rūpaka-vyatireka*, assists and enhances the *rasa* (*saṅkara* of type 1). Abhinavagupta will state these two options with crystal clarity in his comment on *kārikā* 3.43, with reference to this same verse.

Interestingly, neither Ānanda nor Abhinavagupta address what seem to me, at least, to be the more pressing and impressive elements of Kālidāsa's verse – the fact, for example, that the tone is ironic and rather self-deprecating; Duṣyanta is playing with himself as he explores the new world of feeling he has discovered, and he sounds rather disgusted with his own propensity to a somewhat barren intellection at a moment where he needs and wants to act. Moreover, as so often in Kālidāsa, this verse, with its primary image, is meant to adumbrate and thus enhance a much later, thematically powerful moment in the play – in Act VI, where Duṣyanta, now consumed by remorse, has painted a picture of the absent Śakuntalā and, forgetting that this painting is only an artistic illusion, attempts to drive away a bee that is attracted to the face, and more specifically the lips, of the image (6.20). The Vidūṣaka, observing the scene, will have to disabuse the hapless king of his confusion, thus re-establishing an all-too-tenuous border between illusion and reality. But this fusing of visible reality with mental projection – a different sort of *saṅkara* than those spelled out by the DhvĀ and its great commentator, one that is far more far-reaching in its possible cognitive effects – also constitutes one of the latent, highly reflexive themes of the play as a whole. The appearance of the error-driven bee in both Act I and Act VI – probably the same bee – thus turns out to be rather crucial, even, we might say, over-determined. This is obviously not the kind of observation that either Ānanda or Abhinavagupta would be likely to make; they have more urgent tasks at hand. However, it is also worth stating that even if *svabhāvokti* can be identified here, it's a relatively pallid example of the figure, so conventional and predictable as to be almost silly. I'm afraid such a reading may well vitiate the *rasa*-driven analysis that Abhinavagupta, following Ānanda, is offering us.

And yet "mixing in" does have an honorable role in the theory of *dhvani*, including (especially) *rasa-dhvani*, and beyond it; there is good reason to take the time to understand it as it appears in both the DhvĀ and the *Locana*. Certain kinds of "mixing in" definitely serve specific aesthetic goals and can help characterize the sensitive listener's experience. In particular, what we might call "deep

compounding" is clearly capable of working upon the awareness of the listener in unexpected ways. But what about *saṃsṛṣṭi*, "combination," *saṅkara*'s categorical sibling? Let us briefly consider two examples relevant to our discussion.

We began with 3.43, and it is in the *vṛtti* to that *kārikā* that we find, first, a prominent example of *saṃsṛṣṭi*, familiar from an earlier passage (2.5):

> *teṣāṃ gopa-vadhū-vilāsa-suhṛdāṃ rādhā-rahaḥ-sākṣiṇāṃ*
> *kṣemaṃ bhadra kalinda-śaila-tanayā-tīre latā-veśmanām |*
> *vicchinne smara-talpa-kalpana-mṛdu-cchedopayoge 'dhunā*
> *te jāne jaraṭhī-bhavanti vigalan-nīla-tviṣaḥ pallavāḥ ||*

> How are they, my friend – the bowers of vines
> on the banks of the river that are friends to the gopīs
> and witnesses to *her*, Rādhā's, secrets? And the twigs and sprays
> that we would cut to make a love-bed – we need them
> no more. I know: they've now grown old and lost
> their dark sheen.

Kṛṣṇa is speaking – either to himself (Abhinavagupta's theory about the second half of the verse) or, more likely, to a messenger from the herders of Braj who has sought him out in Mathurā. The meeting with the messenger has called up in Kṛṣṇa an overwhelming feeling of longing and nostalgia that is channeled into his question about the vines and the sprays. So is this longing the true subject of the *dhvani* active in the verse? Not quite. Abhinavagupta gives an extended interpretation in his comments on 2.5, which deals with cases where *rasa* is subordinate to some other expressive element in the statement and thus becomes the somewhat limited figure known as *rasavat*. We can summarize his analysis there together with his brief comments on 3.43 as follows:

1. Only bowers of vines can be true friends to the gopīs, since they can't speak and thus will certainly tell no one about the gopīs' secret love encounters. Similarly, such bowers witnessed Rādhā's meetings with Kṛṣṇa; hence Rādhā truly loves them (*rādhāyāś ca sâtiśayaṃ prema-sthānam*). However, vines and sprays are not, after all, really "friends" or "witnesses" – these words are used metaphorically, by *lakṣaṇā*, so we have two instances of *lakṣaṇā-mūla-dhvani* of the type where the literal meaning is transferred to another (*arthântara-saṅkramita*). There has to be some motive behind such a transfer, and in this case the *lakṣaṇā* indicates the ex-

treme affection Rādhā has for the vines and their benevolent presence in her life and the lives of her friends. (In fact, this articulation of the motivation seems to me rather weak.)

2. There are further suggestive usages of the kind that require thought and, thus, a short interval before the *rasa* kicks in. Kṛṣṇa, very sure of himself, thinks: "If I'm not somewhere close, why would the gopīs need a love-bed? (*mayy anāsīne kā smara-talpa-kalpaneti bhāvaḥ*)." In other words, he is certain that their love for him and his for them is perfectly mutual (*parasparânurāga-niścaya-garbha*). Also, the fact that the green sprays that have lined the bowers are now grey and old means that it must be quite a long time since he, Kṛṣṇa, left Braj, for if he had stayed there, he and the gopīs would have been making love continuously and the sprays would never have dried out and faded. Similarly, the final phrase, "lost their dark sheen," suggests that Kṛṣṇa is long gone and yet – remembering the sprays – filled with intense longing (*autsukya-nirbharatva*).

3. That longing, as already intimated, results from memories awakened by the sight of the messenger (*gopa-darśana-pra-buddha-saṃskāra*), so that Kṛṣṇa now feels the pleasure of reawakening desire (*prabuddha-rati-bhāva*) on the basis of the conditioning factors (*vibhāva*) operating within his memory – specifically, the memory of Rādhā (the *ālambana* or foundational condition) and of the bowers (which are intensifiers, *uddīpana-vibhāva*s). Note that this anamnetic yearning takes place inside a character internal to the poem and not directly in someone listening to the poem outside.

4. Two words – *te*, "they," and *jāne*, "I know" (or perhaps, "I recall and therefore know") – operate in a very different manner from that of all three previous points. They are not devoid of *dhvani*, but they serve the literal (*vācya*) sense, which is in this case the real source of charm in the poem, a direct evocation of the emotional power of memory (*vācya-syaiva smaraṇasya prādhānyena cārutva-hetutvāt*). One could also say (pushing Abhinavagupta's statement a little further) that the image of the once-green, now pale and dying sprays is strong enough to override the existing instances of definable suggestion. The poet concretizes and highlights the stark image by starting the fourth *pāda* with this *te*: "they," "these" (very leaves and twigs and sprays) are what

concern us. Abhinavagupta notes that *jāne* is often a marker of the figure *utprekṣā*, "flight of fancy," but that here, again, its literal meaning is what matters. That is: the actual content of Kṛṣṇa's knowing/remembering, a personal act, is of real interest to the listener.

This final comment by Abhinavagupta comes closest, in my view, to shedding light on the deeper mechanisms of this lovely verse. What does Kṛṣṇa, who happens to be God, actually know at any given moment? He can, it seems, forget rather important pieces of his life. Also, the anacolouthon, *jāne*, close to the start of *pāda* 4, brings this entire epistemic domain into focus as a subject. There is a subtle but marked transition from *te* to *jāne* that signals, as Abhinavagupta seems to propose, the return to the literal meaning as of primary interest. But to feel the true force of this transition one has to go back to *pāda* 3 with, first, its dense and profoundly expressive compound – *smara-talpa-kalpana-mṛdu-cchedopayoge* – and then its plaintive adverb at the end, *adhunā*, "now." The compound calls up, step by step, the sweet moments when the eager lovers cut leaves and sprays to make themselves a bed. This vivid memory then issues remorselessly into the brutal, lonely "now."

In fact, I think this loss of the green love-beds is the heart of the poem – and both Ānanda and Abhinavagupta are right in seeing the other forms of suggestion that may well be present as decidedly secondary. The torments of memory and, I suppose, of forgetting comprise another primary register. Seen in this light, the *lakṣaṇā* suddenly seems more powerful than it looked at first glance. The longing has been deftly transferred to, or projected on to, the mute vines and sprays. Indirection generates intensity in a good Sanskrit poem.[12]

Abhinavagupta's two, widely separated comments on this verse are differently focused: in 2.5 he is mostly interested in *saṃlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya*, while in 3.43 he wants to highlight *guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya*. I have compounded his interpretative remarks. In both cases, however, whatever the emphasis, we can clearly see the difference between what we find here and the mode of "mixing in" studied earlier. The triggers of suggestion in this verse are distinct in type and situated at different points in the syntax. We don't see the mingling of figures that enhance one another mutually, nor do we see *dhvani* swerving back into itself and absorbing its own sub-

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12   My thanks to Yigal Bronner for discussing this poem with me.

types so as to generate much higher voltages. Instead, the suggested senses seem to dwell peacefully side by side. There is, in short, no fusion; the poem isn't intent on swallowing up its own tail. On the other hand, an emotional state, pregnant with highly specific cognitive themes, swells to the point where the listener can barely contain it. That progression, which depends on opening up a certain space for reflection, creates the poem and shapes the listener's experience. The first half, quizzical, almost innocuous, quietly sets the stage for the agony of the second half. No one, I think, gets lost to himself or herself, or finds his or her feelings "universalized," in the course of hearing this verse. If anything, the poem might be said to foster in every listener who has known love and the loss of love some form of radical "personalization." I'll return to this theme.

We're closing in, by now, on Ānanda's autobiographical *yā vyāpāravatī*, the verse I find so compelling. Before we turn to it, I want to examine one more, relatively simple example of *saṃsṛṣṭi* that follows immediately upon *yā vyāpāravatī*, thus effectively bracketing it together with the two poems we've already discussed. The verse is a famous one, from Kālidāsa's *Megha-dūta* (31):

> *dīrghī-kurvan paṭu mada-kalaṃ kūjitaṃ sārasānāṃ*
> *pratyūṣeṣu sphuṭita-kamalâmoda-maitrī-kaṣāyaḥ* |
> *yatra strīṇāṃ harati surata-glāniṃ aṅgânukūlaḥ*
> *siprā-vātaḥ priyatama iva prârthanā-cāṭu-kāraḥ* ‖

> Each morning at dawn
> it draws out the cry of the cranes –
> a little eerie, and exciting –
> as, sharpened by the friendly fragrance
> of lotus flowers unfolding, it soothes
> the bodies of young women exhausted
> after a night of long loving and makes them
> ready for more. It's like a practiced lover,
> begging, bantering, flattering,
> this breeze blowing
> from the Siprā River.

Ānanda introduces this verse as an example of *saṃsṛṣṭi* dependent upon a single word – or, more generally, where some variety of suggestion combines with an expressly stated (that is, not suggested) figure of speech (*vācyâlaṅkāra*). After citing the verse he notes that it, too (as in the previous example), contains one instance of

suggestion based on metaphoric usage, where the literal meaning is put aside (*avivakṣita-vācya*): this is the word *maitrī*, "friendship," used to characterize the fragrant breeze as "friendly." No breeze is ever literally friendly. In addition, Ānanda says, other words in the verse contain various other figures. Abhinavagupta spells them out in one of his insightful interpretative passages.

For example, how is it that the breeze "draws out" the cranes' cry? There are three reasons: the sound carries over a long distance (*siprā-vātena hi dūram apy asau śabdo nīyate*); the cranes go on crying because they're so happy at the touch of the breeze (*tathā su-kumāra-pavana-sparśa-jāta-harṣāc ciraṃ kūjantīti*); and the cry mingles with the sound of the waves stirred by the breeze, thus becoming fuller and longer (*tat kūjitaṃ ca vātândolita-siprā-taraṅga-ja-madhura-śabda-miśraṃ bhavatīti dīrghatvam*). This naturalistic observation puts us in the domain of *svabhāvokti*, though Abhinavagupta doesn't say this.[13] Then there is something to be said about the word *kaṣāya* at the end of *pāda* b: it means, according to Abhinavagupta, both the reddish color of the pollen in the opening lotuses and "in love" (*uparakta*), the latter sense suited to the explicit simile – the wind as lover – in the final *pāda*. In fact, the word that modifies *kaṣāya* is that same *maitrī*, the metaphoric "friendship," which, Abhinavagupta asserts, suggests a mutual harmony derived from an exclusive and repeated connection (*anyâ-saṅgâviyoge parasparānukūlya-lābha*).[14] In other words, the erotic register, which will become explicit at the end of the poem, is already suggested by the lexical choices in the first half.

But the explicit simile has its own suggestive power that can be paraphrased as follows: the breeze-as-lover –appearing as grammatical subject only at the start of *pāda* d, the neuralgic point of so many Sanskrit poems – is gentle, courteous, considerate, and skilled; it/he arouses the exhausted beloved by lightly massaging her body and, at the same time, whispering to her words of praise and endearment that make her beg for more loving; thus the wind becomes the very embodiment of pure desire that comes alive from equal and mutual affection (*parasparânurāga-prāṇa-śṛṅgāra-sarvasva-bhūto 'sau pavanaḥ*). And this, says Abhinavagupta, is only natural, since the breeze from the Siprā is surely a cultured, self-

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[13] Ingalls (p. 662) rightly says that *svabhāvokti* pervades the entire stanza. By now we should have observed that *svabhāvokti* seems to have a particular association with *saṃsṛṣṭi*.

[14] V.l. *abhyāsâṅgâviyoga-parasparânukūlya-lābhaḥ*.

aware lover (*nāgarika*), not just any old village idiot (*na tv avidag-dho grāmya-prāyaḥ*). And once we have reached this point, it is easy to go back and read the first half of the verse as adumbrating, or indeed already modifying, the culminating image, so that it is the breeze as lover who draws out the moans of his beloved and who is profoundly attached to her face, which is like the fragrant lotus opening at dawn. I think these points are well taken and do, indeed, partly explain how the verse thickens and refines the passionate tone it is seeking to establish by light touches of resonant suggestion.

And yet we are meant to see in this poem a clear case of *saṃ-sṛṣṭi*, despite the analytic drift toward what appears more like "mixing in," especially given the pervasiveness of the naturalistic description that thus occupies the same locus as the sequential suggestions. In fact, even the word *maitrī*, as Abhinavagupta unpacks it, now seems integral to the central metaphoric register with its underlying simile. We need only pry this word loose from the tight compound in which it appears – but without sacrificing its intrinsic relation to *kaṣāya* in the sense of "in love" – to see how suited it is to the mood of profoundly affectionate loving. So has the verse been misclassified by Ānanda and better defined by Abhinavagup-ta? Do we really care? It's all too easy to become trapped within the proliferating categorical niceties of this particular poetic theo-ry.[15] When that happens, the whole point of the discussion, which – do we still remember this? – was once focused on substantial aes-thetic effects and the mechanisms that generate them, tends to get lost. Ānanda himself, as we shall see, was well aware of this dan-ger.

For the record, and for the purposes of this essay, let me sum-marize what has emerged from our reading of the *vṛtti* following this *kārikā* with Abhinavagupta's comment. There are two basic interpretative options. We can look at *maitrī* as an instance of me-taphor-based suggestion, with a very limited range indeed – so li-mited as to separate the word off, more or less completely, from the other active suggestive images and lexemes in the verse. In this case we have, technically speaking, a case of *saṃsṛṣṭi*; but the re-sult is a gap almost ludicrous in dimension between this restricted form of *dhvani* and the overall import and potential effect of the

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[15]   See, for example, Patwardhan's learned comment on this passage in INGALLS ET AL., pp. 662-663.

poem. Or we can follow Abhinavagupta's hint and let *maitrī* do the work it is clearly capable of doing along with its figurative partners (*svabhāvokti* and *upamā*, at least, but maybe also *rūpaka* and *utprekṣā*), in which case we are a) much closer to "mixing in," with its greater intensities and b) beautifully poised to deepen our exploration of the cognitive and logical processes that the verse naturally triggers, whether they lead to some kind of *rasa*-experience or not. In general, I find these processes – which Abhinavagupta begins to analyze with real insight – far more compelling than any universalized liquefaction.

2. AUTOBIOGRAPHY, CONFESSION, SUBVERSION

At last we come to the verse I've been wanting to read with you. Let me remind you that it appears in the DhvĀ between remarks on *teṣāṃ gopa-vadhū** ("How are they, my friend...") and *dīrghī-kurvan* ("Every morning at dawn..."), in the context of the attempt to make sense of PSS in the larger scheme of *dhvani*-oriented poetics and, more specifically, in relation to the two modes we have been studying, "mixing in" and "combining." We will see in a moment that our first example, *calâpāṅgāṃ dṛṣṭim* ("Again and again..."), is also explicitly drawn into discussion of this new verse. Here it comes:

> *yā vyāpāravatī rasān rasayituṃ kā-cit kavīnāṃ navā*
> *dṛṣṭir yā pariniṣṭhitârtha-viṣayonmeṣā ca vaipaścitī |*
> *te dve apy avalambya viśvam aniśaṃ nirvarṇayanto vayaṃ*
> *śrāntā naiva ca labdham abdhi-śayana tvad-bhakti-tulyaṃ sukham ||*

> Poets have a special way of seeing
> that is always new, and compelling,
> that lets you taste
> what can be tasted.
> And there's the other way, too,
> where you think and analyze
> with an opening mind
> until you know for sure
> how things are.
> I've tried them both, Lord
> who sleeps on the sea,
> and I'm so tired of always
> working hard to define
> the world, for nothing ever

even comes close
to the happiness I have
in loving you.

Ānanda tells us that he composed this verse.[16] In theory, it could be a statement projected on to some other literary persona (Ingalls reluctantly suggests Bhartṛhari or Dharmakīrti; the latter choice is, in fact, rather meaningful, as I hope to show). Yet the poem rings true as a personal statement, perhaps intertextually enhanced; and its placement at this point in *uddyota* 3, in the midst of the attempt to make sense of PSS as a workable category, supports, I think, this reading. The poem is introduced by a short statement about "mixing in" as frequently occurring when *rasa-dhvani* – *dhvani* of an imperceptible interval – mingles with explicitly stated figures of speech (*vācyâlaṅkāra*). This remark allows Abhinavagupta first to mention, once again, that we have three major forms of "mixing in" as well as the neighboring category of "combination," and then to call to mind the Kālidāsa verse about the lucky bee (*calâpāṅgāṃ dṛṣṭim*). We have already seen the two main interpretative options that Abhinavagupta offers for this verse. It's at least possible that Abhinavagupta wished to connect the naturalistic description of Kālidāsa's bee with Kālidāsa's meticulous, and also evocative, portrait of the morning breeze from the Siprā in the next verse to come up for analysis. Or perhaps he felt that the bee offers an indubitable example of successful "mixing in" of figures and *asaṃlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya*. Whatever the case may be, both Ānanda's preface to the new verse and Abhinavagupta's explication of it set the stage for a second general remark, to the effect that we also find "mixing in" with other forms of suggestion – that is, those kinds that are not *rasa-dhvani*. It is to illustrate this statement that Ānanda quotes his own verse. At the very least, this means that *yā vyāpāravatī* leaves room for the reader to think, quite consciously, about what the poem is trying to say. This poem, according to its author, is not meant to spark off an immediate *rasa* experience, despite Ānanda's preface to this passage. It has another, apparently more urgent aim.

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[16]   As has been noted before, by Raghavan, Ingalls, and Chakrabarti, the first three-quarters of the verse appear verbatim in *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-mahā-rāmāyaṇa*, 6.1 – whose date, in the form of the text we now have, may be later than Ānanda's.

Ānanda comments only very briefly on the verse. He says it contains the kind of *dhvani* that is based on metaphor, *lakṣaṇā*, where the literal meaning is transferred (*saṅkramita*) to another object; and that the figure of speech *virodha*, "contradiction," comes in to assist the aesthetic process at this point. As in our previous example (centered on the transferred and suggestive meanings of the word *maitrī*), the discussion here begins with the single word "seeing" (*dṛṣṭi*). Put simply, you cannot "see" a taste, as Abhinavagupta makes clear in his comments. So the prominent use of *dṛṣṭi* (at the start of *pāda* b) sets up a tension in the mind that is resolved only when we understand the motivation behind the poet's choice: the "seeing" involved is not ordinary sensual perception but an imaginative act of the inner eye, which sees much farther and deeper than in ordinary vision (*loka-vārtâpatita-bodhâvasthā*, Abhinavagupta again). Moreover, the extraordinary nature of this imaginative vision (*pratibhā-rūpā dṛṣṭiḥ*) is explicitly signaled by the word "special" (*kā-cit*, in the sense of something wonderful, even ineffable, *nirvacanīya*). This extraordinary form of seeing is always fresh and new, "continuously, moment by moment, creating worlds by unexpected novelties" (*kṣaṇe kṣaṇe nūtanair nūtanair vaicitryair jaganti āsūtrayantī*).

Before we go any further, we should note how Ānanda's laconic and technical remark has been saved by Abhinavagupta's gloss. The *lakṣaṇā*-based *dhvani* does tell us something about the way a good poet works. But even so, there is, once again – as in the case of the Siprā breeze – a huge gap between the limited, almost mechanical treatment of a single word, here the suggestive word "seeing," and the dramatic import of the verse as a whole. What we have is a very direct statement, not meant to trigger any *rasa* (and what *rasa* would it be, anyway? We'd have to invent a new one, something like "exhaustion"), but powerfully formulated so as to allow any listener or reader to identify with the thought presented. That includes those among us who have specialized in the Kashmiri *alaṅkāra-śāstra*. Ānanda tells us that after long efforts at working at poetry and, apparently, poetics as well as at disciplined intellection that seeks to know things as they are, he's tired of it all. There's another, much more promising road to happiness.

Here is a moment where a ramified system of categories, replete with metaphysical assumptions, like all such systems, reveals to itself, and to us, its own insufficiency. I find the statement very

moving. It also speaks to the natural resistance a sensitive reader may have to analytical dissection of a good poem, as when Mandelstam tells us, a millennium or so after Ānandavardhana, that when you can paraphrase a poem, you know that poetry "has not spent the night; the sheets have not been rumpled." We could also say that the extreme semanticization of Sanskrit poetics in the Kashmiri *śāstra*, to use Yigal Bronner's term, comes briefly face to face with what has been sacrificed and lost.

Yet if we seek to understand more deeply the drive to a metaphysical program internal to aesthetic theory, a program still latent in Ānanda but fully elaborated in Abhinavagupta[17] with features specific to Kashmiri erudition in the ninth to the eleventh centuries, then we have only to follow Abhinavagupta's lucid exposition of this same verse. Here is what he says:

> *kavīnām iti vaipaścitīti vacanena nâham kavir na paṇḍita ity ātmano 'nauddhatyam dhvanyate. an-ātmīyam api daridra-gṛha iva upakaraṇa-tayânyata āhṛtam etan mayā dṛṣṭi-dvayam ity arthaḥ. te dve apīti na hy ekayā dṛṣṭyā samyaṅ-nirvarṇanaṃ nirvahati... aniśam iti punaḥ punaḥ anavarataṃ nirvarṇayantaḥ varṇanayā tathā niścitârtham. idam ittham iti parāmarśânumānâdinā nirbhajya nirvarṇanaṃ kim atra sāraṃ syād iti tilaśas tilaśo vicayanam. yac ca nirvarṇyate tat khalu madhye vyāpāryamāṇayā madhye cârtha-viśeṣeṣu niścitonmeṣayā niścalayā dṛṣṭyā samyaṅ-nirvarṇitaṃ bhavati. vayam iti mithyā-tattva-dṛṣṭy-āharaṇa-vyasaninaḥ ity arthaḥ. śrāntā iti na kevalaṃ sāraṃ na labdhaṃ yāvat pratyuta khedaḥ prāpta iti bhāvaḥ... abdhi-śayaneti yoga-nidrayā tvam ata eva sāra-svarūpa-vedī svarūpâvasthita ity arthaḥ. śrāntasya śayana-sthitaṃ prati bahumāno bhavati.*
>
> *tvad-bhaktīti tvam eva paramâtma-sva-rūpaḥ viśva-sāraḥ bhakteḥ śraddhā-pūrvaka upâsana-krama-jaḥ tad-āveśaḥ. tena tulyam api na labhyam, āstāṃ tāvat taj-jātīyam.*
>
> *evam prathamam eva parameśvara-bhakti-bhājaḥ kutūhala-mātrâvalambita-kavi-prāmāṇikobhaya-vṛtteḥ punar api parameśvara-bhakti-viśrāntir eva yukteti manvānasyeyaṃ muktiḥ sakala-pramāṇa-pariniścita-dṛṣṭâdṛṣṭa-viśeṣa-jaṃ yat sukhaṃ yad api vā lokottaraṃ rasa-carvaṇâtmakaṃ tata ubhayato 'pi parameśvara-viśrānty-ānandaḥ prakṛṣyate. tad-ānanda-vipruṇ-mātrâvabhāso hi rasâsvāda ity uktam prāg asmābhiḥ. laukikaṃ tu sukhaṃ tato 'pi nikṛṣṭa-prāyaṃ bahutara-duḥkhânuṣaṅgād iti tātparyam.*

By the words "of poets" and "think and analyze," he suggests his lack of pretension, as if to say, "I'm neither a poet nor a scholar." That is: I took over these two ways of seeing, though they are not really mine, the way food is borrowed from elsewhere to serve in a poor man's home. Why "both"? Because neither one alone is enough to paint the world as it really is... "All the time": describing (literally: painting) over and over, without cease, in order to define everything as exactly as possible. That means dividing things up bit by bit through reflection (*parāmarśa*) and inference (*anumāna*), among other things, in order to find the essence; and also it means letting your eyes engage with it all while from time to time they stare steadily at some detail or another. "I": who am addicted both to false seeing[18] and to true seeing. "So tired": not only did I not find the essential truth, but I'm also exhausted... "Lord who sleeps on the sea": You who in your Yogic sleep know the real form of essential truth and who rest in your self. A person who is exhausted has respect for a person who is sleeping.

"In loving you": you are the self of the highest self and the inner essence of all that is. "Loving you" means complete immersion in that through a series of ritual acts informed by profound attentiveness. "Comes close": not only is there nothing equal to this, but there is nothing even remotely like it.

What he means is that he was first devoted to God, but out of passionate curiosity alone he took on the modes of life of the poet and the logician; then he realized once more that resting in love of God is the right way. That happiness that comes from analyzing whatever can be seen and what cannot be seen through logical means of knowing, and also that kind that is made up of an otherworldly tasting – the joy of resting in God is much better than either of these. For tasting *rasa* is but a pale reflection of a single drop of that joyfulness – as I have said elsewhere. As for ordinary happiness in the world, it's far worse than this, because so much unhappiness is inevitably mixed into it. That's what the verse means.

Ānanda's biographical moment inspires a personal echo in Abhinavagupta. We sometimes ask ourselves how Abhinavagupta's *rasa*-based poetics relates to his Śaiva ritual-based metaphysics.[19] Here we find one candid answer by the master himself. Rasa experience (*rasâsvāda*), to which he has devoted two massive commen-

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[18] *mithyā-dṛṣṭi*: that is, the poet's imagined reality.

[19] See SHULMAN 2010; also the penetrating suggestions in Gnoli 1968, pp. xlii-l.

taries, turns out to be hardly more than a slight spray of real joyful-
ness. He knows a lot about such forms of intense and lasting happi-
ness. Among other things, were we to tease out the full comple-
ment of components that make up such joy, we could extract from
this passage the primary notion of deep resting – as when cons-
ciousness turns inward upon itself and finds repose in that self.[20]
There would also be something to say about *āveśa*, "complete im-
mersion" informed by attentiveness. This is not the place to at-
tempt to define the nature of the awareness that emerges when one
attains some such state. There is, however, in my view, a direct
link between these statements and Abhinavagupta's own *stotra*s,
which by no means lend themselves to being understood in terms
of the theory proposed in the DhvĀ or, more to the point, in the
Locana. These poems are, above all, personal, non-repeatable ex-
pressions in which complex cognitive and affective states merge to
create a new aesthetic.

Having allowed himself this lyrical, yet straightforward, cres-
cendo, Abhinavagupta returns one more time to the initial sugges-
tion embodied in the word *dṛṣṭi*. He wants a more precise analysis
of the *dhvani* involved – one that will make better sense of Ānan-
da's remark that his verse will serve to illustrate "mixing in" (and
not "combination"). Patwardhan has lucidly articulated the argu-
ment here, and I see no reason to repeat it.[21] Abhinavagupta's need
to revisit this issue is, however, more than a mere retreat from the
candor that has informed his paraphrase of the verse. As we have
seen, "mixing in" – especially when it involves the inward twist or
turn of suggestiveness moving through its own, profoundly perva-
sive nature, joining with its own sub-categories or with figures that
occupy the same locus that it inhabits in itself – is, indeed, a pow-
erful conceptual tool. One might say that this mode exemplifies, on
the level of poetic experience, something of the inward turn of
awareness that is named "repose in self."

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[20] See *Abhinavabhāratī*: *rasa-niṣpatti-sūtra*, summary of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's posi-
      tion (GNOLI 1968, p. 10); see comment by Gnoli, p. xxiii, n. 1; CHAKRABARTI
      2005, pp. 27-36.

[21] INGALLS ET. AL. 1990, pp. 658-669.

3. POST-SCRIPT ON DHARMAKĪRTI

Before we let go of Ānanda's verse, and before we find ourselves immersed, again, not in real joyfulness but in the seductive ersatz variety of cataloguing and making lists, we might note that the verse we have studied could be seen as part of a small set. *Kārikā* 3.40, only a few pages back from 3.43, asserts, not surprisingly, that PSS can indeed fit the over-arching category of *dhvani* if the poet's intention is ultimately directed toward *rasa*. The rather extensive *vṛtti* closes with two autobiographical verses attributed – thus Ānanda – to Dharmakīrti.[22] *Yā vyāpāravatī* is thus by no means alone; the theoretical context helps explain why. Here are the two verses in question:

> *lāvaṇya-draviṇa-vyayo na gaṇitaḥ kleśo mahān arjitaḥ*
> *svacchandaṃ carato janasya hṛdaye cintā-jvaro nirmitaḥ |*
> *eṣâpi svayam eva tulya-ramaṇâbhāvād varākī hatā*
> *ko 'rthaś cetasi vedhasā vinihitas tanvyās tanuṃ tanvatā ||*

> It was a huge effort, and he spared no expense.
> A hungry fire now burns in the hearts of men
> who were happy before.
> And as for her, poor girl, she's left to languish
> because no lover could ever
> be her equal. So what was God thinking
> when he turned his mind
> to fashioning her body?

> *an-adhyavasitâvagāhanam an-alpa-dhī-śaktinâ-*
> *py adṛṣṭa-paramârtha-tattvam adhikâbhiyogair api |*
> *mataṃ mama jagaty alabdha-sadṛśa-pratigrāhakaṃ*
> *prayāsyati payonidheḥ paya iva sva-dehe jarām ||*

> No one in this world
> has fathomed my thought.
> Even the best minds that engaged with it
> with all their strength
> failed to see my truth.
> Not even one worthy reader
> really got it.
> Like water in the ocean,

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[22] Only the second is solidly attested in surviving works of Dharmakīrti, and there is reason to doubt the attribution to this poet-philosopher of the first. For present purposes, Ānanda's attribution remains of interest.

my ideas will grow old
inside my body.

The second verse makes explicit what is hinted at (through the figure *aprastuta-praśaṃsā*, according to Ānanda) in the first, very well-known poem.[23] The disgruntled tone is Dharmakīrti's signature. In the first verse he has displaced his complaint on to a young girl who will never find a lover worthy of her greatness. The second poem speaks to us directly in the first person: the great thinker will never be understood. A poet of genius, Dharmakīrti offers us an unsettling image of near-autistic, profoundly isolated self-containment: water – ever the same water – endlessly flows through water. Or is there something more to the image, a vision, perhaps, of the mind as restless, fluid, in movement, moving through itself and thus intensifying its own aliveness in the way *dhvani* "mixes in" with other instances of *dhvani*? And is there meaning to the fact that Ānanda has chosen three autobiographical verses, one of them his own, to illustrate just such points of intensified aesthetic experience where the system he has so rigorously developed pushes beyond its own premises?

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A Vaiṣṇava Paramādvaita in 10ᵗʰ-Century Kashmir?

The Work of Vāmanadatta

Raffaele Torella

Bhāgavatotpala, more widely known in Kashmir under the name Utpalavaiṣṇava,[1] scattered his commentary on the *Spandakārikā* (*Spandapradīpikā*, henceforth SpPr) with often striking quotations from a work entitled *Saṃvitprakāśa* (henceforth SP), sometimes paired with another work entitled *Ātmasaptati*, their tone and content looking closely related to each other. If we know the name of author, which neither Bhāgavatotpala nor later authors ever mentioned, we owe it to Jayaratha, the diligent commentator of Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka* (henceforth TĀ). TĀ 5.154cd-155ab reads:

> *nīle pīte sukhe duḥkhe citsvarūpam akhaṇḍitam* |
> *gurubhir bhāṣitaṃ tasmād upāyeṣu vicitratā* ‖

> In blue, yellow, pleasure and pain the very nature of consciousness remains undivided: this has been said by the master. Therefore, there is diversity as regards the means [only].

"By the master," Jayaratha says in his commentary (vol. III, p. 467), "namely by Vāmanadattācārya in the SP." This passage is not found in the mss. of the SP (see below), but we can still give credit to Jayaratha's attribution, since the *śloka*, this time in full, is quoted in SpPr p. 18 (Dyczkowski ed.) as belonging to the SP, and

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[1] In the two printed editions of the SpPr (both not fully reliable) by Gopinātha Kavirāja and M. S. G. Dyczkowski, the name in the colophon is given as Bhagavatotpala and Bhagavadutpala, respectively. What most probably is the correct form (Bhāgavatotpala) is found in the colophon of two mss. of the SpPr in the Research Library, Srinagar (No. 861, *raciteyaṃ bhāgavatotpalena*; No. 829, *ity ācāryabhāgavato-utpalaviracitā*). These mss. belong to a group of four. Śāradā mss. of the SpPr which have not been used for the above editions (No. 2233 has *ity ācāryotpalaviracitā*; No. 994 ends abruptly while commenting on *śloka* 31).

moreover it recurs unchanged in the *Lakṣmītantra* (henceforth LT), which incorporates many verses from the SP (see below). The colophons of the *Ātmasaptati* and the other four Prakaraṇas which follow the SP in the extant mss. also mention his name as the author.

Vāmanadatta most probably lived around the middle of 10th century. The earliest authors to quote from him are the aforementioned Bhāgavatotpala, and Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha in the *Mṛgendravṛtti* (see below). Bhāgavatotpala, who quotes Utpaladeva (the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*, henceforth ĪPK)[2] but not Abhinavagupta, probably belongs to the second half of the 10th century. Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha belongs approximately to the same period, given that he also quotes Utpaladeva (the *Īśvarasiddhi*)[3] and that his son Rāmakaṇṭha is quoted by Abhinavagupta[4] (and Kṣemarāja – he is the *kairaṇavyākhyātṛ* referred to in the *Svacchandoddyota,* vol. I, p. 322).

The colophons of the SP and the other Prakaraṇas indicate that Vāmanadatta is from Kashmir and a brahmin, and they introduce us to his particular doctrinal position:

> *ekāyane prasūtasya kaśmīreṣu dvijātmanaḥ |*
> *kṛtir vāmanadattasya...* ‖

The mention of the Ekāyana testifies to Vāmanadatta's affiliation to the Pāñcarātra. The followers of the Pāñcarātra refer to one Ekāyanaveda which they consider the essence and primordial source of the four Vedas and also call "secret tradition" (*Īśvarasaṃhitā* 21.531: *ādyam ekāyanaṃ vedaṃ rahasyāmnāyasaṃjñitam*). The lost *Kāśmirāgamaprāmāṇya* of Yāmuna, according to what the author himself says in his main work, the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* (p. 79), dealt with the non-human nature of the Ekāyana-branch. In another passage of the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* (p. 40) Yāmuna points out that the Ekāyanaśākhins upheld – against the Śaivas – the birth, i.e. the limited nature, of Rudra. By crossing the references given in the *Haravijaya* and the *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* (SANDERSON 2009, pp. 107-108), we have in Kashmir two subdivisions of Pāñcarātra: Ekāyanas and followers of Saṃkarṣaṇaśāstra, corresponding to Saṃhitā Pāñcarātra and Saṃkarṣaṇa Pāñcarātra, respectively. However, a

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[2]   Pp. 3, 7, 17, 38-39, 53.

[3]   5. 55, quoted in *Mṛgendravṛtti* pp. 30-31 (ad vidyāpāda 1.11).

[4]   For a thorough assessment of Rāmakaṇṭha's date see GOODALL 1998, pp. xiii-xviii.

later Saṃhitā, the *Parameśvarasaṃhitā,* links the Ekāyanaveda with Saṃkarṣaṇa (CZERNIAK-DROŻDŻOWICZ forthcoming), the Ekāyanas receiving the appellation of Āgamasiddhāntins, against the Vaidika termed Mantrasiddhāntins.[5] According to the *Pādma-saṃhitā*, the Ekāyanas are a very special kind of Bhāgavatas: they do not need initiation into Pāñcarātra, being so to speak born Pāñ-carātrins (CZERNIAK-DROŻDŻOWICZ forthcoming).

The presence of Vaiṣṇavism in Kashmir from early times is ex-tensively documented by archeological and literary evidence,[6] just as it seems probable that some of the Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās (cited apparently for the first time in the SpPr) were elaborated in Kash-mir. Indeed, the SP is a *stuti* dedicated to Viṣṇu, and in it and the other Prakaraṇas several doctrinal references that are peculiar to the Pāñcarātra can be found, such as, for instance, the doctrine of the *vyūha*s in Prakaraṇa 4. However, as we shall see, this is a Pāñ-carātra interpreted in a strictly non-dualistic sense, which makes it fully consonant with the contemporary schools of non-dual Śai-vism. Many Śaiva masters do not hesitate to quote Vāmanadatta's work as an authority alongside other authoritative purely Śaiva texts and to support Śaiva doctrines. This gives the impression that the adhesion to a certain spiritual climate in the Kashmir of the time represented such a strong element of affinity, at the most ele-vated levels, that it succeeded in overcoming sectarian and doctri-nal differences. One may also quote another example, that of Bhaṭ-ṭa Divākaravatsa, belonging approximately to the same period (SANDERSON 2007, p. 255), and author of two works, the *Kakṣyā-stotra* and the *Vivekāñjana*, which are quoted as authorities by Śai-va authors, like Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja, despite their Pāñ-carātra contents. This may appear all the more surprising when one thinks that the relations between Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas had often been – and were to become even more so in the future – such as to cast a shadow over the alleged tolerance of Hinduism (cf. DAS-GUPTA 1932, p. 18; GONDA 1970, pp. 93-94). Even when coexis-tence is, after all, peaceful, as in the Kashmir of the time, Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas do not go beyond a generic acknowledgement of the limited and provisional truth of the other, which is only admitted if

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[5]   On Āgamasiddhānta and Mantrasiddhānta (plus Tantra° and Tantrāntara°), see RASTELLI 2003.

[6]   The relevant passages from the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* have been collected and studied in RAI 1955, pp. 188-194. See SANDERSON 2009a, pp. 58-70; 2009b, pp. 107-109.

subordinated to the absolute truth represented by one's own creed. This is particularly evident in the Vaiṣṇavas, who are much more oriented than the Śaivas towards the *ekāntavāda* (cf. GONDA 1970, p. 93). Anyhow, we see that in India even when one religious community accepts the partial truth of another, the delimitation between the respective authoritative texts tends to remain rigid. Śaivas and Pāñcarātrins are no exception to this. In criticizing the validity of the scriptures belonging to the Pāśupatas, Kālamukhas, Kāpālikas and Śaivas (*Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 44), Yāmuna says:

> As the authoritativeness of these Tantras is already vitiated by their mutual contradictions, it is not really necessary for them to be rejected with the stick of the Veda. [...] Let it not be said, how could Rudra, who is very trustworthy, promulgate such a vast collection of texts which are not authoritative ? [...] Or else one may reason that since Rudra may have composed such a system for the purpose of deceiving the world because he is known as a promulgator of deceitful doctrines, it is not even necessary to assume error on his part. (Transl. BUITENEN 1971, p. 71.)

It is known, on the other hand, that Kṣemarāja in the *Pratyabhi-jñāhṛdaya* relegates the Pāñcarātra to a very humble position on the scale of principles.[7]

The figure of Vāmanadatta does not have any place in the later Vaiṣṇava tradition, in which sectarian elements tend to prevail. He survives only indirectly since several stanzas of the SP are found to be incorporated or paraphrased in the LT (particularly in Chapter 14), a relatively late and eclectic text, which only begins to be considered an authority from the time of Vedāntadeśika onwards (GUPTA 1972, p. xx).[8] Bhāgavatotpala, an author whose doctrinal and religious affiliation is very close to Vāmanadatta's (and Pāñca-rātra's),[9] and who quotes him so frequently, aims to illuminate and

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[7]   See p. 17: *parā prakṛtir bhagavān vāsudevaḥ, tadvisphuliṅgaprāyā eva jīvāḥ iti pāñcarātrāḥ parasyāḥ prakṛteḥ pariṇāmābhyupagamād avyakte evābhini-viṣṭāḥ*. This does not prevent Maheśvarānanda from quoting as an authority a Pāñcarātra scripture like the LT (see below), most probably due to the emphasis this text places on the Goddess.

[8]   Some verses of the LT are cited in the *Mahārthamañjarīparimala* (henceforth MPP): 14.5cd-6, cit. p. 65; 22.7ab, cit. p. 175. The probable date of Maheśva-rānanda is very close to Vedāntadeśika's (around the beginning of the 14th c.; cf. SANDERSON 2007, p. 412).

[9]   Quite unconvincingly, DYCZKOWSKI 1992 argues (p. 28) that Bhāgavatotpala was in fact a Śaiva as shown by his referring to Śiva as his *abhimatadevatā* (SpPr, p. 7). It is instead clear from the context that by saying so Bhāgavatot-

support the doctrine of the Spanda with an equal share of Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva authorities. He cites (p. 12) two passages, from a Śaiva and a Pāñcarātrin work, now both lost, that indicate the existence of a tolerant and all-comprehensive stratum of the two opposing schools that recognised each other as being united in non-duality. The Pāñcarātra text, the *Māyāvāmanasaṃhitā*, reads:

> *viṣṇuśivasūryabuddhādirūpatayā tattacchakticakraparivārayutas tatkāraṇaṃ bhagavān eka eva dhyānabhedenopāsyatvenābhihitaḥ.*

> In the form of Viṣṇu, Śiva, Sūrya, Buddha etc. and accompanied by the retinue of the various powers of which he is the sole cause, one is the Blessed One, variously named depending on the different kinds of meditation and the diverse rites.

And the Śaiva text, the *Kulayukti*:

> *vedānte vaiṣṇave śaive saure bauddhe 'nyato 'pi ca |*
> *eka eva paraḥ svātmā jñātā jñeyaṃ maheśvari ||*

> In Vedānta, in Viṣṇuism, in Śaivism, in the Saura sect, in Buddhism and so on, one is the supreme, the own self, the knower and the knowable, O Maheśvarī.[10]

No mention of Vāmanadatta and his works (or of Bhāgavatotpala) is to be found in the extant works of Yāmuna, the first great systemizer and defender of the Pāñcarātra tradition, who must have lived a little later than Vāmanadatta (we must however take into account that his *Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya* has not come down to us); nor is it in Vedāntadeśika or in Rāmānuja. The later Pāñcarātra tradition, once it firmly turned towards the *viśiṣṭādvaita*, erased the memory not only of Vāmanadatta, but also of a whole series of Vaiṣṇava texts apparently grounded on non-duality, whose existence is testified by Bhāgavatotpala's quotations, for instance the *Jñānasaṃbodha*, the *Jābalīsūtra*, the *Ṣāḍguṇyaviveka* and others.

Vāmanadatta's teaching, on the contrary, was held in great respect by the Śaiva authors. Primarily by those who belonged to the great and variegated non-dual tradition, but not by them alone; in

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pala is referring to the author of the *Spandakārikā*, not to himself. Then, the first part of his very name (Bhāgavata) leaves no doubt about his religious affiliation.

[10] A verse from the SP (not extant in the mss.) cited in SpPr, p. 27 states that there is no difference between the qualities of Śiva and Viṣṇu (*bhedaḥ sarva-jñatādīnāṃ jñānādīnāṃ ca nāsty amī | jñānasyaiva dharmatayā cidrūpasya sthitir yataḥ ||*).

fact, the first Śaiva to quote him is the *siddhāntin* Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, who in the above-mentioned passage (*Mṛgendravṛtti*, vidyāpāda, p. 153) quotes with approval, without citing the author or the title, two verses belonging to Prakaraṇa 2 (6, 56). The first of these two verses is also quoted in the chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* on the Śaivadarśana, but in order to forestall drawing the mistaken conclusion that the *Ātmasaptati* was known to Mādhava, it must be said, as I have shown elsewhere (TORELLA 1979), that the chapter on the Śaivadarśana is not much more than a clever collage of passages that Mādhava has taken from Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's *Mṛgendra-vṛtti* and Aghoraśiva's *Tattvaprakāśavṛtti*.

The author who most extensively quotes from Vāmanadatta's works is Bhāgavatotpala. The total number of verses quoted is 42,[11] and they are all to be found in Prakaraṇa 1 (the SP), with the exception of six (five belonging to Prakaraṇa 2 and one to Prakaraṇa 5). Another literal quotation, this time from Prakaraṇa 2 (v. 30), can be found in Abhinavagupta's *Parātrīśikāvivaraṇa* (p. 214); a passage of his *Tantrasāra* (henceforth TS) may contain a reminiscence of a verse of SP.[12] Other quotations from Vāmanadatta's Prakaraṇas are found in Maheśvarānanda's MMP,[13] Śivopādhyā-ya's *Vijñānabhairavoddyota*,[14] Kṣemarāja's *Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti*[15] and Bhāskarakaṇṭha's commentary on the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvi-marśinī*.[16]

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[11] P. 3 (SP 107-8), p. 6 (SP 78-80), p. 8 (2.58), p. 9 (SP 24, 2.19, 5.26), p. 10 (SP 95), pp. 13-4 (SP 112-13), pp. 17-18 (SP 54-56), p. 18 (SP 49-50, 42-43, 45, one *śloka* from SP not found in the mss.), p. 19 (SP 53, 57, 59), p. 22 (SP 106), p. 23 (SP 103-4), p. 27 (SP 14, one *śloka* from SP not found in the mss.), p. 29 (SP 72), p. 31 (SP 27), p. 36 (SP 30), p. 37 (SP 31, 63, one *śloka* from SP not found in the mss., 12, 38-39ab), p. 38 (one *śloka* from *Ātmasaptati* not found in the mss., SP 10), p. 39 (1.92), p. 40 (2.47, 1.95), p. 41 (one *śloka* from *Ātmasaptati* not found in the mss), p. 47 (1.20), p. 48 (one *śloka* from SP not found in the mss.).

[12] TS pp. 8-9: *cinmātratattvaṃ... upādhibhir amlānam* – SP 3cd: *yad upādhibhir amlānaṃ naumi tad vaiṣṇavaṃ padam.*

[13] See p. 20 (not found in the mss; cf. below); p. 21 (2.58); p. 22 (not found in the mss.); p. 25 (3.27 and 3.2).

[14] See p. 109 (SP 13).

[15] See p. 83 (SP 13).

[16] Vol. I, p. 48 (SP 13); vol. I, p. 93 (SP 20); vol. I, p. 64 (SP 31); vol. I, p.13, 302 (SP 36); vol. I, p. 71 (SP 39cd); vol. I, p. 72, 268, vol. II, p.137 (2.6); vol. I, p. 54, 248, 412, vol. II, p. 203 (2.19); vol. I, p. 53, 218 (2.30-31).

The passage from the TĀ cited above permits us to touch on another question to which, however, it is not possible to obtain a definite answer, namely whether Abhinavagupta had been a disciple of Vāmanadatta. The fact that Abhinavagupta calls him *gurubhiḥ* is not cogent in itself, since the term may have been used in a generic sense.

Of the SP and the other Prakaraṇas only three mss. have come down to us,[17] all of them incomplete. Two printed editions are available (only based on mss. A and B), one by M. Dyczkowski and one by Bh. P. Tripathi, both of them quite problematic with respect to the reading of the mss. and the emendations proposed.[18] As we have seen, the work is divided into Prakaraṇas. SP is the title of the first one[19] and was later extended by some, including the two editors referred to above, to the whole work. The SpPr, probably the oldest source for this collection of texts, uses the title *Saṃvitprakāśa* only for verses belonging to the first Prakaraṇa,[20] and *Ātmasaptati*[21] for closely related verses, quite similar both in content and style to the SP. All the latter verses come indeed from Prakaraṇa 2, entitled *Ātmasaptati*[22] in mss. B and C, and *Ātmasaṃstuti* in ms. A.[23] It is clear that Bhāgavatotpala considers the SP and

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[17]   A: Research Library, Srinagar, No. 1371 (Kashmiri *devanāgarī*); B: Benares Hindu University Library, Varanasi, No. C4003 (*śāradā*); C: Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen, Cod. Ms. Sanscr. Vish 5 (*śāradā*).

[18]   The two editions (both bearing the title of SP) are in fact only one as Tripathi's is virtually identical (including the typographical setting) to Dyczkowski's with the exception of a few corrections mainly of misprints. It would be possible to make some hypotheses about the reason why Dyczkowski decided to hand his edition over to Tripathi. About the "story" of Dyczkowski's edition see TORELLA 1994, p. 482.

[19]   In the three mss. the colophon reads: *saṃvitprakāśo nāma prathamaṃ prakaraṇam.*

[20]   Once he calls it *Saṃvitprakaraṇa* (p. 38); see below. There is only one exception: the quotation p. 9 from Prakaraṇa 5.26 is introduced by *uktaṃ saṃvitprakāśe* (see below).

[21]   On one occasion both editions of the SpPr (Kavirāja p. 112, Dyczkowski p. 37) have *uktaṃ hi svātmasaptatau*, which must be a mere mistake (at least, all the Srinagar mss. mentioned above read *uktaṃ hy ātmasaptatau*).

[22]   *ātmasaptatir nāma dvitīyaṃ prakaraṇam.*

[23]   According to the number recorded by the Srinagar ms. A (see below), the second Prakaraṇa should have had nineteen verses more than the 60 that have come down to us. Thus, *Ātmasaptati* might be either a mistake for *Ātmasaṃstuti* or (much more probably) an approximate reference to the number of the

Ātmasaptati as two distinct works.[24] Instead, Maheśvarānanda ascribes to SP one verse belonging to Prakaraṇa 2 (MMP, p. 21) and two verses belonging to Prakaraṇa 3 (ibid., p. 25).[25] Even admitting that it was Vāmanadatta himself that collected different treatises composed by him into a single work, he does not appear to have given this collection a particular title. Prakaraṇa 1 has the peculiar character of a philosophical *stuti* to Hari, also showing here and there subtle emotional nuances. The second mostly lacks these features, even though Vāmanadatta still calls it *saṃstuti*.[26] These features are altogether absent in the other Prakaraṇas, which makes rather unlikely the hypothesis that the Prakaraṇas as a whole might have had the collective title of *Viṣṇustuti*.[27] Of the 160 *śloka*s that Vāmanadatta himself mentions in one of the closing verses of Prakaraṇa 1[28] only 140 have survived. The title and the number of the extant verses of the other Prakaraṇas are as follows: *ātmasaptati* (vv. 60), *vikalpaviplava* (vv. 60), *vidyāviveka* (vv. 98), *varṇavicāra* (vv. 52), *paramārthaprakāśa* (vv. 27).[29] The Srinagar ms. A has seven and half more verses, belonging to a seventh Prakaraṇa, after which the ms. ends abruptly. B and C end with the colophon of

verses (79) that composed it. The confusion might have been caused by the previous part of the colophon of Prakaraṇa 2: *imaṃ vāmanadattena vihitām ātmasaṃstutim | adhigamya vimucyate jantavo bhavaviplavāt ||*.

[24] See SpPr pp. 37-38: *uktaṃ hi svātmasaptatau* [*read: hy ātmasaptatau*] *yadvad vastu svabhāvena jñānena viṣayīkṛtam | tadvat tādātmyam āyāti jīvaḥ sarva-mayo hy ataḥ || iti |* **anyat** *saṃvitprakaraṇe − yathāgninā samāviṣṭaṃ sarvaṃ tadrūpam īkṣyate | tathā jñānasamāviṣṭaṃ sarvaṃ tadrūpam īkṣyatām || iti.*

[25] The fact that Maheśvarānanda uses a single title, i.e. the title of Prakaraṇa 1, also for verses coming from other Prakaraṇas, has only one precedent, but an important one, that of the SpPr referred to above, n. 20. One may surmise that, even though *Saṃvitprakāśa* is definitely the specific title only of Prakaraṇa 1, the intrinsic importance and renown of the latter and its occuring first in the collection of Prakaraṇas (and also being by far the longest) may have sporadically given the occasion of an extended appellation.

[26] See n. 23 above.

[27] Cf. SANDERSON 2009a, p. 108. On the only occasion Bhāgavatotpala identifies three verses quoted by him as *stutau* (p. 19) they all belong to Prakaraṇa 1. Once Vāmanadatta himself refers to one *Haristuti*, but this is a hymn composed by his daughter Vāmadevī (4.78cd).

[28] SP 139: *ṣaṣṭyuttaraṃ ślokaśatam idaṃ bodhaṃ vināpi yaḥ | paṭhen madhuri-por agre bhaktyā mokṣaṃ sa gacchati ||.*

[29] After the colophon of each Prakaraṇa (except 1 and 4), the Srinagar ms. A records what was the original (?) number of verses: 79 (Prakaraṇa 2), 61 (Prakaraṇa 3), 52 (Prakaraṇa 5), 27 (Prakaraṇa 6).

Prakaraṇa 6, both having a lacuna between 4.90 and 6.22. The *devanāgarī* MS in the BORI Library bearing the title of SP has nothing to do with Vāmanadatta's work.

We are left with a preliminary question: what happened in the Vaiṣṇava circles immediately before the time of Abhinavagupta to make at least three significant Pāñcarātra authors – Vāmanadatta, Bhaṭṭa Divākaravatsa and Bhāgavatotpala – enter into the philosophical and spiritual orbit of their Śaiva adversaries? It has also been suggested the possibility of the inverted path (SANDERSON 2009a, p. 108), that is, the birth of the non-dual Śaiva philosophy from the influence of these eccentric Vaiṣṇava developments (*in primis,* Vāmanadatta's Prakaraṇas), a possibility that seems to me rather unlikely. It is not single points, but a whole constellation of typically Śaiva themes that can be found there, particularly linked to the complex philosophical world of Utpaladeva.

If, in this presentation of some aspects of Vāmanadatta's work, I mainly focus on Prakaraṇas 1 and 2 it is because, apart from their probably being in themselves his most significant texts, they are by far the most quoted by the Śaiva authors. First of all, in the complex mosaic of a philosophical *stuti*, written in a refined *kāvya* style, the SP proper, we find, within an undoubtedly Pāñcaratra doctrinal framework, a fascinating blend of rigourous speculation and devotional poetry, which at first sight reminds us of the then rising star of Utpaladeva, the actual founder of Pratyabhijñā, more or less contemporary to Vāmanadatta (and also often referrred to by Bhāgavatotpala), with his collection of Śaiva *stotra*s. The other Prakaraṇas share the same philosophical and spiritual attitude as the SP without, however, the *bhakti* nuances of the latter and the sense of intimate dialogue with Hari, emphasized by the frequent vocatives (*nātha*, *prabhu*, *bhagavan*, etc.) and above all by the constant addressing him as *tvam*.[30]

Some of the fundamental themes of Utpaladeva – unobjectifibility of consciousness, subject/object relationship and problematicity of the very notion of *viṣaya* – recur in several stanzas of the SP and *Ātmasaptati*:[31]

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[30] Most of the *tvaṃ* of the SP turn to *ahaṃ* in the verses incorporated into the LT, where the Goddess herself is speaking.

[31] The text and numeration of the stanzas is according to my forthcoming edition (see Appendix).

2.5. The self cannot be object of cognition for anybody, what is other than it is not logically admissible. From the differentiation of the knowable derives the differentiation of the means of knowledge. If there is no such differentiation, then what might produce the differentiation [of knowledge]?

2.6. If the self were knowable, its knower would be "other"; but then the self would be[come] "other." "Other," in fact, is what is the object of knowledge.

2.56. Consciousness alone shines; that which is other from it is illuminated. What is illuminated is the object, and how can the object subsist without a subject?

1.10. Just as whatever is penetrated by fire is seen as being of the same essence as fire, in the same manner whatever is penetrated by consciousness is to be seen as being of the same essence as consciousness.

1.11. An intrinsic and definite status is inconceivable for things, dependent as they are on a subject that knows them, and consequently they can only manifest themselves, by their very nature, as having the knower as their essence.

1.12. The fact that things have You as their essence, no one disputes. Their capacity of being known demonstrates this: indeed, only that which in itself is light may be made to shine.[32]

1.24. If knowledge (*vedanam*) knows something after bringing the knowable object to having knowledge as its own form, then how to speak of knowable object and knowing subject (*vedakatā*) as two distinct realities?[33]

2.8. "Making [something] an object of knowledge" – the wise ones say in this connection – is the same as "making [it] one's own." What is universally accepted for any other reality, why should it not be so for consciousness?

2.9. What has not been made its own by consciousness (*saṃvidāsvīkṛtaṃ*) cannot be termed "object of knowledge" (*viṣaya*).[34] [But] what has

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[32] Cf. ĪPK 1.5.2 (cf. TORELLA 2002, pp. 111-112).

[33] The text remains doubtful owing to the oscillation in the mss. and old quotations between *vedanatā* and *vedakatā*; also the emendation of *vedanam* to *vedakaḥ* might be considered.

[34] Also the reading *saṃvidā svīkṛtaṃ* "what has been made its own by consciousness" could be considered (this would anticipate the conclusion made in

been made its own by a certain entity becomes identical with such entity. [Then,] how can the very designation of "object of knowledge" stand?[35]

2.35. While knowledge can shine autonomously being separated from the senses and without being muddied by the objects of knowledge, the same cannot be said of the object of knowledge.

2.36. It is said in this connection that in order to make known the objects of knowledge the three means of knowledge work separately being concerned with distinct classes of objects of knowledge. [But] the same does not hold for knowledge.

Another favourite topic of Utpaladeva's discourse is the alleged externality of the object of knowledge (ĪPK 1.8.5, 1.8.7; cf. TORELLA 2002, pp. 148-150). In the same vein, Vāmanadatta says:

2.32. Even establishing the other as other is not possible until the other is assimilated by the self, since only when it is known does the other become the other.

2.44. If it were possible to define an object as being external even when it has entered one's consciousness, then it would be external to consciousness itself, so how could it be said to be "its" [of consciousness]?

2.45. If, on the other hand, it has not entered one's consciousness, how can its existence be known, since only consciousness has the task of hunting down being and non-being?

The examination of the nature of relation is closely connected with Utpaladeva's treatment of the same topic in ĪPK 1.2.10-11 (TORELLA 2002, pp. 95-98), 2.4.14 (TORELLA 2002, p. 183) and the *Sambandhasiddhi*.

2.17. There can be no relationship between two things complete and realised in themselves (*siddha*), because all expectation is lacking between them; and not even between two that are not realised and established, because as such they would not exist. So any relationship in reality does not exist.

2.54. What is real/existing (*satāṃ*) is without any such "requiring" because it is already complete and realised in itself, nor conversely is "non-requiring" possible in what is non-existent owing to its non-realisa-

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the following *ardhaśloka*).

[35] Cf. e.g. Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti* ad 1.4.1 (TORELLA 2007b, p. 544).

tion. Things lacking "dependency" have neither the nature of the knower nor of the knowable.

The status of cause presupposes sentiency. Only the conscious agent subject can be a causal agent (ĪPK 2.4.1-21; cf. TORELLA 2002, pp. 175-188).

> 1.63. It is well known that everything has You as cause, since Your presence is apparent in everything. Given that everything shows the presence of consciousness, the cause [of everything] cannot be something without consciousness.

> 2.22. Whatever is denied the quality of active subject cannot assume the role of instrument, etc. [...]

Vāmanadatta appears also reminiscent of how Utpaladeva deals with the theme of memory in ĪPK 1.2.3, 1.3.1ff. (cf. TORELLA 2007b).

> 1.20. You, always omniscient, are present in the heart of everyone: if this were not so, how otherwise could one account for memory, whose object is something that no longer exists?

The presence of Bhartṛhari's teaching is evident at several places of Vāmanadatta's works, and, as is well known, it was through Utpaladeva that Bhartṛhari became one of the main pillars of non-dual Śaiva philosophy (TORELLA 2009).

> 1.7. It is merely a question of the power of the word: that is, the fact that it brings about a fragmentation of the real, which itself would be unitary, by virtue of a multiplicity of functions.

> 5.26. The word is the cause of all human activities: this is what reason shows, it is not only scripture that says so. In fact, there is no operation whatsoever without the work of discursive thought, nor is there discursive thought without the word.

The concept of *pratibhā* as the ultimate ground for the means of knowledge appears to be nourished with Utpaladeva's ideas as expressed particularly in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti* (in turn, being a development of Bhartṛhari's doctrine):[36]

> 2.37. Sensorial knowledge derives directly from the object, inferential knowledge comes from the relation [between objects]; it has been said

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[36]   Cf. TORELLA 2013.

that they [sensorial knowledge and inferential knowledge] are the root of *āgama*. No other means of knowledge exists.

2.38. It is required that, in turn, these three means of knowledge have intuition as their own soul, otherwise it would impossible to account for ascertainment of truth and error.

2.39ab. Intuition is only known by introspective self-awareness; it is present in a form exempt from succession (*akramātmikā*) within the various activities.[37]

Just like Utpaladeva, Vāmanadatta makes frequent use of the simile of the mirror or crystal and the reflection on them to account for the relationship between consciousness and the images of the allegedly external objects.

1.51. Just as the child has no separate cognition of the mirror without his face [reflected in it], just so he who is not wise does not grasp the consciousness from which the knowable has been extracted.

1.54-56. Just as the true nature of a crystal continuously coloured by other things is not perceived owing to its excessive transparency, in the same way, O Blessed One, Your own body, which is united with the various beings, owing to its absolute limpidity is not perceived without them. Neither for this [reason] can we affirm that such a crystal does not exist separately from whatever colours it, or that the pure body of consciousness does not exist once liberated from the form of things.

1.57-59. Just as it is impossible to indicate separately the intrinsic existence of a universal from which all particulars have been removed – but this does not imply that it does not exist –, and just as it is impossible to indicate the intrinsic existence of gold once it has been freed from its various forms, such as earring, etc. – but this does not imply that it does not exist –, so be it said of Your permanent, intimate, pure nature, once pleasure and pain have been eliminated. It consists of consciousness, only knowable through introspective intimate awareness.

1.40. Pleasure and pain do not appear, discrimination has no firm ground: everything appears the same once You, the sun of consciousness, rise.

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[37] If we accept the reading *kramātmikā*, transmitted in all the extant mss., the meaning does not change significantly: "it [only] appears in a successive form within... "

1.41. For the blind You are the one in whom there is no darkness, for the deaf You are the one in whom the Voice never disappears. Starting from Brahmā to the animals, You are the same in the knowledge of everybody.

Hari is present at all levels of ordinary reality. In fact, since everything is equally penetrated by Him, there is no real difference between *mokṣa* and *saṃsāra*. If the various ordinary reality can occur in its multifariousness it is precisely because of His constituting its permanent and undifferentiated basis (cf. ĪPK 2.3.15b *samabhitti-talopame*; ĪPK 1.3.6-7, 2.4.19; cf. TORELLA 2002, pp.103-104, 186).

1.95. No ordinary activity – whether corporeal or verbal or mental – can take place if Thou, O Lord, art not already present in it and established beforehand.[38]

1.89. Two persons who meet and speak of ordinary things thereby express something that however has You as its final subject, [even] without speaking of You [directly]. [...]

1.36. Albeit directly perceptible, in that You transcend all conceptual processes, You are "forgotten" – like something in front of someone whose mind is elsewhere.

1.39. Lights do not shine if Your light does not rise. You are the only one that can truly be called light; all the others are like the darkness.

2.58. In actual fact, there is no bondage, and there being no bondage, there is no liberation either. These two entities are both fabricated by discursive thought and in themselves are nothing.

1.60. I bow to Brahman which is without specification, partless, outside space and time, light to itself, exclusively consisting of consciousness, perennially risen.

1.61. Were You not exempt from particularization among particulars, the comprehension of the particular would be impossible as everything resides in itself.

1.62. In You, Lord, who are the cause, there is no differentiation, then how could differentiation be in the effects forming this world? Therefore, o Padmanābha, the world is without differentiation.

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[38] Cf. the so-called *ādisiddhasūtra* (1.1.2) of ĪPK.

1.64. You are the substratum of everything, made of everything and transcending everything. How is it possible that there be space and time in You, who are infinite and without action (*niṣkriyātmani*)?[39]

1.66. The wise ones know you to be what never declines from its own nature, what is not modified by other realities, what is not delimited by other realities, this permanent being You are.

1.67. Time, etc. arise from You with the aim of delimiting what can be delimited. But what can time etc. do to You, whose own form is immeasurable?

In the motif of the presence of Hari, or consciousness, in the empty space that separates two physical realities, or two thoughts or sensorial experiences, or two phonemes in a word, we can detect Vāmanadatta's acquaintance with the texts of the Spanda school and with Śaiva scriptures such as the *Vijñānabhairava*.[40]

1.4. The mind that, having expelled conceptual constructs, remains in the middle state, experiences there the immaculate flow of consciousness.

1.42. Always pure does this perception remain, albeit variegated according to the various forms. At the moment in which the passing from one form to another occurs, at that moment too perception is [fully] immaculate.

1.43. Just as a garment originally white and then dyed cannot take any other colour unless it first returns to its original white [...]

1.44. [Just as] he who pronounces a phrase, how could he pass from one phoneme to another, if in the interval, he did not repose in You, who are pure consciousness?

1.45. In the same way, consciousness, which is pure by nature and assumes one form or another, stays pure in the interval between abandoning one form and passing on to another.

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[39] The absence of *kriyā* in Hari, stated also in SP 73b, as a point of apparent disagreement with the Śaiva *paramādvaita,* will be treated in my forthcoming edition and translation.

[40] Very intriguing is the mention of the Krama goddess Kālakarṣaṇī in 4.13d.

The season in which a few brilliant personalities of Pāñcarātra surrendered to the fascination by the philosophers and spiritual masters of the Śaiva *paramādvaita* was short, in any case lasting no more than three to four decades. All the same, the mainstream of Pāñcarātra never forgave them, and committed them to disdainful oblivion. Their memory however has survived for centuries in the Śaiva circles, proud perhaps of having attracted such brilliant outsiders.

APPENDIX

VĀMANADATTA'S VERSES QUOTED IN THE PAPER (ACCORDING TO R. TORELLA'S FORTHCOMING EDITION)

A = Kāśmīri Devanāgari Ms (Śrinagar); B =Śāradā Ms (Benares); C = Śāradā Ms (Göttingen); E = M.S.G. Dyczkowski edition; V = Bh.P. Tripathi (Vāgīśa Śāstrī) edition

1.4. *dūrāpāstavikalpena cetasā yo*[41] *'nubhūyate* |

madhyamāṃ vṛttim āsthāya sa saṃvitprasaro 'malaḥ ||

1.7. *kevalaṃ vākprabhāvo*[42] *'yaṃ yad abhinnam api svayam* |

vibhedayati sā vastu svetikartavyatāvaśāt[43] ||

1.10. *yathāgninā samāviṣṭaṃ sarvaṃ tadrūpam īkṣyate*[44] |

tathā jñānasamāviṣṭaṃ sarvaṃ tadrūpam īkṣyatām[45] ||[46]

1.11. *pramātrapekṣabhāveṣu*[47] *na hy avasthāvakalpate* |

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[41] °*na cetasā yo* ABC, *na cen māyā* EV. (LT 14.12b *cetasā yatra bhūyate*; the more correct *yena* is the reading of mss. ADEFG).

[42] *vākprabhāvo* AC, *vākprabho* then corrected to *vākprabhāvo* B, *vākyabhāvo* EV.

[43] *sā vastu svetikartavyatā°* ABC, *tad vastuṣv iti kartavyatā°* EV.

[44] *īkṣyate* CEV, *īkṣyatām* corrected to *īkṣyate* B, *īkṣyatām* A (*īkṣyate* cit. in SpPr, p. 38).

[45] *īkṣyatām* EV, *īkṣatām* C; *īkṣyatām* cit. in SpPr, p. 38 (cf. LT 14.14 *tathā saṃvitsamāviṣṭaṃ cetyaṃ saṃvittayekṣyate*).

[46] The *ardhaśloka*, omitted in AB, has been added in both mss. in the margin, where however it is only partly legible (*sarvaṃ ta...kṣyate na sa...* A, *tathā jñā...rve? tadrūpaṃ ī...* B). It is quoted in full in SpPr, p. 38.

[47] °*apekṣa*° em, °*apekṣā*° ABC (in AB the original *pramātṛ*° has been then cor-

yatas tataḥ prakāśantāṃ[48] *svayam eva tadātmanā* ‖

1.12. *tvadātmakatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ vivadante*[49] *na kecana* |
yat prakāśyadaśāṃ yātā nāprakāśaḥ[50] *prakāśyate*[51] ‖

1.20. *sarvajñaḥ sarvadaiva tvaṃ sarvasya hṛdaye na cet* |
kenānyathāsya[52] *saṃbhāvyā naṣṭārthaviṣayā smṛtiḥ* ‖

1.24. *vedyaṃ svarūpatāṃ nītvā yadā jānāti vedanam*[53] |
tadānīṃ vedyatā kā syāt kā vā vedakatāparā[54] ‖

1.36. *vikalpātītarūpatvāt pratyakṣo 'py asi vismṛtaḥ* |
puraḥsthito yathā bhāvaś cetaso 'nyābhilāṣiṇaḥ ‖

1.39. *na prakāśāḥ prakāśante*[55] *tvatprakāśodayaṃ vinā* |
prakāśākhyas tvam eko 'taḥ sarve 'nye tamasā samāḥ ‖

1.40. *sukhaduḥkhe na bhāsete*[56] *viveko nāvatiṣṭhate* |
sarvaṃ[57] *samaṃ samābhāti*[58] *cidbhānāv udite tvayi* ‖

1.41. *andhānām apy anandhas tvaṃ*[59] *mūkānām anapāyivāk* |
āviriñcāt tiryagantaṃ samaḥ[60] *sarvasya vedane* ‖

1.42. *sadaiva śuddho 'nubhavo 'yaṃ pratyākārakarburaḥ* |

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rected to pramātra°), *pramātṛpakṣabhāveṣu* EV.

[48]   *prakāśantāṃ* ABC (*prakāśāntāṃ corrected to* prakāśantāṃ A), *prakāśase* EV.

[49]   *vivadante* EV (indeed, P 1.3.47 prescribes *ātmanepada*), *vivadanti* ABC; *vivadante* cit. SpPr, p. 37 (reading confirmed by the Srinagar mss. listed above).

[50]   *prakāśyadaśāṃ yātā nā°* A, *prakāśyadaśāya tanau* (*tā in the margin seems to correct* ta-) B, *prakāśyadaśāyato nā°* C, *prakāśyadaśāṃ yāto nā°* EV. SpPr p. 37 has *prakāśyadaśāṃ yāto* (*prakāśyadaśāṃ yātā ms. No. 829, 2233, prakāśadaśāṃ yātā ms. No. 861, prakāśadaśāṃ yātaṃ ms. No. 994*).

[51]   *prakāśyate* C, *prakāśate* ABEV (this is also the reading in SpPr, p. 37, but mss. No.s 829 and 861 have *prakāśyate*).

[52]   *kenā°* ACEV, *kānā° corrected to* kenā° B.

[53]   *vedanam* AEV, *vedanāṃ* C, *vedanāṃ corrected to* vedanam B.

[54]   *vedakatā°* ABC, *vedanatā°* em. (EV); *vedanatā°* cit. in SpPr, p. 9, and all mss. (also possible).

[55]   *prakāśante* ABEV, *prakāśyante* C.

[56]   *sukhaduḥkhe na bhāsete* ABC, *akhaṇḍās te na bhāsante* EV.

[57]   *sarvaṃ* ABC, *sarve* EV.

[58]   *samābhāti* ABC, *samābhānti* EV.

[59]   *anandhas tvaṃ* ABC, *anandhatvaṃ* EV.

[60]   *āviriñcāt tiryagantaṃ samaḥ* ABC, *avacinvanti mārgaṃ taṃ samam* EV.

ākārāntarasaṃcārakāle tadāpi[61] *nirmalaḥ* ‖

1.43. *yathā jātyā sitaṃ vastraṃ raktaṃ rāgeṇa kenacit* |

na tad aprāpya[62] *śuklatvaṃ punā*[63] *rāgāntaraṃ śrayet* ‖

1.44. *ayam uccārayan vākyaṃ varṇād varṇaṃ kathaṃ vrajet* |

yāvan madhye na viśrāntas tvayi śuddhacidātmani ‖

1.45. *evaṃ śuddhā citir jātyā*[64] *yadākāroparāgiṇī* |

tattyāgāparasaṃcāramadhye śuddhaiva tiṣṭhati ‖

1.51. *mukhaṃ vinā yathādarśaṃ pṛthag bālo*[65] *na manyate* |

tathā samuddhṛtajñeyaṃ[66] *jñānaṃ nāvaity apaṇḍitaḥ*[67] ‖

1.54. *atyantācchasvabhāvatvāt sphaṭikasya yathā svakam* |

rūpaṃ paroparaktasya nityaṃ naivopalabhyate[68] ‖

1.55. *tathā bhāvasamāyuktaṃ bhagavaṃs tāvakaṃ vapuḥ* |

atyantanirmalatayā pṛthak tair nopalabhyate ‖

1.56. *naitāvatāsau*[69] *sphaṭikaḥ pṛthaṅ nāsty eva*[70] *rañjanāt* |

bhāvarūpaparityaktā tava vā nirmalā tanuḥ ‖

1.57. *yathoddhṛtaviśeṣasya sāmānyasya nijasthitiḥ*[71] |

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[61] *tadāpi* conj., *tasyāpi* ABCEV. The text remains doubtful (cf. LT 14.24 *sadai-vāpratibaddhāyā bhāntyā eva vapur mama* | *pratyakṣaṃ cetyasaṃcārakāle 'pi vimalātmanām* (*viditātmanām* mss. ABCDG) ‖.

[62] *na tad aprāpya* ABC, *tatpadaprāpta°* EV (probably referring to the quotation in SpPr, p. 18 *tatpadaṃ prāpta°*, found in all mss.). Cf. LT 14.25c *punaḥ sva-varṇam aprāpya*.

[63] *punā* BEV, *puna* AC.

[64] *citir jātyā* BCEV, *cinnirvṛttyā* A.

[65] *bālo* ABC, *bimbo* EV.

[66] *samuddhṛta°* BC, *samuddhṛtaṃ* AEV.

[67] *jñānaṃ nāvaity* (*nāvety* C) *apaṇḍitaḥ* ABC, *jñātaṃ na dvaitapaṇḍitaiḥ* EV.

[68] *naivo°* em. (cf. LT 4.36 *atyantācchasvabhāvatvāt sphaṭikādir yathā maṇiḥ* | *uparakto japādyais tu tena rūpeṇa nekṣyate* ‖), *evo°* ABC (B has in the left margin: *nopalabhyate iti dvayor anuṣaṅgaḥ*, then cancelled) EV (*evo°* also in Sp.Pr, p. 17, and all mss.).

[69] *naitāvatā°* CEV (cit. in SpPr, p. 18), *etāvatā* corrected to *naitāvatā°* B, *etāva-tā°* A.

[70] *nāsty eva* em. (cf. EV; cit. in SpPr, p. 18, and all mss.), *nāste na* ABC. Cf. LT 14.37cd *pṛthag janair na lakṣyāsmi naivāhaṃ nāsmi tāvatā*.

[71] *nija°* ABC, *nijā* EV (*nijā* cit. in SpPr p. 19 and all mss.)

pṛthaṅ na śakyā nirdeṣṭuṃ na ca tan nāsti[72] *tāvatā* ‖

1.58. *yathoddhṛtakuṇḍalādeḥ*[73] *kanakasya svayaṃ sthitiḥ* |
<*pṛthaṅ na śakyā nirdeṣṭuṃ na ca tan nāsti tāvatā*> ‖[74]

1.59. *evaṃ nityā nijā śuddhā sukha*[75]*-duḥkhaniṣedhanāt*[76] |
svasaṃvedanasaṃvedyā tava saṃvinmayī sthitiḥ ‖

1.60. *aviśeṣaṃ nirvibhāgam adeśaṃ kālavarjitam*[77] |
svajyotiś cidghanaikāntaṃ naumi brahma sadoditam ‖

1.61. *nirviśeṣo viśeṣeṣu nābhaviṣyad bhavān yadi* |
viśeṣāvagatir na syāt sarvasya svātmani sthitheḥ ‖

1.62. *tvayi nātha na bhedo 'sti kāraṇe tat*[78] *kuto bhidā* |
kārye 'smin syāt padmanābha nirviśeṣaṃ tato jagat ‖

1.63. *tvatkāraṇatvaṃ*[79] *sarvasminn api jñātaṃ*[80] *tvadanvayāt*[81] |
saṃvitsamanvite viśve nāsaṃvit kāraṇaṃ bhavet ‖[82]

1.64. *sarvādhāre sarvamaye sarvataś cātirekiṇi* |
tvayy anante ko nu deśaḥ[83] *kālo vā niṣkriyātmani* ‖

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[72] *tan nāsti* ABC, *tatrāsti* EV (cit. in SpPr, p. 19, but all mss. have *tan nāsti*).

[73] *yathoddhṛtakuṇḍalādeḥ* em. (cf. EV), *yathoddhṛtā kuṇḍalādeḥ* BC, *yathoddhṛ-tā kuṇḍalādiḥ* A (*yathoddhṛtā kuṇḍalādeḥ* is also in SpPr, p. 19; of the four mss. only ms. No. 861 has the *śloka*, in the latter form).

[74] An *ardhaśloka* is omitted in the mss, probably due to homoteleuton; the *ardhaśloka* that I have tentatively added comes from the quotation of the *śloka* in SpPr, p. 19 (it occurs only in ms. No. 861); in fact, its being totally identical to 57cd makes its wording (not its meaning) somewhat suspicious. Cf. also LT 14.38: *kuṇḍalāder yathā bhinnā na lakṣyā kanakasthitiḥ | na ca śakyā vinirdeṣ-ṭuṃ tatrāpy asty eva sā dhruvam* ‖.

[75] *sukha°* ABEV, *sukhaṃ* C.

[76] *°niṣedhanāt* ABC, *°aviśeṣitā* EV (*°aviśeṣitā* cit. in SpPr, p. 19, and all mss. Cf. LT 14.39 *evaṃ nityā viśuddhā ca sukhaduḥkhādyabheditā | svasaṃvedana-saṃvedyā mama saṃvinmayī sthitiḥ* ‖.

[77] *nirvibhāgam adeśaṃ kālavarjitam* BC, *nirvibhāgapade ṣaṭkālavarjitam* A, *nir-vibhāgapadaṃ saṅkaṭavarjitam* EV.

[78] *tat* ABC, *yat* EV.

[79] *tvatkāraṇatvaṃ* ABC, *tvatkāraṇe tvaṃ* EV.

[80] *jñātaṃ* em. (cf. V), *jātaṃ* ABC, *jñāto* E.

[81] *tvad°* C, *tad°* corrected to *tvad°* ABC, *yad°* EV.

[82] The *ardhaśloka*, omitted in BC, in B has been later added in the margin.

[83] *tvayy anante ko nu deśaḥ* ABC, *tvayy ante ko 'nudeśaḥ syāt* EV.

1.66. *yat svarūpān na cyavate yat*[84] *parair nopādhīyate* |
yad anyair aparicchedyaṃ tan nityaṃ tvāṃ vidur budhāḥ ||

1.67. *paricchedyaparicchittyai*[85] *tvattaḥ kālādisaṃbhavaḥ* |
aprameyasvarūpasya tava kālādayo nu ke[86] ||

1.73. *ity avajñātadeśāder akriyāj*[87] *jagadudbhavaḥ* |
tvatto vivṛttyā[88] *mantavyo na svarūpānyathāsthiteḥ* ||

1.89. *tvānuktvā*[89] *tvatparaṃ*[90] *brūtaḥ*[91] *saṃgatau*[92] *vyāvahārikam* |
……………………………………………………… ||[93]

1.95. *śarīrajo vā śābdo vā manaso*[94] *vā samudgataḥ* |
vyavahāro 'py asau nāsti yatra tvaṃ nātha nāgrataḥ ||

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2.5. *ātmā na meyaḥ kasyāpi tadanyan nopapadyate* |
meyabhedān mānabhedas[95] *tasyābhāve sa kiṃkṛtaḥ* ||

2.6. *ātmā yadi bhaven meyas tasya mātā bhavet paraḥ* |
para ātmā[96] *tadānīṃ syāt sa paro yas tu mīyate* ||

2.8. *svīkāro viṣayīkāraḥ sa tatrodghoṣyate budhaiḥ* |
yad anyatra prasiddhaṃ tat saṃvidaḥ kim apohyate[97] ||

2.9. *saṃvidāsvīkṛtaṃ*[98] *yac ca na tad viṣayasaṃjñitam* |

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[84] *yat* ABC, *sat* EV.

[85] °*paricchittyai* ABC, °*paricchinnais* EV.

[86] *nu ke* BC, *na ke* A , *na vai* EV.

[87] *ity avajñātadeśāder akriyāj* ABC, *ity eva jñātadeśāder akriyā*° EV.

[88] *vivṛttyā* ABC, *vivṛtyā* EV.

[89] *tvānuktvā* conj., *tvām uktvā* ABCEV.

[90] *tvat*° conj., *tat*° ABCEV.

[91] *brūtaḥ* ABC, *brūmaḥ* EV.

[92] *saṃgatau* BC, *saṃghatau* A, *sadgatau* EV.

[93] An *ardhaśloka* likely to have been omitted here.

[94] *manaso* AC, *manaso* corrected to *mānaso* B, *mānaso* EV (cit. SpPr, p.10 *mānaso*, and all mss.).

[95] *meyabhedān mānabhedas* ABC, *meyabhedātmāno bhedas* EV.

[96] *para ātmā* ABC, *parānyātmā* EV.

[97] *apohyate* AEV, *apodyate* C, *apodyate* corrected to *apohyate* B.

yatsvīkṛtaṃ[99] *tadātmaiva viṣayoktiḥ kva*[100] *tiṣṭhatām* ‖
2.17. *saṃbandhaḥ siddhayor nāsti nairākāṅkṣyeṇa vṛttitaḥ* |
nāsiddhayor asattvena tenāsau syān na vastutaḥ ‖
2.22ab. *nirastakartṛbhāveṣu*[101] *karaṇatvādyasaṃbhavaḥ*[102] |
……………………………………………………………… ‖
2.32. *paravyavasthāpi pare yāvan nātmīkṛtaḥ paraḥ* |
tāvan na śakyate kartuṃ yato buddhaḥ paraḥ paraḥ ‖
2.35. *yathendriyair vinābhūtaṃ*[103] *viṣayair apy anāvilam* |
svataḥ prakāśate jñānaṃ viṣayo naivam iṣyate ‖
2.36. *tatrāhur*[104] *viṣayajñaptyai yat pramāṇatrayaṃ pṛthak* |
pṛthagviṣayasaṃyogān na tad abhyeti vedanam ‖
2.37. *sākṣāt samakṣadhīr arthāt saṃbandhād anumānadhīḥ* |
te mūlam āgamasyāhur iti nānyapramodbavaḥ ‖
2.38. *trayāṇām api mānānāṃ pratibhāprāṇateṣyate* |
samyaṅmithyātvanirṇīter anyathānupapattitaḥ ‖
2. 39. *svavittir eva pratibhā kartavyeṣv akramātmikā*[105] |
nirmalā kathitā tajjñair yayā jīvanti jantavaḥ ‖
2.44. *jñāne 'py antaḥpraviṣṭasya bhāvasya yadi bāhyatā*[106] |
jñānād eva tadā bāhyaṃ svam idānīṃ kim ucyatām ‖
2.45. *athāpraviṣṭo*[107] *vijñānaṃ sattāsya jñāyate kutaḥ* |
jñānasyaivādhikāro 'sti[108] *sadasanmārgaṇe yataḥ* ‖
2.54. *anapekṣā satāṃ siddher asiddher api nāsatām* |

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[98] EV read *saṃvidā svīkṛtaṃ* (also possible).

[99] *yat°* em., *tat°* ABC, *tat* EV.

[100] *kva* BCEV, *ku* A.

[101] *°bhāveṣu* ABC, *°bhāve tu* EV.

[102] *karaṇatva°* BC, *kāraṇatva°* AEV.

[103] EV read *vinā bhūtam*.

[104] *tatrāhur* ABC, *tatrāṅga°* EV.

[105] *°ṣv akrama°* em., *°ṣu krama°* ABCEV.

[106] *bāhyataḥ* corrected to *bāhyatā* B, *bāhyataḥ* ACEV.

[107] *athāpraviṣṭo* AC, *athāpravaṣṭo* B, *arthāpraviṣṭaṃ* EV.

[108] *'sti* ABEV, *'pi* C.

nirapekṣeṣu bhāveṣu na mātṛtvaṃ na meyatā ∥

2.56. *prakāśate saṃvid ekā tadanyat tu prakāśyate ∣*

prakāśyaṃ[109] *ca bhavet karma tac ca kartrā*[110] *vinā katham ∥*

2.58. *vastusthityā na bando 'sti tadabhāvān*[111] *na muktatā ∣*

vikalpaghaṭitāv etāv ubhāv api na kiṃcana ∥

<p align="center">*</p>

4.78cd. *tathā hy ukto madduhitrā*[112] *vāmadevyā haristutau ∥*

<p align="center">*</p>

5.26. *vāg evāsyāḥ kāraṇaṃ viśvavṛtter nyāyyaṃ*[113] *caitan nāgamaḥ kevalo 'yam ∣*

nāsaṃkalpaṃ kiṃcid astīha kāryaṃ vācaṃ vinā na vikalpo 'sti kaścit ∥

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[109] *prakāśyaṃ* A, *prakāśye* BCEV.

[110] *kartrā* AEV, *kartā* BC.

[111] *tadabhāvān* ACEV, *tadā bhāvan* B.

[112] *tathā hy ukto madduhitrā* AB, *tathādyuktaṃ madduhitryā* EV.

[113] *nyāyyaṃ* em. (cf. EV), *nyāyaṃ* A (*nyāyyaṃ* cit. SpPr, p. 9; the mss. oscillate between *nyāyaṃ* and *nyāyyaṃ*).

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Theatre, Acting
and the Image of the Actor
in Abhinavagupta's Tantric Sources[*]

JUDIT TÖRZSÖK

A considerable number of Sanskrit plays that depict *śaiva* tantric practitioners have been subject to detailed analysis to obtain more information about tantric currents in classical India. This is perhaps particularly true for *kāpālika*s, who figure conspicuously in several classical plays.[1] This paper proposes to look at the question the other way round and show how *śaiva* tantric sources use theatrical terms and the image of the actor and how they incorporate theatre or some form of acting in their rituals. For, rather surprisingly, a number of *śaiva* tantric passages show awareness of the classical theatrical tradition and theory of drama. I shall focus on sources available to Abhinavagupta, whose major works treat theoretical questions concerning both tantra and drama. In fact, Abhinavagupta himself is the most important link between these two areas, for he is an exceptional author in that he produced original and influential works on both subjects. It is to be hoped that by studying points of contact between these fields we shall better understand the intellectual history of Kashmir in the early middle ages

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1   For some general information and debate on the identity of *kāpālika*s, see SANDERSON 2011 and TÖRZSÖK 2011. The most important and well-known classical plays studied in this context are Mahendravikramavarman's *Mattavilāsaprahasana* and Bhavabhūti's *Mālatīmādhava*.

and the cultural background in which Abhinavagupta wrote his masterpieces.

In what follows, I shall first look at some examples of how dance is used in imagery and ritual, for, although dancing and acting cannot be identified, they often overlap in the Indian tradition, and dance forms an integral part of Indian theatre. After this partial detour, I shall analyse the image of the actor (*naṭa*) in scriptures (*tantra*s/*āgama*s) as well as in some exegetical works and attempt to understand the theoretical implications it entails in different contexts. This analysis is followed by a presentation of ritual observances, *vrata*s, which may involve some form of role playing. While the mere identification of the practitioner with the deity cannot be called role playing, the vocabulary used in these *vrata*s (e.g. *nepathya* for the costume to be worn, *rasa* for the dominant sentiment) often evokes the world of theatre. Finally, a short passage prescribing the offering of a dramatic representation (*nāṭaka*) is focused on.

1. SETTING THE MOOD: DANCING DEITIES, DANCING DEVOTEES

Śiva's association with theatre and dance[2] is a commonplace. The appearance of dancing forms of Śiva is also unexceptional in tantras and cannot be taken to bear any significance in itself. However, a pantheon in which dancing deities figure prominently, especially if they are described using some technical terms, may reflect a closer acquaintance with dancing and acting, or at least shows an attempt to associate such deities with the actual art. Similarly, it is

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[2]   Here, I only wish to point out that I do not intend to discuss the concept and treatment of dance and theatre as overlapping but distinct notions in the Indian tradition. The terminology in Sanskrit is often ambiguous, or rather, the inseparable nature of the two is also reflected in that it is often not possible to translate certain terms as either denoting pure dance or pure theatre. For a detailed discussion of the terms *nṛtta, nāṭya* and *nṛtya*, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 408ff. It must be remarked that these distinctions may not always be applied systematically in the non-technical literature (when dealing with the goddess Naṭṭeśvarī/Nāṭyeśvarī, shall we translate her name as "Mistress of Dance" or "Mistress of Theatre"?). Nevertheless, in what follows, it is mainly the role of dance that is discussed in Part 1, before turning to acting and theatre proper (Parts 2-4), an order which reproduces (unintentionally) Bharata's order of discussion (whose internal logic is pointed out in BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 96).

also prescribed sometimes that practitioners themselves should dance. Such dance may simply indicate happiness metaphorically, as, for instance, when the practitioner dances "out of joy" – these instances are irrelevant in the present context. It is, however, also enjoined occasionally that he should worship the deity with dancing, and, at least in some instances, his dance appears to conform (or is supposed to conform) to rules of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (henceforth NŚ). Although the presence of these dancing deities and devotees may not have a direct bearing on how theatre is perceived or represented in the tantras, they form a background that cannot be neglected.

A Pantheon of Dancing Goddesses

The *Jayadrathayāmala* (henceforth JY)[3] in particular mentions a number of dancing Kālīs, whose description sometimes evokes more than just their association with Śiva destroying the universe at the end of each cosmic aeon. In the following passage, reference seems to be made to the various styles of poetic or dramatic composition (*vṛtti*) and "the power of speech" or "command of language" (*vāgvibhava*) is also mentioned.

> *naumi kālīṃ karālāsyāṃ pradhānāvaṇibhakṣyaṇī[ṃ]*[4] ‖
> *krīḍārthaṃ yā kare citrabrahmāṇḍārbudamālikam* |
> *etā[ṃ] natvā pravakṣyāmi rahasyam idam adbhutam* ‖
> *na mayā kasyacit khyātaṃ tvadṛte surasundari* |
> *sarvapralayasaṃsthāne jagad etat samāharet* ‖
> *narttanti*[5] *ghoracaṇḍākṣī vṛttirājavilāyakī* |
> *sā kalākālanilayā tasyāṃ kālaḥ pralīyate* ‖
> *cidacidvyaktimadhyasthā sā mahābhairavātmikā* |
> *anasyutā*[6] *vāgvibhave prajñāyogagatā yadā* ‖
> *tadā yogeśvarī jñeyā sarvakālīśvareśvarī* | (2.17.772cd-777ab)

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[3] I am grateful to Olga Serbaeva for making her e-text of the JY available to me.

[4] Letters or syllables in square brackets have been added by the present author.

[5] I have left this form as it stands in the MS, for it is unclear whether it is meant to be an irregular verb form (for *nṛtyati*, which would create an unmetrical *pāda*) or a present participle (for *nṛtyantī*).

[6] This is meant to stand for the adjective *anasūyā*. Given that *anasūyā* is almost always used as a noun, the author(s) may have preferred creating a form which resembles a past participle ending with *-ta*.

> I pay obeisance to Kālī,[7] whose mouth is gaping wide, who devours *pra-kṛti* and the earth [i.e. the universe from the *tattva* of Earth up to *prakṛti*] and who [holds] a colourful garland of ten million eggs of Brahmā in her hand,[8] to play with. After paying obeisance to her, I shall explain this miraculous secret. I have never told it to anyone apart from you, o beautiful goddess. When the dissolution of everything takes place, she withdraws this world, dancing, with terrible and frightening eyes, destroying[9] the King of [Poetic] Styles.[10] Time/Death and energy[11] reside in her, and time dissolves in her. She stands between the manifestation of consciousness and non-consciousness, she is of the nature of Mahābhairava/ of a very frightening nature. When she practices her [transcendental] wisdom/when she is absorbed in [transcendental] wisdom, without envying the power of speech [of anyone], she is known as Yogeśvarī, the ruler of all Kālī rulers.

However, rather than using the *vṛtti*s and linguistic skills as tools, this Kālī does not appear to need them: she destroys the King of Styles and does not envy [anybody's] power of speech. The image suggests that her knowledge is beyond what can be expressed ver-

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[7] I do not comment on particularities of tantric or Aiśa Sanskrit here, unless they result in problems of interpretation.

[8] Alternatively: she [holds] a garland of hundreds of millions of parts [which form] the manifold egg of Brahmā. In both interpretations, emphasis is laid on the fact that she holds the world in her hand, to play with.

[9] Lit. "who makes him dissolve." However, it is likely that she is visualized as trampling on a male figure, as is common in visualisations and iconography.

[10] The compound *vṛttirāja* could be interpreted in other ways, for instance as the King of Existence/Subsistence. However, a passage from the *Kubjikāmata* (6.29-33), in which this word also figures, suggests that a *vṛttirāja* possesses mastery of poetic and śāstric composition: *anena jñātamātreṇa pratyayān kurute bahūn | vṛttirājā varārohe niveśya cakramadhyataḥ || vṛttihīnas tatas tatra kāvyakartā na saṃśayaḥ | cakramadhye ca sañcintya suśuklāṃ ca parāparām || pustakavyagrahastāṃ ca jñānamudrādharāṃ tathā | sphāṭikenākṣasūtreṇa sarvābharaṇabhūṣitām || ... udgirantī[ṃ] mahaughena śāstrakoṭīr anekaśaḥ | evaṃ dhyānasamāviṣṭaḥ sākṣād vāgīśvaro bhavet ||.* For the place and importance of the four *vṛtti*s in the context of drama, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1995. It is also possible that both meanings are intended: being beyond what can be expressed, she tramples on the King of Styles, and representing Time and Death, she crushes the King of Existence.

[11] The word *kalā* can be interpreted in several ways in tantric contexts and it may also be used here to achieve a certain poetic effect. Apart from "energy" it could also denote "limited power to act" or "principle(s) constituting the universe" etc., see the entry *kalā* in TAK II.

bally, and her performance cannot be controlled by the prescribed rules.

While it may be forced to see allusions to aesthetic experience and theatre in the descriptions of various dancing Kālīs,[12] it may be of some interest to point out the existence of a so-called "Dancer-Goddess": Naṭṭeśvarī[13] or Nāṭyeśvarī. At least three *śaiva* sources mention this goddess,[14] whose name appears alternatively as Naṭṭe-śvarī (JY chapter 4.64), Nāṭeśvarī (*Agnipurāṇa* 1.50.32b) and Nā-ṭyeśvarī (*Pratiṣṭhālakṣaṇasārasamuccaya* 6.171).[15] The earliest source, the JY, clearly names her Naṭṭeśvarī[16] and describes her as a dancing goddess dominating the cycle of withdrawal (*saṃhāra-cakra*) and wearing bone ornaments or being skeleton-like (*karaṅ-kiṇī*). The other two sources first identify her with Cāmuṇḍā (*ru-dra-cāmuṇḍā*), suggesting that she has this name because she holds severed heads (*śiras/muṇḍa*); but they also give her the name Na-ṭeśvarī or Nṛtyatī, apparently because she also holds a *ḍamaru* drum.[17] In all these sources, she seems to be the female equivalent

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[12] One of them may still be worth mentioning, for it uses the word *rasa*, although it is possible that no allusion to the term *rasa* describing aesthetic experience is meant: *kālī karālā kalanapratṛptā cakrakṣayākāramahograrūpā ‖ narttanti sarvagrasanodbhaṭākṣī kṣībā parānandarasāsavena ǀ* (JY 2.5.15cd-16ab)."The terrible Kālī has been satisfied by seizing (*kal-*) [the world], has the very fierce form of the destruction of the multitude [of the world]/of the wheel [of time/of deities] (*cakra*), she is dancing with eyes eager to devour the universe and drunken with the nectar (*rasa*) of supreme joy." As suggested by Lyne Bansat-Boudon (personal communication), both meaning of *rasa* may be used here: intoxicating liquor and aesthetic enjoyment; similarly to *Para-mārthasāra* (henceforth PS) 79-80 (for which see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRI-PATHI 2011, pp. 265-270).

[13] The word *naṭṭa-* seems to come from Middle Indic *ṇaṭṭa-*, which can be derived from *naṭa, nṛtya* or *nāṭya*, cf. the entry *naṭṭa-* in the *Pāia-sadda-mahaṇṇa-vo* (SHETH 1928). Judging from the Sanskrit forms, the last derivation may be the most likely.

[14] These parallels have been pointed out by Olga Serbaeva in her personal notes to the e-text of the JY.

[15] The last of these sources was certainly not available to Abhinavagupta, but it includes a close parallel to the *Agnipurāṇa* passage.

[16] *evaṃ tava samākhyātā nāmnā naṭṭeśvarī śivā* 4.64.36cd; and the name also figures in the colophon.

[17] This appears to be the implication in the following verse: *sā caivāṣṭabhujā devī śiroḍamarukānvitā ǀ tena sā rudracāmuṇḍā naṭeśvary atha nṛtyatī ‖ Agni-purāṇa* 1.50.31cd-32ab.

of Śiva destroying the universe as the Lord of Dance (*naṭeśa*).[18]

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Dancing as an Offering in Pretantric

and Tantric Worship

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The act of dancing can be part of prescribed *śaiva* worship, at least from the *pāśupata*s onwards. The first passage to prescribe the offering of dancing is perhaps the well-known *Pāśupatasūtra* (henceforth PSū)[19] 1.8: "One should serve [the Lord] with the offerings of laughing, dancing, making the sound *huḍuk*, making obeisance and mantra recitations."[20] However, such an offering was probably not a *pāśupata* oddity for it is also to be found in lay contexts, in the *Skandapurāṇa* for instance. To cite but one example (26.37), when people of Benares worship the *gaṇa* Nikumbha, they also sing and dance, among other things:

> Some did pilgrimage, others undertook fasts, fire rituals, mantra recitations, yet others, wishing their desire to be fulfilled, performed worship, or made offerings,[21] yet some others offered songs and dances.[22]

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[18] Let us remark here that while the South Indian bronze image of a gracefully dancing Śiva has always dominated Western secondary literature, the earliest North Indian images of the dancing Śiva (from the 6th-7th centuries CE) seem to be bhairavic forms, carrying perhaps a skull-staff, such as the famous image (the west panel of the north entrance) in Elephanta (see e.g. COLLINS 1988, p. 24 and BURGESS 1871, p. 41).

[19] The date of this text is uncertain, as is that of its commentator, Kauṇḍinya. The latter's dating, based on scanty evidence, is usally given between 400 and 600 CE, while the founder of the *pāśupata* movement, Lakulīśa, may have lived near the beginning of the Christian era (see e.g. HARA 2002, pp. 198-199). Inscriptions confirm that *pāśupata*s were actively involved in public religion by the fourth century CE (see e.g. RĀMESH AND TEWARI 1990, pp. 4ff. and 21ff.)

[20] *hasitagītanṛttahuṃḍuṃkāranamaskārajapyopahāreṇopatiṣṭhet.* The odd word to be pronounced, which resembles the bull's cry according to Kauṇḍinya, is written in different forms *ḍuṃduṃ, huṃḍuṃ, huḍuṃ, huḍuk* in various sources. For a discussion, see HARA 2002, p. 216 and ACHARYA 2013.

[21] Note that here, *upahāra* clearly seems to refer to offerings, unlike in the PSū passage, at least if we follow Kauṇḍinya's interpretation. Dancing and singing is a very commonly cited *śaiva* way of worship from the earliest tantras onwards, see for instance, the way in which various semi-divine beings worship Śiva in *Niśvāsa Mūla* 1.4-6: *kecit stunvanti deveśaṃ kecin nṛtyanti cāgrataḥ | kecid gāyanti hṛṣṭās tu kecit praṇatamūrdhabhiḥ || kecid ramanti gāyanti kecit puṣpaṃ kṣipanti ca | kecid dhyāyanti niratā vādyaṃ vādyanti cāpare || siṃha-*

Turning back to *pāśupata* worship which includes singing and dancing, it seems to have been adopted and adapted in *śākta* tantric scriptural sources, such as the *Brahmayāmala* (henceforth BY) and the JY, often in sections concerning the *vidyāvrata* or *pūrvasevā*, the preliminary observance preceding *sādhana* proper.[23] However, occasionally it also pops up in other contexts in which one may not expect it to appear, such as in the following passage of the JY (2.17.252-8), in which it is integrated into a standard invocation of *yoginī*s that does not commonly involve such *pāśupata*-like elements.

> *atha melāpasaṃsiddho vidhānam idam ārabhet* |
> *vīrabhūmau*[24] *vīravapu*[ḥ] *smṛtim āsādya śobhanām*[25] ‖
> *tatpratāpaprajaptāṅgo palālipravipūritaḥ* |
> *stabdhātmā devadeveśīṃ japet saptaśatāni tu* ‖
> *yāvat tāvad devadevya āgacchanti samantataḥ* |
> *nānārūpadharā bhīmā madaghūrṇitalocanā*[ḥ][26] ‖
> *dṛṣṭ*[v]*ā vāmāṅgasaṃbhūtam*[27] *argham āsāṃ prakalpayet* |
> *datte* [']*rghe tāḥ pranṛtyanti mahātumulanādinaiḥ*[28] ‖
> *huḍukkārādivādyaiś*[29] *ca karavaktre kṛtair api* |
> *tāsāṃ sārddham ato nartte*[n] *mahātāṇḍavayogataḥ* ‖
> *nṛttyamānaḥ sādhakendraḥ khetalaṃ yānti vegataḥ* |
> *tābhiḥ sārddhaṃ rājamānas*[30] *tārābhir iva candramā* ‖
> *vaset kalpakṣayaṃ yāvad bahubhogabharāvṛtaḥ* |
> *paryante devadeveśyā dehe nirvāṇam ety*[31] *asau* ‖

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nādaṃ pramuñcanti garjante hy utpatanti ca | *hasante kilakilāyante nityapramuditendriyāḥ* ‖.

[22] *cakrur yātrās tathā kecid upavāsāṃs tathāpare* | *homaṃ japyaṃ tathaivānye pūjāṃ cānye varārthinaḥ* | *upahārāṃs tathaivānye gītanṛttaṃ tathāpare* |. Note that the NŚ (37.29) itself also attests that theatre was considered an offering to the gods: in fact, the text claims that they preferred it to garlands and incense (cited in BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 57-58).

[23] See e.g. BY 21.

[24] *vīrabhūmau* conj. : *cīrabhūmair* MS.

[25] *śobhanām* em. : *śobhanāt* MS.

[26] °*ghūrṇita*° em. : °*ghūrmita*° MS.

[27] *vāmāṅga*° conj. : *nāmāṅga*° MS.

[28] Understand or emend °*nādinaiḥ* to °*nādanaiḥ*.

[29] *huḍuk*° conj. : *huhuk*° MS.

[30] *rājamānas* em. : *rājapānas* MS.

[31] *ety* em. : *aty* MS.

> The practitioner who is successful in meeting *yoginī*s should undertake
> the following rite. On a ground prescribed for heroes, having the body of
> a hero, he must mentally recite his auspicious [mantras], and having em-
> powered his body by their force, being filled with meat and wine, he
> must paralyse his Self and repeat the mantra of the goddess of gods sev-
> en hundred times, until the divine goddesses arrive from all directions.
> They have different forms, are frightening, with their eyes rolling in in-
> toxication. When he sees them, he should prepare a guest offering of
> blood taken from his left arm. After the offering, they will dance and
> shout loudly all around. He must make sounds such as *huḍuk* and the
> like with his hands and mouth; and then he will dance with them, per-
> forming a great *tāṇḍava* dance. The eminent *sādhaka*, while dancing,
> will suddenly fly up in the sky with them as their lord, shining just like
> the moon with the stars. He will then live till the end of a *kalpa* with
> them and enjoy multiple pleasures. In the end, he will reach final libera-
> tion in the body of the goddess of the gods.

The description of worship with dancing, the sound *huḍuk* and the
like clearly echoes PSū 1.8, except that here the practitioner dances
with the *yoginī*s, who are at the same time the objects of worship.
Moreover, the dance is required to be performed *mahātāṇḍavayo-
gataḥ*. The term *tāṇḍava* can have a more or less technical or gen-
eral meaning according to context,[32] and here the short description
does not allow us to determine the intended meaning. It is never-
theless probable that by this potentially technical precision, the
dance prescribed is not simply jumping around in joy, but some-
thing more specific and structured.

The prescription of this structured or choreographed dance
stands in contrast with another prescription of dance in the same
text (albeit in another, independent section). The context of this
passage is different, for what is prescribed is a unique *mudrā*. As
this and other *mudrā*s of the JY show, they are not hand gestures
but more complex performances involving the whole body. Their
aim is to propitiate the deity, to obtain superhuman effects, and/or
to induce possession. The *mudrā* in this case (4.2.407-411) is call-
ed the Mudrā of Dancing (*nṛttamudrā* or *nṛttanī*).

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[32] It can be used in at least two different meanings: 1) Śiva's fierce dance as op-
posed to Pārvatī's graceful (*lāsya*) one (e.g. in NŚ 4.13-16 and *Daśarūpaka*
1.4, for which see also BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 22 and 285); 2) dance in
general (*nṛtta*), see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 96 citing Abhinavagupta on NŚ
4.268: *tāṇḍavam iti sarvaṃ nṛttam ucyate*.

ataḥ paraṃ pravakṣyāmi nṛttanī nāma yā smṛtā |
mudrā sarvārthasampannā sādhakānāṃ mahātmanāṃ ||
unmattā[33] *ca pralāpī syād bālavat krī[ḍate] punaḥ |*
†śiṣṭāla -- pravaddhāni†[34] *mudreṣā samudāhṛtā ||*
tuṣyante devatās tasya deśalābhaś (?) ca jāyate |
bālava[n nṛ]ttanaṅ kuryāt phatkāraravayojanaṃ ||
nṛttanī nāma mudraiṣā sarvalokavaśaṃkarī |
mahāmelāpasaṃsiddhau nāsty asyāḥ sadṛśī priye ||
kim anyad vā samākhyātā vistareṇa sumadhyame |
na sā siddhir ihāstīti yā na vā naiva sidhyati ||
pūrvavīryasamāyuktā sarvākarṣakarī parā ||

I shall now teach you the *mudrā* traditionally called the "dancing one," which has everything an eminent *sādhaka* may desire. One must be intoxicated and babble, play like a child. [...] The deities will be satisfied and one shall obtain regions/places (?).[35] One must dance like a child and shout the sound *phat*[36] – this dancing *mudrā* will subjugate everybody. There is nothing comparable to it for obtaining an encounter with *yoginī*s, o my Beloved. What else shall I explain about it in more detail, o Beautiful Goddess? There is no supernatural effect that could not be obtained with it. This supreme *mudrā* has the power previously described and attracts everybody.

The dance prescribed is explicitly an unstructured, "child-like" one, although it also leads to encounter with *yoginī*s and is considered to be an offering, by which the deities will be propitiated.

The presence of wild, child-like or madman-like dancing on the one hand (*unmatta* above in 4.2.407-411) and that of more controlled or structured dance offerings on the other (*mahātāṇḍava* in

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[33] This may be corrupt for *unmatto* with a Middle Indic *-o* ending; or perhaps the word *mudrā* mentioned in the previous line attracted the feminine form here.

[34] Cruxes are enclosed by cross signs.

[35] This compound does not seem common and one feels tempted to conjecture something more usual such as *dravyalābha* (obtaining things), *dhanalābha* (obtaining wealth), *dhānyalābha* (obtaining grains/corn) or possibly *veśalābha* (gaining entry into someone or something). Alternatively, *deśalābha* could stand for *upadeśalābha* (obtaining instruction) or *samāveśalābha* (obtaining possession). If *deśalābha* is retained, it could perhaps also mean 'obtaining a country/countries', something that may be promised to kings. Finally, it could also mean the supernatural power of reaching a place (in an instant), but this magical power is not normally expressed in this way.

[36] Perhaps this is corrupt for the more wide-spread mantric syllable *phaṭ*.

the preceding passage of 2.17.256), which occur in different parts of the JY, raises the question as to what kind of dance the *pāśupata* version was originally meant to be.

While the *sūtra*s themselves do not help to answer this question, Kauṇḍinya does deal with the problem. His text reads:

> And dancing is performed without being attached to the conventions of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (*nāṭyaśāstrasamayānabhiṣvaṅgeṇa*), with [various] movements: throwing up or down hands and feet, contracting or extending them, moving without stopping.[37]

This is also how singing is understood to be performed by Kauṇḍinya: without attachment to the rules of the Science of music.[38]

However, at this crucial point, there is also an alternative manuscript reading concerning the use of the NŚ: *nāṭyaśāstrasamayānusāreṇa*, "according to the rules of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*." This reading was adopted by HARA 2002. According to HARA 2002, p. 216, even the reading *anabhiṣvaṅgena* (in the case of singing) should refer to conformity to śāstric prescriptions, which is nevertheless doubtful. What *anabhiṣvaṅga* could possibly denote is that dancing and singing are performed *without* applying the rules in a very strict manner.

More light may be shed on the question if Kauṇḍinya's description or gloss on *nṛtta* is better understood. HARA 2002 (p. 216) takes the upward and other movements (*utkṣepaṇādi*) to denote the five types of motion and refers to *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.6,[39] whose list

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[37] *nṛttam api nāṭyaśāstrasamayānabhiṣvaṅgeṇa hastapādādīnām utkṣepaṇam avakṣepaṇam ākuñcanam prasāraṇaṃ calanam anavasthānam.* While the four elements *utkṣepaṇam, avakṣepaṇam, ākuñcanam, prasāraṇaṃ* must be construed with 'hands, feet etc.', the last two words cannot. I understand them to add a more general element of the definition of dance, namely the fact that it implies moving without stopping. I thank Prof. Eli Franco for calling my attention to the problem here, although his understanding is slightly different from mine in that he takes *anavasthānam* to qualify all the other movements. Note that the *Daśarūpaka* defines dance itself (*nṛtta*) as being "various ways of throwing the limbs" (*gātravikṣepa*, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 408-409). This dance must, of course, conform to rules (cf. NŚ, cg. 4 and BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 40).

[38] *gāndharvaśāstrasamayānabhiṣvaṅgena.* The term *gāndharva(śāstra)* refers in particular to the teaching of the NŚ on music, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 193ff.

[39] This is cited as 1.1.7 by Hara, but editions of the text commonly number this *sūtra* as 1.1.6, including Jambuvijayaji's edition used by Hara.

indeed agrees with Kauṇḍinya's on the whole. What this betrays is not that Nāṭyaśāstric rules must be applied (as Hara takes it), but rather that Kauṇḍinya was not concerned at all with Nāṭyaśāstric conformity here – he allows the devotee's dance to involve any kind of movement. He allows similar freedom for singing, which does not conform to Gāndharvaśāstra and can be in Sanskrit or Prakrit, of the practitioner's own composition or someone else's. In fact, he even specifies ad loc. that for the sake of the observance, dancing (*nṛtta*) is to be performed together with singing.[40] Thus, unlike in a proper performance, the practitioner here acts as singer and dancer at the same time.[41]

From the *pāśupata*'s dance, the dancing *mudrā* and the dancing goddesses, the conclusion one can draw is that the dances described do not normally appear to conform to śāstric norms. The dance of the goddesses is meant to express their total freedom, which is not determined by śāstric prescriptions. This "wild dance" is in turn probably what is imitated by the dancing devotees, whether *pāśupata* or *śākta*, in order to strengthen their identity with the deity[42] and/or to enact possession by them (in the case of the *mudrā* at least). Accordingly, they may involve any kind of movement and are compared to the uncontrolled behaviour of children or madmen. However, one may occasionally encounter a more structured type of dance when the practitioner invokes *yoginī*s. Dancing with *yoginī*s seems to require a more controlled performance – perhaps so that the practitioner should remain the controller of these female powers, rather than abandon himself to them (and thus become their play-thing, *paśu*).

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[40] *niyamakāle niyamārthe geyasahakṛtaṃ nṛttaṃ prayoktavyam.*

[41] Unless we assume that he asks someone else to sing for him, which is highly unlikely. However, the two may not be performed simultaneously.

[42] On this idea in the *pāśupata* case, see HARA 2002, pp. 216ff.

2. LIKE AN ACTOR (*NAṬAVAT*)

One Actor Playing Many Roles[43]

More relevant to our investigation is the image of the actor (*naṭa*), who often figures in various comparisons. The most famous one, which also brings out several details of the image, is perhaps to be found in the *Śivasūtra*s (henceforth ŚS): the Self is an actor, the subtle body (*puryaṣṭaka*) is the stage and the sense organs are the spectators. As the commentaries further explain, the Self is identical with the godhead or consciousness (*cit*), who enacts a play, which is the phenomenal world. The roles he takes up are the limited individual subjects. Thus, the image, which is very wide-spread in different writings of Kashmirian nondualist Śaivism, conveniently explains the way in which one god or one soul becomes manifested as many.

This ontological image takes on an epistemological aspect in the writings of the exegetes. For the roles of the actor there, instead of being aspects of the phenomenal world, are identified with various philosophical and theological schools. This is the case in Kṣemarāja's *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* (henceforth PH) 8, in which the roles of the actor/consciousness are identified with the points of view of various schools[44] from the Cārvākas at the lowest level up to the Trika at the highest. The image relies on the same idea of representing how the One becomes many, but with a different emphasis: the One, which is perfect and omniscient, takes up various, imperfect forms which have limited knowledge. Consequently, in Kṣemarāja's description, various schools are further identified with the various, hierarchically arranged ontological principles or *tattva*s, from *buddhi* (representing several *darśana*s) up to Sadāśiva (grammarians following Bhartṛhari) for non-*śaiva* systems, with *śaiva*s being situated above them.

The idea of placing various religious systems in the hierarchy of *tattva*s seems to come from a scriptural source, as Kṣemarāja himself points out. The unidentified citation given by Kṣemarāja and

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[43]   For another usage of the actor analogy, see Lyne Bansat-Boudon's article in this volume, in which she examines *Tantrāloka* (henceforth TĀ) 1.332 and the commentary thereon.

[44]   *tadbhūmikāḥ sarvadarśanasthitayaḥ.* On this passage and its commentary, see also BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 160, n. 689.

starting with "Buddhists are at the level of intellect (*buddhi*)" appears in slightly different forms in several exegetical works. The hierarchy it expresses is, however, the same: Buddhists are at the level of the intellect (*buddhi*), Jains are at the level of the [three] material strands of existence (*guṇa*),[45] at the top of the *guṇa*s are the Sāṃkhyas, the Pāñcarātra is placed at the level of the material source of creation (*prakṛti/avyakta*), while the Veda-knowers (perhaps covering both Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta) are at the level of Puruṣa.[46] While the source is scriptural, seeing these systems as Śiva's roles seems to be Kṣemarāja's contribution to the idea. Kṣemarāja also includes several more systems into his account, which is another significant innovation.[47]

In addition to Śiva's roles being identified with schools, Kṣemarāja also hints at a further series of identifications between these schools and the sets of cognizing subjects (*pramātṛ*).[48] For in Kṣemarāja's above account, the Sāṃkhya and (some unidentified) others are said to be attached to the level (*bhūmi*) of the *vijñānakala*s. The *vijñānakala*s or *vijñānākala*s form a group of cognizing subjects who are "inert in gnosis" (SANDERSON 1986, p. 191), and are only tainted with the *āṇavamala* (impurity of believing one's self to be limited). They are one of the (usually) seven groups of cognizing subjects (*pramātṛ*). The identification of Śiva's roles and the seven cognizing subjects is brought out in Kṣemarāja's *Spandanirṇaya* 1.1.:

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[45] Note that *guṇa* or the *guṇa*s are not usually included in the standard list of *tattva*s, but they do figure among them in some scriptures, see the entry *guṇa* in TAK II.

[46] The longest version of the quote is in *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 3.80: *buddhitattve sthitā bauddhā guṇeṣu tv arhatāḥ sthitāḥ | guṇamūrdhni sthitāḥ sāṃkhyā avyakte pāñcarātrikāḥ | sthitā vedavidaḥ puṃsi...* The *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (henceforth ĪPVV), vol. III, p. 98, gives only *buddhitattve sthitā bauddhā avyakte pāñcarātrikāḥ*, while Jayaratha ad TĀ 6.151 omits the Sāṃkhya: *buddhitattve sthitā bauddhā guṇeṣv apy ārhatāḥ sthitāḥ | sthitā vedavidaḥ puṃsi tv avyakte pāñcarātrikāḥ ‖*. On the different conceptions of the Self, see also PS 33 (BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 169-173 and 338-342).

[47] In particular the inclusion of Bhartṛhari, who does not figure in the scriptural version at all, but who is placed very high in Kṣemarāja's hierarchy. On the importance of Bhartṛhari for Kashmirian nondualist Śaivism, see e.g. TORELLA 2008 and 2013, pp. 465ff. See also a possible reference to Bhartṛhari in PS 27 (in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI, p. 157, n. 675).

[48] For discussions of the seven *pramātṛ*s, see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 330ff and VASUDEVA 2004, pp. 151ff.

> By his power of absolute freedom, the glorious Great Lord assumes [on the subjective level] the cognitive roles of Śiva, the Mantramaheśvaras, the Mantreśvaras, the Mantras, the Vijñānākalas, the Pralayākalas and the Sakalas[, whereas, on the objective level,] he assumes the roles [of the objects that are] made known thereby. (Transl. BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 331.)

A similar idea appears in Kṣemarāja's disciple's, Yogarāja's commentary on Abhinavagupta's PS.[49]

Although it is in Kṣemarāja's works that the epistemological aspect of Śiva's "roles" appears in the foreground, something of this shift is perceptible already in Abhinavagupta's TĀ 4.29ff. Without using the image of Śiva as actor, Abhinavagupta speaks of various theological and philosophical currents (*vaiṣṇava*s, *vedāntin*s, *vaibhāṣika*s) as being at different levels of the cognizing subject (*pramātṛ*),[50] in particular at the double level of *pralayākala*s ("those inert in dissolution"), which comprises *prāṇapramātṛ*s (those conceiving the self as inner breath) and *śūnyapramātṛ*s (those conceiving the self as void). In the same passage, he also cites the (lost) *Kāmika* and points out that the Sāṃkhya, Pāñcarātra, Buddhists and Jains are tainted by limited knowledge (*vidyā*) and passion (*rāga*), as well as by *niyati*. He gives us only a cursory account of where different schools are placed in the hierarchy of the universe and the cognizing subjects and does not elaborate on the question further; this short passage is nevertheless enlightening not only because of the placement of rival theories in the scheme of cognizing subjects, but also because of the context of this placement. For after explaining that all those following a [false, *asat*] master of these rival schools of thought are fettered by Māyā, he goes on to say that thanks to the practice of right reasoning (*sattarkayogena*), such a person will be led to a true master (*sadguru*). To support this, he cites *Mālinīvijayottara* 1.44, but with a slight alteration. The scriptural passage clearly states[51] that turning to the right *guru*

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[49] The hierarchy of schools is expounded in his commentary on Kārikā 27 (see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 152ff). However, the image of the actor appears only elsewhere, in his commentary on Kārikā 1 and 5 (BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 68 and 87ff).

[50] The cognizing subject (*pramātṛ*) and the subject of experience (*bhoktṛ*) is considered to be a knower (*jñātṛ*) in śaivism as well as in other systems, see e.g. VASUDEVA 2014, p. 15.

[51] Note that Abhinavagupta cites the full *śloka* elsewhere (as in 13.202 or 13.249).

is the result of the descent of Rudra's *śakti*.[52] But in Abhinavagupta's description here, the descent of Rudra's power happens *after* such a person has already turned to a true *guru*. Thus, while scripture sees the descent of Śiva's power or his divine grace as the cause of turning to a *śaiva* guru for initiation, Abhinavagupta describes the path taken toward conversion as motivated primarily by reasoning.[53]

In this light, the passage preceding the verses about such a conversion gains more significance. By describing other religious currents in terms of variously limited cognizing subjects, their partial legitimacy is recognized by Abhinavagupta. For these limited ways of cognition can form a ladder to reach true (*śaiva*) cognition – in other words, conversion is possible, and it is possible through right argumentation (*sattarka*), even if one has a different theoretical background.[54]

Thus, it is potential conversion that forms the wider context of presenting religious currents as cognizing subjects in the TĀ. And conversion also seems to be the wider context of Kṣemarāja's PH and Yogarāja's commentary on the PS, in which similar passages are found. For both are short introductory texts, meant to explain the *śaiva* doctrine to those who are not yet initiated into its intrica-

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[52] The verse starts by saying that such a person is *rudraśaktisamāviṣṭo*, possessed by the Power of Rudra.

[53] For the soteriological importance of *tarka* in the Pratyabhijñā, see RATIÉ 2013, pp. 425ff.

[54] Abhinavagupta in fact goes even further than this: he claims that the person who realizes himself the *śaiva* truth or doctrine through right reasoning is superior to others and will have also mastered all the *śāstra*s, again thanks to his true reasoning. Here, he turns his scriptural source upside down again. For the *Mālinīvijayottara* describes someone possessed by *śakti* as suddenly (i.e. miraculously) becoming the master of all *śāstra*s (this is a sign or proof showing that he is really possessed); while Abhinavagupta attributes such knowledge to right reasoning (*sattarka*): *sa samastaṃ ca śāstrārthaṃ sattarkād eva manyate* (4.44cd). Abhinavagupta and his commentator painstakingly point out that when the *Mālinīvijayottara* says that such knowledge appears "suddenly" (*akasmāt*), it must be understood as a way of saying that ordinary people do not see where this knowledge comes from, rather than as really meaning "out of the blue."

cies,[55] therefore both may be used to introduce relative outsiders to
śaiva thought.[56]

Having seen something of the later history of Śiva's or the
Self's roles in the works of Pratyabhijñā authors, it may not be ir-
relevant to look back and identify the possible source of the image
of the actor in theoretical writings. As pointed out above, the earli-
est *śaiva* source for this image, the ŚS, do not contain any refer-
ence to theological schools as roles: the Self is the dancer (*nartaka*)
or perfected actor (*prauḍhanaṭa*, in Bhāskara's gloss), dancing (*nṛ-
tyati*, in Kṣemarāja's commentary) in a play which is the world (*ja-
gannāṭya*), on the inner-self as the stage. The *sūtra*s themselves do
not mention the roles of this actor-dancer. Kṣemarāja does com-

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[55] Even if both texts contain arguments whose real understanding requires one to
     read and understand an impressive corpus, as the richly annotated translation
     of BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011 shows.

[56] According to the introductory part of the PH, Kṣemarāja offers his work to
     those who are simple-minded, without much śāstric sophistication, but who
     desire the "entering into" Śiva, "entering" that the descent of Śiva's Power
     has already started to be bring about (*unmiṣita*). (*ye sukumāramatayo 'kṛtatī-
     kṣṇatarkaśāstrapariśramāḥ śaktipātonmiṣitapārameśvarasamāveśābhilāṣiṇaḥ*
     ...). I understand this reference to "simpletons" (*sukumāramatayaḥ*) to imply
     that he intends to write for a wider public of little learning or insight and in
     particular for those who have been attracted to *śaiva* theology (through a "des-
     cent of *śakti*"), but are unable to guide themselves by their own reasoning
     (Abhinavagupta's *sattarka*) to discover *śaiva* doctrine in a spontaneous way,
     and therefore need guidance in the form of an introductory work. The text
     does not intend to convert those who have no inclination toward śaivism. But
     it tries to draw into śaivism those who have some interest in it, and in this
     sense its purpose is conversion. The PS does not name its target audience.
     However, being the *śaiva* rewriting of an originally *vaiṣṇava* work, it does not
     seem unreasonable to assume that the textual transformation was also intend-
     ed to provide a model for the spiritual one, and that conversion was therefore
     one of the desired effects the work was expected to have. (On this work as the
     rewriting of Ādiśeṣa's original, see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp.
     7ff.) Let us remark here that even Ādiśeṣa's original could be considered a
     "conversion text" to some extent, for, as noted in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRI-
     PATHI 2011, p. 4: "one has the feeling that the questions put by the disciple are
     principally framed in terms of Sāṃkhya, whereas the responses of the teacher
     are usually couched in advaitic terms, even though the latter continues to uti-
     lize (in order to make himself better understood?) several Sāṃkhya concepts."
     A possible conclusion one could draw from this is that the dialogue represents
     the conversion of a Sāṃkhya disciple to nondualist vaiṣṇavism. (Bansat-Bou-
     don in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 4-6, considering the text
     more vedāntic than vaiṣṇava, concludes rather that it represents a transposi-
     tion of dualism into nondualism.)

ment on them but without mentioning the line of reasoning about the roles as limited cognizing subjects. Here, he defines the roles of the Self as having the forms of the states of being awake etc.[57] and thus maintains the image as an ontological one.[58]

It may be difficult to identify the ultimate or earliest source of the image of the actor for the self. It is, however, quite possible that the idea comes from the Sāṃkhya, just as so many other elements in *śaiva* ontology, in spite of the fact that the Sāṃkhya presents it in a dualist system.[59] More precisely, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*s speak of the subtle body taking up different forms or incarnations as an actor/dancer plays different roles:

> Caused in order to fulfill the aim of the Puruṣa/Spirit, and through the power of Prakṛti/Matter, this subtle body (*liṅgam*) [takes up forms] like an actor [takes up roles], which inevitably leads to a causal sequence.[60]

The idea or the comparison may have come from a yet different source. However, the same image is referred to around 700 CE in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (9.66) and it is taken to represent the Sāṃkhya view there. The fact that an outside source, a Buddhist text, mentions this image as that of the Sāṃkhya supports the hypothesis that around 700 CE, this simile was associated with the Sāṃkhya and its arguments.

The passage of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* summarizes the debate between the Sāṃkhya and the Mādhyamaka on the individual soul.

> *tad evānyena rūpeṇa naṭavat so 'py aśāśvataḥ |*
> *sa evānyasvabhāvaś ced apūrveyaṃ tadekatā ||*

> [If you argue] it is the same thing taking on a different form, like an actor [we reply:] he too would not remain permanent. [If you say] it is the

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[57]   *tajjāgarādinānābhūmikāprapañcam.*

[58]   Similarly, Maheśvarānanda follows this line of interpretation. For more details, see COX 2006, pp. 147 ff and 369ff.

[59]   The parallel is remarked in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 68. It must also be noted that the dancer is always female in the Sāṃkhya as opposed to the male one in the *śaiva* system, as Prof. Eli Franco pointed out to me (personal communication).

[60]   *puruṣārthahetukam idaṃ nimittanaimittikaprasaṅgena | prakṛter vibhutvayogān naṭavad vyavatiṣṭhate liṅgam ||* (42). The *Sāṃkhyakārikā*s also use the image of the female dancer (*nartakī*) for *prakṛti* in 59, 65 and 66. However, this usage cannot be the source of inspiration for the *śaiva* version.

same with different natures [we reply] its uniformity is then unprecedented.[61]

The image of the actor is again used to explain the identity of the one and the many, one identity existing behind numerous manifestations in the course of rebirths. In the argument of the Sāṃkhya, it is of course used in the framework of a dualist ontology, to explain the identity of the same soul in different rebirths. In this sense, a major shift occurs when the image is adopted in the ŚS, for there the Self is also the godhead.

To turn back again to Śaivism, when Abhinavagupta uses the image of the actor, although he maintains it as the metaphor of the Lord/Self, playing out the (phenomenal) word as the drama, he elaborates on it with very different details.

sa ca bhramo nāṭyatulyasya aparamārthasato 'tyaktasvarūpāvaṣṭambha-
nanaṭakalpena parameśvaraprakāśena pratītigocarīkṛtasya saṃsārasya
nāyakaḥ sūtradhāraḥ pradhānabhūtaḥ pravartayitā itivṛtte nāyako vā,
yallagnaṃ viśvetivṛttam ābhāti; tata eva prathamaḥ.[62]

And this error [of identifying the body etc. with the subject of experience] is [called] the primary one. For the universe (*viśva*), [which can be identified with] the story of a play (*-itivṛttam*), manifests itself as depending on this leading (*nāyakaḥ*) [error], [just as the story of the play depends on] the Sūtradhāra, who is the main person, being the producer and (*vā*) the protagonist (*nāyaka*) in the story. [In the manner of a Sūtradhāra,] this error leads the world of transmigration (*saṃsārasya*), comparable to a play that is not ultimately true and which is made to be perceptible through the manifestation of the Supreme Lord, who is like an actor (*-naṭakalpena*) firmly relying on his nature he does not abandon.[63]

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[61] I follow the interpretation of Prajñākara's *Ṭīkā* as edited by LA VALLÉE POUSSIN 1898 (p. 300), which agrees with Prof. Eli Franco's suggestions (personal communication). For a different understanding, cf. CROSBY-SKILTON 1996, p. 121: If you argue: it is the same thing taking on a different guise, like an actor. He too does not remain constant. The one thing has different natures. [We respond that] It has an unprecedented kind of uniformity.

[62] ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 244.

[63] See RATIÉ 2011, p. 559: "Et cette illusion (*bhrama*) [consistant à identifier le corps, etc. avec le sujet] est 'première' [selon Utpaladeva] parce que cette intrigue [théâtrale] (*itivṛtta*) qu'est l'univers (*viśva*) se manifeste en reposant [nécessairement] sur le '*nāyaka*' – c'est-à-dire le directeur de la troupe (*sūtradhāra*) qui, [parce qu'il en est le membre] le plus important, est celui qui met en branle l'action, ou le personnage principal de l'intrigue – du cycle des re-

The main point here is not the Lord/Self taking up roles and thus appearing in different ways, although this image is also present in the comparison of the Lord to the actor (*naṭakalpena*). The Sūtra-dhāra, who is both the "impeller" or producer and the protagonist, personifies the error of identifying the self with what it is not. It is thus this error that is responsible for our perception of multiplicity in the world, for the Lord/actor does not abandon his nature even as he plays multiple roles. By introducing the Sūtradhāra as Error personified here, Abhinavagupta keeps the original idea of the Soul/Lord taking up different roles or manifestations, but puts it in an epistemological perspective.

To summarize the changes this allegory of the actor/dancer undergoes in the course of several centuries, without positing a linear chronological development:

1.   The Sāṃkhya uses the image of the actor as standing for the subtle body, which takes up various roles, i.e. various reincarnations. The image is used to express how the one becomes many, in a dualist system, and it is known as such by Buddhist opponents.

2.   The ŚS take over the image, again to explain the transformation of one into many; but it is put in a nondualist context, in which the Self, identified with the godhead, takes up various manifestations, including the phenomenal world.

3.   The philosophical tradition, notably Abhinavagupta, points out that the Supreme Self as the universal subject identical with the godhead manifests itself, with various degrees of limitation, as various cognizing subjects (*pramātṛ*). These limited cognizing subjects are in turn identified with various rival religious currents and their doctrines. This is done in a context that suggests that one can climb up this hierarchy of subjects and reach full understanding of the ultimate (*śaiva*) truth. This implies, as is explicitly stated, that conversion to śaivism through reasoning is possible.

4.   Kṣemarāja synthesizes the image of the ŚS with the theory of the cognizing subjects. He describes the Self/godhead as tak-

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naissances (*saṃsāra*), lequel, semblable à une pièce de théâtre (*nāṭya*), devient objet de cognition [alors qu'il n'est] pas réel au sens ultime, grâce à la manifestation du Seigneur Suprême (*parameśvara*) semblable à un acteur (*naṭa*) qui ne cesse pas de reposer dans sa nature propre [tout en interprétant tel ou tel rôle]."

ing up roles in the form of these cognizing subjects, which are in turn identified with schools of religious thought. Thus, all religious currents and philosophies are seen as lower manifestations of this divine Self. The context of this inclusivistic image remains potential conversion and emphasis is laid on the epistemological rather than the ontological problem the example of the actor represents.

5.   Abhinavagupta himself also introduces an important innovation in the allegory: in addition to the Supreme Lord as actor (*naṭa*), he describes the Sūtradhāra as personifying the main error of the cognizing subject. The Sūtradhāra both participates in the play as the protagonist and directs or produces it, just as this fundamental error of cognition both participates in and puts into motion the world of transmigration. In this way, Abhinavagupta's elaboration provides an epistemic perspective while keeping the heritage of the ŚS.

This outline may well lack many important details and does not by any means have the ambition to write the full history of this image. It may, however, identify some significant changes, no matter how roughly, and provides a starting point to examine the occurrence of the image in *śaiva* scriptural sources available to the Kashmirian exegetes.

The Actor Image in Scriptural Sources

An early text (7th-9th cent. CE) in which several occurrences of the image can be found is the BY. This *śākta* text of the *yoginī* cult evokes the image of the actor to prescribe the way in which the practitioner must see himself. It insists in each case on non-duality – but this non-duality, as pointed out by SANDERSON 1992, p. 306 and as I have shown elsewhere (TÖRZSÖK 2013), refers to nondual practice, i.e. the non-distinction between what is pure and impure from the point of view of orthopraxy, and not to ontological non-duality.

> *evaṃ jñātvā parādvaitaṃ saṃstha[ḥ] syāt sacarācaraṃ |*
> *sādhako [']nilavad yathā krīḍann api na lipyate ‖[64]*
> *aśucitvena deveśi yathārka[ḥ] padmabodhane |*
> *sarvatattvakṛtātmā vai sa prapañcakṛtāspadā ‖*

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[64]   My conjectures. The MS reads *sādhako nilavadyandha krīḍannapi na lipyate*.

naṭavat paśya -m- ātmānaṃ sarvabhakṣaḥ kṛtāntavat |
†*kharave -- yasvato*† *yukta*[*ḥ*] *kāmabhoktṛtvalakṣaṇaḥ* ‖
saṃsakto 'pi na kāmī syā[*'*] *yathā bhāno*[*r*] *didhītayaḥ*[65] |
śāpānugrahakarttāsau sarvaiśvaryapravarttakaḥ ‖
bhuktvā tu vipulān bhogān etad vai tasya lakṣaṇam | (71.95-99ab)[66]

Knowing in this way the world to have this supreme nonduality,[67] the practitioner must be established [in this nonduality]. Just like the wind, he is not tainted by impurity even if he is playing, just as the sun is not tainted when it wakes up the lotuses. His self being made of all the levels of the universe, having the visible universe as his abode, he must see himself as an actor, while consuming everything like death. Even if he is attached [to things] and enjoys the objects of his desires (*kāmabhoktṛtva-lakṣaṇaḥ*), he will not covet anything, just as the rays of the sun [have no attachment to what they touch]. He will bestow his curse or grace and accomplish all acts of power, enjoying multiple pleasures – these will be his traits.

The image of the actor is employed to explain the practitioner's (ritually) nondualist attitude, which is prescribed in almost every chapter of this text. Although he is required to manipulate and consume impure substances, he must not be disgusted or feel impure. He must see himself as an actor in the sense that his real self is outside the reality of the play, which is the world. The same idea is expressed when he is compared to the sun or the rays of the sun and the wind: they can touch anything without being soiled.

This actor image is rather different from that of the Sāṃkhya. It does not intend to explain the dichotomy of the one and the many (as when one actor takes up several roles), but the detachment of the self. In this sense, it is perhaps closest to Abhinavagupta's example involving the Sūtradhāra and emphasizing that the actor/Self is both inside and outside the play/the multiplicity of the world, even if the BY does not describe the godhead but the individual

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[65] The MS reads *dīdhitayaḥ*, which is unmetrical.

[66] Minor corrections I have made to the text are put between square brackets.

[67] This translation attempts to follow the grammatical structure. It is, however, also possible that *sacarācaram* is not the object of *jñātvā*, but is corrupt for or to be understood as a locative ("he should be established in the world knowing supreme nonduality in this way"). The word *sa-* can also be the pronoun or the prefix to *carācara*. The word *saṃsthaḥ* is probably understood in a compound with *parādvaita-* (i.e. *parādvaita-* is to be read twice, once as the object of *jñātvā*, once in compound with *saṃsthaḥ*).

and does not imply or require an underlying nondualist ontology. Similarly, ritual nondualism is referred to in another occurrence (83.169) of the actor simile:

> *advaitabhāvasampannaḥ sarvabhakṣa[ḥ] kṛtāntavat |*
> *naṭavat paśya bhāvena ātmā vai sādhakeśvaraḥ ||*

> Endowed with non-duality and consuming everything like death, the eminent practitioner must see himself with the help of his imagination as an actor.[68]

Although the image itself is different from the actor of the Sāṃkhya, it echoes to some extent the Sāṃkhya idea of the self/Puruṣa as uninvolved witness (*sākṣin*),[69] who does not actively take part in any action, and is therefore never tainted. However, a major difference is that the BY's self actually participates in the action, and in spite of that, remains outside it. In this way, the Self as subject is active but without being involved in action, in a way similar to Abhinavagupta's conception.[70]

The closest early parallel to this view is then not found in the Sāṃkhya, but rather in the PSū (5.20), which insist on the fact that the perfected yogin is not tainted by any *karman* or sin: *siddhayogī*

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[68] I understand *paśya* as an imperative standing for the third person singular, or rather that the second and third persons are used alternatively in the prescription, which is meant for the *sādhaka*. It is also possible that *paśya* stands for *dṛṣṭvā*.

[69] The idea certainly belongs to a kind of pan-Indian heritage or what Torella 1999 calls Sāṃkhya as *sāmānyaśāstra*; Torella mentions on the first page of his paper that the paradigm of spirit-consciousness-inactivity as opposed to matter-unconsciousness-productivity is wide-spread throughout Indian civilization. Vasudeva 2014, p. 10 also mentions that what appears like a borrowing from the Sāṃkhya in Śaivism may often come from other schools which assimilated Sāṃkhya tenets in their own way. It must also be mentioned that Sāṃkhya itself appears in different forms and what appears in tantric sources may well be closer to various versions of what is called epic Sāṃkhya, which is often theistic. On the problem of epic Sāṃkhya, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of the present study, see for instance Brockington 1999, who also points out that some tenets we consider to belong to the Sāṃkhya may have been common currency already by the epic period (Brockington 1999, p. 489). Brockington 1999, p. 485 also mentions that in the *Mokṣadharma* the perceiving self is not the real doer and enjoyer but simply the pure witness-consciousness.

[70] For the experiencer as an active entity in Abhinavagupta's works, see Vasudeva 2014. For an analysis of Abhinavagupta's conception of the actor, who is a "receptacle" (*pātra*), see Bansat-Boudon 1992, p. 150 and 430.

na lipyate karmaṇā pātakena vā. This line in turn is also echoed in the *Skandapurāṇa* (52.24), which has a wording rather similar to the BY's (concerning the *sādhaka* who is not tainted even if he is playing): *yogī tu sarvapāpāni kurvann api na lipyate* ("the yogin is not tainted, even if he commits all kinds of sin").

Another scriptural occurrence, from the JY (1.30.19), also seems to stress "detachment in action" of the actor-self, even if in this case, the actor is said to be the "world" (*jagat*). It is less clear what theoretical implications are suggested, for after identifying the world with the actor and the stage with one's own nature, the rest of the image elaborates on the theatrical aspect. But it may not be too far-fetched to assume that, in addition to the actor's detachment, it stresses the multiplicity of the phenomenal world, which is probably understood as the play with various sentiments. Whatever is the case, the verse is unique in that it makes use of aesthetic terms, such as *vṛtti*, *bhāva* and *rasa*.

> *svabhāvaraṅgamadhye tu nṛtyate naṭavaj jagat* |
> *vṛttitraya[ṃ] samālambya nānābhāvarasāśrayaiḥ* ||

> The world dances like an actor on the stage, which is its nature, resorting to the three styles of composition and making use of the various feelings and dominant sentiments.

Such technical terms can also be found elsewhere, for instance the word *vibhāva* ("stimulants" which contribute to creating a particular aesthetic reaction)[71] in the following passage, taken from the lost *Triśirobhairava*. Here, however, the purpose of the demonstration is clearly to show the freedom of the enlightened actor-self in his play and suggests a nondualist conception of the self, which is identical with the godhead. In this light, it is possible that the above verse is also intended to stress the same freedom, in which case both citations would imply an underlying nondualist conception, whereby the enlightened Self is the omnipotent godhead playing at will. This enlightened and free actor-Self is contrasted below with the limited Self that does not recognize his identity with the godhead:[72]

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[71] For more on *vibhāva*, translated into French as "déterminants," see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 111-114.

[72] The passage is cited by Jayaratha ad TĀ 1.136. The source, the lost *Triśirobhairava*, was probably a Trika scripture prescribing the worship of a three-headed Bhairava. See TAK III at *trika* citing Sanderson.

anyathā svalpabodhas tu tantubhiḥ kīṭavad yathā |
malatantusamārūḍhaḥ krīḍate dehapañjare ‖
samyagbuddhas tu vijñeyaḥ .... |
nānākārair vibhāvaiś ca bhramyate naṭavad yathā |
svabuddhibhāvarahitam icchākṣemabahiṣkṛtam ‖

> Otherwise, if one has little awareness, one plays in the cage of the body, locked up by one's [own] impurity, just like a silkworm, which is locked [in its cocoon] by its [own] silk threads.[73] But one who has right awareness whirls around like a dancer, with his various forms and conditions, without [being limited by] the [false] creations of his own mind, and being beyond volition or happiness.

In addition to emphasizing freedom, the passage also brings out the detachment of the Self by saying that he is beyond volition and happiness. In doing so, it presents this Self in a way similar to the BY's, albeit the detachment is described not from purity and impurity but from the act of attachment itself, since this divine Self is self-sufficient, being as it is the only truly existing entity.

3. "DRAMATIZED" OBSERVANCES

As pointed out above, the PSū already speak of the yogin as someone who is not tainted by any act or sin. This is an important statement, for several of the *pāśupata* observances involve contact with impure substances or impure acts. In this context, a later *pāśupata* text, the *Gaṇakārikāṭīkā* (1.7, p. 57), prescribes that the performer of the *pāśupata* observance must see himself as an actor, surrounded by other people as his public.

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[73] It is not possible to retrace the development of the well-known example of the silk-worm. Two texts, however, should be mentioned here. The *Śāntiparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* may have the earliest two occurrences (12.2924-5b and 12.316.28) of this image. In both occurrences, the self locks itself in its own construction like a silk-worm, but in one case the threads represent *guṇa*s (*kośakāro yathātmānaṃ kīṭaḥ samanurundhati | sūtratantuguṇair nityaṃ tathāyam aguṇo guṇaiḥ ‖ dvaṃdvam eti ca nirdvaṃdvas tāsu tāsv iha yoniṣu |*) and in the other, they represent ignorance (*saṃveṣṭyamānaṃ bahubhir mohatantubhir ātmajaiḥ | kośakāravad ātmānaṃ veṣṭayan nāvabudhyase ‖*). Surprisingly, when the image appears in the *Svacchandatantra* (10.361), it is used to demonstrate that one cannot liberate one's self, so hard is the cocoon one has created that Śiva's intervention is needed to remove it (*kośakāro yathā kīṭa ātmānaṃ veṣṭayed dṛḍham | na codveṣṭayituṃ śakta ātmānaṃ sa punar yathā ‖*).

evaṃ prathamāvasthāyāṃ vidhim anuṣṭhāya yadā khalu prāptajñānaḥ prakṣīṇakaluṣaḥ kṛtābhyanujñaś ca bhavati tadāvasthāntaraṃ gatvā raṅgavad avasthiteṣu janeṣu madhye naṭavad avasthito vivecya vivecya krāthanādīni kuryāt.

In this way, after performing what is prescribed in the first stage [of his observance], when he has obtained [*pāśupata*] knowledge [from his master] and his sins have been destroyed, after getting the authorisation [of his master], he should proceed to the next stage [of his observance]: in the middle of people around him, as if he were an actor on stage, gradually separating [himself from them],[74] he should snore etc.

Acting concerns the famous second stage of the *pāśupata* observance, in which the *pāśupata* behaves in an uncivilized way or "like a demon" (*pretavat*): snoring (PSū 3.12ff), pretending he is limp, making gestures of love (or perhaps sexual gestures), thus provoking slander and curse. In this way, he transfers the fruitions of his bad karma to passers-by and takes their good karmas. While doing so, however, he must remain detached: he must, according to the above passage, behave like an actor and provoke disgust in people as if he was acting in a play.

The *pāśupata*s were probably the first *śaiva*s who "acted" in their observance. They thus started a tradition of observances which involved a theatrical aspect or at least required the practitioner to disguise himself and play a role. He was always meant to do so in front of people surrounding him, in front of passers-by, he thus also demarked himself from society. The *pāśupata*s played to be repulsive in order to provoke an exchange of karma; but later tantrics appear to do role-playing rather in order to assimilate themselves to their deity. This imitation of the deity must of course be distinguished from other important techniques or ways of identification, such as ritual transformation of the body with mantras (*nyāsa/sakalīkaraṇa*), possession (*āveśa*) and complete merging into the god (at the time of final release, *mokṣa*).

There seem to be three particular roles prescribed in such ritual imitations: the goddess (*devī*), the god of love (*kāma*) and the madman (*unmatta*). These three are listed as three alternative vows in a passage of the JY (1.47.10cd-15ab), which gives a set of general rules to follow when impersonating a deity or a madman. In all

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[74]   My understanding of *vivecya vivecya* is tentative.

three cases, the disguised practitioner must behave in an uncontrolled manner and decorate himself excessively, like a woman.[75]

> *devīvratadharo mantrī nitya[ṃ] nepathyakādiṣu* ‖
> *unmattako [']tha[76] śṛṅgārī cāpavratadharo [']thavā* |
> *gītālāpavilāsāḍhyo nānāvarṇoparañjitaḥ* ‖
> *vicitrāmbaramālāḍhyo mālāhastādyanekadhṛk* |
> *grāmacatvararathyāsu prabhramet tvaritaḥ sadā* ‖
> *gāyan hasan paṭhan -- odaṃ nṛttaṃ[77] valgan suharṣitaḥ[78]* |
> *†vintryaurthy†āropitakaras †tadiṣṭakaḥ†karaḥ sadā* ‖
> *samārañjitavaktraś ca raktasūtrāṅganāsadhṛk[79]* |
> *†viṣāṇāvaṣava†cchannaprakoṣṭhodantakarṇikaḥ* ‖
> *svabhāvasthaś caran maunī kvacid bhāvaṃ samāśrayet* |

The master of mantras may observe the Goddess-vow, the Madman(-like) vow or the vow of the Bow-[Carrying Kāma], in which he is in love,[80] always in a costume (*nepathyaka-*) and other [insignia]. He must sing, babble and play around a lot, wear various colours, adorn himself with coloured clothes and garlands and hold a garland and several other attributes in his hands. He should always wander around quickly in villages, crossroads and main roads (or: at crossroads and on main roads of villages), singing, laughing, reciting texts, [...] dancing, and bouncing very happily. [...][81] With his face coloured, he should look like a beautiful woman wearing a red thread [as decoration?]. He must have earrings

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[75] It is possible that the prescription here describes only the first one, the *devī-vrata*. However, while one verse enjoins that one must be like a woman, the rest appears more appropriate for the other vows. Therefore, I understand these verses to describe the three *vrata*s in a general and not necessarily systematic way. Subsequently, each of the *vrata*s is described separately.

[76] The MS reads *ṣa* for *tha*.

[77] The MS reading *nṛttaṃ* is probably to be emended to *nṛtyan*.

[78] The MS has *svaharṣitaḥ* for *suharṣitaḥ*.

[79] Perhaps to be understood/emended to *raktasūtro [']*. The word *sadṛk* appears in the MS as *śadṛk*.

[80] I understand the compound *cāpavratadharo* to stand for *cāpadhara-vrata-dharo*. The compound and the adjective *śṛṅgārī* suggest that Kāma is to be imitated here, for which there is indeed a prescription elsewhere, as will be shown.

[81] The beginning of the line is corrupt and does not seem to yield sense as it stands, except that hand-held attributes are prescribed. The second compound may be corrupt for *śastrāṣṭakakaraḥ* "holding eight weapons in the hand" as in JY 1.15.86c: *śastrāṣṭakakarā devyaḥ*. There may be, however, some technical difficulties in carrying out this prescription with only two hands.

reaching down to his forearms [covered with...],[82] and observe his vow while staying in his own natural state or sometimes he may resort to [another] state.

The Goddess Vow

The detailed description of the goddess vow referred to above can be found under the heading of Cāmuṇḍā Vow (*cāmuṇḍāvrata*), in which the practitioner dresses up and behaves like the terrifying goddess (*Yoginīsaṃcāra* as transmitted in the JY 3.31.36cd-42ab, edited by Sanderson).

> *tataś cared vratavaraṃ triṣaṣṭikulasaṃbhavam ‖*
> *bhairavaṃ vā mahābhāge cāmuṇḍāvratam eva ca |*
> *kṛṣṇāmbaradharo nityaṃ kṛṣṇagandhānulepanam ‖*
> *kṛṣṇamālāvalambī ca karṇālaṅkārabhūṣitaḥ |*
> *valayābharaṇopetaṃ nūpuradhvanibhūṣitam ‖*
> *raktāmbaro raktapādo divyastrīrūpadhāriṇaḥ |*
> *pracchanne nirjane deśe maunī vidyāvrataṃ caret ‖*
> *māsam ekaṃ caren mantrī dvādaśāṃ vā mahāvratām |*
> *māsena tu mahāyogī yoginyāḥ paśyatecchayā ‖*
> *tair vṛtam tu caruṃ kṛtvā trailokye vicaret kṣaṇāt |*
> *sarvajñaḥ sarvakarttā ca sṛṣṭisaṃhārakārakaḥ ‖*
> *yoginīnāṃ pade devi harttā karttā ca jāyate |*

He must then observe the excellent vow of the 63 families also called Bhairava vow and the Cāmuṇḍā vow, o Fortunate One. [First the latter is described:][83] he must always wear black clothes and fragrant paste of black colour, with a black garland and decorated with earrings. He must have bracelets and [other] ornaments and jingling anklets. Dressed in

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82   The text seems to be corrupt here and I cannot propose any convincing conjecture. The first word of the compound is *viṣāṇa* or *viṣāṇā*, which, provided the word is not entirely corrupt, would imply that the practitioner must wear a horn or a horn-like object.

83   I understand that only two observances are described in this chapter of the text: first the Cāmuṇḍāvrata (given here), and then the Bhairavavrata (also called Triṣaṣṭikula- or Kāpāla-vrata). SANDERSON 2009, p. 134, understands that the Bhairava-vrata and the Triṣaṣṭikula-vrata are two different observances, and that the practitioner can choose between altogether three *vrata*s. Since only two are described in the subsequent passage, I understand the *vā* above to refer to alternative names of the same observance; and since the Cāmuṇḍā-vrata is connected with a *ca*, I understand that both *vrata*s must be performed.

red, with red feet, having the form of a divine woman, he must perform his preliminary observance in a secret, solitary place. The master of mantras should perform [this] Great Observance for one or for twelve months.[84] After a month, the great yogi shall see the yoginīs if he wishes. Accompanied by them, he should make a rice offering [including the mingled sexual fluids] and wander in the three worlds in a second. He will become omniscient and omnipotent, performing creation and destruction. He will become the creator and the destroyer, o goddess, in the realm of yoginīs.

The prescription hesitates between prescribing the imitation of the terrifying black goddess or that of a beautiful, divine woman with red ornaments.[85] In any case, the observance is called a *vidyāvrata*, which is the preliminary observance commonly prescribed before the invocation of *yoginī*s.

The Observance of Kāma

Similarly, pretending to be Kāma is also part of the *vidyāvrata*s. I take the following *vrata*, which occurs in *Siddhayogeśvarīmata* (henceforth SYM)10.6cd-8, to be the same as the *śṛṅgārī cāpavrata,* lit. "the amorous observance of the bow" mentioned above in the JY, for the expression seems to suggest that Kāma must be imitated.

> *dhanurdhara[ḥ] śarāṃś caiva pañca dikpālavat tataḥ ǁ*
> *raktena bhasmanā snāto raktayajñopavītinaḥ ǀ*
> *raktapuṣpadharo dhīmān hasantoccair japet tataḥ ǁ*
> *śaram ekaṃ kare gṛhya maunī †neyāt†[86] paribhramet ǀ*
> *vrataṃ brahmaśirasyaita[t] siddhidam parikīrtitam ǁ*

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[84] It is also possible to understand that the Cāmuṇḍā-vrata should be performed for one month and that the Mahāvrata (as a different observance, implying assimilation to Bhairava) is an alternative, but one which must be done for twelve months.

[85] Let us note here that other *śākta* texts also prescribe that the practitioner should or can dress up as a woman. See e.g. *Devīpañcaśatikā* 5.54: *strīveśa-dhārī bhūtvāsau nagnavāso mahāmatiḥ ǀ nirvikalpaḥ prasannātmā pūjākarma-viśāradaḥ.*

[86] Perhaps one should understand *maunīneyāt* as a verb, some kind of irregular optative of a denominative from *mauna* or *maunī* – but this solution is highly conjectural.

The practitioner should hold a bow and five arrows [and remain vigilant?] like a guardian of a direction.[87] He must be bathed in red ashes and should have a red sacred thread. Holding red flowers, the wise one should recite the mantras laughing loudly. Taking one arrow in his hand, he should remain silent [...] and wander about. This is the observance of the Brahma Head [a protection mantra], which is said to bestow success.

Although Kāma is not named here either, the prescription of the bow and the five arrows together with the red colour clearly imply the imitation of Kāma. Just as the goddess vow, this observance is also part of the *vidyāvrata* series, or preliminary mantra propitiation.

The Madman(-Like) Observance

This *vrata*, unlike the previous ones, goes back directly to a *pāśupata* prescription. In PSū 4.6, the practitioner is required to remain alone and act like a madman in the world or towards people (*unmattavad eko vicareta loke*). The commentator explains that it is again performed in order to mislead people about the real identity of the performer.[88]

The same *vrata* is also said to have been practiced by *lākula*s as pointed out in SANDERSON 2006, p. 209. Abhinavagupta mentions in his commentary on NŚ 12.85 that it existed for *lākula*s, in the so-called "stage of the highest yogi."[89] A similar *vidyāvrata*, under the name of *gaṇavrata*, but still with the prescription to behave like a madman, is also found in the earliest tantra, the *Niśvāsa*.[90] Subsequently, it becomes recurrent in *śākta* tantras, often echoing the PSū and their commentary,[91] as in the following passage of the BY

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[87] It is not clear to me what this comparison to a guardian of a direction implies. Since the practitioner takes on the appearance of Kāma, it is unlikely (but not impossible) that he should look menacing (like a guardian of a direction).

[88] *laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṃ sammohanārtham uktam unmattavad iti.*

[89] *paramayogavasthāyāṃ lākuladarśanapratipannānām unmattavratam apy asti.* Cited in SANDERSON 2006, p. 209.

[90] *nṛtyate gāyate caiva unmatto hasate bruvan ǁ bhasmāṅgī cīravāsaś ca gaṇavratam idaṃ smṛtam ǀ* (*Niśvāsaguhya* 3.32cd-33ab). Note that the *Niśvāsaguhya* also has an observance in which one must be disguised as a woman, as in the *devīvrata: gāyate nṛtyate jāpī strīrūpī valabhūṣitaḥ* (3.35cd).

[91] Cf. Kauṇḍinya on PSū 4.6 (*tato vaktavyaṃ māheśvaro 'haṃ kaumāro 'ham iti*) with verse 20 above. Parallel identified in KISS forthcoming, p. 30.

(21.18cd-27).[92] As Kiss points out, the aim here is nevertheless very different compared to the *pāśupata* version, for this prescription "seems to concentrate on the gradual adoption of non-conventional practices (*nirācāra*), which prepares the Sādhaka for the extreme rituals to be performed after this introductory test period" (KISS forthcoming, p. 33).

> *nagnarūpo bhaven nityaṃ muktakeśas tathaiva ca ‖*
> *rudate hasate caiva kvacid geyam udīrayet |*
> *kvacin nṛtyaṃ kvacid valgaṃ kvacid dhāvati sādhakaḥ ‖*
> *brahmāhaṃ viṣṇurūpo 'haṃ īśvaro 'haṃ bravīti ca |*
> *devāḥ prāptakarāsmākaṃ kiṅkaratvaṃ samāgatāḥ ‖*
> *airāvate samārūḍha indro 'haṃ paśya māṃ bravīt |*
> *indrāṇī mama bhāryā ca śvāno 'haṃ sūkaraṃ hy ahaṃ ‖*
> *aśvamūrddho hy ahaṃ caiva ghoṭavigrahakam tathā |*
> *rathyāyāṃ śayanaṃ kuryād uttiṣṭed dhāvate ti ca ‖*
> *yāgasthānaṃ na laṅgheta pūjayen manasāpi vā |*
> *mūtreṇa vandayet saṃdhyāṃ kvacin mūrdhni tu prakṣipet ‖*
> *striyo dṛṣṭvā namaskṛtya mātā ca bhaginīti ca |*
> *evaṃ saṃbhāṣayen mantrī kroṣaṇaṃ tu na kārayet ‖*
> *bhramaṇaṃ tu tathaiveha āhnikan tu tathaiva hi |*
> *bhojanaṃ tu divā naiva unmatto 'pi samācaret ‖*
> *mastake tu tilāṃ kṣipya yūkaṃ kṛtvā tu bhakṣayet |*
> *saśabdaṃ mārayed vātha lokasammohanaṃ prati ‖*
> *unmattakaṃ mahādevi evaṃ saṃcārya sādhakaḥ |*
> *nānārūpābhi ceṣṭābhir yogināṃ tu hitāvahaṃ ‖*

He should always be naked, his hair unbound. He weeps, he laughs, sometimes he bursts out in song. Sometimes the Sādhaka dances, sometimes he jumps up, sometimes he runs [away]. He states, "I am Brahmā! I am Viṣṇu! I am Īśvara! The gods are in my hands! They have become my servants! Look at me – I am Indra, mounted on [his elephant] Airāvata!", he says. "Indrāṇī is my wife!". And, "I am a dog! I am a pig! I am horse-headed [?] and my body is that of a horse!". He should lie down on the road, then get up and run. He should not set foot on the site of pantheon-worship (*yāgasthāna*) and should not perform worship, not even mentally. He should salute the junctions of the day (*saṃdhyā*) by [offering his own] urine. He should sometimes pour some of it on his head. When seeing women, he should greet them thus: "Mother! Sister!". This is how the Mantrin should engage in conversation. He should not abuse [them]. Roaming (*bhramaṇa*) is [to be performed] in the same

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way in this case (*iha*) [as taught above], as [is the sequence of] the daily rituals (*āhnika*). He should not eat in the daytime, even though [he behaves like] a madman. He should throw sesamum seeds on his head and, pretending that they are (*kṛtvā*) lice, he should eat them. Or he should kill [the "lice"] with a big fuss in order to delude people. The Sādhaka should, O Mahādevī, pursue the Madman-like [observance] (*unmattaka*) thus, with different patterns of behaviour. This is for the benefit of yogins.

In this *vrata,* "acting" is described much more vividly than in the observances of the Goddess and Kāma. There is also a more detailed and elaborate version of this *vrata* in the JY (3.38.167cd-173cd) which brings out the theatrical aspect of the observance:

> atha vonmattakaṃ kāryaṃ vrataṃ paramaśobhanam ‖
> asatyul[l]āpalāpī syād yena kena[93] cid †ātaḥ† |
> digambaro muktakeśo sarvabhakṣo hy alolupaḥ ‖
> kṣaṇaṃ hase' kṣaṇaṃ gāye' kṣaṇaṃ rode' kṣaṇaṃ raṭet |
> kṣaṇaṃ plavet kṣaṇaṃ nartte' kṣaṇaṃ dhāve' kṣaṇaṃ lalet ‖
> kṣaṇaṃ śāntaṃ kṣaṇaṃ vīraṃ kṣaṇaṃ[94] bībhatsavad[95] bhavet |
> kṣaṇaṃ raudrarasāvastho kṣaṇam eva bhayānakam ‖
> kṣaṇaṃ śṛṅgāriṇaṃ devi kṣaṇaṃ hāsyaikatatparaḥ |
> kṣaṇam adbhutasaṃrūḍho kṣaṇaṃ kāruṇyam āsthitaḥ ‖
> nānārasasamāviṣṭo nānābhāvasamāsthitaḥ |
> nānāvilāsasaṃyukto nānāgītaravākulaḥ ‖
> rathyāpatitanirmālyaṃ śavanirmālyam eva vā |
> dhārayet satataṃ dehe sphuṭec ca bahubhāṣayā ‖

Or he should perform the madman-like observance, which is particularly auspicious. He should babble lies [...][96] naked, with his hair undone, eating everything and not desiring anything, he must laugh for a second, then sing then cry and howl. One moment he must leap around, then dance, run or play around. For a moment he must resort to the [aesthetic experience of the] sentiment of tranquility,[97] then to the heroic one, to

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[93] The MS reads *keta*.

[94] The MS reads *kṣaṭāṃ*.

[95] The MS reads *bhītatsavad*.

[96] The MS seems to be corrupt in several places here. The first word could also be considered a crux, but the meaning seems clear. Perhaps the latter half of the line means "he should speak with anyone [without distinction]."

[97] It is notable that the text already knows of the *śāntarasa*, which appears perhaps only from Udbhaṭa onwards.

that of disgust, wrath, terror, love, humour, marvel, and pathos.[98] Possessed by various aesthetic experiences and resorting to various dominant sentiments, playing various games and filled with the sound of multiple songs, he must always wear a garland that has either fallen on the road or a garland [that has come] from corpses on his body and express himself in several tongues.

The subsequent part of the text also prescribes that the practitioner must emit the cries of various animals and pretend to be a *kāpālika* and/or an outcaste *caṇḍāla*. Therefore, even though the theatrical aspect of the observance is very prominent here, the point remains the Sādhaka's preparation for impure rites through which he will become Bhairava himself as the master of the universe, both pure and impure. The list of *rasa*s must be understood in this light: they are all present in him, preparing him for the experience of totality.

4. THE GREAT PLAY OR MOCK PLAY (*MAHĀKRĪḌĀ*)

Thus far, we have seen various elements of theatre and dramatic theory appearing in tantric contexts. Occasionally, it also happens that the enactment of a play is prescribed in a ritual context. Such a prescription is found in the second half of the BY (54.93cdff.), which is chronologically somewhat later than the first half. The play itself or the rite in which the play is performed seems to be termed *mahākrīḍā* or "great play," which is an unusual name for a theatrical production. The word *krīḍā* is more often used in connection with Bhairava (or the practitioner who becomes Bhairava), who plays freely, at will in the world. It is therefore possible that this play to be performed for Bhairava is in some way related to this notion. However, *mahākrīḍā* may also be the term for the whole ritual that involves the play itself.

The ritual context of the performance is again an observance. Before the prescription of this *mahākrīḍā*, the BY first envisages a more common type of observance, in which the naked practitioner remains silent, wanders around at night in the cremation ground with various bhairavic weapons or attributes, eats meat and drinks alcohol. Then either an alternative is prescribed (in which he wears various clothes as opposed to being naked previously) or a continuation of the previous practice is given, in which he can wear va-

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[98] For *kāruṇya/karuṇā* meaning the pathetic sentiment, see BANSAT-BOUDON 2000, pp. 84ff.

rious clothes and ornaments, he plays drums, shouts and the like. The observance finishes with a drama (*nāṭya*), at the end of which the practitioner becomes a leader of *yoginī*s.

> *kṛṣṇāmbaro [']thavā raktā-*[99] *vastraiś citrais tathā priye* | 93
> *bhasmasnāto [']thavā mantrī raktacandanacarccitaḥ*
> *lalāṭe tilakaṃ kṛtvā pādau laktakarañjitau* | 94
> *kaṇṭhe [ca] kaṇṭhikā[ṃ] dadyā' kiṅkiṇīśreṇimālinaḥ* |
> *karṇe kare ca bāhubhyāṃ kaṭakābharaṇaṃ tathā* | 95
> *javāmālāvṛto mantrī muṇḍamālāvalambakaiḥ* |
> *ḍamarum vādayen mantrī paṭahikām vā mahātmanaḥ* | 96
> *śivārāvaṃ prakurvīta kravyādāśabdam*[100] *eva ca* ‖
> *nṛtyārambhaṃ sabhāvātmā śabdāt tatra samārabhet* | 97
> *yoginīsahitaṃ nāṭyaṃ vīrabhāvāvalambanam* ‖

The master of mantras wears black or red clothes, or clothes of variegated colours, my Beloved, or he is bathed in ashes [and naked?], or covered with red sandalwood paste. He must make a *tilaka* on his forehead, put lac on his feet, a necklace around his neck with rows of jingling bells. He must also put jewels in his ears, on his hands, armlets on his arms and wear a garland of red *javā* flowers, which rests on a garland of heads.[101] The eminent master of mantras should play on an hourglass-shaped drum or a kettle drum and emit a jackal's cry or the sound of a demon. Then he should take up there, at the sound [of musical instruments] (*śabdāt*), the starting position in dance (*nṛtyārambham*),[102] while his self is infused with the [dominant] sentiment.[103] He must undertake the performance of a play (*nāṭyam*) with *yoginī*s, which is based on the heroic sentiment (*vīrabhāva-*).

The heroic sentiment is probably prescribed with reference to the Sādhaka as a "hero," who must be brave and fearless when he invokes *yoginī*s at night in the cremation ground and they suddenly arrive in hordes, with a frightening appearance. The text does not elaborate on the subject further and it remains a question what kind

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[99] This must be intended in the sense of *athavā raktāmbaro*.

[100] This stands for *kravyādaśabdam metri causa*.

[101] Because of the irregularities of the Sanskrit, this is a tentative interpretation.

[102] For *nṛtyārambha* denoting a particular position (*avasthānaviśeṣa*) in dance, see e.g. the *Vikramacarita* Southern Recension F3b and the *Nṛtyaśāstra* it cites: *aṅgeṣu caturaśratvaṃ samapādau latākarau* | *prārambhe sarvanṛtyānām etat sāmānyam ucyate* ‖.

[103] Other interpretations of the compound are also possible, but this seemed to me the most appropriate in the context.

of play is to be performed with the *yoginī*s as actresses. The occurrence of the prescription is, however, not completely unparalleled. The short recension of the SYM (27.20) also enjoins that one must provide the god (Bhairava) with a play (*krīḍā*). Nothing is specified about this *krīḍā*, but it may well be the same play that the BY prescribes, for the BY also calls the whole ritual sequence involving the dramatic performance simply *krīḍana*.

CONCLUSION

Although theatre certainly cannot be considered a fundamental part of tantric prescriptions and texts, elements of acting and performance do appear in various ways as shown above. From the above investigations, it is possible to point out some major shifts as to how theatre and its image play a role in tantric texts. To summarize these changes:

1.   The image of the actor, inherited from the Sāṃkhya (perhaps as *sāmānyaśāstra*) and identified there with the subtle body, becomes reinterpreted. The BY uses it not to explain the tension between the one and the many, but the detachment of the self from whatever it manipulates, in order to defend its ritual nondualism (without professing clear ontological nondualism). In this, it remains nevertheless close to the Sāṃkhya-like conception of the self as uninvolved witness (*sākṣin*). Later *śākta* tantras, however, use the image of Śiva as the actor or dancer to show the absolute freedom of the deity-self, as part of a nondualist ontology, in which creation or the phenomenal world is a product of the deity's play, but is identical with Him. This image of freedom, in turn, is reinforced by other images of dancing deities, in particular goddesses, whose dance also expresses their unrestrained character.

      At the exegetical level, the nondual image of the divine self as actor is the first to make an appearance (in the ŚS). However, its purpose is not to demonstrate the Self's or Śiva's freedom, but rather the unreal nature of multiplicity. This demonstration about the nature of being is then elaborated by the Kashmirian exegetes and developed into a demonstration about the nature of perception and knowledge. Rather than showing what there is, the image comes to show levels of knowledge: the roles of Śiva represent various cognizing

subjects and thus various religious currents. This representation of rival schools of thought makes it possible to envisage their conversion, whereby they can ascend from their lower position until they reach true (*śaiva*) knowledge.

2.   In the *pāśupata* system, observances that involved some form of acting or pretension did so in order to hide the identity of the practitioner and to provoke an exchange of karma between him and his spectators, i.e. passers-by. The aim is thus to mislead others, to elicit slander and curse. While some *pāśupata* observances were taken over in *śākta* Tantric sources, their purpose became different: they prepared the practitioner for the path of ritual non-duality because they required the use of impure substances; and they were one of the ways in which the practitioner enacted his identity with a/the deity. By the time of the JY, an awareness of the aesthetic aspects of this role playing seems to appear and the nine *rasa*s are referred to.

3.   Contrary to the *pāśupata*s, whose dance (*nṛtta*) was probably unstructured and free, tantric sources also refer to structured dance and dramatic performance. The offering of a play (*nāṭya*) to Bhairava, although found in a unique prescription of the BY (and in a possible allusion in the SYM), may attest to a practice in which a play was performed as part of tantric ritual.

We cannot know what actual practice involved and some of these prescriptions could be just entirely fanciful, but there seems to be much more awareness of theatre and performing in the tantric sources than in pretantric *pāśupata* practice and particular effort seems to be made to integrate some aspects of theatre into religious practice. Whether this influenced Abhinavagupta or not, this is a remarkable feature in itself.

One of Abhinavagupta's major contributions to dramatic theory concerns the relationship between aesthetic relishing and *kaula* tantric experience, both of which require the suspension or obliteration of the ego. As far as I can see, this is not brought out anywhere in the scriptural sources, for *kaula* and *krama* texts proper I have been able to consult (omitting from this category the JY, which is very heterogeneous) do not appear to deal with *nāṭya* or related subjects, at least not directly. It would seem then that Abhinavagupta's theory of *carvaṇā* bringing together theatre and tantra is entirely his own, a fact that does not come as a surprise. It re-

mains, however, to be seen whether (and how) the description of *kaula* experience in the scriptures is echoed in Abhinavagupta's writings on theatre.[104]

It also remains a question whether the above described use of theatre in tantras shows the increasing influence and importance of classical theatre, or rather, it betrays an attempt of the tantric authors to integrate their texts in the cultural framework of an elite. Whatever is the case, it reflects an increasing awareness of the dramatic tradition in an unexpected context: tantric scriptures. This fact in itself implies that theatre, although it was clearly destined to the elite in the form we know it from the classical sources, was perhaps less restricted to the royal court than our classical sources suggest. It is merely hypothetical of course, but more popular theatrical forms such as Mūṭiyeṭṭu in today's Kerala, which is some way between deity possession and theatre, may well have existed in the past elsewhere in India too, and stood as proof not only of the close relation of ritual and drama, but also of the universal appeal of theatre.

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[104] For the way in which tantric ritual becomes "aestheticised" in Kaulism, see SANDERSON 1988, p. 680. A closer study of the *kaula* scriptures, many unedited, may reveal their influence on Abhinavagupta's aesthetic theory.

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Lakṣaṇam Aparyālocitābhidhānam –

Śobhākara's Resistance to Ruyyaka[*]

SOMDEV VASUDEVA

The *Alaṅkāraratnākara*, or the "Treasury of Ornaments" (hereafter *AlRat*), of Śobhākareśvaramitra[1] (Śobhākara for short) is a Kashmirian work on *alaṅkāraśāstra* of the late twelfth to early thirteenth centuries that seeks to challenge innovations proposed in the *Alaṅkārasarvasva*, or the "Treasure of Ornaments" (hereafter *AlSar*), the most successful work of the Kashmirian rhetorician Ruyyaka, completed around 1150 AD. We may consider this a sub-genre of response texts[2] the development of which can be traced throughout the history of *alaṅkāra* dialectics.[3] The nature of the intertextuality between Śobhākara's and Ruyyaka's works shows

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[1] Hitherto, the suffix -*īśvaramitra* has not been appended to Śobhākara's name. I do so on the strength of the early Kashmirian birchbark MS discussed below, which gives his name as *paṇḍitabhaṭṭaśrīśobhākareśvaramitra*-. That the suffix -*īśvaramitra* belongs to the proper name and is not a mere honorific title is made more likely by the fact that his father's name was Trayīśvaramitra (thus in Bodleian MS D87, though commonly given as Trayīśvaramiśra), where it is scarcely plausible to detach the suffix -*īśvaramitra* (KRISHNAMACHARIAR 1937 gives his father's name as Trayīśvaramiśra, the colophon of Devadhar's edition reads ... *bhaṭṭatrayīśvaramantriputrasya*..., making Śobhākara's father a minister). It appears to have been a practice in Kashmir to use a common suffix in naming successive generations, as can be seen in cases such as Bhaṭṭa Rāma**kaṇṭha**, son of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa**kaṇṭha**.

[2] That is, rival texts teaching very similar doctrines within a short time of each other. This is a pattern comparable to what we see in other *śāstra*s, but it is also different as there exists no doctrinal framework provided by a Sūtra authored by an omniscient founder.

[3] For example Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, Ruyyaka and Śobhākareśvaramitra, Appayadīkṣita and Jagannātha, etc.

that their dispute is one that differs from earlier altercations, such as that between Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin (recently reevaluated in BRONNER 2011). Ruyyaka had reinvigorated *alaṅkāra* rhetorics by paying careful attention to implicit epistemological and ontological categories, and Śobhākara problematized this resystematisation. Both authors were writing after what MCCREA 1998 has identified as a Kuhnian paradigm shift introduced by the advent of the *dhvani* theory, a thesis to which both our authors subscribed.

In his *AlSar*, Ruyyaka introduces each *alaṅkāra* with a definition formulated as a Sūtra. He follows this with an explanatory Vṛtti auto-commentary into which he embeds and analyses verses drawn from a wide range of Kāvya literature. Since *alaṅkāra* rhetorics lacked a foundational Sūtra which could have given it a ready-made ontology and epistemology that commentators could build on, the ambition was probably to fill this perceived need, to become the Sūtrakāra of the *alaṅkāraśāstra.* At the same time, by adopting this particular format he consciously reverts to the formal style of presentation that the eminent authority Vāmana, a South Indian immigrant to Kashmir,[4] had introduced into *alaṅkāraśāstra* more than three hundred years earlier in his *Alaṅkārasūtravṛtti*.[5] In

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[4]   As far as Vāmana's valuation of *rīti* is concerned, it may be significant that Vāmana was a South Indian immigrant to Kashmir, presumably conversant with some Dravidian language[s], and a man who had crossed a considerable part of India in search of patronage. This appears to imply that divergences in regional styles of Sanskrit might have been pronounced in the late eighth century.

[5]   Current narratives of the historical development of *alaṅkāraśāstra* credit Vāmana primarily with two things, the elaboration of *rīti*, or the Ways of Poetry, and the introduction of the notion of the soul of poetry (*kāvyasyātmā*) as a category of discussion. Arguably just as important, if not more important, was another legacy that Kashmirian rhetoricians such as Ruyyaka and Śobhākara inherited from their predecessors Vāmana and Bhāmaha (see BRONNER in this volume): an established canon of literary citations and the very idea of seeking out actual literary citations to exemplify figures of speech. This ensured that *alaṅkāraśāstra* would become firmly anchored in a living literary culture, eschewing the earlier model where literary theorists wrote their own examples to fit their theories. A format of Kārikā and Vṛtti, with specimen verses composed by the author himself is followed by Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa*, Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, Udbhaṭa's *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, and Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṃgraha*. A format of Kārikā with Vṛtti, and verses excerpted from actual literature is adopted by Ānandavardhana's *Sahṛdayāloka* (or *Dhvanyāloka*), Mukulabhaṭṭa's *Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā*, Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Kuntaka's *Vakroktijīvita*, and Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka*.

his introduction to the *AlSar,* Ruyyaka describes rhetorics as a *śāstra* that has undergone a process of evolution, where less precise theories of earlier authors are superseded by later ideas. Vāmana's Sūtras clearly were obsolete, and a new Sūtra was called for. Much as Ruyyaka styled his work on Vāmana, Śobhākara consciously styled his work in imitation of Ruyyaka, almost as if he intended it as a replacement, albeit with slightly longer prose passages to accommodate refutations of Ruyyaka's theories.

A striking feature is the vehemence with which Śobhākara attacks, without naming his opponent, nearly all the elements of Ruyyaka's treasure: definitions of *alaṅkāra*s, their classification into subtypes, the identification of *alaṅkāra*s in examples, and, significantly, the very epistemological basis upon which figures of speech can be differentiated. Even Śobhākara's choice of title *(-ratnākara),* "storehouse of treasures" or "mine of treasures," is presumably intended as an upgrade of Ruyyaka's simpler title of "treasure."[6] Yet, while Śobhākara finds fault with many specific innovations Ruyyaka proposes, at the same time he is sympathetic to Ruyyaka's project of radically rethinking the semantic and epistemological foundations – imported from grammar and *pramāṇaśāstra* – upon which *alaṅkāraśāstra* was built. In this he can be quite innovative.[7] He is the first to insist, for example, that *rūpaka* metaphors must be based on *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. Śobhākara must therefore not be dismissed as a conservative voice trying to roll back Ruyyaka's new ideas.

An important third voice in this debate is Ruyyaka's commentator Jayaratha, who, in his *Vimarśinī,* takes it upon himself to shield the *AlSar* from Śobhākara's attacks. These three texts, the *AlSar*, the *AlRat*, and the *Vimarśinī,* provide us with an abundance of riches to explore the dynamics of an intense debate taking place towards the end of the Kashmirian hegemonic phase in the field of *alaṅkāra* rhetorics. In particular, they enable us to understand, at least provisionally, something about the underlying motivations and ideologies that steered the debate to assume the tone that it did.

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6 As such, his work, in some passages appears more like a refutation, or a hostile commentary, such as the *Kāvyaprakāśakhaṇḍana* of the Jain scholar Siddhicandra Gaṇi, a refutation of Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*.

7 As I discuss below, even when he decides to return to *sambhāvanā* as the foundation of *utprekṣā* he does so with a markedly new perspective, one that goes to the heart of how a system of *alaṅkāra*s, each with its own *vicchitti*, or strikingness, can be systematised.

The contemporary accounts of scholarly interactions in Kashmir that have come down to us shed only a little light on the matter, in no small part because they frequently contradict each other. The celebrated logician Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's (ca. 840-900) *Āgamaḍambara* describes heated theological and philosophical debates along sectarian lines, while a learned gathering of a different nature is described in the *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* of Ruyyaka's disciple Maṅkha. While the first shows a world of intellectual hostility and rivalry the second portrays scholars gathered to have a good time. Such background information goes only part way in explaining the verse with which Jayaratha concludes his *Vimarśinī* commentary:

> Whatever here is correct or otherwise
> Has been stated in direct accordance with the system of rhetorics
> May the wise give it their regard for a moment
> Setting aside the anger of enmity
> With this much my task is achieved.[8]

What does he intend with this disclaimer? Why should enmity and anger be involved in a debate that seeks to establish workable definitions for figures of speech? It almost sounds as if he were describing a vendetta or a crime of passion, and he seems to be directing his words to Śobhākara, if he was still alive, or his followers.

Śobhākara introduces his work with a benediction verse that is borrowed from the *Nyāyamañjarī* of the Kashmirian logician Bhaṭṭa Jayanta. This raises the question of a possible connection between the *AlRat* and the *Nyāyamañjarī*. Is Śobhākara deliberately drawing attention to the fact that his ontology and epistemology are in some way related to the work of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta? Is his resistance to Ruyyaka part of a Kashmirian contest between realist Naiyāyikas and radical Śaiva Non-dualists to lay claim to the neutral domain of poetics and inscribe it with their own epistemologies and ontologies?

These questions can of course only be answered by tracing textual passages demonstrating Śobhākara's indebtedness to specific doctrines unique to Bhaṭṭa Jayanta. As such, the identification of these testimonia has become an important part of my ongoing project to critically re-edit the *AlRat*. The exact nature of the relation-

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8   *Vimarśinī* (205 KM_Ed, 144ʳ K_R): *yan nāma kiṃ cid iha samyag athānyathā vā sākṣād alaṅkṛtinayocitam etad uktam | vidveṣaroṣam apasārya budhaiḥ kṣaṇasya tatrāvadheyam iyataiva vayaṃ kṛtārthāḥ ||.*

ship between the *AlRat* and the *Nyāyamañjarī* for now remains unclear, but some ideas are presented in the sequel.

Seen in this light, it is possible that Ruyyaka's paradigm of the gradual evolution of *alaṅkāra* rhetorics, evidencing historical awareness of progress within a *śāstra,* progressing from simple enumerative schemas to ever more refined epistemic analyses, might not have seemed to Śobhākara like a disinterested, objective sketch of the history of a neutral *śāstra*. Śobhākara may rather have perceived it as a transparent attempt to controvert established Naiyāyika tenets, and he may have tried to neutralize of Ruyyaka's attempts to move beyond Nyāya epistemology. *Alaṅkāra* epistemology might not have been the only thing Śobhākara believed to be at stake here, for Bhaṭṭa Jayanta upheld the primacy of the Nyāya as the main protection of the Veda against heretical doctrines.[9] This could explain why Śobhākara's debate with Ruyyaka seems at times as though it might be a scene in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Āgamaḍambara.*

Before we look at this issue in detail, a few words about our sources are called for. Work on the *AlRat* has hitherto been hindered by the poor state of the editio princeps of Devadhar (who had access only to defective manuscript materials), published in 1942 in the Poona Oriental Series. There have been a few studies, the most notable of which is a precis by Parthasarathy Rao (PARTHASARATHY RAO 1992). Lallan Upadhyaya apparently also completed an unpublished new edition as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Punjab in 1978, which I have not yet seen.[10] Fortunately, the situation can be improved substantially by making use of a Kashmirian birchbark manuscript in the Stein collection of the Bodleian library in Oxford (Bodleian MS Sansk D87), hereafter K_R. As far as I can tell, this manuscript has not, so far, been used to restore problematic passages in the *AlRat*.

This manuscript is not dated. The colophon on folio 156ʳ ll. 4-9 of K_R reads:

> *samāpto ['] yam alaṅkāraratnākaraḥ ‖ ‖ kṛtir mahopādhyāyapaṇḍita-bhaṭṭaśrītrayīśvaramitraputrasya tatrabhavataḥ paṇḍitabhaṭṭaśrīśobhā-*

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9   See KATAOKA 2007 for Jayanta's argument that the Nyāya is the only system which can establish the Veda's validity, since the Mīmāṃsā focuses on exegesis. See also HALBFASS 1986-1992, KATAOKA 2007, and FRESCHI AND KATAOKA 2012.

10   Two more theses I have not seen are SHARMA 1972 and DUBEY 1982.

kareśvaramitrasya | ‖ ‖ *iti śubham śrīr astu* ‖ ‖ *aśuddhatvam ādarśado-*
*ṣāt* ‖ ‖ *śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ* ‖ ‖ *oṃ namaḥ sarasvatyai* | ‖

It is however bound in the same volume as a manuscript of the
Abhijñānaśakuntala, written in a very similar (identical?) hand.
This manuscript bears the following colophon:

‖ *samāptam idam abhijñānaśakuntalam nāma nāṭakam* ‖ ‖ *iti śubham astu*
lekhakapāṭhakayoḥ ‖ ‖ *śivaṃ ca sarvajagatām* ‖ *aśuddhatvam ādarśado-*
ṣāt ‖ *saṃ* 51 *pau śudi* 11 *gurau* ‖ *śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ* ‖

The date should therefore be Thursday, the 11th lunar day of the
waxing fortnight of the month Pauṣa in the year 51. As is common
in Kashmirian dates, the first two digits of the Laukika (or Sapta-
rṣi) era, the era usually used in Kashmirian manuscripts, are omitt-
ed. However, since the weekday is given, we are in a position to
determine the century using the last two digits of the year, the
weekday, and the lunar day of the month. Using M. Yano's *Pan-
canga* 3.14,[11] the only date in the last millennium where these con-
ditions were fulfilled was January the 14th in AD 1677 (while
Kashmir was under Mughal rule), a date which is also consistent
with the Śāradā paleography. Given that the *AlRat* was bound with
this manuscript, and given the codicological and paleographical si-
milarities between the two manuscripts, it is likely that the *AlRat*
was copied by the same scribe around the same time. For the text
of Jayaratha's *Vimarśinī* I used Bodleian MS Stein Or d21, a later
paper manuscript written in Śāradā, that for the sections consulted,
proved superior to the Kāvyamālā edition (KM$_{Ed}$).

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[11] We add 47 years (see SEWELL AND BĀLKRIṢṆA DĪKṢIT 1896, p. 41) to arrive at
a presumed Śaka year of ++98 where the 11th day of the month Pauṣa must be
a Thursday. Consulting Yano's Pancanga on http://www.cc.kyotosu.ac.jp/~
yanom/pancanga/, accessed on Sunday, July 17, 16, and considering the year
Caitrādi and Pūrṇimānta, using the latitude and longitude of Srinagar, the full
date correlation is Śaka 1598, Vikrama 1733. Pauṣa Śuklapakṣa 11, AD 1677-
1-14 Thursday (=1677-1-4 in Julian).

Figure 1: Folio 101ʳ of K$_R$ showing the end of the commentary on vibhāvanā (53 in P$_{Ed}$) and the definition of viśeṣokti (54 in P$_{Ed}$) on line 6

1. COGNITIVE ABERRATIONS

Śobhākara has composed a complex work on aesthetics. He shows little interest in engaging the theory of affective suggestion *(dhvani),* but instead analyses in detail the types of cognition affecting the reader, the poet, and the imaginary characters created by the poet in various figures of speech. This paper focuses on an issue that was central to his endeavour: the use of aberrant or deflected cognition to differentiate certain types of *alaṅkāra*s. We will limit our investigation to just three figures of speech in view of the prolixity of the arguments: the Erroneous *(bhrāntimat),* the Assumption *(utprekṣā)* and the Hyperbolic *(atiśayokti).* In both Ruyyaka's and Śobhākara's works these three figures are introduced in a group of related figures of speech where similarly deflected cognitions are prominent[12] (summarized in the table below to show their relationship).[13]

Ornament	Śobhākara's Definition	Ruyyaka's Definition
Apahnuti The Concealed	29: *viṣayasya mukhyasya vāpahnave 'nyavidhiḥ,* An alternative mode when the target or the principal are concealed	20: *viṣayāpahnave,* When the target is concealed
Sandeha The Doubtful	30: *tasyāpi sandihyamānatve,* When the target is being doubted	17: *viṣayasya sandihyamānatve,* When the target is being doubted

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[12] The important technical terms *viṣaya* and *viṣayin* are here translated as target and source. In a simple metaphor, for example: "Her face is the moon!", the face is the *viṣaya* or target, and the moon is the *viṣayin* or source.

[13] Ruyyaka does not see this as a discrete group. Rudraṭa, the first to classify figures according to underlying principles, had grouped them under the four headings [1.] *vāstava* (factuality), [2.] *aupamya* (similitude), [3.] *atiśaya* (hyperbole) and [4.] *śleṣa* (convergence of meaning). Ruyyaka classified figures of meaning into nine groups: [1.] *sādṛśya* (similarity), [2.] *gamyatva* (implication), [3.] *virodha* (contradiction), [4.] *śṛṅkhalābandha* (chain-like sequences), [5.] *tarkanyāya,* [6.] *kāvyanyāya,* [7.] *lokanyāya,* [8.] *gūḍhārthapratīti* (communicating a concealed meaning), [9.] *rasādayaḥ* (sentiment based).

Ornament	Śobhākara's Definition	Ruyyaka's Definition
Vitarka The Deliberation	31: *sambhāvitasambhāvyamānā-pohaḥ,* Exclusion of an entity that has been or is being suspected	—
Utprekṣā **The Assumption/** **Identifying**	32: *viṣayitvena sambhāvanam,* Assuming of the target as the source	21: *adhyavasāye vyāpā-raprādhānye,* When the process of identifying ascertainment predominates
Bhrāntimat **The Erroneous**	33: *anyarūpatayā niścayaḥ,* Ascertainment of the target as something else	18: *sādṛśyād vastvanta-rapratītiḥ,* Cognition of something other due to similarity
Ullekha The Profiling	34: *ekasyānekadhā kalpanam,* Contrivance of a single thing in many ways	19: *ekasyāpi nimittava-śād anekadhā graha-ṇam,* Perceiving a single thing as manifold because of an occasioning factor
Pratibhā The Intuition	35: *sambhāvyamānasya* [*kalpa-nam*], Hypothesis of an imagined entity	—
Kriyātipatti The Conditional	36: *yadyarthoktāv asambhāvya-mānasya* [*kalpanam*], [The hypothesis] of an unlikely thing conditioned by the statement of a word meaning "If"	—
Atiśayokti **The Hyperbolic**	37: *adhyavasānam,* Identifying ascertainment	22: *adhyavasitaprādhā-nye tu,* When, conversely [to 21], the identifyingly ascertained predominates

Ruyyaka's and Śobhākara's analysis of such deflected cognitions in poetry presupposes an intersubjectivity involving three different types of perceivers. [1.] The poet may imagine an agent who doubts, mistakes, or imagines etc. [2.] The poet himself or herself may doubt, imagine etc. [3.] The reader may doubt, imagine etc. To be able to analyse a poem along the lines of Ruyyaka or Śobhākara we therefore also need to know what each of these perceivers knows. That is to say, do they know what other agents know? What is their degree of positive and negative introspection, i.e., are the agents aware of what they themselves know or do not know? As I show below, Ruyyaka makes an essential distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic aberrant cognitions. He seeks to exclude the former, epistemic errors, from poetic discourse as too mundane: they do not inherently encapsulate the kind of strikingness *(vicchitti)* that arises from poetic insight. By non-epistemic he does not mean the ineffable qualia of cognition *(bhoga)*, but rather doxastic or thetic types of cognition *(abhimāna)*.

2. INTERSUBJECTIVITY, EPISTEMIC FAILURE AND DOXASTIC ERROR

Our authors agree that the figure of speech called the Erroneous is dependent on the first of the above mentioned three types of perceivers (i.e. an agent imagined by the poet), but disagree on whether epistemic errors can be allowed in *bhrāntimat*. *Bhrāntimat* (lit. "abounding in error")[14] was first defined by the Kashmirian *alaṅkārika* Rudraṭa. In his view, it requires a perceiver *(pratipattṛ)* who, when he is perceiving one thing, without doubting grasps instead another, similar thing.[15] Close to this is Mammaṭa's definition in the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, which may be approximated as: "Cognition of X when perceiving Y which is similar to X."[16] Ruyyaka

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[14] The suffix *matup* is added in the sense of plurality or abundance *(bhūman)*. See the discussion in *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* 3.38: **bhrāntimān** *iti bhūmni matup | bhūmārtho dvividho bahūnāṃ bhrāntīnām ekaviṣayato bhinnaviṣayāṇāṃ vā samānakartṛtā | ādyo bhrāntimato viṣayo, dvitīyo bhrāntimālāyāḥ |.*

[15] *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 8.87: *arthaviśeṣaṃ paśyann avagacched anyam eva tatsadṛśaṃ | niḥsandehaṃ yasmin pratipattā bhrāntimān sa iti ‖.*

[16] *Kāvyaprakāśa* 10.132cd: *anyasaṃvit tattulyadarśane.* The perceiver making the error, however, need not be human, as Mammaṭa's example makes clear: *kapāle mārjāraḥ paya iti karān leḍhi śaśinas tarucchidraprotān bisam iti karī saṃkalayati | ratānte talpasthān harati vanitāpy aṃśukam iti prabhāmattaś candro jagad idam aho viplavayati ‖552‖.*

(*AlSar* 19) retains the centrality of similarity[17] in his definition: "The perception of a different thing due to similarity."[18] As an example he quotes a verse where parrots make a series of mistakes:[19]

> Hoping the lips,
>> of women whose eyes are like lily petals
>> would be Bimba fruits
> Believing their rich curls to be Utpākajambū [fruits][20]
> Mistaking the red rubies in their earrings for pomegranate kernels
> Your Majesty! The pet parrots of the Gūrjara king
> Darting about repeatedly
> Suddenly collapsed of thirst
> In the desert.[21]

This verse expresses in evasive courtly circumlocution that the Gūrjara king is fleeing into the wilderness with his wives because of his defeat by the king who is being addressed. Ruyyaka expands on his definition in his prose auto-commentary with: "That mode of eloquent expression *(bhaṇiti)*, in which the property of the mind known as error exists, is called the Erroneous."[22] This clarifies that mere epistemic failure, which in itself is simply a property of the mind, is not intended to be an ornament of speech.[23] Ruyyaka specifically seeks to exclude epistemic errors resulting from common types of cognitive dysfunction such as those Dharmakīrti excludes in his definition of perception: "Error resulting from strong blows to the vitals etc. are not within the domain of this ornament."[24]

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[17] *AlSar* 19: *sādṛśyaprayuktā ca bhrāntir asya viṣayaḥ,* "Its domain is error employed [by the poet] due to similarity."

[18] Ibid*.: sādṛśyād vastvantarapratītir bhrāntimān ‖.*

[19] Already Rudraṭa had introduced an additional perceiver *(pratipattṛ)*, sometimes even an animal, who makes an error in *bhrāntimat.*

[20] Ripe or cooked rose-apple fruits?

[21] Ibid.: *oṣṭhe bimbaphalāśayālam alakeṣūtpākajambūdhiyā karṇālaṃkṛtibhāji dāḍimaphalabhrāntyā ca śoṇe maṇau | niṣpattyāsakṛdutpalacchadadṛśām āttaklamānāṃ marau rājan gūrjararājapañjaraśukaiḥ sadyastṛṣā mūrcchitam ‖.*

[22] Ibid*.: bhrāntiś cittadharmaḥ vidyate yasmin bhaṇitiprakāre sa bhrāntimān |.*

[23] Jayaratha explains that therefore the presence of error in the ornament of speech is to be understood figuratively; *Vimarśinī* 19: *nanu bhrāntiś cittadharmaḥ sa yasyāsti sa bhrāntimān iti vaktuṃ nyāyyaṃ tat katham alaṃkārasyaitad abhidhānam ity āśaṅkya – āha **bhrāntir** ityādi | sa iti bhaṇitiprakāraḥ | ataś cālaṃkāre bhrāntisadbhāva* (*bhrāntisadbhāva*] KM_ED*, bhrāntimacchabdaḥ* Ka) *upacarita iti bhāvaḥ |.*

[24] Ibid.: *gāḍhamarmaprahārādinā tu bhrāntir nāsyālaṅkārasya viṣayaḥ |.*

Among triggers for such mechanical dysfunction Dharmakīrti in-
cludes at *Nyāyabindu* 1.6 the *timira* eye-disease which distorts per-
ceptions, rapid movement which makes a whirling firebrand ap-
pear like a circle, travelling on a boat which makes trees appear to
move, and a disturbance of the humours *(saṃkṣobha)*.[25] Ruyyaka
gives examples of the last of these, a misperception caused by a
gāḍhamarmaprahāra,[26] a violent blow to the vitals.

> Cāṇūramalla,
>> his whole chest smashed
>> by a punch from Kṛṣṇa
> saw a hundred moons in the sky.[27]

We may compare this with a parallel idiom in English of "seeing
stars." For Ruyyaka there is no outstanding artistic beauty *(vichitti)*
in a depiction of such mechanically triggered misperception, and
the above verse therefore does not exemplify the Erroneous. Ra-
ther, he emphasises the exigency of a remarkable error constructed
by the imagination of a poet who has eloquently brought to light a
similarity.

> On the other hand, an error which is also based on similarity, is perceiv-
> ed as arising directly from the poet's imagination for the sake of strik-
> ingness, as has been demonstrated [in the verse preceding the above
> verse]. But it is not so for a naturally arising *(svarasotthāpita-)* [episte-
> mic error] as it occurs in the case of silver[28] and mother-of-pearl.[29]

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[25] *Nyāyabindu* 1.6: *tayā rahitaṃ timirāśubhramaṇanauyānasaṃkṣobhādyanāhi-
    tavibhramaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam |*.

[26] This is the exact phrase used to gloss *saṃkṣobha* in the *Tarkabhāṣā* 13.13: **gā-
    ḍhamarmaprahārahatasya** *jvalatstambhādi pratibhāsi jñānaṃ ca na pratya-
    kṣam ity uktaṃ bhavati | nanu yadi nāma tajjñānaṃ na pratyakṣaṃ kathaṃ tato
    vastuprāptir iti cet, na tato vastuprāptiḥ | kiṃ tarhi, jñānāntarād eveti ke cit ||*
    [so Dharmottara]. As we will see below, Jayaratha connects the exclusion ra-
    ther to a discussion in *Pramāṇavārttika (pratyakṣapariccheda)* 3.282.

[27] *AlSar* 19: *dāmodarakarāghātacūrṇitāśeṣavakṣasā | dṛṣṭaṃ cāṇūramallena śa-
    tacandraṃ nabhastalam ||*. Incidentally, the final *pāda* is also a famous *sama-
    syāpūraṇa*.

[28] Ruyyaka concludes the discussion by adding: *evaṃ sthāṇur vā syāt puruṣo vā
    syād iti saṃśaye 'pi boddhavyam |*. "This [principle] should be understood to
    extend also to doubt, which takes the form: 'Is this a man or a wooden
    post?'." This is a reference back to the definition of *sandeha*, the Dubious, at
    AlSar 18, where similarly only an imaginatively creative doubt is admitted,
    and not a mechanical failure due to poor lighting conditions or remoteness etc.

This introduces aspects of voluntarism (*svārasika* vs. *utpādya*) and doxastic conditions (*abhimāna*) into the investigation. For Śobhā-kara, aesthetic cognitions can be *svārasika (svarasataḥ, svarasot-thāpita,* "naturally ocurring") or *utpādya, (utpādita, utthāpita, pra-tibhotthāpita, prayojanapara,* "intentionally evoked"). The *Alaṅkā-raśāstra* usage[30] of these terms is probably indebted to Ānandavar-dhana's distinction of implicit *vākyārtha*s into either *svataḥsam-bhavin* or *kaviprauḍhoktimātrasiddha*.[31] A *vākyārtha* that reveals a second meaning (or situation) can be either inherently plausible *(svataḥsambhavin)*, or it can be imagined by a creative poet *kavi-prauḍhoktimātrasiddha* (or, adding poetic intersubjectivity, ima-gined by a character imagined by the poet).[32] While discussing the figure of *ullekha*, Śobhākara predicates the *svārasika* and *utpādya* modes on cognition (*pratipatti*), and this draws a response from Ja-yaratha, who cites Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's theory of cognition. Generally, for Śobhākara, *svārasika* appears to denote involuntary, automatic, spontaneous, or invariable modes of cognition, whereas *utpādya* denotes volitional, intentionally evoked, telic or paratelic modes of cognition.

In his view, the Erroneous is not concerned with the mechan-ism of epistemic malfunction, but rather with the reader's appreci-ation of how the poet ventures to insinuate what the agent imagin-ed in a poem believes to be happening. It is also important that the reader and the poet share the same degree of omniscience relative to the situation (we know what is really happening), whereas the imagined agent in the poem does not.

Śobhākara contests nearly everything of substance that Ruyyaka asserts about the Erroneous. It is he who first breaks with tradition and denies that similarity is necessary in the Erroneous. Let us

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[29] Ibid.: *sādṛśyahetukāpi bhrāntir vicchittyarthaṃ kavipratibhotthāpitaiva gṛhya-te yathodāhṛtam | na svarasotthāpitā śuktikārajatavat |.*

[30] For other usages see, e.g., FRESCHI 2012, p. 339 on the distinction between *svārasikākāṅkṣā* and *utthāpitākāṅkṣā*.

[31] *Dhvanyāloka* 2.24: *prauḍhoktimātraniṣpannaśarīraḥ sambhavī svataḥ | artho 'pi dvividho jñeyo vastuno 'nyasya dīpakaḥ ‖.*

[32] *Dhvanyāloka* 2.24, *Vṛtti*: *svataḥsambhavī ya aucityena bahir api sambhāvya-mānasadbhāvo na kevalaṃ bhaṇitivaśenaivābhiniṣpannaśarīraḥ |* Mammaṭa *Kāvyaprakāsa* 4.9: *svataḥsambhavī na kevalaṃ bhaṇitimātraniṣpanno yāvad bahir apy aucityena saṃbhāvyamānaḥ | kavinā pratibhāṇamātreṇa bahir asann api nirmitaḥ kavinibaddhena vaktreti vā dvividho 'para iti trividhaḥ |.*

look at how he arrives at this conclusion. At first he appears to follow Ruyyaka's lead:

> *AlRat* (fol. 77ʳ K$_R$, 52 P$_{Ed}$): *anyarūpatayā niścayo bhrāntimān* ‖33‖
> *viṣayasyānyarūpasyāpi rūpāntaratvenāsamyagabhimānarūpo niścayo*
> *bhrāntimān | udāharaṇam –*
>
> > *pusiā kaṇṇāharaṇendaṇīla*[33]*kiraṇāhaā sasimaūhā*[34] *|*
> > *māṇiṇivaäṇammi*[35] *sakajjalaṃsusaṅkāe*[36] *daïeṇa*[37] ‖164‖
>
> (*Gāhākosa* 302)[38]
>
> *atra sādṛśyahetukā bhrāntiḥ |*

The Erroneous is the ascertainment [of the *viṣaya*] as having a different form [than its own]. The Erroneous is an ascertainment which is a non-veridical (*asamyag*), doxastic cognition (*abhimāna*)[39] of a target (*viṣaya*) as having a certain form even though it [factually] has another form. An example:

> Her lover wiped away the moonbeams
> darkened by sapphire rays from her earrings
> on the face of the sulking woman,
> in the belief that they were kohl-stained tears.

Here we have a case of error caused by similarity.

In explaining the Erroneous as a non-veridical, doxastic alternative cognition that supplants a veridical cognition, Śobhākara uses the term *abhimāna* to designate a kind of make-believe that does not correspond to reality.[40] In this he appears to be following Ruyya-

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[33]　°*ṇīla*°] P$_{Ed}$, °*nīla*° K$_R$.

[34]　*sasimaūhā*] P$_{Ed}$, *sasimarūhā* K$_R$.

[35]　°*vaäṇammi*] P$_{Ed}$, °*vaäṇāhi* K$_R$.

[36]　*saṅkāe*] P$_{Ed}$, *saṅkāï* K$_R$.

[37]　*Gāhākosa* 302: *pusiā kaṇṇāharaṇeṃdaṇīlakiraṇāhaā sasimaūhā | māṇiṇivaä-ṇammi sakajjalaṃsusaṃkāī daïeṇa* ‖; *Vimarśinī* 19: *bimbapratibimbabhāvo yathā "pusiā kaṇṇāharaṇendaṇīlakiraṇāhaā sasima hā | māṇiṇivaäṇammi sakajjalaṃ susaṅkāe daïeṇa* ‖" (*Chāyā: proñchitāḥ karṇābharaṇendranīlakiraṇāhṛtāḥ śaśimayūkhā | māninīvadane sakajjalāśruśaṅkayā dayitena*) *atra sakajjalatvendranīlakiraṇāhatatvayor bimbabhāvaḥ | sādṛśyanimittakatvam eva cāsya draḍhayituṃ pratyudāharati gāḍhetyādinā |*).

[38]　*Chāyā* (slightly modified): *proñchitāḥ karṇābharaṇendranīlakiraṇāhatāḥ śaśi-mayūkhāḥ | māninīvadane sakajjalāśruśaṅkayā dayitena* ‖.

[39]　I.e., a non-veridical, doxastic cognition called an *abhimāna*.

[40]　That is, *abhimāna* is intended in the Naiyāyika sense of mistaken belief as explained in the commentaries to *Nyāyasūtra* 4.2.31: *svapnaviṣayābhimānavad ayam pramāṇaprameyābhimānaḥ.* For the likelihood that Śobhākara was a

ka's lead in shifting his focus beyond epistemic failure.[41] Ruyyaka
would concur that the Prakrit verse exemplifies the Erroneous, for
the similarity between the moonbeams and the tears is based on an
imaginatively perceived similarity. Śobhākara proceeds, however,
to argue that Ruyyaka's definition is too narrow, for neither is si-
milarity a prerequisite, nor is intense emotional shock to be ex-
cluded.

> *AlRat* (cont.): *tadanyanimittā yathā –*
>> *prāsāde sā pathi pathi ca sā pṛṣṭhataḥ sā puraḥ sā*
>> *paryaṅke sā diśi diśi ca sā tadviyogāturasya* |
>> *haṃho cetaḥ prakṛtir aparā nāsti te[42] kāpi sā sā*
>> *sā sā sā sā jagati sakale ko 'yam advaitavādaḥ* ‖165‖
> (*Amaruśataka* 105)
> *atra[43] gāḍharāgānubhavahetukaṃ[44] tanmayatānusaṃdhānaṃ prāsādāder*
> *vallabhārūpatvena pratītau nimittam* |

> The Erroneous with a different cause is as follows:
>> For him, anguished by separation from her –
>> The terrace: She[45]
>> Every path: She
>> To the side: She
>> Ahead: She
>> The bed: She
>> Everywhere: She
>> Alas, O heart! There is no other material for you whatsoever
>> The whole world: She she she she she she!

Naiyāyika, see below.

[41] In the intellectual milieu of our Kashmirian authors, however, the term *abhi-*
māna does not come without its own baggage. For Ruyyaka and Jayaratha, as
adherents of Śaiva non-dualism, *abhimāna* can in the context of ritual identifi-
cation with a deity correspond to reality. Kṣemarāja commenting on *Svac-*
chandatantra 4.423 glosses *abhimāna* with "certain cognition" (*abhimānaṃ* =
niścitāṃ pratipattiṃ). However, this is not an issue they would debate in a
general śāstric discourse.

[42] *te*] K_R, *me* P_Ed.

[43] *atra*] P_Ed, *atra ca* K_R.

[44] *gāḍharāgānubhavahetukaṃ*]. Cf. *AlSar: gāḍhamarmaprahārādinā tu bhrāntir*
nāsyālaṅkārasya viṣayaḥ; Cf. Pramāṇavārttika (*pratyakṣapariccheda*) 3.282
cited by Jayaratha ad loc.: *kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ* |
abhūtān api paśyanti purato 'vasthitān iva ‖.

[45] This translation follows Śobhākara's commentary that takes the speaker to be
identifying the terrace etc. with his beloved.

> What is this philosophy of non-dualism?
> Here a cognitive synthesis of identity, caused by an experience of intense passion, functions as the occasioning cause for the cognition of the mansion etc. as having the form of the beloved.

Śobhākara interprets Amaru's verse – the final verse in most recensions – to be saying that the love-sick speaker actually misperceives completely unrelated everyday objects to be his beloved. This extreme cognitive deviancy is possible because of the derangement caused by the speaker's intense lovesickness, and the figure of speech remains, in contrast to Ruyyaka, the Erroneous. He continues with two further examples:

> *evaṃ ca* – (P$_{Ed}$ 53, K$_R$ 77^v)
> *durjanadūṣitamanasāṃ puṃsāṃ sujane 'pi nāsti viśvāsaḥ ǀ*
> *bālaḥ pāyasadagdho dadhy api phūtkṛtya bhakṣayati ǁ166ǁ[46]*
> *"devam[47] api harṣaṃ pitṛśokavihvalīkṛtaṃ śriyaṃ śāpa iti mahīṃ mahā-*
> *pātakam iti rājyaṃ roga iti bhogān bhujagā[48] iti nilayaṃ niraya ityādi*
> *manyamānam" ityādau sādṛśyanimittavinābhāvisvaśokādinimittabhede[49]*
> *'pi nālaṅkārāntarabuddhiḥ kāryā ǀ pratītibhede hy alaṅkārabhedo yukto*
> *na nimittabhede 'laṅkārānantyaprasaṅgāt ǀ tadbhede tu kavipratibhotthā-*
> *pitavicchittisadbhāve 'ntarbhāva eva nyāyyaḥ ǀ*

Equally [not based on similarity is the following]:
> People deceived by the wicked trust not even the good.
> A child burnt by [hot] milk blows upon even yoghurt before eating.

In an example such as: "[Eminent persons surrounded] King Harṣa, who, overwhelmed by the grief of his father['s death], considered wealth to be a curse, the earth to be a great sin, sovereignty to be a disease, pleasures to be serpents, the palace to be a hell, and so on," even though there is a

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[46] This verse can be found in: *Subhāṣitaratnakośa* 38.12 (1265), *Subhāṣitāvali* 390, *Hitopadeśa* 4.110.

[47] *Harṣacarita* 5, p.34 (28) [p. 239 (4)]: *devam api harṣaṃ tadavasthaṃ pitṛśo-kavihvalīkṛtam, śriyaṃ śāpa iti mahīṃ mahāpātakam iti rajyaṃ roga iti bho-gān bhujaṅgā iti nilayaṃ niraya iti bandhuṃ bandhanam iti jīvitam ayaśa iti dehaṃ droha iti kalyatāṃ kalaṅka ity āyur apuṇyaphalam iti āhāraṃ viṣam iti viṣam amṛtam iti candanaṃ dahana iti kāmaṃ krakaca iti hṛdayasphoṭanam abhyudaya iti ca manyamānam... kulaputrāḥ... paurāṇikāḥ paryavārayan.* Śaṅ-kara ad loc: **devam** *ityādau devam api harṣam evaṃvidhā janāḥ paryavāra-yann iti sambandhaḥ ǀ.*

[48] *bhujagā*] P$_{Ed}$, *bhujaga* K$_R$.

[49] °*nimittavinābhāvisva*°] conj.*,* °*nimittāvinābhāvisva*° K$_R$, °*nimittaṃ vinā bhāvā-vasāya*° (em.) P$_{Ed}$.

different type of occasioning cause,[50] namely personal grief etc., which does not presuppose causation by similarity, there should not arise the notion that it is a different figure of speech. A differentiation of figures of speech makes sense when there occurs a difference of cognition, not when a different occasioning cause occurs, because of the unwarranted consequence that an infinitude of figures of speech would arise. When there is such a difference [of cognition] then there is just cause for an inclusion in the proper category of strikingness contrived by the imagination of the poet.

In this example there is no immediate similarity between wicked people and good people, or between hot milk and yoghurt. In the second example too, similarity is not involved in the phenomena Harṣa mistakes for each other. Nevertheless, the rhetorical ornament still conforms, for Śobhākara, to the strictures laid down for the Erroneous. He therefore concludes that occasioning factors such as similarity should not be used to distinguish figures of speech. In any case, there are too many such factors in poetic language to make this a feasible undertaking. Rather, at least in the present context, he wishes to base separate figures of speech on different types of cognition.

Jayaratha endeavours to defend Ruyyaka by disputing that similarity can be absent in the Erroneous. Rather than *Nyāyabindu* 1.6, he takes Ruyyaka and Śobhākara to be referring to *Pramāṇavārtika* 3.282 (a much quoted verse originally intended to corroborate yogic perception) which he cites:[51]

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[50] "Occasioning cause" here translates *nimitta*. Śobhākara points out that it would be impossible to exhaustively enumerate all the occasioning factors that could generate a simile. Where the early *alaṅkārika* Daṇḍin (*Kāvyādarśa* 2.29-39 etc.) multiplies simile types, enumerating such types as: *samānopamā*, *nindopamā*, *praśaṃsopamā*, *ācikhyāsopamā*, *virodhopamā*, *pratiṣedhopamā*, *caṭūpamā*, *tattvākhyānopamā*, *asādhāraṇopamā*, *abhūtopamā*, *asaṃbhāvitopamā*, later rhetoricians such as Mammaṭa sought to find global categories to subsume such open-ended diversity.

[51] *Vimarśinī* 19: **sādṛśyaprayukte**ti | na tu "*kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnā-dyupaplutāḥ | abhūtān api paśyanti purato 'vasthitān iva*" ‖ (45). Cf. *Pramā-ṇavārttika* (*pratyakṣapariccheda*) 3.282 (=*Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.29). Manora-thanandin comments: *kāmaś ca śokaś ca bhayaṃ ca tair unmādāś caurasvapnādayaś ceti kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādibhir upaplutā bhrāntās te 'bhūtān apy arthān bhāvanāvaśāt purato 'vasthitān iva paśyanti yasmāt tad-anurūpaṃ pravṛttiṃ ceṣṭante* ‖.

> Those assailed by passion, grief, fear, drunkenness, dreams of(/or) thieves, and so on, perceive non-existent things as if they were right before them.

Jayaratha repeats Ruyyaka's judgment that misperceptions caused by intense conditions cannot be accommodated in the Erroneous, and he contradicts Śobhākara's interpretation of the final verse of the *Amaruśataka.* The poet, he claims, intended something quite different, and the figure of speech must be identified as the Particular *(viśeṣa),* where a single thing is perceived multiply, and not as the Erroneous. Rather than actually perceiving the beloved as being the terrace, the road etc., he intends that the lovesick speaker sees one woman in many places at once, we might say that he sees her everywhere.

> Here an identifying cognitive synthesis of one finite woman, caused by intense passion, is the occasioning cause for [her] simultaneous perception on the terrace, [the road,] etc. Therefore it is not a case of the Erroneous, for that would involve a cognition of the terrace etc. as being the beloved. The Erroneous is defined as a non-ascertainment of the correct construal by taking X as Y. And since the terrace, and so on, are not perceived as the beloved, this is a clear case of the Particular *(viśeṣa).*[52] If one were to argue that there is a misperception due to seeing the beloved on the terrace and so on even though she is not there, then that is wrong. For in that case we would have here a bare epistemic mistake and not a figure of speech. There emerges a series of cognitions of a woman on the terrace etc., even though she is not there, by the force of intense passion as the occasioning cause, and this happens through inherent cognitive malfunction *(svarasataḥ),* because it is not contrived by the poet's imagination.[53]

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[52] This is also what Ruyyaka identifies the ornament in this verse as in his discussion of the Particular (*AlSar* 50: *anādhāram ādheyam ekam anekagocaram aśakyavastvantarakaraṇaṃ viśeṣaḥ*), where it exemplifies a single thing having a multitude as its scope. He explains: *ekasyā eva yoṣitaḥ prāsādādau yugapadavasthānam.*

[53] *Vimarśinī* 19: *ity atraikasyā eva parimitāyā api yoṣito gāḍhānurāgahetukaṃ tanmayatānusaṃdhānaṃ prāsādādāv anekatra yugapatpratītau nimittam iti na bhrāntimadalaṃkāraḥ | sa hi prāsādāder vallabhārūpatvena pratītau syāt | anyasyānyarūpatvena samyagabhidhānātmāniścayo hi bhrāntimallakṣaṇam | na ca prāsādādir vallabhātvena pratīyate iti sphuṭa evāyaṃ viśeṣālaṅkārasya viṣayaḥ | atha prasādādāv abhūtāyā api vallabhāyā darśanād bhrāntir iti cet, naitat | evaṃ hy atra bhrāntimātraṃ syān nālaṃkāraḥ | gāḍhānurāgātmakanimittasāmarthyāt svarasata eva prāsādādāv asatyā api yuvatyāḥ pratītisamul-*

Yet this is exactly what Śobhākara had said is happening.[54] The lovesick speaker misperceives the terrace, etc., to be his beloved. Jayaratha does not address this other than by flatly denying that this is what the poet can have meant. Without a clear justification this remains just a personal opinion on the degree of derangement the speaker is experiencing, and Śobhākara could simply reply by stating his personal opinion to the contrary. Jayaratha finds similar tendentious faults of interpretation with the other examples Śobhākara's has provided. But let us return to Śobhākara's analysis of the Erroneous to see how he evaluates Ruyyaka's definition.

> *yadi ca "sādṛśyād vastvantarapratītir bhrāntimān"*[55] *ity avyāpakaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ tarhi vyāpakaṃ lakṣaṇāntaraṃ vidheyam, na tv alaṅkārāntaram upasaṅkhyeyam | sādṛśyavyatiriktanimittotthāpitāyāṃ ca bhrāntau vicchittiviśeṣasadbhāve*[56] *kathaṃ nāmānalaṃkāratā*[57] *| alaṅkāratve ca kim iti bhrāntimadbahirbhāvaḥ |...*

> And if the definition [provided by Ruyyaka]: "The Erroneous is the perception of a different thing due to similarity" is too narrow, then a different, wider definition must be provided, but one should not add another ornament [instead]. And when a specific strikingness is present in a misperception arising from an occasioning cause other than similarity, how could it not be a poetic ornament? And if it must be an ornament how could it be extraneous to the Erroneous?

After determining that similarity is not the only occasioning cause for the Erroneous, Śobhākara can criticize Ruyyaka's definition for being too limited. He reiterates that distinct cognitions must underlie individual figures of speech in two summary verses:

> *sandehasambhāvanayor yathāsti pratītibhedaḥ sphuṭa eva tadvat |* (fol. 78ʳ KR)
> *sādṛśyahetvantarayor bhrameṣu na leśataḥ kvāpi viśeṣabuddhiḥ ||*
> *pratītibhedena vinā na vācyaḥ kutrāpy alaṅkāragataś ca bhedaḥ |*
> *nimittabhedena ca bhinnatāyāṃ prasajyate sā khalu saṃśayādau ||*

We have no cognition of a distinction whatsoever as regards errors, whether [their] cause is similarity or something else, in the way that we have a clear difference of cognition between doubt and assumption. Without a difference of cognition one can in no case assert a difference of a figure of speech. And if [there would be a] difference of cognitions due to difference in causes, this [having different cognitions] would apply to doubt and so on [as well].[58]

3. Competing Typologies

The above discussion reveals that the main disagreement between Śobhākara and Ruyyaka concerns their rival typologies of cognition (*pratītibheda*). Under what headings can deflected cognitions be subsumed? Śobhākara lays out his schema as part of his definition of the figure of speech called the Assumption (*utprekṣā*). In agreement with earlier theorists, he sees this as grounded on a surmise (*saṃbhāvana*).[59] This reverts to an earlier consensus that Ruyyaka sought to overturn by claiming that the Assumption depends not on supposition, but that it arises rather when the predominant focus falls on the process of identifying ascertainment (*adhyavasāya*).[60] In the expression: "the anklet remained mute, as if in grief of separation from your foot,"[61] the target (*viṣaya*) is the anklet, and it is assumed, through a process of identification occurring as a part of cognition, that it is instead the source (*viṣayin*), in this case a conscious agent capable of speech, from whence derives its seeming ability to choose to remain mute. For Śobhākara the key feature of this cognitive deflection is an assumption (supposition, surmise) that the target is the source.

    AlRat 32, P$_{Ed}$ 47, K$_R$ 74^v l. 3: *viṣayitvena saṃbhāvanam utprekṣā*[62] ‖32‖

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[58] That is, doubt or imagination are different types of cognitions (*pratītibheda*), and each one of these is itself differentiated by occasioning factors (*nimittabheda*). For example, a doubt may arise from a similarity or from multiplicity.

[59] For an insightful recent discussion of this figure in the *AlSar* see Shulman 2012.

[60] *AlSar* 22: *adhyavasāye vyāpāraprādhānya utprekṣā*. On the Śaiva understanding of *adhyavasāya*, and how it differs from that of the Buddhists, see Kawajiri 2011.

[61] Śobhākara discusses the same standard example as Ruyyaka, *Raghuvaṃśa* 13.23.

[62] *utprekṣā*] P$_{Ed}$, *u*[*tpre*]+ K$_R$.

viṣayitvenārthād viṣayasya saṃbhāvanaṃ "bhavitavyam anena sthāṇu-nā" ityādyaniścayātmakohatarkādi[63]-śabdābhidheyasaṃbhāvanā[64]-pra-tyayaviṣayīkṛtatvam utprekṣā | ataś cāniścayātmakatayā saṃbhāvanāyāḥ saṃdehamūlatvaṃ na tv adhyavasāyagarbhatā |

Supposition [of the target] as the source is the Assumption. Surmise (*saṃbhāvanam*), that is to say of the target (*viṣaya*), as being the source (*viṣayin*), is the Assumption (*utprekṣā*). It is the condition of being made the object of a cognition that is a supposition, designated by words such as deliberation, speculation and so on,[65] which are not ascertainments, as in the example: "This must be a post." Therefore, *saṃbhāvanā* is based on doubt because it is a form of non-ascertainment, but it is not based on determination.

Śobhākara's main critique is that imagination cannot be based on a positive form of determining and ascertaining cognition as Ruyya-ka claims, but that it must rather be based on doubt. An example of an ascertainment would be: "This is a post," and a doubt would be: "Is this a post or a man?". In a speculation, the situation is: "This surely must be a post!". Śobhākara would prefer to classify the As-sumption as a form of doubt. He then contextualises this type of doubt further:

tathāhi saṃdehaniścayarūpatvena pratyayānāṃ dvaividhyam | niścayaś ca[66] yathārthāvyabhicārī[67] samyakpratyayaḥ | vyabhicārī tv asamyak | ta-tra tāvad utprekṣāyā[68] na samyaktvam[69] | arthāvyabhicārābhāvāt | nāpy asamyakpratyayarūpo viparyāsaḥ, tasya niścaya[70]rūpatvāt | asyāṃ ca śābdenāpi vṛttena bhrāntimadatiśayoktyādivad viṣayiṇo niścayābhāvāt |

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[63]   °*niścayātmakohatarkādi*°] em., °++[yā]tma[ko]hatarkādi° KR, °*niścayātma-kavitarkādi*° PEd.

[64]   °*saṃbhāvanā*°] PEd, °*sambhavana*° KR.

[65]   *ūhatarkādi-*] *Cf. Gītārthasaṃgraha* of Abhinavagupta 4.34 for a list of syno-nyms involving *ūha* and *tarka*: *...papraśnena ūhāpohatarkavitarkādibhiḥ...* PEd in this place reads *vitarka*, a variant that is less plausible since Śobhākara accepts the existence of an independent *alaṅkāra* called *vitarka*. Cf. also e.g. ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 101: *...ūhanaṃ tarkaṇaṃ saṃbhāvanam iti...*

[66]   *ca*] PEd, *cā*° KR.

[67]   *yathārthāvyabhicārī*] PEd, ++[rth]*āvyabhicārī* KR.

[68]   *tāvad utprekṣāyā*] KRpc, *tāvad utprekṣā* PEd KRac.

[69]   *samyaktvam*] PEd, *sa*[myaktva]*m* KR.

[70]   *niścaya*°] PEd, *ni*[śca]*ya*° KR.

aniścitaṃ[71] *ca*[72] *saṃdigdham evety avivādaḥ | ata eva nādhyavasāyamū-latvam asyāḥ | tasya viṣayanigaraṇaṃ viṣayiniścayaś ca*[73] *svarūpam | na cātraikam api sambhavati viṣayopādānāt, niścayābhāvāc ca*[74] *| tena "adhyavasāye vyāpāraprādhānya utprekṣā" iti lakṣaṇam aparyālocitā-bhidhānam eva |*

To explain further, cognitions are twofold because they can take the form of doubt or ascertainment. Ascertainment, which does not deviate from factual reality, is veridical cognition. That which deviates is non-veridical. The Assumption is not veridical, because of the absence of non-deviation from factual reality. Nor is [the Assumption] a misperception in the form of a non-veridical cognition, because that consists in an ascertainment. But in the Assumption (*asyāṃ*) there is an absence of the ascertainment of the source (*viṣayin*) even verbally, just as there is in the Erroneous (*bhrāntimat*)[75] and the Hyperbole (*atiśayokti*). And nobody disputes that an uncertain cognition is doubtful. Therefore the Assumption cannot be based on identifying ascertainment (*adhyavasāya*), the essence of which is a devouring of the target and an ascertainment of the source. And in the present case not even one of these is possible, because the target is present and ascertainment is lacking. Therefore the definition: "The Assumption occurs when the process predominates in an identifying ascertainment," is ill-considered.

Śobhākara here makes the claim that it is universally accepted that uncertain cognition (*aniścita*) is doubtful.

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[71] *aniścitaṃ*] K_R, *aniścite* P_Ed.

[72] *ca*] P_Ed K_R^pc, omitted K_R^ac.

[73] °*niścayaś ca*] P_Ed K_R^pc, °*niścaya*° K_R.

[74] °*ābhāvāc ca*] P_Ed, °[*ā*]*bhā*+[*cca*] K_R.

[75] In the Erroneous it is the target (*viṣaya*) that is misperceived as something else, but it is not mistaken for the source (*viṣayin*).

Figure 2: Śobhākara's typology of cognition

Given the importance epistemology plays in Śobhākara's system it is not surprising that Jayaratha subsequently singled out his cognitive typology for a detailed critique.[76] Jayaratha denies the introduction of veridicality, that is, the categories of *samyak* and *na samyak*, determined by the presence or absence of cognitive deviation (*vyabhicāra*), into this paradigm. He takes a step back and charges that Śobhākara has missed the bigger picture.[77] Ruyyaka's definition of the Assumption appeals not to the result of cognition, but rather to the underlying bare process of cognising (*pratītivṛttimātra*) that itself enables us to determine cognitive validity.

> *Vimarśinī* 54 KM, 78ᵛ l.14 K_SV: *iha hi niścayāniścayarūpatvena pratyayānāṃ dvaividhyam, niścayaś cārthāvyabhicārī samyag anyathā tv asamyag iti bhedo[78] na grāhyaḥ | pratītivṛttimātrasyaiveha vicārayitum upakrāntatvāt, tasya ca prāmāṇyavicāra upayogāt |*

> In this case one should not adopt a classification of cognitions into two kinds: ascertainment and non-ascertainment, nor [should one accept] that ascertainment is non-deviating and [hence] veridical, and otherwise [cognition] is non-veridical, because here we have begun to evaluate the

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[76] Abhinavagupta too considered *utprekṣā/utprekṣaṇa* as a particular category of cognition. See RATIÉ 2010, pp. 343-344.

[77] Jayaratha does not, for example, engage Śobhākara in the *svataḥ/parataḥ* controversy of intrinsic or extrinsic validity, or any other argument that would even tacitly accept that validity is relevant here.

[78] *bhedo*] KM_ED K_SV, *bhedena* Kha.

bare process of cognition, and that [process itself] enables a deliberation on validity.

Jayaratha proposed a different paradigm of three cognitions that can, he claims, be experientially verified by any literary critic (*sa-hṛdayasākṣika*): ascertainment *(niścaya)*, doubt (*saṃśaya, sandeha*) and deliberation (*tarka, sambhāvanā*). The latter two he classifies under the heading of *aniścaya* (non-ascertainment). Therefore, Śo-bhākara's assertion that non-determination is invariably a doubtful cognition cannot be maintained. This means that for Jayaratha the distinction between doubting (*saṃdigdha*) cognitions and imaginative cognitions (*sambhāvita*), under which he includes conjectural (*tarkita*) cognitions, is much greater than in the paradigm of Śo-bhākara. Śobhākara does not consider doubt and imagination as identical, as Jayaratha seems to insinuate, he merely states that both belong under the heading of doubtful cognition. In his discussion of the Erroneous he even explicitly notes that there is a difference of cognition between doubt and imagination, and this is the reason why we may consider them as the bases of distinct figures of speech. Jayaratha continues:

Vimarśinī cont.: *aniścayaś ca saṃśayatarkarūpatvena dvividhaḥ | ataś cāniścitaṃ ca saṃdigdham eveti na vācyam | tarkātmanaḥ sambhāvanā-pratyayasyāpy aniścayātmakatve saṃdigdhatvābhāvāt | utprekṣā sam-bhāvanādiśabdābhidheyatarkapratītimūleti nāsyāḥ saṃdehamūlatvam | tasya bhinnalakṣaṇatvāt | athānavadhāraṇajñānaṃ[79] saṃśaya ity anava-dhāraṇajñānatvāviśeṣāt saṃśayān nārthāntarabhāvas[80] tarkasyety asyāḥ saṃśayamūlatvam iti cet, naitat | anavadhāraṇajñānatvāviśeṣe 'pi saṃ-śayatarkayor bhinnarūpatvāt |*

Non-ascertainment has two forms: doubt and deliberation. And therefore, it cannot be said that the non-ascertained is invariably doubtful, because an imaginative cognition that is a deliberation (*tarka*) is not doubtful while being a non-ascertainment. The Assumption is based on a cognition that is a deliberation and is designated by terms such as imagining etc., therefore it is not based on doubt, for that is defined differently. You may now argue as follows. Because doubt is a cognition which does not determine its object (*anavadhāraṇa*), therefore deliberation cannot be something different from doubt, since they both have in common that they do not determine their object. Therefore the Assumption is based on

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[79]   *°jñānaṃ*] K$_{SV}$, *°jñāna°* KM$_{ED}$.

[80]   *nārthāntarabhāvas*] K$_{SV}$, *nārthāntarābhāvas* KM$_{ED}$.

doubt. This is wrong, because doubt and deliberation are different even though they are both non-determining cognitions.

The relevant part of the discussion simply confirms that both are in agreement that the Assumption is based on uncertain cognition. Jayaratha then analyses the standard śāstric examples of dubious cognitions.

> *tathāhi – sthāṇur vā puruṣo veti sāmyena*[81] *pakṣadvayollekhaḥ* (79ʳ) *saṃ-śayaḥ | puruṣeṇānena bhavitavyam ity ekatarapakṣānukūlakāraṇadarśanena pakṣāntarabādhanam iva tarkaḥ*[82] *| puruṣa evāyam iti pakṣāntarā*[83]*-saṃsparśenaikatarapakṣanirṇayo niścaya ity asti sahṛdayasākṣikaṃ pratyayānāṃ traividhyam |*

We can summarise this as follows. [1.] In an ascertainment: "This is precisely a man" one alternative is determined without any contact with an alternative. [2.] In a doubting cognition (*saṃśayaḥ*): "It is a post or it is a man" the two alternatives are equally vivid. [3.] In a deliberation *(tarkaḥ)*: "This must be a man" one alternative appears as if annulled by seeing a cause conformable to the other.

Figure 3: Jayarathas's typlogy of three cognitions

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
[81] *sāmyena*] KSV, *sāmānyena* KMED.

[82] Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 18: *sandigdhe 'rthe 'nyatarapakṣānukūlakāraṇadarśanāt tasmin sambhāvanāpratyayas tarkaḥ |*.

[83] *pakṣāntarā°*] KSV, *pakṣāntara°* KMED.

The main disagreements are whether validity is relevant when a cognition is looked at as a bare process that is not yet complete, and whether surmise is a form of doubt or a category of its own.

For Śobhākara the Erroneous, as a form of identifying ascertainment, comes close to other figures of speech that involve ascertainment, most directly to the Hyperbolic (*atiśayokti*). He must therefore establish clear criteria to distinguish the two, and this sheds further light on how he understands his typology of cognitions.

> *AlRat* (80^r K$_R$) *adhyavasānam atiśayoktiḥ* ‖37‖
>
> *viṣayanigaraṇenābhedapratipattir viṣayiṇo 'dhyavasānam* │ *iyaṃ*[84] *cā-bhedapratipattir viṣayānupādāne kevalaviṣayivācakaśabdaprayogabale-na vākyāj jāyata iti śābdī* │ *bhrāntimadādau tu nimittāntareṇātasmiṃs*[85] *tatpratītiḥ pramātrantarasyopajātā vaktrānūdyate na tu janyata*[86] *iti na pratipattiḥ śābdī* │ *iha tu vaktrā supratītir eva tathāvidhā pratipādyata iti śābdī pratipattiḥ*[87] │ *tenāsyās tato bhedaḥ* │
>
> Identifying ascertainment is the Hyperbolic. The cognition of the source (*viṣayin*) as non-different [from the target (*viṣaya*)], by the devouring of the target, is identifying ascertainment. And this cognition of non-difference is verbal (*śābdī*) because – given that the target is not [explicitly] stated – it is generated by the sentence through the force of an expression deployed to denote only the source. In the Erroneous etc., on the other hand, a perception of X with respect to not-X[88] being generated by some other occasioning factor for a different perceiver-agent [located in the text] is restated by the speaker but it is not produced, therefore the cognition is not verbal. But here, a clear cognition of this kind is articulated by the speaker, therefore it is a verbal perception. Thereby it (Hyperbole) is different from it (Erroneous).

It is important to Śobhākara that the doxastic error giving rise to the Erroneous is committed by an imagined character in the poem. It is this central feature that he recapitulates in his summary of the difference between the Erroneous and the Hyperbolic:

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[84] *iyaṃ*] P$_{Ed}$, *idaṃ* K$_R$.

[85] *nimittāntareṇātasmiṃs*] K$_R$, *nimittāntareṇa tasmiṃs* P$_{Ed}$.

[86] *na tu janyata*] P$_{Ed}$, *na++++* K$_R$^{mg}.

[87] *pratipattiḥ*] P$_{Ed}$, *pra[tyā]pattis* K$_R$^{mg}.

[88] The formulation *atasmiṃs tat* is widely cited as a definition for various kinds of error. *Cf. Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 248: *atasmiṃs tadgraho bhavaty apramā-ṇatvakāraṇam...* etc. (a restatement of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* on 1.1.4).

pramātrantaradhīr bhrāntirūpā yasminn anūdyate | sa bhrāntimān sva-
dhīr bhrāntā vaktrāsyāṃ tu nivedyate[89] *‖ iti saṃgrahaḥ |*

> Summary: Where the mistaken cognition of another perceiver is restated
> it is the Erroneous, but in Hyperbole (*asyāṃ*) a speaker communicates
> his own mistaken cognition.

A differing poetic intersubjectivity is capable of altering the cogni-
tive dynamics of the situation to such an extent that Śobhākara
would identify a different ornament. If, for example, it were the
poet who consciously and deliberately made an error in represent-
ing a situation in a very certain way, Śobhākara would identify the
ornament as the Metaphor (*rūpaka*), provided that the error is one
of verbal representation (*pratipādanabhrama*) as distinct from cog-
nitive error (*bhrāntā pratipattiḥ*). In this he does not hesitate to go
against Ruyyaka and all previous thinkers. For Śobhākara the tar-
get and the source are in that case related by *sāmānādhikaraṇyam,*
that is, they are represented as collocated, as sharing a common
substrate. This error must then also be shared by the reader, who
sees two syntactically coordinated words sharing the same case-
suffix, and therefore superimposes the source on the target.[90] The
unusual doxastic error arising from unwarranted colocation, delib-
erately committed by the poet and willingly re-enacted by the read-
er, is what he calls a Metaphor.

4. *MAṄGALA* VERSES

While the preceding discussion attempts to clarify how Śobhākara
deals with Ruyyaka's work, it does not tell us why the dispute ap-
pears so ardent. This a question that is much more difficult to an-
swer, and only a few ideas may be offered at the present stage of
research.

Both Ruyyaka and Śobhākara inherited a canon of example ver-
ses selected by their predecessors. When they do introduce new
verses, therefore, it can be revealing to look at these more closely.
Śobhākara, it turns out, introduces several new verses that happen
to share a solar motif. This might be no more than a play on his
name, but it is also possible that it intends to signal a religious affi-
liation. Can this possibly have played any role in defining his scho-

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[89] *nivedyate*] K$_R$, *na vedyate* P$_{Ed}$.

[90] Śobhākara adopts from Ruyyaka the idea that *rūpaka* is based on superimposi-
tion (*āropa*) but he redefines this as an extension of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*.

larly stance in his dispute with Ruyyaka? We have counter-evidence that suggests an author's religious affiliation was immaterial in a field such as *alaṅkāra*. Ānandavardhana was a (Pāñcarātrika?) Vaiṣṇava, and his almost reverential commentator Abhinavagupta was a Śaiva. Or, can we at least assume that religious affiliation might determine which teachers or *maṭha*s a student would seek out? While it certainly seems to be the normative case that, for example, Śaiva students would study with Śaiva teachers, that is not always the case. Nor does co-religiosity guarantee friendly relations between authors. The opposite may be the case, two students of the same teacher can plausibly become bitter rivals. A teacher's fame seems to have been even more important than sectarian bias. Abhinavagupta, again, studied with non-Śaiva teachers, and he taught Kṣemendra, who may have been, at that time already, a convert to Vaiṣṇavism. These contradictory trends mean that not much useful information can be added to what little we know about our authors' motivations. But still, it is worth factoring even such unsatisfactory information into our considerations. Consider the following list of *maṅgala* verses found in surviving works of Sanskrit rhetorics, identifying the main deity addressed or referenced:

- Daṇḍin, *Kāvyādarśa* 1: Sarasvatī

- Bhāmaha, *Kāvyālaṃkāra* 1: Sarvajña

- Vāmana, *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtravṛtti* 1: Paramaṃ Jyotis

- Udbhaṭa, *Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṃgraha* 1: —

- Pratīhārenduraja, *Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṃgrahalaghuvṛtti* 1: Śauri (here sun?), 2: two feet of Gaurī[91]

- Ānandavardhana, *Sahṛdayāloka* 1: Narasiṃha

- Kuntaka, *Vakroktijīvita* 1: Śiva

- Rudraṭa, *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 1: Gaṇādhipa, 2: Gaurī's two feet

- Mammaṭa, *Kāvyaprakāśa* 1: Kaveḥ Bhāratī

- Ruyyaka, *Alaṅkārasarvasva* 1: Parā Vāc

- Abhinavagupta, *Locanā* 1: Sarasvatyās tattvam

- *Locanāmaṅgalavivṛti**: Svacchanda[92]

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[91] Final verse: *mīmāṃsāsārameghāt padajaladhividhos tarkamāṇikyakośāt sāhityaśrīmurārer budhakusumamadhoḥ śauripādābjabhṛṅgāt | śrutvā saujanyasindhor dvijavaramukulatkīrtivallyālavālāt kāvyālaṅkārasāre laghuvivṛtim adhāt kauṅkaṇaḥ śrīndurājaḥ ||.*

[92] *Locanāmaṅgalavivṛti* 1: *upāsmahe svānubhavaikavedyaṃ svacchandam ānan-*

- Mukulabhaṭṭa, *Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā*: ——
- Ratnākara, *Dhvanigāthāpañjikā* 1: Vāgdevī
- Mahimabhaṭṭa, *Vyaktiviveka* 1: Parā Vāc, [2: Sun, Jagatpradīpa[93]]
- Śāradātanaya, *Bhāvaprakāśana* 1: Karimukha (Gaṇeśa), 2: Govinda, 3: Śiva, 4: Śāradā

The *maṅgala* verse of *AlRat* is a special case. It is not a verse that Śobhākara composed himself. Dedicated to Gaṇeśa as the sun, worshipped by Gods and demons alike, dispelling the night of impediments, it signals to the reader that Śobhākara is seeking to place his work into the tradition of the Naiyāyika Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, for it is the third verse of the *Nyāyamañjarī*.[94]

surāsuraśiroratnamarīcikhacitāṅghraye |
*vighnāndhakārasūryāya gaṇādhipataye namaḥ ‖ (AlRat*1.1 = *Nyāyamañ-jarī* 1.3)

Homage to Gaṇeśa,
The sun to the night that is impediments,
His feet adorned with rays
From the crest jewels of Gods and demons.

If it is additionally significant that Śobhākara chose a verse with a solar motif, we may need to question whether this could be indeed tied to his religious identity. Were some of these authors Sauras, Bhojakas, or Śaiva worshippers of Śivasūrya?[95] The sun as the light of the world is also the recipient of praise in the second verse of the *Vyaktiviveka* of Mahimabhaṭṭa, a work on which Ruyyaka wrote a hostile commentary. It may be significant, in this context, that both the names Mahiman and Śobhākara can be interpreted as denoting the sun. The suffix *-mitra* too is commonly found with

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dasamudram īśam | vyāptaṃ jagacchaktitarattaraṅgair adṛṣṭapāraṃ parameṣ-ṭhināpi ‖.

[93] The first verse contains a *vastunirdeśa* statement and a salutation to supreme speech. *Vyaktiviveka* 1-2: *anumāne 'ntarbhāvaṃ sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ prakā-śayitum | vyaktivivekaṃ kurute praṇamya mahimā parāṃ vācam ‖ yukto 'yam ātmasadṛśān prati me prayatno nāsty eva taj jagati sarvamanoharaṃ yat | ke-cij jvalanti vikasanty apare nimīlanty anye yad abhyudayabhāji **jagatpradī-pe** ‖.*

[94] I thank H. Isaacson for first drawing my attention to this fact.

[95] See the original *Saurasaṃhitā*, recently discovered, and currently being edited by Diwakar Acharya, for one of the few remaining original sources of sun worship.

Bhojaka names.[96] In his *AlSar*, Ruyyaka accuses Mahimabhaṭṭa of making an ill-considered statement when he alleges that suggestion can be subsumed under inference. The expression he uses is not very common: *avicāritābhidhānam*.[97] Śobhākara, in an example of śāstric repartee, redirects the same insult back to Ruyyaka when he accuses him of failing to adequately define the Assumption: *lakṣaṇam aparyālocitābhidhānam*.[98] It is conceivable that we should interpret this data as support for a conflict between a realist Naiyāyika (and Mīmāṃsaka) faction, represented by Śobhākara, who draws on the work of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, and a non-dualist Śaiva faction represented by Abhinavagupta, Ruyyaka and Jayaratha who engage in Śāstra on the basis of Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*. Though why Śobhākara would seem to be supporting Mahimabhaṭṭa remains unclear. Only more comparative research on specific doctrinal positions and intertextuality will enable us to determine the likelihood (or not) of this scenario.

In the dispute between Ruyyaka, Śobhākara, and Jayaratha, we see how fast *alaṅkāraśāstra* can change. Uninhibited by presence of an early founding text with authoritative commentaries, it had neither a given ontology nor an epistemology to call its own. This is not because it does not need either of these, to the contrary, *alaṅkārika*s unhesitatingly borrow terminology, categories, and even entire theoretical frameworks from other schools they studied.

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[96] A Bhojaka is usually identified as a Magabrāhmaṇa who serves as an officiant in the cult of Sūrya. See Humbach 1978 and von Stietencron 1966. Their status seems to have been contested and renegotiated several times, for example in the *Śūdrācāraśiromaṇi* of Kṛṣṇa Śeṣa a Bhojaka is said to be a member of mixed castes to the second degree. Benke 2010 translates (p. 98): "The son of a Brahmin and a woman called a Puṣpaśekhara, is a Bhojaka by *jāti* and makes a living from worship services for Sūrya." It remain unclear whether there were Magabrāhmaṇas in Kashmir, and if there were it remains equally unclear what relation these bear to the later threefold divison of Kashmirian Brāhmaṇas into Bhaṭṭa (Guru, Bāchabat), Kārkun and Joṣī (Jotish). See Witzel 1994 for a detailed account of what we know about the Brāhmaṇas of Kashmir.

[97] *AlSar* 1: *yat tu vyaktivivekakāro vācyasya pratīyamānaṃ prati liṅgatayā vyañjanasyānumānāntarbhāvam ākhyat tad vācyasya pratīyamānena saha (saha]* Ed, omitted T₁T₂) *tādātmyatadutpattyabhāvād **avicāritābhidhānam** | tad etat kuśāgradhiṣaṇaiḥ kṣodanīyam atigahanam iti neha pratanyate |.*

[98] *AlRat* 32: *tenādhyavasāye vyāpāraprādhānya utprekṣeti **lakṣaṇam aparyālocitābhidhānam** eva |.*

ABBREVIATIONS

conj.   = conjecture
corr.   = correction
em.   = emendation
om.   = omitted
kiṃ{*ci*}*t* = deleted akṣaras
⟨*kiṃcit*⟩   = text supplied by editor
+   = illegible akṣaras
kiṃ[*ci*]*t* = square brackets indicate partly legible akṣaras

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AlRat
[*Alaṅkāraratnākara*] See P$_{Ed}$ and K$_R$

AlSar
[*Alaṅkārasarvasva*] See KM$_{ED}$, K$_{SV}$ and J$_{ED}$

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[99] Bound in suede deerhide; ff. 38-144; ll. 24; *akṣara*s per line 25; 25.3*17.3cm; inscribed area 10.1* 18.5cm; rubrication; folios numbered in bottom left of the rectos; sometimes substantial marginal notes and corrections secunda manu upto *fol.* 86r; interlinear Sanskrit paraphrase *(chāyā)* for Prakrit passages; the *khaḍgabandha* is illustrated in the left margin of *fol.* 60ʳ. Clauson records: "In Pt. Sāhibrā's handwriting. Purchased in 1894 from **Śaṅkara Rājānaka** [M.A.S.]. Explicit on fol. 144ᵛ l. 18: ‖ 87 ‖ *rājarāja iti bhūbhujām abhūd*

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agraṇīr guṇigaṇāśrayaḥ param tāṃsatī sarasirājahaṃsatāmātanotkalighanā-
game pi vaḥ ∥ śaktādhikaśriyas tasya śrīśṛṅgāra iti śrutaḥ guṇātikrāntadhiṣaṇo
mantriṇām agraṇīr abhūt ∥ tadātmajanmā vaidaghyabandhur jayarathābhi-
dhaḥ vyadhād idam asāmānyaṃ śravaṇābharaṇaṃ satām ∥ yan nāma kiñ cid
iha samyag athānyathā vāmākṣadalaṅkṛtinayocitamateduktam vidveṣaroṣam
apasārya budhaiḥ kṣaṇasya tatrāvadheyam iyataiva vayaṃ kṛtārthāḥ ∥ pūrṇe-
yam (fol. 144ʳ) alaṅkāravimarśinī kṛtis tatrabhavato rājānakaśrīśṛṅgāraputra-
rājānakaśrījayarathasyeti śubham ∥ ∥.

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Helārāja on Omniscience, *Āgama*,
and the Origin of Language[*]

VINCENZO VERGIANI

In the late first millennium CE, approximately at the same period that saw the rise of the Pratyabhijñā school of non-dualist Śaivism on the Indian philosophical scene, Kashmir was also home to Helārāja's composition of a complete commentary, consisting of two distinct works,[1] on Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (henceforth, VP).[2] Only one of these survives, the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* (henceforth, PrPr) on the third *kāṇḍa*.[3] As I have remarked in a recent publication,[4] it

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[1] Or possibly three, because it is not clear whether the commentary on the first two books consisted of one or two distinct works. This text is now lost. As pointed out by Subramania Iyer (VP 3.1, p. xi), the *Śabdaprabhā*, to which Helārāja refers under *Jātisamuddeśa* 37 (VP 3.1, p. 45, l. 3), was his commentary on the first *kāṇḍa*. Another mention of the *Śabdaprabhā* (VP 3.1, p. 54, l. 9) is found in the commentary on *Jātisamuddeśa* 46, which I examine in detail here.

[2] In the verses at the end of the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* Helārāja himself says that he belongs to an illustrious lineage of Kashmiri Brahmins. See SUBRAMANIA IYER 1969, pp. 39-40.

[3] Helārāja mentions his commentary on the first two *kāṇḍa*s of the VP in the second and third *maṅgalaśloka* of PrPr: *kāṇḍadvaye yathāvṛtti siddhāntārtha-satattvataḥ | prabandho vihito 'smābhir āgamārthānusāribhiḥ || taccheṣabhūte kāṇḍe 'smin saprapañce svarūpataḥ | ślokārthadyotanaparaḥ prakāśo 'yaṃ vidhīyate ||*. For a translation and discussion of these verses see VERGIANI 2014. I will examine the first *maṅgalaśloka* below, § 9.

[4] See VERGIANI 2014.

seems likely that the appearance in mediaeval Kashmir of the first
known complete commentary on the VP should be somehow link-
ed to the key role that Bhartṛhari's views came to play in the philo-
sophy of the Pratyabhijñā, and possibly to the change of fortune
the grammarian-philosopher underwent, from an adversary for So-
mānanda to the main ally for Utpaladeva, to use Torella's phrase.[5]
To what extent Helārāja shared the religious and philosophical out-
look of Pratyabhijñā and consciously played a role in its appropria-
tion of Bhartṛhari's ideas is unclear. In this article, I will examine
one passage of Helārāja's only surviving work, the PrPr, in an ef-
fort to shed light on this somewhat elusive figure.[6]

The passage I examine in this article is Helārāja's commentary
on VP 3.1.46, a verse of the *Jātisamuddeśa*, the first chapter of the
third book of the VP. The PrPr on this *kārikā* contains an unusually
extensive discussion of two topics – omniscience and scriptural au-
thority – which at first sight may seem to be only tenuously related
to the content of Bhartṛhari's verse. In dealing with these topics,
which, as is known,[7] became pivotal to the Indian philosophical
and religious debate in the second half of the first millennium CE,
Helārāja literally packs the passage, which I will analyse in depth
in the following pages, with quotations from various authoritative
brahmanical works and indirect references to several others.[8]

The backdrop of Helārāja's treatment of these topics is the
emergence, in the early first millennium CE, of two conflicting re-
ligio-philosophical visions within Brahmanism, one centred on the
Veda and the other on a personal God. The former view, advocated
by Mīmāṃsā, claims that the Veda is eternal and uncreated (*apau-*

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[5]   On the Pratyabhijñā's reception of Bhartṛhari's ideas see TORELLA 2002, esp.
      p. xxv, and TORELLA 2008.

[6]   I will occasionally point to echoes and parallels between Helārāja's views and
      those found in the works of the Pratyabhijñā authors, but with no claim to be-
      ing exhaustive or exploring them in depth. A systematic investigation of this
      theme will hopefully be the subject of a future publication.

[7]   In the centuries that lapsed between Bhartṛhari's and Helārāja's times the
      question of omniscience acquired great prominence in the religious and philo-
      sophical debates of early mediaeval India. On the significance of this impor-
      tant development, see e.g. FRANCO 2009, McCLINTOCK 2010, TORELLA 2012,
      the various contributions in ELTSCHINGER AND KRASSER 2013, and MORIYAMA
      2014.

[8]   Here I have tried to identify as many as possible of these allusions, but I am
      afraid that I may have missed just as many.

ruṣeya) and, precisely because of its total otherness from the world of men, it represents their only reliable guidance in the pursuit of transcendental goals – in short, the realisation of *dharma* through the correct performance of the prescribed rites. And, as a logical corollary of the eternality of the Veda, the Mīmāṃsakas claim that the language of the sacred texts (Sanskrit) is also eternal, namely, that there is a natural fixed relation between words and the objects or actions they designate. In their system there is no place for a creator God, since the universe is regarded as immutable, without beginning or end, and the righteousness of the customs and beliefs of the Āryas – in one word, the *varṇāśramadharma* – as codified in the traditional body of textual knowledge collectively known as Smṛti rests on the allegedly uninterrupted transmission of this knowledge, which claims to be based on the Vedas, from time immemorial through generation after generation of brahmins.

While similarly declaring its allegiance to the Veda, the other view, voiced by brahmanical systems such as Yoga and, notably, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,[9] attributes a central role to God (Īśvara), who is said to possess qualities such as knowledge (*jñāna*) and sovereignty (*aiśvarya*)[10] and is considered responsible for the periodical creation and destruction of the world. It is God who issues the Veda and, crucially, at the beginning of each creation cycle teaches it to the *ṛṣi*s who partake of his omniscience thanks to the merit they have gained through ascetic practices and meditation (presumably in previous lives). God is also responsible for instituting language, as it is he who establishes the convention (*samaya*) that links words to objects/meanings.

The above is a very broadly painted sketch of complex views with far-reaching religious and theoretical implications and much internal variation and has no claim to exhaustiveness. Nevertheless, it should help to situate Helārāja's ideas in a clearer historical

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[9] As is known (see EIPh, p. 100), the seminal *sūtra*s of the latter two schools are distinctly non-theistic, but the shift towards theism is already evident in the works of the earliest commentators, namely Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara (Nyāya, probably 5th and 6th c. CE respectively) and Praśastapāda (Vaiśeṣika, 6th c. CE). On these developments in some brahmanical systems, see also MORIYAMA 2014, pp. 29f.

[10] On God's attributes according to Praśastapāda, see CHEMPARATHY 1968, pp. 72-73, which also contains the translation of a passage in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* describing Īśvara's role in the creation and dissolution of the universe.

perspective. As I will show below, much of what he writes in the commentary on VP 3.1.46 can be traced back to Bhartṛhari's own work, but in other respects he is heavily indebted to ideas formulated by representatives of the two major theistic brahmanical schools of the time, Yoga and the already mentioned Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, although he often reinterprets these ideas in his own original way. It seems to me, in fact, that Helārāja's commentary on VP 3.1.46, occurring as it does in the initial chapter of the PrPr, is a key passage (though undoubtedly not the only one) meant to establish the theoretical and ideological frame of the whole work and to demonstrate the possibility of incorporating Bhartṛhari's views into a theistic philosophical horizon, in contrast to Mīmāṃsā, whose positions on *āgama* and omniscience are explicitly challenged here by Helārāja.

In the next paragraph I will look at some of the evidence in the VP (especially in the first *kāṇḍa*) that testifies to Bhartṛhari's views on Vedic revelation and omniscience. Taken together, these passages, which Helārāja had certainly commented upon in the lost *Śabdaprabhā*, form the backbone of his argument in PrPr ad VP 3.1.46, and the foundation on which he builds the argument in order to promote his own philosophical agenda.

1. An Early Philosophical Account of Vedic Revelation

The earliest non-mythological treatment of Vedic revelation is possibly found in *Nirukta* 1.20, a passage that is quoted in the *Vṛtti* on VP 1.5. These, together with another passage of the first *kāṇḍa* consisting of VP 1.173 with the *Vṛtti*, which also deals with Vedic revelation, the relation between Śruti and Smṛti, and the role of *ṛṣi*s in their transmission to mankind, are discussed in great depth by Aklujkar in an important article published in 2009. Even though Helārāja makes no direct reference to either VP passage, one may reasonably assume that he had them in mind when writing the commentary on VP 3.1.46 because he quotes the same passage from the *Nirukta* and further cites VP 1.172 (discussed below), a verse underscoring the uninterrupted transmission of both Śruti and Smṛti, which leads to the second VP passage that speaks of the Vedic revelation.

These VP passages predate most of (or possibly all) the other accounts of Vedic revelation to which Helārāja refers in the PrPr

ad VP 3.1.46. It is worth presenting them in their entirety here (with Aklujkar's translations), since from a historical and theoretical vantage point they constitute the starting point of Helārāja's original synthesis.

The first passage, containing the *Nirukta* quotation, occurs in the VPVṛ ad 1.5,[11] and comments, or rather elaborates, on the term *anukāra* used in the verse:

> About to reveal to those others who have not discovered the [ordinarily imperceptible] properties[12] of things that subtle, eternal and sense-transcending [form of] speech which they [themselves] behold, the seers who have discovered the properties of things [and] to whom *mantras*[13] appear set down for transmission an image (*bilmam*), as they wish to convey, like something that happened in a dream, what they experienced through sighting and hearing. This is ancient [or traditionally handed down] lore.[14] Indeed, [another reliable or respectable source, the *Nirukta*] says: "There came about [or there were at a distant time] seers who had discovered the properties of things. Through instruction, they have entrusted *mantra*s to others who had not discovered the properties of things. The others, experiencing fatigue toward instruction, have set down for transmission this corpus [i.e. the Nighaṇṭu, Nirukta, etc.] and the Veda and the Veda ancillaries in order to grasp the image. [The word] *bilma* is [to be thought of as] *bhilma* or [as] *bhāsana*."[15]

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[11] The verse reads: *prāptyupāyo 'nukāraṃ ca tasya vedo maharṣibhiḥ | eko 'py anekavartmeva samāmnātaḥ pṛthak pṛthak ‖*. "The means of reaching and the representative likeness of that [*śabda-tattva*] is Veda. It is set down for transmission severally by the great seers as if it has more than one path, although it is one." (Transl. AKLUJKAR 2009, p. 6.)

[12] For the translation of *dharma* in the compound *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇo* with "property," see AKLUJKAR 2009, pp. 15f.

[13] I have taken the liberty to modify Aklujkar's translation in a few places (which I indicate in footnotes) for the sake of readability, but respecting the spirit of his renderings. Here I have re-introduced the Sanskrit term *mantra*, which for very good reasons Aklujkar translates with the phrase "materially effective speech formations." Despite the loss of accuracy, I think it safe to assume most Indologists know the meaning of *mantra*.

[14] Aklujkar translates *purākalpa* with "thought formulation (or systematized knowledge)." On *purākalpa* as the name of a text (or class of texts), see AKLUJKAR 2009, p. 24.

[15] *yāṃ sūkṣmāṃ nityām atīndriyāṃ vācam ṛṣayaḥ sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇo mantra-dṛśaḥ paśyanti tām asākṣātkṛtadharmabhyaḥ parebhyaḥ pravedayiṣyamāṇā bilmaṃ samāmananti, svapnavṛttam iva dṛṣṭasmṛtānubhūtam ācikhyāsanta ity eṣa purākalpaḥ. āha khalv api: "sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ. te 'pa-*

A very similar but somewhat more detailed account is found in
VPVṛ 1.173.[16] The verse reads:

> *avibhāgād vivṛttānām abhikhyā svapnavac chrutau* |
> *bhāvatattvaṃ tu vijñāya liṅgebhyo vihitā smṛtiḥ* ‖

Those [ṛṣis] who evolve from the [ultimate] unity [namely, *brahman*]
come to know the Śruti as [ordinary persons come to know something]
in a dream. As for the Smṛti, it is fashioned on the basis of the indica-
tions [in the Śruti] after knowing the real nature of things.

The *Vṛtti* remarks:

The inherited view (*āgama*) of those who think that the [original] cause
constantly [that is, again and again] proceeds forth [to create] in the
manner of sleeping and waking up, fashioning itself after the individual
persons [or the distinct *puruṣa*s] is this: some seers come about as a mul-
tiplicity in the unitary entity *pratibhā* [that is, at a stage which is just one
step short of reaching *brahman* (...)]. They, seeing that [*pratibhātman*
which is the same as] *mahat ātman*, the one characterized by Being
[alone, that is, the one which is the undifferentiated or highest-level exis-
tence], matrix of nescience, join that [*pratibhātman*] through awakening
[that is, through advanced awareness (...)]. Some [seers], on the other
hand, come about as a multiplicity in *vidyā*. They, likewise, join the *āt-
man* that has the knot of the mind [that is, the *ātman* equipped and deli-
mited for engagement with the world and that, yet, remains] pure [and]
conception-free with respect to the elements ether etc., taken jointly or
severally. Their adventitious,[17] nescience-based interaction [with the
world] is not literally so [that is, it can be predicated of them only
through a transfer of ordinary persons' attributes to them]. What is con-
stant, intrinsic and primary [to them] is [their] *vidyā*-nature. They see
[our] traditionally handed down text in its entirety with insight alone as
one would hear in sleep a word [sound] inaccessible to the sense of hear-
ing − [the text] having all the powers of differentiation and having the
powers inseparable [from itself, i.e. the subtle form of the authoritative

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*rebhyo 'sākṣātkṛtadharmabhya upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ. upadeśāya
glāyanto 'pare bilmagrahaṇāyemaṃ granthaṃ samāmnāsiṣur vedaṃ ca vedā-
ṅgāni ca. bilmaṃ bhilmaṃ bhāsanam iti veti.* (Sanskrit text as given in Akluj-
kar 2008, p. 6; transl. ibid., pp. 24-26.)

[16]   The following Sanskrit texts and translations (with a few minor modifications)
are from Aklujkar 2009, pp. 29-31.

[17]   Here the text in Aklujkar 2009, p. 30 reads "adventious," which I assume is
a misprint for "adventitious" (Skt. *āgantu*).

Veda]. Some [of them], additionally, having ascertained the nature of specific entities as it concerns the helping or harming of humans and having seen indications to that effect in some parts of the traditionally received texts, compose the Smṛti, meant for the mundane and non-mundane objects. As for the Śruti, they set [it] down for transmission as it was seen [in the experience described above], without a change of wording [or sound] whatsoever – initially, undivided [i.e. as a single corpus], later incorporating the *caraṇa* division.[18]

I need not go here into a detailed analysis of these passages (for which see AKLUJKAR 2009), but I would like to draw attention to a few points that are relevant to the topic of this article. While subscribing – as one would expect – to the dogma of the eternal and uncreated nature of the Veda, Bhartṛhari (following in the footsteps of the distant precedent set by Yāska and of countless mythological narratives) introduces a quasi historical dimension into the account of the rise and transmission of the brahmanical tradition by identifying a starting point for the process, in which the Vedic seers, the *ṛṣi*s, play the role first of recipients of the primordial Revelation (*śruti*) and then of authors of the *smṛti*s and teachers of later generations. In the case of the Śruti, they act as simple receptacles and transmitters of the Vedic text as it appears to them in their primordial experience (*śrutiṃ tu yathādarśanam avyabhicari-taśabdām eva... samāmananti*) without making any intervention of their own. On the contrary, their agency is a crucial element in the production of the Smṛti texts, which the *ṛṣi*s themselves compose on the basis of the indications they find in the Veda, and which rest on their perception of the true nature of things (*teṣāṃ teṣām arthā-nāṃ svabhāvam upalabhya*); their purpose is to help men pursue what is useful and avoid what is harmful (*puruṣānugrahopaghāta-*

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18   *yeṣāṃ tu svapnaprabodhavṛttyā nityaṃ vibhaktapuruṣānukāritayā kāraṇaṃ pravartate teṣāṃ ṛṣayaḥ kecit pratibhātmani vivartante. te [taṃ] sattālakṣa-ṇaṃ mahāntam ātmānam avidyāyoniṃ paśyantaḥ pratibodhenābhisambhavan-ti. kecit tu vidyāyāṃ vivartante. te manogranthim ātmānam ākāśādiṣu bhūteṣu, pratyekaṃ samuditeṣu vā, viśuddham anibaddhaparikalpaṃ tathaivābhisam-bhavanti. teṣāṃ cāgantur avidyāvyavahāraḥ sarva evaupacārikaḥ. vidyātma-katvaṃ tu nityam anāgantukaṃ mukhyam. te ca, svapna ivāśrotragamyaṃ śab-daṃ, prajñayaiva sarvam āmnāyaṃ sarvabhedaśaktiyuktam abhinnaśaktiyuk-taṃ ca paśyanti. kecit tu puruṣānugrahopaghātaviṣayaṃ teṣāṃ teṣām arthā-nāṃ svabhāvam upalabhyāmnāyeṣu kvacit tadviṣayāṇi </tat-tad-> liṅgāni dṛ-ṣṭvā ca dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthāṃ smṛtim upanibadhnanti. śrutiṃ tu yathādarśanam avyabhicaritaśabdām eva, prathamam avibhaktāṃ punaḥ saṅgṛhītacaraṇavi-bhāgāṃ, samāmantīty āgamaḥ.*

viṣayaṃ) for goals that, interestingly, may be either mundane or trans-empirical (*dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthāṃ*). It is also remarkable that Bhartṛhari is completely silent on the process of creation or emanation of the physical world, and in particular of human beings. His narrative is really about the coming into being of the brahmanical tradition centred on the Veda. The beginning of VPVṛ 1.137 (*svapnaprabodhavṛttyā nityaṃ vibhaktapuruṣānukāritayā kāraṇaṃ pravartate*...) suggests that this process is repeated cyclically.[19] It is also worth noting that, despite the central place language occupies in his philosophy, not only epistemologically but also ontologically, Bhartṛhari makes no specific mention of the origin of the relation between words and meanings. This silence presumably implies that for him the relation linking certain sequences of sounds to certain objects in the universe is a given that the primordial sages "perceive" in the received text, and then they pass this knowledge to their descendants.

It is evident that in this account of Vedic revelation and the beginning of brahmanical tradition the extraordinary cognitive capacities of the seers play a key role. The manifestation of the Veda from the ultimate undivided *śabdabrahman* is an unexplained (and possibly, in Bhartṛhari's eyes, inexplicable) event that is not meant, ostensibly, for the instruction and salvation of creatures, since there is no subject intentionally acting as teacher. The seers, who themselves issue from the same ultimate reality, as pointed out in VP 1.173 (*avibhāgād vivṛttānām*), could not possibly receive the sacred text or draw the teachings they then hand down in the Smṛti if they were not endowed somehow with exceptional capacities. How did these capacities arise? A hemistich from the first kāṇḍa (VP 1.30cd), also quoted by Helārāja under VP 3.1.46,[20] suggests that the seers's knowledge is also founded on *āgama*: *ṛṣīṇām api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy āgamapūrvakam*, "Even in the case of seers, knowledge is preceded by inherited knowledge."[21] However, this is not purely intellectual knowledge, as is clarified in the *Vṛtti*:

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[19] On Bhartṛhari's likely belief in the cyclical creation of the universe, see the remarks in AKLUJKAR 2009, p. 63.

[20] The context of the quotation in the PrPr (see PrPr 1, p. 54, ll. 23-24) is examined below, § 7.

[21] The text and translation of this verse and of the following *Vṛtti* are from AKLUJKAR 2010, pp. 405-406.

Even in those mutually differing schools in which we hear the talk of some extraordinary human quality, impervious to reasoning,[22] the seers' knowledge of this or that thing, [to the extent it is] born of a mystical or transforming experience,[23] is said to occur when the seers' personalities are modified by a quality found [i.e. recommended for cultivation] in the *āgama*.[24]

Thus, the seers' superior (*anuttaraḥ*) kind of cognition is born from the cultivation of certain human qualities (*puruṣadharmaḥ*) with the support of traditional knowledge, and therefore, one can infer, it is not intrinsically different from ordinary cognition, but rather a potentiated version of the latter.[25] Significantly, in VP 1.172, quoted by Helārāja under VP 3.1.46,[26] Bhartṛhari refers to the hallowed authors of the Smṛti with the term *śiṣṭa*:

> *anādim avyavacchinnāṃ śrutim āhur akartṛkām |*
> *śiṣṭair nibadhyamānā tu na vyavacchidyate smṛtiḥ ‖*

> They say that the Śruti is without beginning, uninterrupted, authorless, but the Smṛti, composed by *śiṣṭa*s, is [equally] unbroken.

No clear distinction is made, seemingly, between the two figures, but the role played by the former in the Vedic revelation and the association of the latter (for example in the *Mahābhāṣya*[27]) with

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[22] Aklujkar translates *tarkātītaḥ* with "impervious to (common) ways of making sense."

[23] With the clause "to the extent it is born of a mystical or transforming experience" Aklujkar translates the single Sanskrit word *ārṣam* in an effort to capture its complex implications.

[24] *yeṣv api tarkātītaḥ pṛthagvidyācaraṇaparigraheṣu kaścid anuttaraḥ puruṣadharmaḥ śrūyate, teṣv api [tat]tadarthajñānam ārṣam ṛṣīṇām āgamikenaiva dharmeṇa saṃskṛtātmanām āvirbhavatīty ākhyāyate.*

[25] As will be shown below, this is one of the controversial issues that oppose Mīmāṃsā to those thinkers, such as Helārāja, who uphold the existence of omniscient beings.

[26] Introduced with the words *uktaṃ brahmakāṇḍe* (see PrPr 1, p. 53, ll. 20-23; note that the verse number given there is wrong, since in Subramania Iyer's own edition of the first *kāṇḍa* the *kārikā* is numbered 136).

[27] See MBh ad A. 6.3.109 (vol. III, p. 174, ll. 4-10): *ke punaḥ śiṣṭāḥ. vaiyākaraṇāḥ. kuta etat. śāstrapūrvikā hi śiṣṭir vaiyākaraṇāś ca śāstrajñāḥ. yadi tarhi śāstrapūrvikā śiṣṭiḥ śiṣṭipūrvakaṃ ca śāstraṃ tad itaretarāśrayam bhavati. itaretarāśrayāṇi ca na prakalpante. evaṃ tarhi nivāsato ācārataś ca. sa cācāra āryāvartta eva. kaḥ punar āryāvarttaḥ. prāg ādarśāt pratyak kālakavanād dakṣiṇena himavantam uttareṇa pāriyātram. etasminn āryanivāse ye brāhmaṇāḥ*

contemporary brahmins excelling in virtue and learning – all the more idealised as they are vaguely identified – suggests that for Bhartṛhari omniscience is not just a quality associated with certain legendary individuals in a remote past but something that even his contemporary may possibly achieve. The same blurring of boundaries between ṛṣis, yogis and śiṣṭas is observed in other places in the VP that are discussed below, including VP 3.1.46, to which I now turn.

One caveat is required, however, before embarking on the examination of this *kārikā* and the commentary thereon. One of the challenging aspects of this passage is that often the philosophical and theological arguments voiced by Helārāja appear very terse or dense or both, and the logical links between one step in the reasoning and the next are not always as clear as one may wish because the author does not spell them out. The explanation for that is to be found in something Helārāja says towards the end of the passage, where he informs his readers that he has discussed the topic of omniscience in depth in his commentary on the first *kāṇḍa* and refers them back to it:

> Thus, by means of the first half [of the verse], [Bhartṛhari] has indicated here that omniscience has been proved on the basis of the authority of traditional sources. I have myself [dealt with and] settled [the topic of] the authority of *āgama* at length in the *Śabdaprabhā* on the first *kāṇḍa* of the VP, therefore one should draw the conclusion on the basis of that [discussion].[28]

In light of this statement, one should therefore regard PrPr on VP 3.1.46 as a kind of digest of a presumably much more articulated treatment of *āgama* and related topics that was found in Helārāja's earlier work, now unfortunately lost. Keeping this in mind, it is now time to examine the verse.

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kumbhīdhānyā alolupā agṛhyamāṇakāraṇāḥ kiṃ cid antareṇa kasyāś cid vidyāyāḥ pāragās tatrabhavantaḥ śiṣṭāḥ.

[28] PrPr 1, p. 54, ll. 7-9: *tad evam āgamaprāmāṇyam āśritya sarvajñasiddhir atra sūcitā pūrvārdhena. vistareṇāgamaprāmāṇyaṃ vākyapadīye 'smābhiḥ prathamakāṇḍe śabdaprabhāyāṃ nirṇītam iti tata evāvadhāryam.*

2. VP 3.1.46 IN LIGHT OF BHARTṚHARI'S VIEWS
ON *YOGIPRATYAKṢA*

VP 3.1.46 occurs at the end of a portion of the *Jātisamuddeśa* (VP 3.1.40-45) in which the various universals are said to be differentiations of the one *mahāsattā* and are due to the latter's own powers.[29] It is observed that they persist even when their substratum is destroyed (v. 41), and this leads to a brief survey of different views about the events that happen at *pralaya*, the cyclical dissolution of the cosmos (vv. 42-43), and the relation between universals and particulars (vv. 44-45). The verse appeals to the experience of exceptional beings as proof of the existence of universals:

> *jñānaṃ tv asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ tāsu sarvendriyaṃ viduḥ |*
> *abhyāsān maṇirūpyādiviśeṣeṣv iva tadvidām ||*

> However, they state that the knowledge which those who are superior[30] to us have of these [universals] proceeds from all the senses through practice, just as the experts' [knowledge] of the characteristics of gems and precious metals.

Here Bhartṛhari appears to record an authoritative opinion which he apparently subscribes to: individuals with extraordinary powers, whose knowledge is not subject to the ordinary limitations of the senses, have a direct apprehension of universals (i.e. an apprehension that is not mediated through their substrata); and this kind of cognition is compared to the intuitive evaluation of the quality of gems and precious metals that jewellers and other such experts possess, sharpened by practice (*abhyāsāt*).

Who are these *asmadviśiṣṭa* individuals? Helārāja glosses the term with the phrase *pratiniyatapadārthadarśibhyo 'smadādibhyo viśiṣṭāḥ sarvadṛśa ādiguravaḥ* (PrPr 1, p. 51, l. 15), "the omniscient primeval teachers, who are superior to people like us who

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[29] VP 3.1.40: *āśrayaḥ svātmamātrā vā bhāvā vā vyatirekiṇaḥ | svaśaktayo vā sattāyā bhedadarśanahetavaḥ ||*. Cf. ĪPK 1.5.14 and Torella's remarks thereon (TORELLA 2002, p. 121, n. 29).

[30] In translating *asmadviśiṣṭānām* with "superior to us" I follow Isaacson's translation of the same expression as found in Praśastapāda's PDhS (see ISAACSON 1990, p. 70), which I discuss below. However, note that in a discussion of *yogipratyakṣa*, Vyomaśiva's *Vyomavatī*, the earliest surviving commentary on PDhS (Vyomaśiva is dated to 900-960, see EIPh, p. 10, therefore roughly contemporaneous with Helārāja) employs the expression *asmadādivilakṣaṇā yoginaḥ* (vol. II, p. 145, ll. 9-12), where I think the term *vilakṣaṇa* puts the stress on difference rather than superiority.

[only] perceive objects restricted [to specific senses]," thus apparently identifying them with the *ṛṣi*s. However, around the mid-first millennium CE the expression *asmadviśiṣṭa* is also found in the section on *pratyakṣa* of Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (henceforth, PDhS), where it refers to yogis who can have direct perceptual knowledge of universals and of other constituents of reality that are beyond the reach of normal human cognition. After dealing with ordinary perception (*asmadādīnāṃ pratyakṣam*, "the perceptual knowledge of [ordinary] people such as us"),[31] Praśastapāda goes on to present the phenomenon of yogic perception:

> But for yogis, who are superior to us (*asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ*), when [in the condition called] *yukta*, an unerring seeing of the object's own nature arises, by virtue of [their] internal organ [which is] assisted (*anugṛhīta*) by *dharma* arising from yoga, in regard to [the following substances:] their own *ātman* and the *ātman* of others, ether, space, time, atoms, the air and the internal organ, [as well as] in regard to the qualities, actions, universals and individuators which are inherent in these [substances], and in regard to [the category] inherence. Furthermore, for [yogis in the condition known as] *viyukta*, perceptual knowledge arises in regard to objects which are fine (*sūkṣma*), concealed [from sight], or at a [great] distance, because of contact between four [factors], in consequence of the assistance (*anugraha*) of *dharma* arising from yoga.[32]

In VP 3.1.46 Bhartṛhari is probably echoing a very similar theory of extraordinary perceptual knowledge, although he does not attribute the view to any particular school. It seems likely that these ideas were circulating in Vaiśeṣika circles before Praśastapāda's

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[31] Transl. Isaacson 1990, p. 70; the text of the whole section is given there on p. 61.

[32] *asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ tu yogināṃ yuktānāṃ yogajadharmānugṛhītena manasā svātmāntarākāśadikkālaparamāṇuvāyumanassu tatsamavetaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣeṣu samavāye cāvitathaṃ svarūpadarśanam utpadyate. viyuktānāṃ punaś catuṣṭayasannikarṣād yogajadharmānugrahasāmarthyāt sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭeṣu pratyakṣam utpadyate*. (Transl. Isaacson 1990, p. 71.) It is worth noting that there is a second occurrence of the phrase *asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ tu yogināṃ* in the *Viśeṣapadārthanirūpaṇa* of PDhS, where "Praśastapāda makes use of the concept of yogic perception in order to establish the existence of one of the fundamental categories of his system" (Isaacson 1993, p. 154), namely *viśeṣa*.

time[33] and Bhartṛhari was acquainted with them. For the expression *asmadviśiṣṭa*, both authors have probably been inspired by *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* (henceforth, VS) 2.18, *saṃjñākarma tv asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ liṅgam* "The name-giving of those who are superior to us is the mark (of the existence of nine substances)."[34] This *sūtra* concludes a sequence of aphorisms dealing with air (*vāyu*) and its distinctive quality, touch (*sparśa*). As pointed out in MATILAL 1977, p. 56, "[s]ome difficulty is noticed in establishing the air as a substance, for it is not 'visible'. But the sense experience of touch [when air blows] establishes the external touch as a quality, and air is inferred as the bearer of this quality."[35] VS 2.1.16, *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭāc cāviśeṣaḥ*, states that air is established to be a substance, having *sparśa* as its special quality, by analogy (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭāt*) with the other (visible) elements and their qualities; 2.1.17, *tasmād āgamikam*, records an objection declaring this conclusion to be based merely on traditional knowledge (*āgamikam*), to which the next *sūtra*, 2.1.18, *saṃjñākarma tv asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ liṅgam*, replies that the naming (*saṃjñākarma*) of things, in this case the name *vāyu* "air," is itself a sign that allows us to infer the existence of air because names were assigned by the one/s who is/are "superior to us."[36]

Another phrase used by Praśastapāda in the passage quoted above is *sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭa*, which also occurs in the VP.[37] But in this case, as Isaacson has noted, both probably borrow the

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[33] Praśastapāda is generally dated around 550 CE (for a brief assessment of this issue, see ISAACSON 1990, p. 10; see also EIPh, p. 282) and therefore supposedly later than Bhartṛhari.

[34] Transl. NOZAWA 1993, p. 105. On the complex problem of identifying the various historical layers of the VS, and the probable relative lateness of those dealing with *yogipratyakṣa* see WEZLER 1982, and ISAACSON 1993, neither of which discusses VS 2.18 in particular.

[35] See VS 2.1.10: *na ca dṛṣṭānāṃ sparśa ity adṛṣṭaliṅgo vāyuḥ*.

[36] Near the end of the commentary on VP 3.1.46 Helārāja quotes another *sūtra* from this section, VS 2.1.19, echoing Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* thereon: see § 8 below.

[37] See VPVṛ 1.81 (1.79 in Subramania Iyer's edition with the Vṛtti): *alaukikam api samādhānaṃ sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭopalabdhau cakṣur evānugṛhṇāti*, "Even supernormal concentration only benefits the sense of vision [not the object] in the perception of [objects that are] subtle, concealed or very distant." Helārāja also uses the phrase, with the additional reference to past and future objects, in the commentary on VP 3.1.46 (see § 8 below).

expression from YS 3.25,[38] *pravṛttyālokanyāsāt sūkṣmavyavahita-viprakṛṣṭajñānam,*[39] also dealing with yogic perception. While there is undoubtedly a tendency in all our texts to conflate *ṛṣi*s with yogis and *śiṣṭa*s, as I have noted above, it seems that in this case Bhartṛhari, engaged in a dialogue with other brahmanical thinkers, may have envisaged a larger and probably contemporaneous set of individuals than just the primordial seers understood by Helārāja.

In the second half of the verse, the comparison between yogic cognition and the expertise in gems and precious metals is clearly an intra-textual reference to a verse in the first *kāṇḍa,* VP 1.35:

> *pareṣām asamākhyeyam abhyāsād eva jāyate |*
> *maṇirūpyādivijñānaṃ tadvidāṃ nānumānikam ‖*

> Those who know jewels, precious metals etc. perceive those objects in their distinctiveness [i.e. with their individual good features and bad features] only through constant practice. [If others ask them, "How did you figure out the merits or blemishes of this diamond, and so on?"] they cannot give expression to their [experience or process of] knowing. [This sort of knowing] is not an outcome of inference [it is like perception in its directness, but it is not ordinary perception either, as it perceives what most others cannot]. [40]

VP 1.37-38 with the *Vṛtti* thereon further elaborate on the nature of the extraordinary cognition that allows certain individuals to have access to non-mundane truths. These individuals' superior faculties stem from their cultivation of a pure mind, which allows them to have direct knowledge – similar to perception in quality – of trans-empirical objects, and even see into the past and the future:

> *āvirbhūtaprakāśānām anupaplutacetasām |*
> *atītānāgatajñānaṃ pratyakṣān na viśiṣyate ‖* (VP 1.37)

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[38] Maas 2013 argues that the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* portions of what he refers to as *Pātañjala Yogaśāstra* were composed as a unified whole and presents evidence from various ancient sources that support his hypothesis. The references Helārāja makes to this work in the passage examined here appear to confirm this. According to Maas 2013, p. 65, "the work can be dated with some confidence to the period between 325 and 425 CE."

[39] Cf. Isaacson 1990, p. 71, n. 70.

[40] Transl. Aklujkar 2010, p. 409 (see next note); in 1.35c Aklujkar suggests reading *maṇirūpyādiṣu jñānaṃ.*

> The knowledge of the past and future [objects] of those whose insight has manifested itself and whose mind is in no way tainted differs in no way from perception.[41]

The *Vṛtti* explains that these are *śiṣṭa*s "whose flaws have been burnt out by ascetic practices and whose cognitions are unimpeded" (*tapasā nirdagdhadoṣā nirāvaraṇakhyātayaḥ śiṣṭāḥ*). Here, as in VP 1.35 and 3.1.46, it is emphasised that the extraordinary cognition of *śiṣṭa*s is the fruit of effort and practice (*abhyāsa*) and not inherently different from perception although, as AKLUJKAR 2010 puts it (p. 409), "it is like perception in its directness, but it is not ordinary perception either, as it perceives what most others cannot." These exceptional individuals see things, in fact, that are inaccessible to the senses of ordinary human beings, and their statements cannot be contradicted or invalidated by mere reasoning.[42] And in a different context, in the *Vṛtti* on VP 2.152,[43] which enumerates the possible sources of *pratibhā*, among which there is yoga, Bhartṛhari says that yogis can have a direct intuitive knowledge (*pratibhā*) even of other people's intentions (*tad yathā yoginām avyabhicāreṇa parābhiprāyajñānādiṣu*).[44]

As can be seen from this cursory survey of various passages in the VP where Bhartṛhari touches upon the topic of extraordinary cognition, he clearly admits of it but stops short of providing a systematic treatment. No clear-cut distinction is made between *ṛṣi*s, yogis and *śiṣṭa*s,[45] and there is no distinct theoretical treatment of omniscience in his epistemology, but the authoritativeness of the

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[41] Transl. SUBRAMANIA IYER 1965, p. 47. AKLUJKAR 2010 does not give a full translation of this verse.

[42] VP 1.38: *atīndriyān asaṃvedyān paśyanty ārṣeṇa cakṣuṣā | ye bhāvān vacanaṃ teṣāṃ nānumānena bādhyate ॥*.

[43] VP 2.152: *svabhāvacaraṇābhyāsayogādṛṣṭopapāditām | viśiṣṭopahitām ceti pratibhāṃ ṣaḍvidhāṃ viduḥ ॥*.

[44] On this passage, see the remarks in TORELLA 2012, p. 472, n. 9.

[45] In this respect Bhartṛhari seems to anticipate the tendency to conflate these categories that will later become common (as reflected also in Helārāja's commentary on VP 3.1.46). ISAACSON 1993, p. 156 notes that "the vision of *ṛṣi*s, which is treated separately from yogic perception in the PDhS, and which is also mentioned separately in the VS, [...] in later times [...] seems to have usually been subsumed under *yogipratyakṣa*." See also TORELLA 2012, p. 471, n. 6): "when later speculation on this subject more and more shifts to its epistemological implications, *yogijñāna* and *ṛṣijñāna* will tend to be taken as mere synonyms."

*āgama*s, the foundational texts of Brahmanism, is explicitly related to their origination from exceptional and trustworthy individuals.

3. HELĀRĀJA'S COMMENTARY ON VP 3.1.46: GOD AS THE *ĀDIGURU*

The reference to extraordinary knowledge in VP 3.1.46 gives Helārāja the opportunity to discuss omniscience (*sarvajña*) at some length in his commentary, engaging with the debates on this and other related issues that had taken place since Bhartṛhari's time, and in particular allows him to introduce a theistic perspective that is notably absent in Bhartṛhari's work.

Helārāja reveals his philosophical agenda already in the introductory paragraph to VP 3.1.46, tackling the issue from the vantage point of the origin of language. As is known, in the *Jātisamuddeśa* Bhartṛhari examines the relation between word and meaning presupposing that words denote *jāti*, the universal. As shown above, in VP 3.1.46 he records an authoritative view according to which the universals of things can be directly perceived by exceptional beings, apparently implying that at least some *jāti*s are not just conceptual-linguistic constructs but are ontologically "real." On the basis of this premise, Helārāja introduces the verse considering a possible objection to the assertion that there is a fixed (*siddha*) or eternal (*nitya*) relation between word and meaning, as maintained by both the Grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas:

> One may argue that, for someone who does not know the relation between the word [*go*] and its meaning, the nature ["cowness,"] distinct from other [natures] and recurring in [the individual] cows, [as evidenced in the individual cognitions] "[this is] a cow," "[this is also] a cow," does not manifest itself. And if that commonality [i.e. *gotva*] is manifested by the individual manifestations, how could there be no cognition of it [even for someone who does not know the relation between the word and the object]? If one will apprehend [it] learning (*vyutpanna*) from others, how did these others, and those before them [apprehend it]?[46]

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[46] PrPr 1, p. 51, ll. 4-6: *nanv aviditaśabdārthasaṃbandhasyānyebhyo vyāvṛttaṃ goṣv anugataṃ rūpaṃ gaur gaur iti na pratibhāsate. yadi ca tābhir vyaktibhir abhivyaktaṃ tat sāmānyaṃ kathaṃ tatpratyayo na syāt. athānyebhyo vyutpannaḥ* pratipatsyate te 'pi kuta*[*ḥ*]... *Here I adopt the reading *vyutpannaḥ* found in R. Sharma's edition (VP 3.1, p. 95) instead of '*vyutpannaḥ* in Subramania Iyer's.

The objection points out that by itself the word – i.e. a phonic form (*rūpa*) such as *go* "cow" –, which the Mīmāṃsakas assume to be possessed with an innate capacity (*śakti*) of denotation, is unable to make the corresponding universal, e.g. "cowness" (*gotva*), known. First one has to learn the relation between that specific word and its object. The Mīmāṃsakas are ready to concede this, since it is a fact of ordinary experience that this is how children learn to speak. For example, in v. 41 of the *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* (SAP) of the *Ślokavārttika* (henceforth, ŚlV), where many of the issues raised here by Helārāja are discussed, Kumārila remarks:

> *sarveṣām anabhijñānāṃ pūrvapūrvaprasiddhitaḥ |*
> *siddhaḥ sambandha ity evaṃ sambandhādir na vidyate ||*

> For all those who do not know it, the relation [between word and meaning] is fixed on the basis of the accepted usage of those before [them], and those [even] before, therefore in this way [one can conclude that] there is no beginning of the relation [i.e. it is eternal].

Thus, the word, the object and their relation are all eternal, but while the first two are accessible to the senses, the third has to be learnt afresh by each new member of the community. The uninstructed (*avyutpanna*) will learn the meaning of the word *go* – i.e. its regular association with the object "cow" – from the repeated observation of its use in different contexts on the part of knowledgeable speakers, normally one's elders.[47] However, as Helārāja points out, this explanation leads to a difficulty: each generation must have learnt the relation between words and meanings from the previous one in a chain of transmission that, although uninterrupted, is nevertheless made of ordinary human beings and therefore is not itself authoritative. The continuous practice of previous generations would be tantamount to a line of blind men[48] since it

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[47] The final verses of the SAP contain a more accurate description of the learning process (140cd-141ef): *śabdavṛddhābhidheyāṃś ca pratyakṣeṇātra paśyati || śrotuś ca pratipannatvam anumānena ceṣṭayā | anyathā 'nupapattyā ca budhyec chaktiṃ dvayāśritām || arthāpattyāvabuddhyante sambandhaṃ tripramāṇakam.*

[48] In VP 1.42 (*hastasparśād ivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvatā | anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ ||*) Bhartṛhari compares a man who relies on reason alone to a blind man groping around while hurrying along an uneven path. The maxim of the blind men (see APTE, Appendix E, p. 53, s.v.) occurs e.g. in Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* (TV 1.3.1, p. 71): *puruṣāntareṣūtpadyamānaḥ kaiścid dṛśyata ity andhaparamparānyāyenāpramāṇatā*, where it refers to the transmission of *smṛti*s.

could not claim to stem from an unquestionably reliable source. As Helārāja puts it, drawing his conclusion,

> Therefore, unless [we assume that in the beginning there was] an omniscient seer (*draṣṭāram*) who had a direct vision [of the relation between *śabda* and *artha*], a succession of blind men would result. And in every case of relation between a word and an object, the so-called practice of the elders (*vṛddhavyavahāra*) would be generated through a succession of blind men, because it would have no foundation (*nirmūlatvāt*).[49]

In this way Helārāja claims that the assumption of the existence of an omniscient being who literally "saw" the relation between *śabda* and *artha* and transmitted its knowledge to later generations is the most logical explanation for the intrinsic stability and reliability of language – a claim, as we will see, that is reiterated at the end of the commentary on VP 3.1.46.

Furthermore, while in the case of cows and other similar material objects there is a visible configuration of features that is shared by all the individuals in which that given *jāti* inheres, in other cases, such as Brahmin-hood[50] (*brāhmaṇatva*) etc., this essence is much more elusive. Thus, it is harder to account for the relation between the word *brāhmaṇa* and its object:

> And, in the case of Brahmin-hood etc., there is no manifestation of a form that is recurring [in individuals of the same kind and] distinct [from that of individuals of a different kind, and which would be] also similar if it were cognised by a [small] child, or a mute person,[51] etc. because the form manifests [itself] in a similar way [to all people, since

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49 PrPr 1, p. 51, ll. 6-8: ... *iti sākṣāddarśinaṃ sarvajñaṃ draṣṭāram antareṇāndhaparamparā prasajyate. sarvatra ca śabdārthasaṃbandhe 'ndhaparamparāyā eva vṛddhavyavahāra iti nāma kṛtaṃ syāt, nirmūlatvāt.*

50 Note that Helārāja appears to regard caste (which is one of the senses of the word *jāti*) as a "natural" kind rather than a socio-cultural construct. On the philosophical debate about the naturalness of social distinctions, see HALBFASS 1992, chapter 10.

51 That is, the direct perception of a cow is similar and similarly valid (*pramāṇa*) for everyone, whether the perceiving subject is an adult, a child or someone with mental or physical handicaps and regardless of their knowledge of the word *go*, but it was generally admitted that this does not hold in the case of Brahmins or other social types.

there are no external physical characteristics that can identify a Brahmin], as in the case of cow-hood etc.[52]

What guarantees the correct application of the word *brāhmaṇa* to certain individuals? Or, from a different angle, is there really a universal *brāhmaṇatva* the essence of which is captured by the word *brāhmaṇa*? The only way to explain the use of certain words to denote objects whose *jāti* has no uniform perceivable physical configuration is, according to Helārāja's conclusion, that "one must necessarily accept the existence of an omniscient being,"[53] someone who had a kind of direct "perception-like" apprehension of the *jāti*, of the word to express it, and of the relation between the two, and passed this knowledge on to ordinary human beings.

It seems likely that Helārāja was influenced by a similar argument already adumbrated in VS 6.1.3 and developed in Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* thereon.[54] Adhyāya 6 of the VS, which deals with qualities, begins its treatment with a discussion of *dharma*, which in Vaiśeṣika taxonomy is considered a quality. Introducing the first *sūtra* of the chapter, Candrānanda explains that the means for achieving *dharma* are the injunctions found in the Veda, and if one wonders about the source of the truthfulness of the Veda,[55] the answer is:

> *buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtir vede* | (VS 6.1.1)
>
> The composition of the sentences in the Veda is based on [the activity of] the intellect.

This pithy statement, claiming that the Veda is the product of some form of intelligence that is responsible for its composition, is one of the earliest attestations of a conception of the Veda radically different from the one upheld by Mīmāṃsā. In the *Vṛtti* Candrānanda elaborates on this idea, introducing the idea of *racanāvattva* of the

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[52] PrPr 1, p. 51, ll. 8-10: *brāhmaṇatvādīnāṃ rūpavyañjanasādṛśyād bālamūkā-dijñānasadṛśo 'py asau gotvādīnām ivāvṛttavyāvṛttarūpāvabhāso nāstīty ava-śyam eva sarvajño 'bhyupagantavya iti.*

[53] *avaśyam eva sarvajño 'bhyupagantavya(ḥ)* (PrPr 1, p. 51, ll. 9-10).

[54] AKLUJKAR 1970, p. 340 has been the first, as far as I know, to point out that Helārāja seems to have known the work of Candrānanda, who was probably also a Kashmiri (ISAACSON 1995, pp. 141-142) and active in the 7th or 8th c. CE (CHEMPARATHY 1970, p. 48).

[55] *tasya* [i.e. *dharmasya*] *vaidiko vidhiḥ sādhanam. vedasya satyatā kuta iti cet, yataḥ...* [the *sūtra* follows] (VSVṛ, p. 45, l. 3).

Veda that is also found in the work of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa[56] (and to which Helārāja himself refers below):

> A sentence such as *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* is a composition (*racanā*) issued from [the activity of] the intelligence of the venerable Maheśvara and therefore it is a valid source of knowledge, since truthfulness pervades the nature of what is composed by trustworthy (*āpta*) individuals.[57]

It is important to stress that, while the following *sūtra* states that the nature of the Veda is such as to point to the intervention of a seer/seers, using the word *ṛṣi* in line with traditional accounts of the self-revelation of the Veda (although perhaps suggesting a greater involvement of the seers in putting the sacred texts in a form accessible to human beings), already in the *Vṛtti* on VS 6.1.1 Candrānanda interprets it as a reference to God's authorship of the Veda. The following *sūtra* replies to the objection that *dharma* is not accessible to ordinary means of knowledge[58]:

> *na cāsmadbuddhibhyo liṅgam ṛṣeḥ* | (VS 6.1.2)

> And [since it could] not [have issued] from our intellects, it is an inferential sign of [the intervention of] a seer.

The *Vṛtti* explains:

> In fact, the knowledge of the Venerable One is not similar to our knowledge, whose domain are objects that are present, not concealed, and related (*sambaddha*) [to the senses]. Hence, the knowledge of the Venerable One can have as its domain objects that are beyond [the reach of] the senses.[59]

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[56]   The relative chronology of Candrānanda and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th c. CE) is uncertain as the former's date is not known but is certainly prior to Helārāja's. If Candrānanda is earlier than Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, as argued by Chemparathy (see n. 54 above), he may be recording an early version of a thesis that Jayanta fully expounds later in the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

[57]   *"agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ" ity evaṃbhūtā racanā bhagavato maheśvarasya buddhipūrvā sā tataḥ pramāṇam, āptapraṇītatvasya satyatāvyāpteḥ* (VSVṛ, p. 45, ll. 5-6).

[58]   Candrānanda introduces it with the words *atīndriyam aśakyaṃ jñātum iti cet* (VSVṛ, p. 45, l. 7) "If [one objects that] it is impossible to know what is beyond [the reach of] the senses."

[59]   VSVṛ, p. 45, ll. 9-11: *na hi yādṛśam asmadvijñānaṃ vartamānāvyavahitasambaddhārthaviṣayaṃ tādṛśam eva bhagavato vijñānam. ataḥ sambhavati bhaga-*

Similarly, one can infer that a superior being has assigned a name to Brahmins:

> *tathā brāhmaṇe saṃjñākarmasiddhir liṅgam* | (VS 6.1.3)

> In the same way, the consensus about the assignment of the name [*brāhmaṇa*] to a Brahmin is an inferential sign [of the intervention of a seer].

Candrānanda points out the implications of the *sūtra*:

> When we see objects such as Brahmins etc., the cognition "This is a Brahmin" does not arise for us through perception without [proper] instruction. And when someone has the perceptual knowledge of an object, then we see that a name is given (*saṃjñāpraṇayanam*), as in the case of [the naming of] a son etc. And they explain the meaning of the *sūtra* [saying] that names for "Brahmin," etc. are found [in use] that were composed by him [the Lord] after he directly saw [every] object.[60]

CHEMPARATHY 1970 has suggested (p. 50) that Candrānanda's idea that the existence of God can be inferred from the fact that things have names, as expressed in the passage quoted above, "may be deduced from an earlier proof of Praśastamati," i.e. Praśastapāda, as Candrānanda himself appears to indicate with the concluding words *iti sūtrārthaṃ varṇayanti*. As Chemparathy shows in another article (CHEMPARATHY 1968, p. 68), this earlier proof is found in a fragment of a lost work[61] of Praśastamati/Praśastapāda's quoted by Kamalaśila in the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, which is worth quoting in full as it seems to be one of the earliest sources for the theistic view on the origin of language embraced here by Helārāja (with some differences, as I will show below):

> However, Praśastamati has said: "At the beginning of creation the usage of words of men presupposes instruction by another; because, when they are awakened [from the state of dissolution] at a later time, [their usage of words] with regard to each object is fixed (*niyata*): just as in the case of children, whose usage of words is not yet established, the usage of words fixed for each object such as cow etc. presupposes the instruction of mother etc. He whose instruction of words is presupposed at the be-

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vato 'tīndriyārthaviṣayaṃ vijñānam.

[60] *vinopadeśena brāhmaṇādikam artham asmākam ālocayatāṃ pratyakṣeṇa na "brāhmaṇo'yam" iti jñānam utpadyate. pratyakṣeṇa cārtham ālocya saṃjñā-praṇayanaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ putrādiṣu. santi caitā brāhmaṇādisaṃjñās tā yena pratya-kṣam artham ālocya praṇītā iti sūtrārthaṃ varṇayanti* (VSVṛ, p. 45, ll. 14-16).

[61] Possibly a *Ṭīkā* on the VaiSū with the equally lost *Vākya* and *Bhāṣya* thereon: cf. Thakur in the Introduction to Jambuvijaya' edition of VS, pp. 12 and 14.

ginning of creation is the Īśvara, who possesses an abundance of knowledge that does not disappear even at the time of the dissolution."[62]

Needless to say, the language in question is not human speech in general in its innumerable varieties, but rather Sanskrit, the language par excellence in the eyes of all our authors. This view seems to imply that the fact Sanskrit is the language of the Vedic corpus is not enough to account for its *laukika* use. The Vedic revelation to the *ṛṣi*s is felt to be insufficient by itself to explain the origins of human language. Some further intervention is required. It is as if a link were missing between the highest truths embodied in the Veda and the dimension of *vyavahāra* and, as Helārāja sets out to establish in this passage, to a large extent following in the footsteps of various predecessors, this link is God.

As I mentioned above, Helārāja takes the term *asmadviśiṣṭa* as meaning "the omniscient primeval teachers." But these teachers, the *ṛṣi*s of yore, must have themselves received their knowledge from a previous source, and this can only be the Lord (*īśvara*) according to Helārāja, who quotes *Yogasūtra* (YS) 1.26 to support this view:

> Thus Patañjali [says]: "He is the teacher even of the ancient [sages] because he is not limited by Time."[63]

Drawn from an authoritative brahmanical text such as the YS, the quotation allows Helārāja to bring God onto the stage (in the introduction to the verse, he had generically talked of a *sarvajñā*, an omniscient being), overstepping the non-dualist atheism of the VP. He then elaborates on the idea expressed in the *sūtra*:

> The Lord is the teacher, i.e. the instructor (*upadeṣṭṛ*), of the omniscient beings. And his mind, senses and body are eternal because he is not li-

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[62] TSP p. 43, ll. 1-5: *praśastamatis tv āha sargādau puruṣāṇāṃ vyavahāro 'nyopadeśapūrvakaḥ, uttarakālaṃ prabuddhānāṃ pratyarthaniyatatvād aprasiddhavāgvyavahārāṇām kumārāṇāṃ gavādiṣu pratyarthaniyato vāgvyavahāro yathā mātrādyupadeśapūrvaka iti. yadupadeśapūrvakaḥ sargādau vyavahāraḥ sa īśvaraḥ pralayakāle 'py aluptajñānātiśaya.* Transl. CHEMPARATHY 1968, p. 68, with some minor modifications. Chemparathy points out (ibid., n. 15) that it is not sure whether the sentence after *iti* "is a continuation of Praśastamati's own argument or whether it is an additional concluding statement by Kamalaśīla himself."

[63] PrPr 1, p. 51, ll. 16-17: *tathā ca patañjaliḥ: "sa pūrveṣām api guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt."* The pronoun *saḥ* refers back to Īśvara in YS 24: *kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ.*

mited by Time. Otherwise, once the dissolution [of the cosmos] has taken place, [and] Brahmā etc. have arisen again, who would be their teacher? And thus the world, having no normative knowledge (*śāstram*), no observance (*anuṣṭhānam*) of injunctions and interdictions, would be as good as blind and mute.[64]

The fact that the Creator is not under the sway of Time is shown by the fact that, after the *pralaya*, at the beginning of every new cosmic cycle, the divine beings who re-appear in the cosmos are once again taught its eternal law, *dharma*. Who else could be their teacher if not the Lord? They in turn hand down that knowledge to humans, as can be inferred from the remark that, if it were not so, the world would be bereft of *śāstra* (*niḥśāstram*), unaware of ritual and social obligations and taboos, and stumbling in the dark, as it were. Thus, in a few lines at the beginning of the PrPr on VP 3.1.46, Helārāja sketches an account of the spread of normative knowledge of cosmogonical proportions, tracing the contemporary views about matters that are beyond the reach of senses and reasoning (*dharma*, primarily, but also *ātman*, the constituents of the universe, etc.) to the seers who learn those truths directly from God at the dawn of time, when he also issues the Veda.

The historical antecedents of this position in philosophical texts are to be found especially in the works of the earliest Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors of the post-*sūtra* period. At the very beginning of PDhS (2, 1.7), for example, Praśastapāda states that *dharma* has been manifested in the Lord's injunctions.[65] And later, in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (henceforth, NM), Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th c. CE) argues for the existence of God responding to the criticisms levelled against theism by the Mīmāṃsakas, and in particular Kumārila. The latter were formidable opponents, whose opinions could not be ignored or easily dismissed. Having declared his theistic stance early in his commentary on VP 3.1.46, Helārāja himself feels obliged to take account of the Mīmāṃsakas' reaction to the theism of other brahmanical schools and explain their arguments, as a kind of *pūrvapa-*

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[64] PrPr 1, p. 51, ll. 18-20: *sarvajñānām īśvaro gurur upadeṣṭā. tasya ca buddhīndriyadehānāṃ kālenānavacchedān nityatā. anyathā pralaye vṛtte punarutpanneṣu brahmādiṣu ka upadeṣṭā syāt. tataś ca niḥśāstraṃ niranuṣṭhānaṃ vidhiniṣedhayor andhamūkaprāyaṃ jagat syāt.*

[65] PDhS 2: *dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmyavaidharmyatattvajñānaṃ niḥśreyasahetuḥ. tac ceśvaracodanābhivyaktād dharmād eva.*

kṣa that he then proceeds to confute, as I will show in the next section.

4. The Dispute with Mīmāṃsā on *Pralaya*
and the Purpose of *Arthavāda*s

Claiming that the Veda is issued from the Lord at the beginning of each new cosmic age, namely at each re-creation of the world after its periodical destruction, clearly clashes with the Mīmāṃsā's tenet of the eternal and uncreated nature of the Veda, which warrants its unique authority on transcendental matters. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Mīmāṃsakas oppose it, resolutely rejecting the idea of a cosmos subject to cyclic *pralaya* "dissolution" and *sṛṣṭi* "creation" under the impulsion of a creator God. What is at stake for them is not just the cyclicity of time or even the existence of God, for which they have little use, but the eternality of the words of the Veda[66] in which the injunctions for the realisation of *dharma* are formulated.

Much of the argument against the view that the relation between words and objects/meanings is based on a convention established by God at the beginning of creation is presented by Kumārila in the SAP of ŚlV ad *Jaiminisūtra* (henceforth, JS) 1.1.5, which is probably presupposed by Helārāja when he advances his counter-argument under VP 3.1.46.

Kumārila defines the terms of the dispute in SAP 12cd-13cd:

> *pratītiḥ samayāt puṃsāṃ bhaved akṣinikocavat* |
> *samayaḥ pratimartyaṃ yā pratyuccāraṇam eva vā* |
> *kriyate jagadādau vā sakṛd ekena kena cit* ||

> [Objection:] Comprehension [of the meaning of a verbal expression] will arise for human beings from a convention (*samayāt*) [linking a certain word to a certain object], like winking. [Reply:] Is this convention created [ad hoc] for each individual, or for each utterance, or does someone [create it] once [and for all] at the beginning of the world?

The answer, from a Mīmāṃsā perspective, is of course that the relation between word and meaning is eternal and uncreated. This is summarised in SAP 41ad (quoted above, § 3) and followed in SAP

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66 And, to the extent that they are similar to Vedic words, of *laukika* words.

42cd-44cd by the dismissal of the opponents' thesis, which is briefly recalled and rejected:

sargādau ca kriyā nāsti, tādṛk kālo hi neṣyate |
yadi tv ādau jagat sṛṣṭvā dharmādharmau sasādhanau |
yathā śabdārthasambandhān vedān kaś cit pravartayet ||
jagaddhitāya vedasya tathā kiñ cin na duṣyati |
sarvajñavat tu duḥsādham ity atraitan na saṃśritam ||

And the making [of such a relation between word and meaning] does not happen at the beginning of creation, for we do not admit that there is such a time. [Objection:] But if someone, after creating the world, set *dharma* and *adharma* in motion, together with the means [to bring them about], and the Vedas, in which the relations between words and meanings are [instituted] for the sake of the world, in this way the Veda [itself] would not be diminished. [Reply:] But this is hard to prove, just like omniscience, therefore here [in the Mīmāṃsā system] we do not rely on this [idea].

In the following verses, Kumārila relentlessly attacks the thesis of the existence of a creator god deploying an array of arguments: how should one imagine the universe before the creation? And what would be the condition and nature of Prajāpati (the creator god of Vedic cosmogonies) himself prior to such an event? There would be no one to know him, who could then pass on the knowledge of God to future beings, and therefore, in the absence of a direct cognition of God, no way to ascertain his existence. Moreover, if God has no material body, how could he entertain the desire to create the world? And if God had a body, he could not have created it himself, therefore one should assume the existence of some other being who created him (and so on, in an infinite regress). If, on the other hand, it is maintained that the creator's body is eternal, what would it be made of, since earth etc. did not exist before he created them?[67]

Furthermore, it is difficult to account for the creation of a world in which misery prevails: how could God wish to create the world

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[67]   See SAP 45ab-49ab: *yadā sarvam idaṃ nāsīt kvāvasthā tatra gamyatām | prajāpateḥ kva vā sthānaṃ kiṃ rūpaṃ ca pratīyatām || jñātā ca kas tadā tasya yo janān bodhayiṣyati | upalabdher vinā caitat katham adhyavasīyatām || pravṛttiḥ katham ādyā ca jagataḥ sampratīyate | śarīrāder vinā cāsya katham icchāpi sarjane || śarīrādy atha tasya syāt, tasyotpattir na tatkṛtā | tadvad anyaprasaṅgo 'pi, nityaṃ yadi tad iṣyate || pṛthivyādāv anutpanne kimmayaṃ tat punar bhavet |.*

out of compassion before there were any beings to be compassionate about? And if compassion were his motive, surely he could make all creatures happy. And if it is argued that a world where there is no suffering is inconceivable, one can retort that this would imply that God is subject to a law above him, and consequently his alleged independence would be undermined.[68]

If, moreover, one argues that God creates the world out of desire, what is this desire that he cannot fulfil without creating the world? And without a purpose, not even a fool would act, therefore, what would be the point of God's intelligence?[69] Similarly, his desire to reabsorb the cosmos would be incomprehensible.[70]

If the Veda had been issued by a creator with such dubious motives, it would itself be unreliable and, therefore, not authoritative. If, on the other hand, the Veda is eternal, it cannot have any relation with events that took place at some point in time. Therefore, those Vedic passages that narrate the creation of the world should be construed as being meant to encourage others (*anyaprarocanā*) to engage in similar actions.[71]

With this last statement, Kumārila aims to preempt the inevitable objection that the Vedas themselves – as well as a myriad of other authoritative brahmanical works – contain accounts of the creation and destruction of the world by a creator God. The standard Mīmāṃsā position is that these are *arthavāda*s,[72] namely Śruti and Smṛti passages of a varied nature – mythological accounts,

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[68] See SAP 49cd: *prāṇināṃ prāyaduḥkhā ca sisṛkṣāsya na yujyate* ‖; and SAP 52ab-54ab: *abhāvāc cānukampyānāṃ nānukampāsya jāyate | sṛjec ca śubham evaikam anukampāprayojitaḥ ‖ athāśubhād vinā sṛṣṭiḥ sthitir vā nopadyate | ātmādhīnābhyupāye hi bhavet kiṃ nāma dṛṣkaram | tathā cāpekṣamāṇasya svātantryaṃ pratihanyate* ‖.

[69] See SAP 54cd-55cd: *jagac cāsṛjatas tasya kiṃ nāmeṣṭaṃ na sidhyati | prayojanam anuddiśya na mando 'pi pravartate | evam eva pravṛttiś cec caitanyenāsya kiṃ bhavet* ‖.

[70] See SAP 57ab: *saṃhārecchāpi caitasya bhaved apratyayāt punaḥ* |.

[71] See SAP 61ab-62cd: *evaṃ vedo 'pi tatpūrvastatsadbhāvādibodhane | sāśaṅko na pramāṇaṃ syād nityasya vyāpṛtiḥ kutaḥ ‖ yadi prāg apy asau tasmād arthād āsīn na tena saḥ | sambaddha iti tasyānyas tadartho 'nyaprarocanā* ‖.

[72] On the Mīmāṃsā theory of *arthavāda* and the slightly different views on the topic of the two major exegetical schools, the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras, see GERSCHHEIMER 1994. Helārāja's formulation here is vague enough to accommodate both, but his opponent seems to be Kumārila, who is quoted later in the passage.

descriptions, explanations, etc. – which are considered to have an auxiliary function with regard to actual direct teaching, as far as they praise certain beliefs, attitudes and conducts and disparage others, and in this way they encourage people to behave in certain ways, bolstering the normative teachings. Kumārila deals with the topic of *arthavāda* in great detail in the first three *adhikaraṇa*s of the TV; in the section of the SAP examined here he recalls it briefly in relation not only to the Veda but also to *smṛti*s such as the *Mahābhārata*, in particular in vv. 64ab-65cd:

> *upākhyānādirūpeṇa vṛttir vedavad eva naḥ |*
> *dharmādau bhāratādīnāṃ bhrāntis tebhyo 'py ato bhavet ||*
> *ākhyānānupayogitvāt teṣu sarveṣu vidyate |*
> *stutinindāśrayaḥ kaś cid vedas taccodito 'pi vā ||*

> According to us, the *Mahābhārata* etc. deal with [topics such as] *dharma* etc. in the form of stories etc., just like the Veda; therefore, [if taken at face value,] from these too one might be misled. Since narrations are of no use [by themselves], for all of these there is some [action enjoined by the] Veda that is the basis of the praise or blame [conveyed by the *arthavāda*], or even [some action] enjoined by them [i.e. the Smṛtis].

At the beginning of his riposte, Helārāja briefly recalls the Mīmāṃsā's stand on *pralaya* and quickly dismisses it as follows:

> But the Jaiminīyas maintain that there is no dissolution (*pralayaḥ*) at all – on the contrary, [they claim that] "the world is never different." This is not true, because the lore (*smṛteḥ*) of the dissolution [of the universe] is found in all the traditional texts (*sarvaśāstreṣu*).[73]

To begin with, Helārāja dismisses the Mīmāṃsā views on *pralaya* simply by invoking the consensus found "in all the traditional texts." The lapidary statement (*na kadācid anīdṛśaṃ jagat*) that in Helārāja's text[74] epitomises the Exegetes' view is not found in any surviving Mīmāṃsā work, but according to KATAOKA 2005 (p. 337) might be a quotation from Kumārila's lost *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, since it

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[73] PrPr 1, pp. 51[l. 20]-52[l. 1]: *atha pralayo naivāsti, api tu "na kadācid anīdṛśaṃ jagad" iti jaiminīyāḥ. tad etad asat sarvaśāstreṣu pralayasmṛteḥ.*

[74] Note that Helārāja quotes the same statement a few pages before our verse under VP 3.1.42, *anucchedyāśrayām eke sarvāṃ jātiṃ pracakṣate | na yaugapadyaṃ pralaye sarvasyeti vyavasthitāḥ ||*, where Bhartṛhari reports the opinion of some (*eke*) who believe that there is no simultaneous dissolution (*pralaya*) of the universe during which the *jāti*s are supposed to remain in existence without their substrata (see PrPr 1, p. 49, l. 1). Unlike here, though, Helārāja does not identify the upholders of this view.

is quoted by Śāntarakṣita.[75] The same sentence appears in NM, Āh-
nika 3, v. 158, at the very end of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's long exposition
of the views of those who deny the existence of God and, conse-
quently, of the recurring dissolution of the world, and before he
gives his reply. Like Helārāja – who I suspect may have been in-
fluenced by him – in vv. 157-158[76] Jayanta presents the belief in
the cyclical destruction and re-creation of the world as a *prasiddhi*,
a commonly accepted view that is opposed only by the *nītiraha-
syavedin*s[77] (i.e. the Mīmāṃsakas).

However, Helārāja is not content with that, but proceeds to exa-
mine the Mīmāṃsā thesis on the nature and function of *arthavāda*s
and refute it.

4.1. Helārāja's Exposition of the Mīmāṃsā View
on Arthavādas

The goal of the Vedic tradition as understood by Mīmāṃsakas is to
instruct about action, i.e. correct ritual practice – explains Helārāja
– and, therefore, according to them, the narrations of past events,
which do not contain any injunction or prohibition and do not
teach anything new (*apūrva*), are not a *pramāṇa*, a source of valid
knowledge:

> Then, since the purpose of the transmission [of the Vedas] is action [i.e.
> correct ritual practice],[78] a statement expressing an existing object is not
> a source of valid knowledge, they say. To explain: since one understands
> the origin of the relation between word and meaning from the practice of

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[75] See Kataoka 2005, p. 337, for the reference to the TS.

[76] NM 3.157-158 (vol. I, p. 491): *na ca prasiddhimātreṇa yuktam etasya kalpa-
nam | nirmūlatvāt tathā coktaṃ prasiddhir vaṭayakṣavat ‖ ata eva nirīkṣya dur-
ghaṭaṃ jagato janmavināśaḍambaram | na kadācid anīdṛśaṃ jagat kathitaṃ
nītirahasyavedibhiḥ ‖*. For a new critical edition of this section of NM, see Ka-
taoka 2005.

[77] I am not sure about the nuances of the expression *nītirahasyavedin*, literally
"one who knows the secret of [proper ritual] conduct," but I suspect Jayanta
Bhaṭṭa may have intended to be sarcastic.

[78] Cf. JS 1.2.1: *āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthānāṃ tasmād
anityam ucyate |*. "Because the tradition [, i.e. the Veda,] aims at ritual actions,
those parts[, i.e. *arthavāda*, etc.,] which do not aim at such things are useless.
Therefore [they are] said to be non-eternal." (Transl. Kataoka 2011, p. 346,
n. 388.)

the elders as it is intended for some task to be done, and since the object of a word is what is intended [when the word is used], therefore, since there is no purpose in the expression of an object that is already realised, [e.g.] the telling of a mere story, a sentence whose object is existent [i.e. has already been realised] cannot be authoritative because it does not have the nature of a teaching (*aśāstratvāt*) insofar as nobody is teaching it, because it contains no incitation to [comply with] an injunction or a prohibition.[79]

Clearly, story-telling is not meant to prompt any course of action, and consequently, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, its words should be taken in a figurative sense. As shown above, they believe that such passages have an auxiliary function with regard to injunctions, insofar as they provide illustrations of beliefs, attitudes and conducts that are laudable and should be imitated, and conversely of others that are deplorable and should be avoided, thus bolstering the normative teachings:

> However, it becomes associated with the nature of an auxiliary (*aṅga-bhāvena*) of a sentence prompting to action. The statements [known as] *arthavāda*s, having the nature of praise [of a given course of action], are in fact associated with the teaching (*śāstre*) [of a certain ritual operation] because they are understood to be auxiliary to the injunctive statements, since in this way the injunction is reinforced (*upodbalitaḥ*).[80]

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[79] PrPr 1, p. 52, ll. 1-5: *athāmnāyasya kriyārthatvād bhūtārthaprātipadikaṃ vā-kyam apramāṇam ity ucyate. tathā hi kāryaparatvenaiva vṛddhavyavahārāc chabdārthasaṃbandhavyutpattipratipatteḥ yatparaś ca śabdasya śabdārthaḥ ity ākhyāyikāmātravarṇane siddhārthābhidhāne prayojanābhāvād vidhiniṣe-dhacodanābhāvāt kasyacid apy aśāsanād bhūtārthaṃ vākyam aśāstratvād eva na pramāṇatām arhati*. Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad JS 1.2.1, pp. 128-129: *kriyā katham anuṣṭheyā, iti tāṃ vadituṃ samāmnātāro vākyāni samāmananti. tad yāni vākyāni kriyāṃ nāvagamayanti, kriyāsambaddham vā kiñcit, evam eva bhūtam artham anvācakṣate... evañjātīyakāni tāni kaṃ dharmaṃ pramimīran.* "In order to state how an action should be performed, the transmitters [of traditional knowledge] hand down [certain] sentences. Now, there are sentences that do not inform about an action, or something connected with an action, [and] in this way indeed [only] tell about [some] past object – what *dharma* could such sentences institute?".

[80] PrPr 1, p. 52, ll. 5-7: *pravartakavākyāṅgabhāvena tu samanvayam eti. śāstre stāvakatvena hy arthavādavākyāni vidhivākyāṅgabhāvagamanād anvaya-bhāñji bhavanti. evaṃ hi vidhir upodbalito bhavati.*

4.2. Critique of the Mīmāṃsā View

The *arthavāda* passages may well be meant mainly to encourage people to undertake certain actions, but does this mean that they should be discarded altogether as sources of valid knowledge? Helārāja concisely presents the two alternatives that arise with regard to the validity of *arthavāda*s. One view, upheld by the Mīmāṃsakas, maintains that they have no object of their own and are a subordinate element in complex sentences centred on an injunction;[81] the other view, to which Helārāja subscribes, starts from the observation that generally these texts do make sense even by themselves and argues that, only after they have fulfilled their communicative function and conveyed their object, they can assist in the achievement of further goals enjoined by other passages:

> With regard to this, we say: do the statements [known as] *arthavāda*s, [being] as meaningless as individual sounds, really become auxiliary in a prescriptive complex sentence (*mahāvākya*) that express the object to be realised? Or do they have some object of their own [and,] bringing an understanding of it, they turn out to be conducive to [the object] to be realised? These are the two alternative views.[82]

Helārāja explicitly rejects the first view with arguments that are at least partly borrowed from Mīmāṃsā itself. It cannot be denied, he points out, that these non-injunctive passages are independently meaningful, because if they were not, they could not be expected to play a supportive role to the prescriptive passages:

> The first view is not correct. Since [sentences] with established objects are seen to express their own object as is appropriate in each case, it should be considered whether such an expression [i.e. an *arthavāda*] is only authoritative with regard to its own object or otherwise, because it

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81   See Kumārila's conclusive remark in TV on JS 1.2.7 (for which see below), p. 23: *tasmād vidhinaikavākyatvāt tadanugraheṇārthavanto 'rthavādā iti.* "Therefore, because they form one sentence with an injunction, *arthavāda*s have a purpose insofar as they assist with it [i.e. the injunction]."

82   PrPr 1, p. 52, ll. 8-10: *atra brūmaḥ. kim anarthakāni varṇavad evārthavādavākyāni mahāvākye vidhāyake kāryārthapratipādake 'ṅgabhāvam upayānti, āhosvid ātmīyaḥ kaścid eṣām artho 'sti yatra pratipattim ādadhati kāryaparāṇi saṃpadyanta iti pakṣadvayam.*

is not tenable that something having no function (*akiṃcitkarasya*), [i.e.] meaningless, can be an auxiliary in another context.[83]

Moreover, Mīmāṃsā subscribes to the principle of the intrinsic validity of cognitions (*svataḥ prāmāṇyam*), which is expounded by Kumārila in ŚlV 33-61 ad JS 1.1.2, according to which a cognition is inherently valid unless proven to be otherwise.[84] Therefore, argues Helārāja, if the sense of a statement in the non-prescriptive portions of the scriptures is not incongruous, namely contradicted by other valid means of knowledge or authoritative sources, there is no good reason to discard it. After recalling this principle, Helārāja applies it to the case of the existence of the omniscient Lord and other deities, who are frequently mentioned in traditional texts:

> When it is contradicted [by other *pramāṇa*s], it is not valid, but when it is not contradicted, it is indeed valid. For according to the views of the Jaiminīyas, a cognition that is not contradicted is self-validating. And we never descry anything contradicting [the existence of] the omniscient Lord and the deities apprehended from the *śāstra*.[85]

However, as pointed out above, the Mīmāṃsakas would retort that those passages, being of a non-injunctive nature, should be interpreted in a secondary or figurative sense. And, even regardless of the Mīmāṃsā's distinction between *vidhi* and *arthavāda*, it is a fact that *arthavāda* passages in the Vedic texts or the Smṛti generally contain numerous statements which are either mutually contradictory or contrary to ordinary experience. One of the arguments raised against their reliability (for example, by the Buddhists) is that, if

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[83]   PrPr 1, p. 52, ll. 10-12: *prathamaḥ pakṣo na yuktaḥ. yathāyathaṃ siddhārthānāṃ svārthapratipattidarśanād akiñcitkarasyānarthakasya paratrāṅgabhāvānupapatteḥ kevalaṃ sā pratipattiḥ tatra svārthe pramāṇabhūtā anyathā veti vicāryam.*

[84]   See v. 47ab: *svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyam iti gamyatām* |. "It should be understood that the validity of every valid cognition is from itself," and the conclusion in v. 53: *tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā | arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānād apodyate* ||. "Therefore, the validity of a cognition, which has resulted from its being a cognition, is [exceptionally] cancelled [only] when [one] finds that the object [of the cognition] is otherwise [than the way it was cognized] or that there are bad qualities in [its] cause." (Transl. KATAOKA 2011, vol. II, pp. 246-247 and 257-259.) For a recent extensive treatment of this theory, see ibid., esp. pp. 60-98.

[85]   PrPr 1, p. 52, ll. 12-14: *yatra bādhaḥ tatrāpramāṇam. abādhe tu pramāṇam eva. abādhitā hi saṃvit svataḥ pramāṇam iti jaiminīyanayaḥ. sarvajñeśvaradevatānāṃ ca śāstrād adhigatānāṃ na kiñcana bādhakam utpaśyāmaḥ.*

they cannot be relied upon on issues that can be settled through ordinary *pramāṇa*s such as perception and inference, their reliability on trans-empirical topics is inevitably undermined too. Or, to put it differently, the dilemma is whether the authority of a traditional source is sufficient guarantee of the veridicity of *all* its contents – a problem to which Helārāja turns next.

4.3. On the Reliability of the Scriptures:
The Example of Talking Cats

The example chosen by Helārāja to illustrate the objection that some scriptural passages are incongruous is quite unusual, as it refers to the fact that certain authoritative works (*śāstra*) refer to talking cats,[86] and I have not been able to find any precedent or parallel for it. In his defense of scriptural authority even on such matters, Helārāja resorts to the argument of omniscience:

> One may object that in the *śāstra* one hears [references to] the meaningful statements of cats etc., and this is incongruous [with common experience], therefore in the very same way any [statement] about [any] invisible [i.e. trans-empirical] object is not reliable. [Reply:] You cannot say that. The meaningfulness of the statements of omniscient beings is never

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[86] It is difficult to guess what authoritative text(s) Helārāja had in mind with this bizarre reference to talking cats. As far as I could ascertain, the few mentions of cats in Vedic texts (whether called *mārjāra* or *biḍāla*) never depict them speaking. However, in the *Mahābhārata* (12.136.18f.) there is a dialogue between a mouse called Palita, who is an expert on *arthaśāstra*, and a cat named Lomaśa. The two, finding themselves in a situation of danger, strike an unlikely alliance that allows both to save their lives, and in the course of the story they discuss at length issues such as trust, friendship, etc. The cat Lomaśa is said to be *buddhimān* "clever" and *vākyasaṃpannaḥ* "possessed with eloquence." Since Itihāsa (the Epics) and Purāṇa were generally regarded as part of the Smṛti, and Helārāja mentions them a few lines below as a source of teachings on *dharma*, he may be alluding to this *Mahābhārata* episode or a similar story (I wish to thank Marco Franceschini for his help in checking the mentions of cats in Vedic texts and drawing my attention to the story of Lomaśa in the *Mahābhārata*). R. Śarmā does not say so explicitly, but after quoting the PrPr sentence about cats verbatim, he recalls that in the *Mahābhārata* one also finds a dialogue between a vulture and a jackal (AK, p. 98: *nanu ca mārjārādīnāṃ sārthakaṃ vacanaṃ śāstre śrūyate, mahābhārate ca gṛdhragomāyusaṃvādaḥ smaryate*).

invalidated, [all the more so] when it is even seen to agree with other traditional sources (*āgama*).[87]

Thus, according to Helārāja one cannot dismiss the veridicity of a traditional source that mentions talking animals because the works in which they are found have been composed by omniscient beings. This seems to imply that these exceptional individuals have access to planes of experience that are beyond the reach of ordinary human cognition, and what sounds incongruous to us might be true on some other level of reality. Moreover, Helārāja points out that this skepticism is even less justified if several sources (*āgamāntareṇa*) agree on something that appears incomprehensible or even absurd to ordinary people.

With the example of talking animals apparently still on his mind, Helārāja appeals to an authoritative source, the YS:

> But ordinary people (*carmacakṣuṣaḥ*[88]) do not believe in this [sort of thing]. To illustrate [my point], the revered Patañjali taught: "Through the concentration upon word and meaning, there arises the knowledge of the cries of all beings" (YS 3.17).[89]

The quotation from the YS seems to have several implications. The *sūtra*, which Helārāja gives in a nonstandard form,[90] states that, while normally there is a superimposition or overlap between a word, the concept it expresses and the object it refers to, one can learn to discern one from the other with the help of meditation, thus achieving the super-natural power of understanding the meanings of the cries of all creatures. At one level, Helārāja seems to be arguing that, as far as matters accessible to the senses are concerned, the consensus of different authoritative texts is equivalent to

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[87] PrPr 1, p. 52, ll. 15-17: *nanu ca mārjārādīnāṃ śāstre sārthakaṃ vacanaṃ śrūyate. na ca tatra saṃvādo 'stīty evam eva sarvam adṛṣṭārtham apramāṇam. maivaṃ vocaḥ. sarvajñabhūtānāṃ vacanasyāgamāntareṇāpi sārthakatvasya saṃvādopalabdher abādhitatvam eva.*

[88] Literally, "those who perceive with their skin," namely their senses alone.

[89] PrPr 1, p. 52, ll. 17-19: *carmacakṣuṣaḥ param etan na manyante. tathā hi bhagavān patañjaliḥ: "śabdārthasaṃyamanāt sarvabhūtarutajñānam" ādideśa.*

[90] As pointed out by SUBRAMANIA IYER (VP 3.1, p. 52, crit. app.), the *sūtra* usually reads as follows: *śabdārthapratyayānām itaretarādhyāsāt saṅkaras tas tatpravibhāgāsaṃyamāt sarvabhūtarutajñānam.* It is impossible to decide whether the discrepancy stems from the fact that Helārāja records a different version of it, or quotes it wrongly from memory, or abridges it intentionally.

the congruity of *āgama* with other *pramāṇa*s (such as perception and inference): the quote from YS may thus be construed as an example of another source subscribing to the idea that animals do communicate in their own way and therefore corroborating the mention of talking cats in other treatises.

Moreover, as a response to those who find the mention of talking animals absurd, the recourse to the YS quotation (and the YS itself) seems to imply that animals' cries are indeed a form of language with a communicative function; their meaning can become accessible to individuals who, with the help of meditative techniques, develop the ability to transcend the expressive (*vācaka*) level of language and grasp what is expressed (*vācya*) directly. In other words, the language of animals can become intelligible to individuals who do not rely just on their senses to understand the world around them, but also on their especially trained minds.

This also seems to be the intention behind the brief observation at the beginning of the passage just quoted. It is interesting to note that the term *carmacakṣus* also appears in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's NM, in a section devoted to the refutation of Kumārila's objections against omniscience. After quoting ŚlV 112 ad JS 1.1.2 (for which see below), in vv. 127-128 Jayanta remarks:

> [Objection:] However, it is preposterous to claim that *dharma*, which consists in [the ritual duties] that ought to be fulfilled and is not affected by past, present and future, can be the object of perceptual cognition. [Reply:] True! This is [indeed] preposterous with regard to ordinary people (*carmacakṣuṣaḥ*) such as you or me, but it is not arduous for omniscient yogis to follow this path.[91]

The rationale behind the NM verses – and Helārāja's statement, possibly inspired by the former – seems to be that reality (both mundane, as in the case of the cries of animals, and ultra-mundane, as in the case of *dharma*) is far more complex than ordinary people even realise. Nevertheless, its aspects and dimensions that lie beyond the powers of human cognition are accessible to omniscient beings, so that if a *smṛti*, by definition the work of such an exceptional individual, contains statements that we do not understand or that seem to clash with our usual experience, we have to assume

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[91] NM, Āhnika 2, pp. 270-271: *nanu kartavyatārūpaḥ trikālasparśavarjitaḥ | cakṣurviṣayatām eti dharma ity atisāhasam ‖ satyaṃ sāhasam etat te mama vā carmacakṣuṣaḥ | na tv eṣa durgamaḥ panthā yogināṃ sarvadarśinām ‖.*

that this is due to our limitations, rather than question the truthfulness of the text.

It is interesting to note that YS 3.17 is also quoted by Abhinavagupta in a passage of the *Parātriśikatattvavivaraṇa* and alluded to in another passage of the same work. The passages in question, discussed in TORELLA 2004 (esp. pp. 174-175), expound Abhinavagupta's view that phonemes (*varṇa*) possess denotative power (*vācakatva*)[92] and, if other sounds such as those produced by musical instruments or the cries of animals are also regarded as expressive in the broader sense of the word, "this simply means that all sounds, without distinction, must have phonemes as their ultimate stuff" (ibid., p. 175).

In Helārāja's passing mention of the cries of animals there is no trace of a speculation on the expressivity of individual phonemes (which, as noted by Torella, would be in conflict with Bhartṛhari's view according to which only *vākya*, the sentence, is the fundamental semantic unit of speech), or even less of the metaphysical implications of this notion as seen in Abhinavagupta's work. But from Helārāja's treatment of this topic it seems legitimate to draw the conclusion that, like Abhinavagupta, he sees the power to understand what animals say as the yogi's capacity of getting closer than ordinary humans to the essential unity of the single consciousness – or, even more to the point, the voice – of the whole universe.

4.4. Making the Case for the Validity
of Non-Injunctive Texts

Helārāja's final position on non-prescriptive passages in scriptural sources appears to be that they are not always or exclusively subordinated to the teaching of ritual injunctions. If they appear to be invalidated (*asaṃvāditva*) by other statements or valid means of knowledge, they should be interpreted in a figurative way. But if a given statement is confirmed by other equally authoritative sources, it is definitely a *pramāṇa*. As Helārāja puts it:

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[92] *varṇānām eva ca paramārthato...* "Ultimately, the power of verbal signification, consisting in the identification with meaning, only pertains to phonemes." (Transl. TORELLA 2004, p. 174.)

Therefore, when in an *arthavāda* sentence there is no congruity [with other *pramāṇa*s, i.e.] when it results in a mere contradiction [of ordinary experience], then, since it expresses an unreal object, it will have to be [construed as] intended (*param*) for the expression of a [ritual] obligation (*kārya*, lit. "what has to be done"). But when there is no contradiction, [for example when] it agrees [with other traditional sources], [then] it is indeed a source of valid knowledge, and in that case it is not intended for any [ritual] obligation.[93]

What is the function, though, of the non-injunctive passages in scriptural sources, if it is admitted that at least some of them have a purpose of their own? Helārāja's opinion is that discursive texts, which often speak of past events and mention well-known objects (in contrast to injunctions, which prescribe actions that ought to be carried out), do indeed teach *dharma* in their own way. He illustrates his point with the example of Itihāsas and Purāṇas, whose authority is accepted by many currents within Brahmanism.[94] These famous works, basically consisting of narrations (like many of the Vedic *arthavāda*s), and often in the form of didactic dialogues (such as the one between Lomaśa and Palita!), also dispense teaching on religious and moral matters that cannot be settled by the simple recourse to reason:

And in this [kind of sentence] there is nothing that is intended for [the reinforcement of a ritual] obligation, because, as the sentences in the Purāṇas and Itihāsa convey objects that are already realised, it is [generally] admitted that their knowledge alone is [sufficient] for *dharma* to arise since it is observed that the dialogues [contained in these works] fulfil [their function] merely by [doing] that[95].[96]

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[93] PrPr 1, p. 52, ll. 19-21: *tasmād yatra nāsti saṃvādo bādhakamātraparyavasānam arthavādavākye, tad asatyārthapratipādanenāstu kāryamātrapratipādanaparam. yatra tu nāsti bādhaḥ śāstrāntareṇa saṃvādaḥ tat pramāṇam eva. na ca tatra kāryaparatā.*

[94] On the authority of *smṛti*s, see the following remark by Kumārila in TV (p. 79): *tena sarvasmṛtīnāṃ prayojanavato prāmāṇyasiddhiḥ. tatra yāvad dharmamokṣasambandhi tadvedaprabhavam. yat tv arthasukhaviṣayam tallokavyavahārapūrvakam iti vivektavyam. eṣaivetihāsapurāṇayor apy upadeśavākyānāṃ gatiḥ. upākhyānāni tv arthavādeṣu vyākhyātāni.*

[95] The phrase "merely by doing that" translates *tāvati eva*, literally "to that extent alone." I take it to mean that they achieve their goal of teaching *dharma* merely by conveying *siddhārtha*s, accomplished objects and events, without having recourse to injunctions.

The religious perspective sketched in this passage is clearly a far cry from the Vedic orthodoxy advocated by Mīmāṃsā, as it pushes the boundaries of Brahmanism as narrowly defined by the latter to accommodate the beliefs and practices of what may be called in short "post-Vedic Brahmanism." Kumārila admits that the Smṛtis are authoritative, but applies the same distinction between injunctive and non-injunctive passages in them as in the Vedas. Commenting on JS 1.2.7, *vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt stutyarthatvena vidhīnāṃ syuḥ*, "Because they [i.e. *arthavāda*s] form one sentence with an injunction, they should be [interpreted] as having the purpose of praising [the action prescribed by] the injunctions," he writes:

> The sentences of the *Mahābhārata* etc. should be explained in this way. [...] Some are direct injunctions concerning [matters such as] gifts, kingship, liberation, *dharma*, etc., while others are *arthavāda*s because they consist of traditional lore about the deeds of other people. And, as this is the intention in all the stories [narrated in these works], one should teach [them to people],[97] therefore, since [in such contexts] an injunction would be pointless, one has to admit that somehow the praise or blame [of certain actions] is being conveyed.[98]

According to Helārāja, however, the scope of the teachings imparted in these texts is much broader than the Vedic ritual arena, and even the passages dealing with established objects (*siddhārtha*s) may have a purpose of their own, for example teaching about appropriate objects of meditation, such as God (*īśvara*), as he argues in the continuation of the PrPr passage:

> Moreover, one can practise meditation etc. [only] when the object of meditation is well known, therefore even the texts that talk about the Lord etc. do have a purpose.[99] Thus, a scripture (*śāstram*) [states]: "It is the

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[96]   PrPr 1, p. 52, ll. 21-22: *na ca tatra kāryaparatā siddhārthapratipādanena purāṇetihāsavākyānāṃ tāvaty eva praśnottarayoḥ samāptatvadarśanāt tatparijñānamātrāc ca dharmotpattyabhyupagamāt.*

[97]   A few lines above Kumārila specifies: *śrāvayec caturo varṇān*, "one should have the four *varṇa*s listen to them."

[98]   TV ad JS 1.2.7, p. 16: *evaṃ bhāratādivākyāni vyākhyeyāni. ... dānarājamokṣadharmādiṣu kecit sākṣād vidhayaḥ, kecit punaḥ parakṛtipurākalparūpeṇārthavādāḥ. sarvopākhyāneṣu ca tātparye sati śrāvayed iti vidher ānarthakyāt kathaṃcid gamyamānastutinindāparigrahaḥ.*

[99]   RATIÉ 2013 (pp. 433f., with n. 128) refers to Abhinavagupta's mention of the Purāṇas etc. as a source through which God becomes established (*siddha*) or well known (*prasiddha*), illustrating it with some passages from his commentaries on ĪPK, such as ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 32: *yad yaj jñānakriyāsvatantraṃ tad*

self that should be known, considered and meditated upon" (BṛUp 2.4.5). Even Patañjali's treatise says: "The sacred syllable *oṃ* is his [the Lord's] sign; its repetition consists in the contemplation of the object signified; thence [arises] the knowledge of the inner consciousness and the absence of obstacles" (YS 27-29).[100]

Two sources are cited in support of this view. The first is a line found in a slightly different form in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, but clearly recognisable in Helārāja's quotation: *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maitreyi*. This often quoted line is the cornerstone of all discussions on meditation in classical works of both Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā.[101] An abridgement of this consisting just in the two words *ātmā jñātavyaḥ* occurs in some of these texts prior or roughly contemporary to Helārāja,[102] who is possibly alluding to them by quoting the Upaniṣad in this form.

The second quotation consists of a string of three aphorisms from YS, in which the sacred syllable *oṃ* is said to be an expression or signifier (*vācakaḥ*) for God (which is its *artha* "object"), so that the recitation of *oṃ* is tantamount to the contemplation (*bhāvanam*) of the Lord and leads to the knowledge of the inner self, removing the obstacles on the path to realisation. Helārāja does not dwell on the two quotes, but their juxtaposition may be meant to remind the readers that while meditation, being necessarily confined to established objects (*siddha-/bhūta-artha*) such as *ātman, praṇava* or *īśvara*, cannot teach anything new or give access to higher truths, it can clear the way to self-realisation, since it trains the mind to discard the passions that are the obstacles (*antarāya*) on

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īśvaraḥ purāṇāgamasiddha iva "Whatever is free as regards knowledge and action is a Lord, just as [the Lord] known (*siddha*) through Purāṇas and *āgama*s." (Transl. Ratié, ibid.)

[100] PrPr 1, pp. 52[l. 22]-53[l. 5]*: kiñ ca dhyeye nirjñāte dhyānādir anuṣṭhātuṃ śakyate iti niṣprayojanatāpi nāstīśvarādipratipādakānāṃ vākyānām. tathā ca śāstram: "ātmā jñātyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ" iti. pātañjalam api: "tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ, tajjapas tadarthabhāvanam, tataḥ pratyakcetanādhigamo 'ntarāyābhāvaś ca" iti*.

[101] As pointed out to me by H. David, who also notes that the sentence *ātmā jñātavyaḥ* is the object of a debate regarding its status as an injunction (*vidhi*), which not all thinkers are willing to admit.

[102] For example in ŚV, *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 103, quoted in Ratié 2014, p. 17, n. 58, where the author examines Kumārila's views on the knowledge of the self.

the way to liberation and, as suggested by some of the passages quoted above, it even provides a kind of direct experience of higher truths. Such an argument is found for example in NM (even though the wording of the latter does not suggest that in this case Jayanta's work was the direct source of inspiration of Helārāja), in the context of a discussion on the nature of *yogipratyakṣa* in contrast to divine omniscience:

> There is a difference, namely that the Lord's knowledge is such [i.e. embracing all objects in all three times] eternally, whereas that of yogis originates from the practice of yoga and meditation. [Objection:] But, nowhere is meditation [seen to focus] on a previously unknown object! What is then the use of meditation, since *dharma* is determined from the sacred texts? [Reply:] Only the injunctions [found in the Veda] are a means of valid knowledge with regard to *dharma*, therefore it is said that first the specific object to be proved [i.e. knowledge of *dharma*] can only come from traditional wisdom even for those yogis whose own nature consists in having apprehended *dharma* – this is indeed the way for yogis. Even later, when [their] perceptual cognition [capable of] apprehending *dharma* is active [thanks to meditation], only the [Vedic] injunctions [are authoritative on *dharma*], thus the distinction [between the two kinds of omniscience, divine and yogic,] becomes indeed blurred. Moreover we will explain that the Lord's knowledge, which is indeed connatural [to him] and has *dharma* as its object, is the cause of the Veda.[103]

The reply is that yogis are initially instructed about *dharma* from the Vedas, but then meditation allows them to "perceive" *dharma*. The ultimate source of *dharma* is God's knowledge of the Veda, as it emanates from him.

As a concluding remark on the validity of scriptural sources, Helārāja points out that one cannot pick and choose at will which

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[103] NM, Āhnika 2, vol. I, pp. 279[l. 3]-280[l. 1]: *asti viśeṣaḥ īśvarasya tathāvidhaṃ nityam eva jñānaṃ yoginām tu yogabhāvanābhyāsaprabhavam iti. nanu nādṛṣṭapūrve arthe kvacid bhavati bhāvanā | āgamāt tu paricchinne dharme bhāvanayā 'pi kim ‖146‖ codanaiva dharme pramāṇam iti sāvadhāraṇapratijñārthaḥ prathamam āgamād avagatadharmasvarūpeṣu satsv api yogiṣu na viplavata eveti ucyate, yogiṣv asty evāyaṃ prakāraḥ. paścād api pravartamāne dharmagrāhiṇi pratyakṣe codanaivety avadhāraṇaṃ śithilībhavaty eva. api ceśvarajñānaṃ sāṃsiddhikam eva dharmaviṣayaṃ vedasya kāraṇabhūtaṃ vakṣyāmaḥ.*

passages to consider fully authoritative and which not.[104] If one un-
questioningly admits the validity of some of the teachings of Smṛti
authors such as Manu, one is logically obliged to admit it en bloc.
In Helārāja's words:

> And it is biased (*pakṣapātaḥ*) to accept [the statements of] *smṛti* authors
> such as Manu etc. [on some issues] and reject [them when they are]
> about Mahendra, Rudra, etc., for it is not the case that Manu etc., the
> great *ṛṣi*s, are not omniscient or free from passions. If they were affected
> by passions or non-omniscient, how could their statements [ever] be au-
> thoritative?[105]

5. GOD AS THE AUTHOR OF BOTH ŚRUTI AND SMṚTI

Having rebutted the Mīmāṃsakas' views on Vedic *arthavāda*s and
*smṛti*s, Helārāja can make full use of the innumerable texts of the
brahmanic tradition that testify to the existence of omniscient be-
ings and to their role in the transmission of traditional knowledge
(*āgama*). First he quotes *Nirukta* 1.20.2, which has been discussed
above (see § 1), and relying on its authority, he concludes that one
should admit that omniscient beings do exist.[106] However, clearly
Helārāja is not entirely satisfied with the account of Vedic revela-

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[104] Cf. NM, Āhnika 3, p. 503, ll. 1-4: *na ca kārya evārthe vedāḥ pramāṇam iti
mantrārthavādānām atatparatvam abhidhātum ucitam, kārya iva siddhe 'py
arthe vedaprāmāṇyasya vakṣyamāṇatvāt.* "And the Vedas are not a source of
valid knowledge only with regard to an object to be accomplished, therefore it
is correct to say that mantras and *arthavāda*s are not [exclusively] meant for
that [i.e. for an object to be accomplished], because we will explain that the
Veda is an authority even with regard to established objects just as [it is] for
objects to be accomplished."

[105] PrPr 1, p. 53, ll. 5-6: *smṛtikārāṇāṃ ca manvādīnām abhyupagamo mahendra-
rudrādīnāṃ pratyākhyānam iti pakṣapātaḥ. na hi manvādayo maharṣayo na
sarvajñā vītarāgā vā. rāgādimattve 'jñatve vā teṣāṃ kathaṃ tadvacanaṃ pra-
māṇam.* Helārāja's statement is rather terse and potentially ambiguous. My
translation is based on its interpretation found in R. Śarma's AK: *smṛtikārā-
ṇāṃ ca manvādīnāṃ vacanāni bhavadbhir abhyupagamyante. mahendraru-
drādidevatāpratipādakāni tu teṣāṃ vacanāni prakṣiptatvād yuktyā pratyākhyā-
yante.* "You accept the statements of the authors of the Smṛtis, such as Manu
etc. But you reject their statements referring to deities such as Mahendra, Ru-
dra, etc., because you argue that they are interpolated (*prakṣiptatvāt*)."

[106] The quotation of *Nirukta* 1.20 is followed by the words *ity āgamaprāmāṇyāt
santi sarvajñāḥ* (PrPr 1, p. 53, l. 11; "based on the authority of this traditional
source, omniscient beings do exist").

tion and the beginning of tradition found in the *Nirukta* – and, we have to assume, with Bhartṛhari's substantially analogous version of the same –, and he goes on to provide his own account of these processes, reclaiming a central role for God:

> These very [omniscient] sages (*munibhir*), whose primeval teacher was the Venerable One (*bhagavān*), [who taught them] so that there would not be a chain of blind men, have handed down that he is the expounder of all *śāstra*s (*sarvaśāstrapravaktā*). Even though the words of the *śāstra* are eternal, the *śāstra* was indeed composed by the Lord (*īśvarapraṇīta-tvam*) because it has the nature of [a work] comprised of compositions (*racanāvattvāt*). Accordingly, God is apprehended from the *śāstra*, [and] the *śāstra* proceeds from him, thus it has been said that "the cause of his [i.e. the Lord's apprehension] is the *śāstra*. But what is the cause of the *śāstra*? Its cause is the Lord. There is an eternal relation between *śāstra* and [the Lord's] excellence (*utkarṣa*), which are ever-present in the essence of the Lord" (YS-*Bhāṣya* 1.24)[107].[108]

In Helārāja's account Īśvara imparts the original teaching to the sages, here called *muni*s. God is said to be the "expounder of all *śāstra*s" (*sarvaśāstrapravaktā*);[109] his purpose is to provide mankind with guidance, namely the means to attain salvation, so that they will not stumble along in the darkness of ignorance. And while the words used in these works are eternal, since according to

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[107] The sentence (in inverted commas in the edition) is a quotation from YS-*Bhā-ṣya* 1.24, not identified in Subramania Iyer's edition of the PrPr. Cf. Vācaspati-miśra's *Tattvavaiśaradī* on YS 1.24 (p. 68): *so 'yam īdṛśa īśvarasya śāśvatka utkarṣaḥ **kiṃ sanimittaḥ** sapramāṇaka āhosvin **nirnimitto** niṣpramāṇaka iti? uttaram – **tasya śāstraṃ nimittam**. śrutismṛtītihāsapurāṇāni śāstram. codayati – śāstram punaḥ kiṃnimittam. ... pariharati – prakṛṣṭasattvanimittam,* "This is the eternal excellence of such a Lord – is there a cause [for admitting it], [i.e.] a valid proof [of it], or is it without a cause, [i.e.] without a proof? The answer is that *śāstra* is the cause [for admitting the excellence of the Lord]. *śāstra* comprises Śruti, Smṛti, Itihāsa and Purāṇa. He presents the objection: But what is the cause of *śāstra*? He replies: Its cause is the excellence of Being."

[108] PrPr 1, p. 53, ll. 11-15: *yeṣām andhaparamparāvyudāsārtham ādigurur bha-gavān sarvaśāstrapravaktā tair eva munibhir āgamyate. śāstrasya hi śabdani-tyatve 'pi racanāvattvād īśvarapraṇītatvam eva. tathā ca śāstrād īśvaraḥ sa-madhigamyate, tasmāc chāstraṃ pravṛttam iti "tasya śāstraṃ nimittam. śāstraṃ punaḥ kiṃnimittam? īśvaranimittam. tad etayoḥ śāstrotkarṣayor īśvara-sattve vartamānayor anādiḥ saṃbandha" ity uktam.*

[109] Among the earliest philosophical statements asserting God's authorship of the *śāstra*s are those found in the PDhS and the YS-*Bhāṣya*, for which see CHEM-PARATHY 1968, pp. 73-74 and 76.

Bhartṛhari language is an integral part of the nature of the absolute, the form in which they are arranged as compositions (*racanā*) is proof that they have been created by God.

Helārāja's use of the expression *racanāvattva* reveals his indebtedness to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's main argument (mostly developed in Āhnikas 3 and 4 of the NM[110]) for the existence of God, namely that the Veda, consisting of compositions, i.e. orderly sequences of words, must have an author, like any other text:

> Since [one has to admit that] sentences consist of arrangements of words, even according to the view that words are eternal, how can the Veda be uncreated, since one has to assume that an individual is its author? Accordingly, the Vedic compositions presuppose an author, because they have the nature of a composition, like worldly compositions.[111]

On the contrary, the Mīmāṃsakas argue that the uncreated eternal nature of the Veda is proven by the fact that no name has been handed down as that of its author, and they reject the theist argument that the existence of God can be asserted on the basis of *śāstra*, and the *śāstra* is authoritative because it is issued from God (an argument that Helārāja chooses to illustrate with the YS-*Bhāṣya* quote cited above), accusing it of circularity and questioning the interpretation of the scriptural sources mentioning a Creator God (see §§ 4.1 and 4.2 above).[112] Here is the summary of their position provided by Jayanta:

> However, it is clear that there is mutual dependence [of the two theses], since one understands that there is a creator [God] from the Veda: the authority of the Veda derives from him [i.e. God], and [the existence of]

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[110] I am not aware of any translations or studies specifically devoted to these chapters of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's major work, but there is a translation of the NM – rather free but helpful – in BHATTACHARYYA 1978 covering the first 5 *āhnika*s.

[111] NM, Āhnika 4, vol. I, p. 573, ll. 4-7: *padanityatvapakṣe 'pi vākye tadracanātmake, kartṛtvasaṃbhavāt puṃsaḥ vedaḥ katham akṛtrimaḥ. tathā ca vaidikyo racanāḥ kartṛpūrvikāḥ racanātvāt laukikaracanāvat.*

[112] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa responds to this allegation claiming that the existence of God is not only asserted on the basis of *āgama*, but can also be inferred from the orderly arrangement (*saṃniveśa*) of the universe, which must be the fruit of the design of an omniscient being (a claim that is of course rejected by Mīmāṃsā, as one could expect). On this inferential argument, which Helārāja only mentions in passing, see § 7 below.

a creator is ascertained on the basis of the Veda! Consequently, this is a faulty reasoning stemming from [understanding] mantras and *arthavādas* literally (*yathāśruta*) without due consideration of the surrounding context. But, actually, no one has any memory of the author of the Veda. Therefore, the Veda is uncreated because there is no recollection of an author, even though he should definitely be remembered![113]

To this the Naiyāyika retorts:

If one wonders which of these two arguments is invalid, the one [that the Veda has an author] because it has the nature of a composition or the one [that the Veda is uncreated] because there is no recollection of an author, only the argument of [the Veda] being a composition is said to be valid. Nowhere can it be admitted that syllables arrange themselves [orderly] without [the intervention of] an individual. Indeed, noble sir, where has this ever been seen or heard on earth, [namely] that words arrange [themselves] naturally in the texts? If the arrangement of words in the Veda were spontaneous, in fact, how could [the arrangement] of threads in a cloth not be spontaneous [too]?[114]

However, taking into account the unique character of the Veda, we have to assume that its author is also exceptional, in a different league from human authors. Only God possesses the exceptional qualities that one has to assume in the individual responsible for the creation of the text that shows the path to *dharma*:

[Objection:] But, since the Veda teaches the relations between the means and the objectives for [the attainment] of the various results of [ritual] actions that are inaccessible to other means of valid knowledge, how can there be a teacher, an individual having direct knowledge of those objects? [Reply:] We say that the individual who is the author of the Veda is not a man like any other, but the supreme Lord who is competent to

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[113] NM, Āhnika 4, vol. I, p. 577, ll. 9-13: *vedāt kartravabodhe tu spaṣṭam anyonyasaṃśrayam. tato vedapramāṇatvaṃ vedāt kartuś ca niścayaḥ. tasmāt paurvāparyaparyālocanārahitayathāśrutamantrārthavādamūlā bhrāntir eṣā. na punaḥ paramārthataḥ kaścit kiñcit vedasya kartāraṃ smarati. tasmāt akṛtakā vedāḥ avaśyasmaraṇīyasyāpi kartuḥ asmaraṇāt.*

[114] NM, Āhnika 4, vol. I, pp. 579[l. 13]-580[l. 2]: *nanu katarad anayoḥ sādhanayor aprayojakaṃ racanātvāt asmaryamāṇakartṛkatvād iti ca ucyate racanātvam eva prayojakam. na hi puruṣam antareṇa kvacid akṣaravinyāsa iṣṭavyaḥ. bho bhagavantaḥ sabhyāḥ kvedaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ kva vā śrutaṃ loke yad vākyeṣu padānāṃ racanā naisargikī bhavati. yadi svabhāvikī vede padānāṃ racanā bhavet paṭe hi hanta tantūnāṃ kathaṃ naisargikī na sā.*

create the three worlds. God is the supreme knower, perpetually blissful, [and] compassionate...[115]

In this account of the origin and transmission of the traditional body of knowledge, there is an intimate, co-substantive relation between God and the scriptures – a view expressed in the YS-*Bhāṣya* passage quoted by Helārāja and reiterated in another authoritative source he cites next, the *Bhagavadgītā*, introduced by the affirmation that Kṛṣṇa is an *avatāra* of Maheśvara:

> Similarly, the venerable incarnation (*avatāreṇa*) Kṛṣṇa, who is possessed (*āviṣṭa°*) with the nature of Maheśvara, has stated in the *Gītā*: "I am the author of the End of the Veda and the knower of the Veda" (BhGītā 15.15)[116].[117]

In this view, *śāstra*, the corpus of traditional brahmanical learning, exists within human time – history – and yet, at the same time, it transcends ordinary reality, as Helārāja explains in the following passage:

> Moreover, in this way the *śāstra*, being eternal, does not undergo destruction because it has the nature of the Lord's mind. And it has indeed been said that the Lord is eternal since he is not limited by Time.[118] The Veda itself, comprising specific compositions, always exists in the mind of the Lord, consisting of direct awareness (*darśanātmani*). Therefore, [in its case] there is definitely no [one who is the] author of the composition, like Manu etc. in the case of the Smṛti, [who composed their treatises] in the course of time. Thus, in the *Brahmakāṇḍa* [Bhartṛhari] has

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[115] NM, Āhnika 3, vol. I, p. 484, ll. 1-6: *nanu vede pramāṇāntarasaṃsparśarahitavicitrakarmaphalagatasādhyasādhanabhāvopadeśini kathaṃ tadarthasākṣāddarśī puruṣa upadeṣṭā bhavet. ucyate: vedasya puruṣaḥ kartā na hi yādṛśatādṛśaḥ | kintu trailokyanirmāṇanipuṇaḥ parameśvaraḥ ‖ sa devaḥ paramo jñātā nityānandaḥ kṛpānvitaḥ |.*

[116] The first half of the verse, not quoted by Helārāja but certainly known to his readers and resonating in their minds, reads: *vedaiś ca sarvair aham eva vedyo*, "I can be known through all the Vedas." Incidentally, in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti* Utpaladeva introduces a reference to the *Bhagavadgītā* with almost the same words used by Helārāja: ... *vikalpavyāpārāpohanaśaktir iti gītāsu bhagavatāviṣṭamaheśvarabhāvena parigaṇitā* (see Torella 2007, p. 480).

[117] PrPr 1, p. 53, ll. 15-18: *tathā ca gītāsv āviṣṭamaheśvarabhāvena bhagavatā kṛṣṇāvatāreṇābhihitam: "vedāntakṛd vedavid eva cāham" iti.*

[118] Cf. YS 1.26, quoted by Helārāja at the beginning of PrPr ad VP 3.1.46.

stated: "They say that the Śruti is without beginning, uninterrupted, authorless, but the Smṛti, composed by *śiṣṭa*s, is [also] unbroken."[119]

Here Helārāja defends the usual distinction between Śruti and Smṛti, while reiterating that the Veda is made of compositions (and therefore, God's creation). The difference between the two classes of texts is that the Veda exists eternally in God's mind, while Smṛti works, even though they express eternal truths, are composed by human authors such as Manu at some point in historical time. From Helārāja's words this seems to imply that the ancient seers who had the revelation of the Veda passed it on without any intervention, in agreement with the view expressed by Bhartṛhari in VPVṛ 173 (quoted in § 1 above). In the case of the Smṛti, on the other hand, they distilled – as it were – the truths they had been taught to impart the same teachings to ordinary people. In both cases, however, the uninterrupted nature of the transmission is emphasised, an idea that is already found in the VP, as shown by the quotation of VP 1.172, and generally reiterated in the works of all brahmanical authors.

6. THE UNIQUE FEATURES OF *YOGIPRATYAKṢA*

In the final part of his articulate rebuttal of the Mīmāṃsakas' doctrines, Helārāja engages again with Kumārila's critique of omniscience, especially levelled at the idea that this form of cognition might include "direct" – i.e. perception-like – knowledge of *dharma,* which for the Exegetes is only possible through Vedic statements.[120] In ŚlV 1.1.2, v. 110cd-111, Kumārila seems to concede that an individual might be omniscient if he/she relied on all the

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[119] PrPr 1, p. 53, ll. 18-23: *evam api ca śāstrasya nityatve kṣatir nāstīśvarabuddhirūpatvāt tasya. īśvarasya nityatvaṃ kālenānavacchedād uktam eva. viśiṣṭaracanāvata eva vedasyeśvarabuddhau darśanātmani sadāvasthitatvam iti smṛtivad yathākālaṃ manvādivad asya racanākartāpi nāstīty uktaṃ brahmakāṇḍe: "anādim avyavacchinnāṃ śrutim āhur akartṛkām |. śiṣṭair nibadhyamānā tu na vyavacchidyate smṛtiḥ ||* (VP 1.172 [= SI 1.136]) *iti.*

[120] See *Śābarabhāṣya* ad JS 1.1.2: *aśakyaṃ hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum ṛte vacanāt*, "For a human being cannot cognize that [heaven arises from the Agnihotra offering] without [resorting to] a [Vedic] statement" (transl. KATAOKA 2011) and the criticism of omniscience in ŚlV ad JS 1.1.2, vv. 110cd-114 (the last one partially quoted by Helārāja here), which is examined in depth in KATAOKA 2011 (in particular pp. 320-329), from which I borrow all the translations of ŚlV quoted in this section. On the Mīmāṃsa rejection of yogic perception, see also L. McCrea's contribution in FRANCO 2009, pp. 55-70.

*pramāṇa*s, but he insists that *dharma* is the exclusive preserve of *śabda* (in the narrow sense of Vedic statements).[121] Claiming that *dharma* can be directly cognised through some kind of extraordinary perception is unacceptable to Kumārila, who points out that each *pramāṇa* has its own specific domain of operation, not unlike the senses, each of which has its own objects – form/colour for sight, sound for hearing, etc.:

> However, a man who postulates an omniscient being [who knows everything] through a single means of valid cognition surely understands everything, [even] taste and so on, with the eye [i.e. by seeing it]. But today people can cognize particular kinds of objects through particular means of valid cognition. The same was [the case] even in those days [of the Buddha and others]" (ŚlV ad 1.1.2, vv. 112-113).[122]

In fact, continues Kumārila in v. 114,

> Even [when] superiority of a particular [*pramāṇa*, e.g. a sense-faculty,] is seen, it [i.e. that superiority] should remain within the [same domain of] perceiving those things that are remote, subtle and so on, because [superiority can]not transgress the domain of that [*pramāṇa*]; it is not the case [that superiority is there] because the ear functions towards a color.[123]

Kumārila points out that each sense organ is only capable of grasping certain kinds of objects but not others. Yet, omniscient beings are supposed to have a simultaneous direct apprehension of all knowable objects in the universe – past, present and future. What is the nature of their cognition, then, since perception, the most obvious candidate among the *pramāṇa*s, is not only subject to the

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[121] ŚlV 1.1.2, v. 110cd-111: *nānena vacaneneha sarvajñatvanirākriyā ‖ vacanād ṛta ity evam apavādo hi saṃśritaḥ ‖ yadi ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ syāt | sarvajñaḥ kena vāryate ‖*. "Here, with this statement, [Śabara] does not [intend to] deny [the possibility of] being omniscient; for [Śabara], stating [an exceptional condition] 'without a [Vedic] statement,' relies on an exception [and allows the general possibility that a person can know a *dharma* from a Vedic statement]. If [a person] knows everything through the six means of valid cognition, what would stop him [from being omniscient]?".

[122] *ekena tu pramāṇena sarvajño yena kalpyate | nūnaṃ sa cakṣuṣā sarvān rasā-dīn pratipadyate ‖ yajjātīyaiḥ pramāṇais tu yajjātīyārthadarśanam | bhaved idānīm lokasya tathā kālāntare 'py abhūt ‖*.

[123] ŚlV 114 ad JS 1.1.2: *yatrāpy atiśayo dṛṣṭaḥ sa svārthānatilaṅghanāt | dūrasū-kṣmādidṛṣṭau syān na rūpe śrotravṛttitaḥ ‖*.

constraints mentioned above but also dependent on the presence of a perceivable object (and therefore confined to the present)?

Concluding the discussion on omniscience, Helārāja elaborates on the nature of extraordinary cognition and, contra Kumārila, he insists that omniscience is essentially perceptual in nature. His view appears to agree with some of Bhartṛhari's own statements on *yogipratyakṣa* quoted above. However, instead of relying on his *mūla* text, here Helārāja chooses to quote a passage of upaniṣadic flavour from an unnamed source in support of the idea that yogis can apprehend any object with any of the senses, or possibly all of them at once:

> Therefore, in this way, based on the authority of *āgama*, [we can affirm that] there are *śiṣṭa*s who see the real nature of things and perceive objects that are beyond the reach of the senses. Thus, they see universals such as cowness, brahmin-hood, etc., according to each case, as distinct from their substrata (*āśrayavivekena*). And the cognition of these *śiṣṭa*s employs all the senses because it does not suffer any limitation, for omniscient beings can carry out the activity of one sense even with another sense. Thus, a traditional source (*āgama*) declares: "Now they do not see with their senses alone: one hears sounds with the sense of smell, one sees colours behind the back, one can even perceive all the objects of the senses with the tip of a finger."[124] Alternatively, their cognition of the universal of brahmin-hood is not merely visual, but also related to other senses. It means that it is capable of ascertaining different subtle universals of sound etc. [125][126]

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[124] The source of this passage is not known, and as far as I have been able to ascertain, no other author quotes it.

[125] I am not sure how to understand the final comment after the quote. Possibly, Helārāja is suggesting that yogis could tell a brahmin from his voice, etc. I suspect that the alternative interpretation he advances of the phenomenon in question reflects one of the positions in the debate, but I have not been able to identify its supporters.

[126] PrPr 1, pp. 53[l. 23]-54[l. 7]: *tad evam āgamaprāmāṇyād bhāvatattvadṛśaḥ śiṣṭāḥ santy atīndriyārthadarśina iti te yathāyathaṃ gotvabrāhmaṇatvādijātīr āśrayavivekenādhyakṣayanti. tac ca teṣāṃ śiṣṭānāṃ jñānaṃ sarvendriyaṃ pratiniyamānapekṣatvāt. sarvajñā hīndriyāntareṇāpīndriyāntaravyāpāraṃ kurvanti. tathā cāgamaḥ: "nedanīm indriyair eva paśyanti, ghrāṇataḥ śabdaṃ śṛṇoti, pṛṣṭhato rūpāṇi paśyati, apy aṅgulyagreṇa sarvendriyārthān upalabhate" iti. athavā na cākṣuṣam eva teṣāṃ viprādijātiviṣayaṃ vijñānam, api tv indriyāntarasaṃbandhy api. śabdādau sūkṣmajātiviśeṣāvadhāraṇakṣamam ity arthaḥ. The first part of this passage, up to kurvanti, is translated in DESH-*

After referring the readers to the discussion on *āgama* in the *Śab-daprabhā* (for which see § 1 above),[127] Helārāja goes on dealing with another aspect of Kumārila's argument against omniscience, namely, the limit of *atiśaya* ("excellence" or "superiority"). Turning to the second half of VP 3.1.46, he interprets it not just as a simple parallel between the expertise of jewellers and the omniscience of yogis, but also as rational proof of omniscience or, as he puts it, an "inference that corroborates it" (*anumānaṃ tadupodba-lakam*).[128] The nature of this inference is explained as follows:

> In this world one sees particular men excel in knowledge, sovereignty, etc., thanks to practice (*abhyāsavaśāt*). Thus, jewellers have different degrees of excellence in inspecting the nature of gems, and treasurers (*rū-pyatarkāṇām*) in distinguishing the quality of precious metals, on the basis of [the experience acquired through] practice. And when some [quality] is [capable] of excellence, it must necessarily be able to reach its highest level (*kāṣṭhāprāptam*) somewhere, like heat [is most powerful] in the sun, the capacity to burn in fire, or coolness in water. In the same way, one can observe superior qualities of knowledge, sovereignty, ability, strength and so forth in certain men; [these qualities,] showing excellence at the highest level [and] encompassing all objects of cognition, indeed allow us to infer a suitable substratum in which they all fully exist together (*pūrṇasamastasampatkam*) [i.e. God]. For it is this excellence that is the seed of omniscience inasmuch as it is observed thanks to the gradation of knowledge etc.[129]

PANDE 1994, pp. 109-110, together with a few more sentences from the end of the PrPr on VP 3.1.46.

[127] One can only speculate about the reason for the odd place of the reference to the *Śabdaprabhā*, in the middle of the discussion on the characteristics of *yo-gipratyakṣa*. It is possible that in his earlier work Helārāja had not dealt with the issue of *atiśaya*, on which he focuses below.

[128] PrPr 1, p. 54, ll. 9-10: *uttarārdhenāgamasiddhe sarvajñe 'trānumānaṃ tad-upodbalakam āha.*

[129] PrPr 1, p. 54, ll. 10-16: *ihābhyāsavaśāj jñānaiśvaryādīnāṃ puruṣaviśeṣeṣv ati-śayo dṛṣṭaḥ. yathā vaikaṭikānāṃ ratnatattvaparīkṣāyām, rūpyatarkāṇāṃ ca rūpyagatātiśayaparicchede yathābhyāsaṃ prakarṣatāratamyam. yac ca sāti-śayaṃ tad avaśyaṃ kvacit kāṣṭhāprāptaṃ sambhāvyate. yathāditye tejaḥ, dā-hakatvam agnau śaityam apsu. tathā jñānaiśvaryaśaktibalādayo guṇāḥ sāti-śayāḥ puruṣeṣu dṛṣṭāḥ sarvajñeyavyāpikāṣṭhāprāptam atiśayam āvedayantaḥ tatsamucitam ādhāraṃ pūrṇasamastasampatkam anumāpayanty eva. atiśaya eva hi jñānādīnāṃ tāratamyena dṛśyamānaḥ sarvajñabījam.*

The gist of the inference is that, if a property can vary in degree at all, one can logically expect it to reach its peak somewhere. This reasoning is originally found in the *Bhāṣya* on YS 1.25, *tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajñabījam*, "In him the seed of omniscience is above excellence" (both the *sūtra* and the *Bhāṣya* are quoted by Helārāja a few lines below):

> The cognition of [objects that are] beyond the reach of the senses, whether past, future or present, [taken] individually or together, be it small or big, is the seed of omniscience. [An individual] in whom this [cognition], as it grows, reaches its highest level, is omniscient. The seed of omniscience is able to reach the highest level because [cognition] is [associated] with excellence [i.e. it can vary in quantity/quality] just like size. The omniscient is someone in whom cognition has reached the highest level.[130]

In his refutation of Kumārila's arguments against omniscience, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa presents the *atiśaya*-based inference in a more articulated form, which may have inspired Helārāja:

> This is the excellence of cognition, which has different degrees (*tāratamya*) like the excellence of qualities such as white etc. Therefore, [this] suggests that excellence can also be absolute (*para*) maximum excellence (*niratiśaya*). And consequently, the yogis are extolled [as those] in whom the highest degree of that [i.e. cognition] is found. And the absolute maximum excellence of cognition is the capacity to apprehend objects that are subtle, hidden, very distant, past, future, etc.[131]

Jayanta considers Kumārila's objection to the idea of *atiśaya/niratiśaya*, quoting ŚlV 114 (see above) and a verse from Kumārila's lost *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* preserved in Śāntarakṣita's TS:

> [Objection:] But, let us admit this idea of the excellence of it [visual perception] when it does not transcend its own object. However, *dharma* is definitely not an object of visual perception! This has been said: ŚlVt 1.1.2.114 [see transl. above]; and also "Even those [people] who are

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[130] *YS-Bhāṣya* 1.25: *yad idam atītānāgatapratyutpannapratyekasamuccayātīndriyagrahaṇam alpaṃ bahv iti sarvajñabījam. etad vivardhamānaṃ yatra niratiśayaṃ sa sarvajñaḥ. asti kāṣṭhāprāptiḥ sarvajñabījasya sātiśayatvāt parimāṇavad iti. yatra kāṣṭhāprāptir jñānasya sa sarvajñaḥ.*

[131] NM, Āhnika 2, vol. I, p. 268, ll. 7-11: *so 'yaṃ darśanātiśayaḥ śuklādiguṇātiśaya iva tāratamyasamanvita iti gamayati param api niratiśayam atiśayam. ataś ca yatrāsya paraḥ prakarṣaḥ te yogino gīyante. darśanasya ca paro 'tiśayaḥ sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭabhūtabhaviṣyadādiviṣayatvam.*

known among men[132] to be eminent in knowledge, intelligence and pow-
er are superior in small increments, not because they see imperceptible
things" (TS 3159).[133]

Jayanta's reply is essentially that one should not assess yogic cog-
nition according to the parameters of ordinary cognition:

> This is not correct because, even if *dharma* is not an object of visual per-
> ception for people like us, nevertheless it will be cognisable to the senses
> of yogis.[134]

In the following lines Jayanta also argues that an ordinary person
can neither prove nor disprove omniscience, because the yogi's ex-
perience is beyond the reach of ordinary cognition, therefore his
Mīmāṃsaka opponent should not hastily dismiss it.[135] However, he
does not insist on the superior perceptual faculties of yogis but
suggests instead that the organ which is active in *yogipratyakṣa* is
the mind, which unlike the sense organs is not dependent on the
presence of the object in order to be able to cognise it.

   Helārāja's argument is in many ways similar to Jayanta Bhaṭ-
ṭa's. He too quotes ŚlV 1.1.2.114 (partially) in order to refute it
and then proceeds to present his view:

> And one should not say that "even [when] superiority of a particular
> [*pramāṇa*, e.g. a sense faculty,] is seen, it [i.e. that superiority] should

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[132] The verse found in the NM contains two variants from the one cited in the TS:
nṛṇām instead of *narāḥ* in b, which I tentatively take as a *nirdhāraṇaṣaṣṭhī* as
shown by my translation, and *cātiśayā* in a, which is probably a mistake for
sātiśayā found in the TS version. I borrow the translation (modifying it slight-
ly to render *nṛṇām*) from Kataoka 2011, pp. 327-328, where the section of
TS in which this verse appears is compared to the corresponding section of
ŚlV.

[133] NM, Āhnika 2, vol. I, p. 269, ll. 1-6: *nanu svaviṣayānatikrameṇa bhavatu tad-
atiśayakalpanā. dharmas tu cakṣuṣo na viṣaya eva. tad uktam "yatrāpy atiśayo
dṛṣṭaḥ sa svārthānatilaṅghanāt | dūrasūkṣmādidṛṣṭau syāt na rūpe śrotravṛtti-
tā ‖" api ca ye 'pi cātiśayā dṛṣṭā prajñāmedhābalair nṛṇām | stokastokāntara-
tvena na tv atīndriyadarśanāt ‖ iti.*

[134] NM, Āhnika 2, vol. I, p. 269, ll. 7-8: *etad ayuktam yataḥ yady api nāsmadādi-
nayanaviṣayo dharmaḥ tathāpi yogīndriyagamyo bhaviṣyati.*

[135] See NM, Āhnika 2, vol. I, p. 267, ll. 1-3: "You do not know that my percep-
tion is not capable of apprehending *dharma*; I do not know that your percep-
tion is not capable of apprehending *dharma*; neither of us knows if another's
perception is unable to grasp *dharma*." (*matpratyakṣam akṣamaṃ dharmagra-
haṇa iti bhavān na jānīte tvatpratyakṣam api na dharmagrāhīti nāhaṃ jāne
anyasya pratyakṣam īdṛśam eveti ubhāv apy āvāṃ na jānīvahe.*)

remain within the [same domain of] perceiving [...] because [superiority can]not transgress the domain of that [*pramāṇa*]"[136] (ŚlV 114ab ad JS 1.1.2), because one cannot establish the proper domain [of a *pramāṇa* in that this is] in accordance with its substratum, and because one does see [properties such as] luminosity etc. in the sun that exceed their domain.[137] Consequently, [according to the second half of VP 3.1.46] one can adequately prove omniscience even through the inference [based on] its assumption[138] (*sambhāvanānumāna*). This has been said: "In him [i.e. God] the seed of omniscience is above excellence" (YS 1.25). This very seed of omniscience, characterised by the excellence of knowledge, etc., is above excellence in him. It means that "he in which it is above excellence is the omniscient"[139] (YS-*Bhāṣya* 1.25).[140]

Thus, according to Helārāja, a yogi may apprehend things in ways that are quite different from those of ordinary individuals and thus see invisible objects, hear inaudible sounds, etc., but also grasp things the senses are unable to grasp, such as past and future objects or trans-empirical entities such as *dharma*, because the scope of a capacity depends on the nature of its substratum. It is possible that Helārāja was also aware of – and responding to – the critique that Maṇḍana Miśra levels against the *niratiśaya* reasoning found

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[136] This quotation is not identified as such in Subramania Iyer's edition of the PrPr.

[137] For the translation of the final remark I have relied on R. Śarma's interpretation. Cf. AK (p. 102): *svārthasya svāśrayānusāritvena niyantum aśakyatvāt. tad yathā – ādityasya dāhakatvaprakāśakatvādayo guṇāḥ sudūraviprakṛṣṭārthaviṣayakā dṛṣṭāḥ, naivam agnipradīpādeḥ,* "The reason is that one cannot limit the domain proper [to a certain property] in that this depends on its substratum. To explain: [certain] properties of the sun, such as the capacity to burn or to illuminate, are seen to affect objects that are very far removed [from it], but this is not so in the case of fires, lamps, etc."

[138] Namely, the presumption of the existence of a substratum such that in it cognition can reach its acme, namely turn into omniscience.

[139] This quotation is not identified as such in Subramania Iyer's edition of the PrPr.

[140] PrPr 1, p. 54, ll. 17-22: *na ca yatrāpy atiśayo dṛṣṭaḥ sa svārthānatilaṅghanād iti vācyam. svārthasya svāśrayānusāreṇa vyavasthāpayitum aśakyatvāt, ādityādau ca prakāśakatvādeḥ svārthātilaṅghanena dṛṣṭatvāt. tasmāt sambhāvanānumānenāpi sarvajñasiddhir ucitā. tad uktam: "tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajñabījam" iti. yad etat sarvajñabījaṃ jñānādīnām atiśayalakṣaṇam tat tatra niratiśayam. "yatra niratiśayaṃ sa sarvajña" ity arthaḥ.*

in the YS-*Bhāṣya*, as his use of the expression *saṃbhāvanānumāna* may indicate.[141]

In the *Vidhiviveka* Maṇḍana considers two possibile interpreta-tions of the argument in the YS-*Bhāṣya* and points out its logical fallacy in either case. One may understand the notion of "highest level" (*kāṣṭhā*) as the objective limit (*avadhi*) of a substance or of a capacity,[142] or as the highest "conceivable" (*sambhāvanīya*) limit. In the former case, that can only suggest a level of cognition that is more powerful than the ordinary, but it does not establish that this kind of extraordinary cognition would be able to apprehend every-thing:

> If the highest level is that above which there is nothing, its attainment is indeed possible (*bhavatu*). However, it is not proved that by means of this [achievement] cognitions (*prājñānām*) can embrace all objects, but rather that most [but not all] objects will be apprehended.[143]

Alternatively, *niratiśaya* may be regarded as the highest "conceiv-able" (*atha yataḥ paraṃ na sambhāvyate*) level, but if this is a pro-perty of substances, Maṇḍana notes, the parallel with size made in the YS-*Bhāṣya* does not work, because the largest imaginable ob-ject would be one that takes up all the space (besides the absurdity of such a thing, the implication is possibly that there would be no comparable object).[144] If, on the other hand, *kāṣṭhā* is seen as a pro-perty of qualities, then the maximum conceivable level they can at-tain depends on the nature of the substratum so that, for instance, the effort required of different beings in order to cover a certain distance will differ greatly – and in any case, if the maximum dis-

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[141] On Maṇḍana Miśra's refutation of omniscience, see Moriyama 2014, p. 29, n. 5, and pp. 37f., and David forthcoming.

[142] ViV, p. 688 (1. 20): *kāṣṭhā yady avadhiḥ kāmaṃ paraṃ yasmād asambhavi | kāryadravyair anekānto guṇaiś ca garimādibhiḥ ‖*. "If the highest level (*kāṣ-ṭhā*) is the limit above which there can definitely be nothing, [such a limit is] uncertain with [regard to] substances that are produced and qualities such as weight etc."

[143] ViV, pp. 688-689: *yadi yataḥ paraṃ nāsti sā kāṣṭhā bhavatu tatprāptiḥ, na ta-yā sarvaviṣayatvasiddhiḥ bhūyiṣṭhaviṣayatā tu bhavet prājñānām...*

[144] ViV, pp. 689-690: *atha yataḥ paraṃ na sambhāvyate. kāryadravyair vyabhi-cāraḥ, na hi sātiśayā api ghaṭādayaḥ parimāṇataḥ parāsambhāvanīyātiśaya-śālinaḥ anyānavakāśaprasaṅgād ekenaiva sarvavyāpteḥ.*

tance one can conceive of is the end of the sky, since the sky is endless, who could ever achieve that level of capacity?[145]

Helārāja appears to overturn this argument (whether his response is triggered by Maṇḍana's treatment in the ViV or not). It is precisely because the power, intensity or scope of a quantifiable property depend on its substratum that it is possible to conceive some unique substance in which that property occurs at the highest level. It is well known that the cognitive capacities of different beings vary enormously. At the highest end of the spectrum there is God, who is omniscient. To express this idea, Helārāja has once again recourse to a quotation from an authoritative source, YS 1.25 with the *Bhāṣya* thereon (the same source that Maṇḍana attacks quite harshly[146]), where the being in which cognition achieves its apex, namely omniscience, is also said to be the fountainhead of the yogi's omniscience. As pointed out by KATAOKA 2011 (p. 326, n. 364), in the ŚlV Kumārila seems to allude to this *sūtra* "in the sense that one can reach the highest limit of human ability 'vertically', and not in the sense that one can transgress the natural demarcation of each *pramāṇa* 'horizontally.'" On the contrary, Helārāja seems to understand it as the affirmation of a divine power that cannot suffer any limitation whatsoever because – as he clarifies a few lines below – the world is its creation. Consequently, the omniscience of yogis, who partake of this aspect of God's nature,

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[145] ViV, pp. 689-690: *na ca guṇadharmo 'yam iti sāmpratam tadgatānāṃ garimā-dīnāṃ tadavasthāsambhavāt sarvair gurutvavadbhir ekakāryārambhābhāvāt prayatnaviśeṣāc cāntikadūraprāpter manuṣyavātahariṇaharipatatriṇām. na ca tasyāsambhāvanīyaparāvastho 'tiśayaḥ anantatvān nabhasaḥ keṣāñcin nirati-śayaprāptānām apātaprasaṅgāt. niravaśeṣagantavyadeśaprāptyā hi prayatno niratiśayaḥ syāt, tadanantatayā kuto 'sya niratiśayatā.*

[146] See the closing remark of this section of the ViV, where Maṇḍana questions the very notion of highest level or limit: if a property is measurable, any of its possible values or levels will be relative; if it is not measurable, the opponent's attempt to explain the yogi's omniscience as the result of the attainment of a level similar to God's is logically untenable, as no level can be determined. Maṇḍana certainly does not mince his words with the author of the YS-*Bhāṣya*: "What is this endlessness? [It is] the fact it cannot be determined [in any way]. [Objection: Being *niratiśaya*] is precisely this absence of a measure, since measure is the fact of having such and such an extent. And asserting that God's cognition has attained the highest level, this [man], who makes [corpses inhabited by] demons rise when he performs appeasing rites, [just] shows his ignorance!" (ViV, pp. 697-698: *kim idam ānantyam. aparicchinnatā. nanv eṣa parimāṇābhāva eva etāvattā hi parimāṇam, īdṛśīṃ ca kāṣṭāprāptim īśvarajñā-nasya vadann ajñānam āvirbhāvayati so 'yaṃ śāntikarmaṇi vetālodayaḥ.*).

is equally unbounded, to the extent that even the usual limitations of the human senses are overstepped.

7. THE NATURE OF ĪŚVARA

More than just omniscience is at stake, in fact, for Helārāja:

> And here the word "omniscience" (*sarvajña*) alludes to sovereignty (*aiśvarya*), therefore it is also established that the one in which sovereignty is above excellence is the lord of all things, the Supreme Lord, because one sees different degrees of sovereignty in kings etc. And thus it has been said that "Even the knowledge of the seers is based on tradition" (VP 1.30cd),[147] because it arises from the Lord who is the root [of their knowledge].[148]

Just as knowledge reaches its acme and is transfigured into divine omniscience, sovereignty, which is seen in different degrees in human beings, only fully exists in the Lord, as absolute independence and agency.[149] Here Helārāja argues that admitting the existence of a supreme God – Parameśvara – is a matter of reason, not just of belief and reliance on tradition. I think this is a crucial element of his discursive strategy in commenting on the VP, because it allows him to introduce God into Bhartṛhari's ontology through a philosophical argument. It is in this spirit, I believe, that Helārāja quotes the verse from the first *kāṇḍa*. In his vision the ancient sages who composed and handed down the traditional body of knowledge must have in turn received it from a pre-existing higher source, which cannot be anybody else but the omniscient God.[150] The nar-

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[147] This half a verse is from one of the *kārikā*s in the first *kāṇḍa* that I mentioned in § 2 above as constituting some of the background of VP 3.1.46.

[148] PrPr 1, p. 54, ll. 22-23: *sarvajñagrahaṇaṃ cātraiśvaryopalakṣaṇam, tena yatra niratiśayam aiśvaryaṃ sa sarveśvaraḥ parameśvara ity api siddham, rājādīnām aiśvaryatāratamyadarśanāt. itthaṃ ca mūlabhūteśvarasambhavāt "ṛṣīṇām api yaj jñānaṃ tad api āgamapūrvakam."*

[149] Cf. YS-*Bhāṣya* 1.24: *tasmād yatra kāṣṭhāprāptir aiśvaryasya sa īśvara iti. na ca tatsamānam aiśvaryam asti*.

[150] A similar keenness to anchor human traditions in the higher reality of God's consciousness is seen in Abhinavagupta's view, as TORELLA 2013 (pp. 473-474) remarks: "Abhinavagupta agrees with a hypothetical objector saying that, if the *vyavahāra* is conceived of as based on increasingly older *prasiddhi*s, there would be the risk of a regressus ad infinitum and a cognitive chaos, unless, Abhinavagupta says, we recognize a single ultimate source for all *prasiddhi*s. In the Śaiva conception of the Absolute, such a standpoint is an all-

rative of Vedic revelation found in the *Nirukta* and subscribed to by Bhartṛhari is seemingly left untouched, but God is now firmly placed at its core.

Bhartṛhari defines *śabdabrahman* as light, consciousness, eternal, all-encompassing, etc., all qualifications that could equally apply to most descriptions of God, but his representation of the absolute is clearly too remote and impersonal for the religious sensibility of the 10th-c. Kashmiri Helārāja. Among the attributes of *śabdabrahman* are notably missing volition and agency. Bhartṛhari's ontology and cosmogony need to be complemented, as it were, by the divine will of a God who *chooses* to set the world in motion. The following paragraph of the PrPr ad VP 3.1.46 is particularly significant in this respect:

> However,[151] [unlike the *ṛṣi*s mentioned in VP 1.30,] Parameśvara, who is not limited by Time, is possessed with innate properties such as knowledge, sovereignty, etc. The insentient world is the body of that sentient [being], in conformity with his desire, comparable to [the physical body] of the individual self, therefore it is he, the knower of the connections etc. between [those] particular configurations [of parts, namely the phenomenal objects], [connections] that consist in the relations of [mutual] assistance [between the parts], who creates it.[152] Therefore, it has also been proved that all this [world] here also has an intelligent (*buddhimat*) creator – this is settled.[153]

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knowing personal being in which the totality of the *prasiddhi*s are contained: this is Parameśvara, Bhairava, who also constitutes the inmost essence of all creatures. Or, [...] *prasiddhi* coincides with the very voice of the Lord."

[151] The particle *tu* is meant to stress the contrast between the eternal nature of God's omniscience etc., and the acquired character of the seers', as they gain their superior qualities through a sustained effort.

[152] The compound *upakāryopakārakabhāvasaṃsthānaviśeṣayogādi* may be construed in more than one way, and my interpretation should be seen as merely tentative. To begin with, the sense of *yogādi* is uncertain: the meaning "connection" for *yoga* is the only one that to me appears to suit the context, even though I am not sure what *ādi* can refer to. Moreover, I take the compound as a *ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa* (*saṃsthānaviśeṣāṇāṃ yogāḥ*), but it would also be possible to understand it as a *karmadhāraya*, meaning that the relations between the parts (namely the phenomenal objects) *are* that particular configuration that is the universe. Only a search for parallels within the PrPr and in other works of that time discussing the relation between God and the universe may hopefully shed light on this difficult expression.

[153] PrPr 1, p. 55, ll. 1-3: *parameśvaras tu kālenānavacchinnaḥ sahajajñānaiśvaryādidharmayuktaḥ. tasya cetanasyācetanaṃ jagad icchānuvidhāyi pratyagāt-*

In this terse and dense passage Helārāja offers a glimpse into his theology. He begins by reiterating that, as he has shown in the previous pages through the recourse to scriptural sources and by means of reasoning, God's nature is eternal, and properties such as knowledge (*jñāna*) and sovereignty (*aiśvarya*) are inherent in it. As was argued above, they exist there in their highest, incommensurate form, namely as omniscience and omnipotence. Next, he compares God's relation with the material world to that between the body and the individual's inner self, in which the former is animated and controlled by the latter. The world, he says, exists and acts in conformity to God's will (*icchā*). Similarly, Helārāja refers to God's omniscience as the knowledge of the entities that populate the universe – the various specific arrangements (*saṃsthānaviśeṣa*) of parts – and the laws that govern their relations, concluding that he is the creator, for only a superior intelligent (*buddhimat*) being can be responsible for "all this here" (*idam atra viśvam*), namely, for the complexity and regularity of the universe. He also states that this has been proved (*siddham*), certainly an allusion to the classical naiyāyika proof of the existence of God – what TABER 1986 (p. 107) calls the "argument from design" and Potter "the cosmoteleological argument" (EIPh, p. 101) – as is found for instance epitomised in the following statement in NM (vol. I, p. 499, l. 2), *yad yat sanniveśaviśiṣṭaṃ tat tad buddhimatkartṛkam*: in a nutshell, anything that consists in an orderly arrangement (*sanniveśa*) of parts must have an intelligent (*buddhimat*) creator. And in order to explain the wondrous complexity and endless variety of the world one can only assume the existence of an agent whose attributes are infinitely superior to those of ordinary agents, namely God. Interestingly, an elaborate discussion of the same proof is also the main topic of Utpaladeva's short theological treatise, the *Īśvarasiddhi*,[154] in which, as RATIÉ 2013 (pp. 390-391, n. 43) notes,

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    mana iva śarīram ity upakāryopakārakabhāvasaṃsthānaviśeṣayogādijñātā sa etan nirmimīta iti buddhimatkartṛkam apīdam atra viśvaṃ siddham iti sthitam.

[154] The initial lines of the *Īśvarasiddhi* after the opening verse read: *tanukaraṇādikāryaṃ buddhimatkartṛpūrvakaṃ saṃniveśaviśeṣavattvāt, yad yat saṃniveśaviśeṣavat tat tad buddhimatkartṛnirmitaṃ yathā ghaṭaḥ,* "Effects such as bodies, the organs, etc., presuppose an intelligent agent because they have a specific arrangement [of parts]: whatever shows a specific arrangement [of parts] has been created by an intelligent agent, for instance a pot." On the *Īśvarasiddhi* see TABER 1986 and, more recently, RATIÉ 2016.

"the Śaiva philosopher endeavours to prove the existence of *īśvara* merely from a Naiyāyika (and Saiddhāntika) point of view."[155]

However, there are implicit and explicit differences between Helārāja's views as presented here and the Naiyāyikas' classical position (without forgetting, of course, that on some issues there were different opinions even within Nyāya). The latter assume that the material causes of the creation, such as the atoms, exist independently of God, and have no unanimous opinion on whether God has a body, and if so, of what kind.[156] Helārāja's wording does not entirely clarify his stance on these questions. In the passage quoted above, it may also be possible to construe *icchānuvidhāyi* as the main predicate of the sentence outlining the relation between God and the world, which would thus emphasise the Lord's omnipotence; in this interpretation, Helārāja may not literally be saying that the world is God's body but simply illustrating their relation through the analogy with the relation between the physical body of ordinary creatures and the individual consciousness. Nor does he make any definite statement about the actual existence of the material world – however, since elsewhere he (like Bhartṛhari) resolutely advocates a non-dualist view of reality,[157] it seems legitimate to assume that for him the dichotomy consciousness/matter (which might indeed be suggested by the qualification of the world as *acetana*, "insentient") does not hold outside the plane of *vyavahāra*

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[155] Ultimately, though, as noted in RATIÉ 2016, p. 329, the non-dualist Śaivas "reject the very possibility of an *īśvarasiddhi* on the grounds that the Lord is 'always already established' (*ādisiddha*) in so far as the individual subject is always aware of his being the Lord through mere self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*)."

[156] On the various views held by different early Naiyāyikas on these and other theological issues, see Potter (EIPh, pp. 104-105).

[157] It is worth recalling, for example, that one of Helārāja's lost works was called *Advayasiddhi*, the title of which already suggests that it was an apology of non-dualism. This is confirmed by the two contexts of the PrPr in which he refers to this work. See for instance PrPr on VP 3.2.15: "The power of consciousness of that [one reality] which has the nature of consciousness is not subject to change, therefore, since there is no [actual] modification, this is not a theory of *pariṇāma*, like the Sāṃkhya doctrine, but rather a theory of *vivarta*. [...] The rejection of [any] other cause has been expounded in the *Advayasiddhi*" (PrPr 1, p. 119, ll. 4-6: *tasya cidrūpasya cicchaktir apariṇāminīti vikārābhāvān nedaṃ sāṃkhyanayavat pariṇāmadarśanam, api tu vivartapakṣaḥ. viśeṣaś cānayor vākyapadīye 'smābhir vyākhyāta iti tata evāvadhāryam. ihāpi sambandhasamuddeśe vakṣyate. kāraṇāntaravyudāsaś cādvayasiddhāv abhihita[ḥ]*).

and, consequently, somehow God creates the world as an emana-
tion of himself. The theological position that transpires from these
few lines would thus appear to be not too distant from – or at least,
not incompatible with – that of the Pratyabhijñā philosophers', ac-
cording to whom the universe is the product of the externalisation
of Śiva's consciousness.[158]

Helārāja's argument in favour of the existence of God appears
in fact to be broadly similar to that made in the ĪS, which was like-
ly known to him. His very mention of *icchā* as an attribute of God,
in one breath with *jñāna* and *aiśvarya*,[159] absolute knowledge and
unbounded agency, points to the affinity – if not the identity – with
Śaiva theology, both non-dualist and dualist.[160] The crucial differ-
ence between these two groups, as Ratié 2016 (ibid., pp. 326-327)
remarks, is that "the Saiddhāntikas hold a dualistic conception of
cosmic creation somewhat similar to that of the Vaiśeṣikas" and
identify the material cause of the universe with *māyā*, while for the
non-dualists Śaivas "the consciousness presiding over the creation
of the universe indeed acts out of mere will, but in the sense that it
does not have recourse to any kind of matter that would exist apart
from it." For example, in ĪPK 2.4.1 Utpaladeva explains that God's
role as the creator consists in making things manifest *out of his vo-
lition* (*icchāvaśāt*), and the *Vṛtti* thereon reiterates that "it is pre-
cisely in this power of volition (*icchāśakti*) that his activity, that is,
his being creator, consists" (*saiva cecchāśaktir nirmātṛtākhyā kriyā*

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[158] See for example ĪPK 3.2.3ab, *svāṅgarūpeṣu bhāveṣu pramātā kathyate patiḥ |.*
"The cognizer is called 'lord' (*patiḥ*) when things appear to him as constitut-
ing his own body," and the *Vṛtti* thereon: *aiśvaryadaśāyāṃ pramātā viśvaṃ
śārīratayā paśyan patiḥ,* "On the plane of sovereignty the cognizer who sees
the universe as his body is 'lord.'" (Transl. Torella 2002, p. 198.) As Ratié
remarks (Ratié 2013, pp. 379-380), "Far from being contingent, this ability of
consciousness to grasp itself as being this or that constitutes its very essence
and is fundamental to the [Pratyabhijñā] system in its epistemological as well
as metaphysical and cosmological aspects, since the Śaiva non-dualists hold
that there is nothing outside of Śiva understood as an all-encompassing cons-
ciousness, and that this unique consciousness creates the universe merely by
grasping (*vimṛś-*) itself in the form of the universe."

[159] Here one is reminded of the complex *icchā-jñāna-kriyā* as the *śaktitraya,* the
triad of powers of the Trika current of Tantrism, on which see recently Nemec
2011, pp. 39f.

[160] For a discussion of the inferential proof of God in the work of the early Said-
dhāntika author Sadyojyotis (7th-8th c.), see Ratié 2016, pp. 312ff., which
points out the similarities with the argument found later in the ĪS.

tasya).[161] And in ĪPK 2.4.21 causality, agency and action belonging to the limited subjects on the plane of *vyavahāra* are said to be the manifestation of God's volition, which occurs when his consciousness chooses to project itself outwardly as the endless variety of the phenomenal world.[162]

In the passage quoted above Helārāja does not explicitly describe the creation of the world in unequivocally idealist terms as the manifestation of God's consciousness but – in light of the nondualist views he advocates elsewhere[163] – his mention of the complex *jñāna-icchā-aiśvarya,* and his silence on the nature of the matter the world is made of, make an idealistic interpretation of his words here at least plausible, if not cogent.

Such an interpretation is further corroborated, I think, by his remark that, in creating the world, God knows the particular arrangements of various features that make up objects, and their connections, namely the relative place of things in a universe that for the limited subjects is an infinitely intricate network of such connections. This may be meant to suggest that at the cosmological level the relation of causality between objects that, in terms of *vyavahāra*, are self-contained, is established by God's principle of necessity (*niyati*). Admittedly, though, the passage is too short and ambiguous to allow a univocal interpretation of Helārāja's views. One regrets the loss of the *Śabdaprabhā* all the more.

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[161] ĪPK 2.4.1, *eṣa cānantaśaktitvād evam ābhāsayaty amūn | bhāvān icchāvaśād eṣā kriyā nirmātṛtāsya sā ‖.* "And thus, his power being infinite, he makes those things manifest thanks to his volition; and this constitutes his activity, his being creator." (Transl. TORELLA 2002, p. 175.)

[162] ĪPK 2.4.21: *itthaṃ tathā ghaṭapaṭādyābhāsajagadātmanā | tiṣṭhāsor evam icchaiva hetutā kartṛtā kriyā ‖.* "Therefore, causality, agency, action are nothing but the will of Him who wishes to appear in the form of the universe, in the various manifestations of jar, cloth and so on." See also the *Vṛtti* thereon: *cidvapuṣaḥ svatantrasya viśvātmanā sthātum icchaiva jagat prati kāraṇatā-kartṛtārūpā saiva kriyāśaktiḥ.* "The very will of Him who is free and has consciousness as His nature to appear as universe constitutes His being cause as regards the universe, in the form of agency; and this is the power of Action." (Transl. TORELLA 2002, p. 187.)

[163] See for instance his reference to the "rejection of [any] other cause" (contra Sāṃkhya dualism) in the passage quoted in n. 157 above.

8. The Origin of Language

In the final portion of his commentary on VP 3.1.46 Helārāja summarises his conclusions about omniscience, pointing to the role of the ancient seers in establishing language among humans but at the same time reconciling this narrative with the Grammarians' view:

> In this way, then, those who are superior to us have been proven by the tradition (*āgama*). And their cognition, which does not depend on the limitations of the senses, has the nature of direct experience (*sākṣātkārarūpa*) – therefore, yogis, who see the true nature of objects that are past or future, subtle, hidden, or very distant,[164] perceive all the universals such as cowness, brahmin-hood, etc., and start teaching them without confusion (*asaṅkareṇa*). However, in the case of brahmin-hood etc. there are some revealing clues (*upavyañjanam*) – having the [same] function as [the physical features such as] dewlap etc. [that characterise cows] – that for us are beyond the reach of the senses. After ascertaining those [clues], the *śiṣṭa*s instituted the names [of things]. This has been said: "The naming [of things] is preceded by perception" (VS 2.1.19). Thanks to the teaching of the venerable [seers] (*tatrabhavatām*), we too have a determinate knowledge of universals such as cowness etc., as is fit [in each case], through the uninterrupted transmission of the tradition. And the institution of names carried out by those [seers] who are superior to us is just the revelation of the existing relation of word and meaning as it stands (*yathāvasthita*) rather than the creation of an unprecedented convention (*apūrvasaṅketakaraṇam*), because the relation between word and meaning is natural (*svābhāvikatvāt*); therefore, distinct universals such as brahmin-hood etc. do exist on the basis of the authority of the *śiṣṭa*s and they are expressed by the suffixes for abstract nouns[165].[166]

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[164] For a very similar list occurring in YS, VPVṛ and PDhS, see § 2, and especially n. 37 above. An identical list, adding past and future objects, is found in the expression *atītānāgatasūkṣmavyavahitādisamastavastuviṣaya* in NM, vol. I, p. 505, l. 13.

[165] This is an allusion to *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 5.1.119, *tasya bhāvas tvatalau*, prescribing the *taddhita* suffixes *tva* or *taL* (= *-tā*) "to form a derivate that denotes the property of being (*bhāva*) what the base of the *pada* denotes" (Cardona 1997, p. 243). In this way Helārāja suggests that there is a correspondence between the structures of reality (in this case, the *jāti*s) and the structures of the language (here, the *taddhita* suffixes), which is captured and revealed by Grammar.

[166] PrPr 1, p. 55, ll. 4-12: *tad evam āgamasiddhāḥ santy asmadviśiṣṭāḥ. indriyapratiniyamānapekṣaṃ ca   sākṣātkārarūpaṃ teṣāṃ   jñānam ity atītānāgatasū-*

In Helārāja's version of the original revelation, the seers (or *śiṣṭa*s, as he calls them here) play a key role in the origin of language. To corroborate this statement, Helārāja quotes VS 2.1.19.[167] Coming after 2.1.18, *saṃjñākarma tv asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ liṅgam*, which was briefly discussed above (see § 2), this *sūtra* adds that the seers' activity of name-giving (*saṃjñākarma*) was preceded by "perception" (*pratyakṣapūrvakaṃ*).

There is little doubt that in the intention of the author of VS 2.1.18 the expression *asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ* refers to seers or yogis, as shown above. However, in the *Vṛtti* Candrānanda takes it as an honorific plural[168] referring to God, in keeping with the Nyāya idea that the relation between *śabda* and *artha* is a convention originally established by the Lord,[169] as he clarifies in his commentary on VS 2.1.19:

> As they directly perceive the categories (*padārtha*), they create names, and [the same] is seen in the naming of a son, and the names [of things] have indeed been created, therefore we believe that there exists a venerable one, superior to us, who has a direct perception even of things that for us are imperceptible, [and] by whom names etc. were created."[170]

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kṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭārthasatattvadṛśo yoginaḥ sarvā gotvabrāhmaṇatvādi-jātīr adhyakṣayantaḥ tadupadeśam asaṅkareṇārabhante. brāhmaṇatvādiṣv asti kiñcit sāsnādisthānīyam upavyañjanam asmākaṃ param atīndriyam. śiṣ-ṭais tad avadhārya saṃjñāḥ praṇītāḥ. tad uktaṃ: "pratyakṣapūrvakaṃ saṃ-jñākarma" iti. tatrabhavatām upadeśād vayam api sampradāyāparamparyād yathāyogaṃ gotvādijātīr adhyavasyāmaḥ. asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ cedaṃ saṃjñā-praṇayanaṃ yathāvasthitaśabdārthasambandhaprakāśanamātraṃ, na tv apū-rvasaṅketakaraṇaṃ svābhāvikatvāc chabdārthasambandhasyeti śiṣṭaprāmā-ṇyāt santi brāhmaṇatvādijātayo viviktā yathāyathaṃ bhāvapratyayābhidhe-yāḥ.

167 This quotation is not identified as such in Subramania Iyer's edition of the PrPr, probably because it appears in a rather different form in Śaṅkara Mi-śra's version of the VS *sūtrapāṭha*, which was the only one available at the time he was preparing the edition.

168 VSVṛtti ad VS 2.1.18: *asmadviśiṣṭānām iti pūjāyāṃ bahuvacanam.*

169 The thesis of the conventional nature of the relation between word and meaning is first found in NS 2.1.55, *na, sāmāyikatvāc chabdārthasaṃpratyayasya.* For the idea that God is the "creator" of this relation, see e.g. Vācaspatimi-śra's *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* thereon (p. 370): *abhidhānābhidheyayor niya-mo gośabdasya sāsnādimān evārtha evam aśvaśabdasya keśārādimān eveti, tasmin niyogo boddhavya iti bhagavataḥ parameśvarasya sargādau, so 'yam samaya ity arthaḥ.*

170 *pratyakṣeṇa hi padārtham ālocayantaḥ saṃjñāḥ praṇayanti, dṛṣṭaṃ ca dāra-kasya nāmakaraṇe, praṇītāś cemāḥ khalu saṃjñāḥ, tasmān manyāmahe – asti*

Helārāja's version of the origin of language is slightly different from Candrānanda's. Having clearly stated earlier in the commentary that God is the seed or root of everything because the world is his creation, here he credits the *institution of language* to the primordial seers who are God's direct pupils. They are *sākṣātkṛta-dharman*, that is, they "see" the true fabric of reality in all its aspects, from the minutest and subtlest to the largest, and they name things, actions and qualities accordingly, forging speech in such a way that it corresponds at some deep level with the phenomenal reality. From this angle, they act as intermediaries between God and ordinary humans in a much more fundamental way than in Bhartṛhari's account, where they just verbalise (or textualise) the *śāstra*s and teach them to later generations (or perhaps, the composition of *śāstra*s itself is the process through which they shape language).

However, there is a crucial difference between Candrānanda and Helārāja. The latter is keen to defend the Grammarians' doctrine of the eternal relation between *śabda* and *artha* epitomised in Kātyāyana's famous statement *siddhe śabdārthasambandhe*, and even more crucially, I think, Bhartṛhari's intuition that the absolute consciousness is essentially language. Having heavily relied on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theistic arguments throughout the commentary on VP 3.1.46, Helārāja now has to distance himself from their thesis that the relation between *śabda* and *artha* is a convention established by God at the beginning of each cosmic cycle. He therefore spells out clearly that the sages do not establish brand-new linguistic conventions (*apūrvasaṅketakaraṇam*), but rather they acknowledge the reality that has been revealed to them, of which the natural (*svābhāvika*) relation between *śabda* and *artha* is an integral part, and pass their knowledge on to the later generations. In his view, language and reality are God's co-extensive creations.

To sum up Helārāja's views about omniscience as laid down in the commentary on VP 3.1.46, knowledge is an inherent property of God, in which it exists in its incommensurate excellence (*nirati-śaya*), namely omniscience. The latter is also found in human beings who can acquire it through the practice of meditation, etc. It is a direct cognition (*sākṣātkāra*), similar to ordinary perception, but

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bhagavān asmadviśiṣṭo yo 'smadādiparokṣāṇām api bhāvānāṃ pratyakṣadarśī yenedaṃ saṃjñādi praṇītam iti. Transl. ISAACSON 1995, which provides an improved edition of this section of Candrānanda's *Vṛtti.*

it is not bound by any of its limitations: all the senses can synesthe-
tically grasp all objects, whether perceivable but for some reason
inaccessible (distant, hidden, infinitely small, etc.) or trans-empiri-
cal (*dharma*, *jāti*s, etc.) in the past, present and future. For this des-
cription of the nature of extraordinary cognition, it is worth stating
once again that he essentially follows in Bhartṛhari's tracks, even
though in his exposition he draws on a variety of brahmanical
sources, many from Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Helārāja is clearly
aware of the previous debates on omniscience and presents two
proofs of *sarvajña*, one based on *āgama*, the other based on infer-
ence. The former, which takes up most of the passage, appeals to
the authority of traditional sources in two ways: first, there are nu-
merous textual sources that mention omniscient beings, among
whom God is foremost; second, the uncontested authority of scrip-
tures and of all *śāstra*s derives from the fact that they have been
composed (or at least, put in a form accessible to humans) and
handed down by omniscient beings, whose teacher was God him-
self. In order to substantiate his claim that *āgama* proves omni-
science, though, Helārāja has to engage with and respond to the
Mīmāṃsakas' claim that *arthavāda*s, the non-injunctive portions of
both Śruti and Smṛti, are not authoritative – which he does, resort-
ing to a variety of arguments (consensus among scriptural sources;
usefulness of passages on past events and well-known objects;
etc.). The second kind of proof is the inference based on *atiśaya/
niratiśaya*, which is given almost as an afterthought near the end of
the passage, and as an explicit response to Kumārila's views (and
possibly to Maṇḍana Miśra's). Remarkably, while much of what
Helārāja writes can be understood in the context of the debates on
omniscience that took place in the second half of the first millen-
nium CE, in the PrPr on VP 3.1.46 there is no direct mention of or
even allusion to the Buddhists, as far as I can tell, despite the fact
they had been among the protagonists of the debate.[171] The contro-
versy on omniscience as presented here by Helārāja is an entirely
intra-brahmanical affair, opposing the atheistic Mīmāṃsā to the
theistic schools. Less prominent, but still detectable, I think, is the
contrast between pluralist and non-dualist views: only the latter, in
Helārāja's eyes (and again, in line with Bhartṛhari), can really pro-

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[171] And despite the fact that they are frequently referred to elsewhere in the PrPr.
Helārāja even quotes Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* twice in the PrPr. I in-
tend to discuss Helārāja's engagement with Buddhist thinkers, especially of
the Pramāṇa tradition, in a future publication.

vide a satisfactory answer to all questions on the nature of cognition (including omniscience) and reality.

9. Situating Helārāja
in Relation to Pratyabhijñā

The conception of language as a fundamental dimension of reality that Helārāja presents in the final portion of PrPr ad VP 3.1.46 is undoubtedly resonant with Bhartṛhari's *śabdabrahman*. On the other hand, as I have noted above, Helārāja's belief in a supreme God who out of his volition (*icchā*) creates the universe is in strident contrast with Bhartṛhari's impersonal Brahman. Helārāja's theism, which – as he strives to show in the extensive passage I have examined here – has a long and respectable history within Vedic Brahmanism (*pace* Mīmāṃsā), is the expression of a religious sensibility that is a far cry from Bhartṛhari's and remarkably close to that of the non-dualist Śaivas of medieval Kashmir. One of the purposes of Helārāja's work may have been precisely to show that Bhartṛhari's theory of language and epistemology are in fact compatible with this radically different religious vision, that it is possible to accommodate most of the teachings found in the VP within a belief system centred on a personal God without incurring any unsolvable contradiction. To put it differently, in Helārāja's eyes, in order to embrace Bhartṛhari's intellectual mentorship one does not need to divorce it from his ontology – essentially, his idea of *śabdatattva* – but could instead appropriate the latter, drawing its full implications, and move beyond it, to a different conception of godhead.

Furthermore, while Helārāja appears to reassert the centrality of the Veda, there is little doubt that the theistic account of the revelation and the origin of *āgama* he advocates potentially opens the way to a relativisation of the importance of the Veda, which then facilitates the emergence of alternative narratives giving pre-eminence to other sets of "revealed" scriptures, such as the Tantric *āgama*s. The accounts of the transmission of scriptures (and of learning in general) found in the Pratyabhijñā literature are in fact structurally similar to Helārāja's and declare God (Śiva) to be their source – if not literally their "author."[172] For instance, in *Tantrālo-*

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[172] For a discussion of the Śaiva revelation according to Abhinavagupta, see Hanneder 1998, especially the Introduction; cf. also Gnoli 1999, Torella 2013, and Ratié 2013.

ka (henceforth, TĀ) 35, which deals with the "meeting of all scriptures" (*samastānāṃ śāstrāṇāṃ melanam*), Abhinavagupta begins with the following definition of *āgama*:

> In this world, all human activities hold in that they have as reference point an ancient complex of innate cognitions and beliefs (*prasiddhi*): this is what is called *āgama*.[173]

In TĀ 35.11b–12a (*pūrvapūrvopajīvitvamārgaṇe sā kvacit svayam ∥ sarvajñarūpe hy ekasmin niḥśaṅkaṃ bhāsate purā |*) Abhinavagupta states that, tracing back this foundational knowledge (*prasiddhi*) to its origin, in the beginning it appears to belong without any doubt to one single inherently omniscient subject, namely Śiva:

> It is Bhairava, the Highest Lord, who consists in this realization (*vimarśa*) [and] is adorned with [all the] innumerable experiences, liberations, their causes and the a priori certainties.[174]

And in v. 30 he strongly reiterates the essential unity of the tradition (even including the Buddhists!):

> In fact *āgama* is one; therefore everything is included in it, from the mundane treatises to the Vaiṣṇava, Buddhist [and] Śaiva [treatises].[175]

In this final section I would like to present two more passages from different sections of the PrPr that appear to confirm Helārāja's affinity to the Pratyabhijñā system, not just culturally but philosophically.

The first is the opening *maṅgalaśloka* of the PrPr:

> *yasmin saṃmukhatāṃ prayāti ruciraṃ ko 'py antar ujjṛmbhate |*
> *nedīyān mahimā manasy abhinavaḥ puṃsaḥ prakāśātmanaḥ |*
> *tṛptiṃ yat paramāṃ tanoti viṣayāsvādaṃ vinā śāśvatīṃ |*
> *dhāmānandasudhāmayorjitavapus tat prātibhaṃ saṃstumaḥ ∥*

> We praise that intuitive knowledge (*prātibham*), whose splendid body is full with the nectar of the bliss that is the light [of consciousness] – when

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[173] TĀ 35 1cd–2ab: *iha tāvat samasto 'yaṃ vyavahāraḥ purātanaḥ ∥ prasiddhim anusandhāya saiva cāgama ucyate |*. (Transl. TORELLA 2013, p. 458; on the notion of *prasiddhi* in the Pratyabhijñā philosophy, see TORELLA 2013.)

[174] TĀ 35.14: *bhogāpavargataddhetuprasiddhiśataśobhitaḥ | tadvimarśasvabhāvo 'sau bhairavaḥ parameśvaraḥ ∥*. Transl. RATIÉ 2013, p. 388, n. 39.

[175] *eka evāgamas tasmāt tatra laukikaśāstrataḥ | prabhṛty ā vaiṣṇavād bauddhāc caivāt sarvaṃ hi niṣṭhitam ∥*. Transl. RATIÉ 2013, p. 415, n. 89. RATIÉ 2013 provides an insightful treatment of the concept of *āgama* in the works of Pratyabhijñā philosophers.

that [intuitive knowledge] comes forth, a certain special new, intimate
majesty (*mahimā*) unfolds brightly within, in the mind, for the individual
soul (*puṃsaḥ*) whose nature is light [i.e. consciousness] – that [intuitive
knowledge] which spreads supreme and eternal contentment without the
savouring of sense objects (*viṣayāsvādam*).

Almost every word in this verse is reminiscent of the non-dualist
śaiva imagery, even though the verse contains no direct reference
to Śiva. The verse extols the breaking forth (*ujjṛmbhate*) of the
light of consciousness in the mind of the individual subject (presu-
mably, and implicitly, someone who has reached the appropriate
level of spiritual advancement), who revels in the bliss resulting
from the new profound realisation that the light was already inside
him – that it was and is in fact his self (*prakāśātmanaḥ*) – and is
pure self-awareness as it transcends the distinction between subject
and object.

Two words in the verse are particularly noteworthy: *āsvāda* and
prātibha. The former, literally meaning "tasting," occurs in the ex-
pression *viṣayāsvādaṃ vinā*, evoking the moment in which an indi-
vidual becomes aware that the distinction between himself and the
external world is fictitious and consciousness actually rests on it-
self, on its ever-lasting luminous nature. As pointed out by TOREL-
LA 2002 (pp. 118f., n. 23), *āsvāda* is one of the common synonyms
of *camatkāra* or *camatkṛti*, "one of the key words of this school,"
denoting the "savouring" of a cognition on the part of someone
who, in Torella's words, "lets the experience rest on the cognizing
subject, that is, makes the 'subject' part predominate over the 'ob-
ject' part." A definition of this important notion is given by Abhi-
navagupta in ĪPVV (vol. II, p. 177, quoted in Torella, ibid.): *ca-
matkṛtir hi bhuñjānasya yā kriyā bhogasamāpattimaya ānandaḥ*,
"*camatkṛti* means the act of a person savouring (*bhuñjānasya*), that
is, the bliss constituted by the full achievement of fruition" (Torel-
la's transl.). Here one finds the same association of *camatkāra*, of-
ten glossed with *āsvāda* in the ĪPVV, with bliss and fulfilment as
in Helārāja's opening verse of the PrPr. In the latter, though, the
reference to a self-awareness stripped of the veil of any objective
content points to the highest level of *camatkāra*, as described for
example in ĪPVV (vol. III, p. 251):

> *prakāśasya ca paradaśāyāṃ camatkāramātrātmā yo vimarśas tad eva*
> *svātantryaṃ, na tu icchārūpam... | camatkāro hi iti svātmani ananyāpekṣe*
> *viśramaṇam | evaṃ bhuñjānatārūpaṃ camattvaṃ, tad eva karoti, saṃ-*

rambheṇa[176] vimṛśati na anyatra anudhāvati | camad iti kriyāviśeṣaṇam, akhaṇḍa eva vā śabdo nirvighnāsvādanavṛttiḥ.

On the supreme plane [the plane of Parā], freedom (svātantryam) [of the Lord] is indeed that reflective awareness (vimarśaḥ) the essence of which is the mere savouring (camatkāramātrātmā) of the light [of consciousness], rather than the nature of volition. [...] For [what we call] camatkāra is [the fact of] resting on one's own self without relying on anything else: thus, wonderment (camattvam) is the condition of one who is relishing (bhuñjānatārūpam), this is what [the experience] causes;[177] it becomes intensely (saṃrambheṇa) aware (vimṛśati), it does not follow upon anything else. camat is an adverb [qualifying kṛ-], or the undivided expression [camatkāra] refers to unimpeded savouring (nirvighnāsvādana).

The word used by Helārāja to refer to this spiritually transforming experience of illumination is prātibha, "intuitive knowledge." Grammatically, this is a taddhita derivative from pratibhā, the unitary "flash" of understanding that according to Bhartṛhari guides all living beings – not just humans – in their daily life and initiates all actions (and, especially, all verbal exchanges). In that instantaneous insight – despite the fact that in everyday life it is coloured by the diversity of the phenomenal world – one can catch a glimpse of the śabdatattva, the word-principle that is universal consciousness.

One can plausibly assume that the use of prātibha in Helārāja's verse is meant to recall the centrality of the notion of pratibhā in Bhartṛhari's philosophy. However, as pointed out by TORELLA 2013 and RATIÉ 2013 from different but converging perspectives, the term pratibhā acquires an increased (if not entirely new) significance in the works of the Pratyabhijñā. It is the highest form of prasiddhi, that hard core of intuitive – and, to some extent, even instinctive – knowledge that is one of the major dimensions of āgama, "tradition" in its broadest – and literal – sense of that which is handed down from previous generations. However, besides the self-evident connection with pratibhā, the term prātibha has a long history of its own going back at least to YS 3.33 prātibhād vā sar-

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[176] The printed edition of ĪPVV reads saṃrambhe. Torella (personal communication, March 2015) suggests emending it to saṃrambheṇa on the basis of a manuscript source available to him.

[177] The clause tad eva karoti is meant to gloss the element -kāra in the compound camatkāra.

vam,[178] where it refers to yogic knowledge, as is made clear by the YS-*Bhāṣya*, which defines it as the nascent moment of knowledge (*jñānasya pūrvarūpam*) and compares it to the light that precedes the rising of the sun (*yathodaye prabhā bhāskarasya*), adding that a yogi will be able to know anything – i.e. become omniscient – when this knowledge, called *prātibha*, arises (*tena vā sarvam eva jānāti yogī prātibhasya jñānasyotpattāv iti*).

It is precisely this *sūtra* that Abhinavagupta quotes in *āhnika* 13[179] of the TĀ, in the section that deals with the various kinds of *śaktipāta*, "descent of power." In relation to the second type of *śaktipāta*, called *madhyatīvra* "middle-violent," which dissipates ignorance,[180] it is said that "the knowledge thanks to which one knows one's own self as the source of bondage and liberation is intuitive knowledge (*prātibha*), the great knowledge, which is independent of scriptures and teachers."[181] A few verses later he states that nothing is unattainable with the help of this intuitive knowledge and then quotes YS 3.33 as an authoritative source in support of this view.[182]

Surely, the mention of *prātibha* in the initial verse of the PrPr is not sufficient in itself to clarify Helārāja's theological views and even less the extent to which they coincide with those expressed by Abhinavagupta in the TĀ. Despite these affinities, in fact, there is a conspicuous absence in the PrPr verse of any reference to Śiva (or any deity, for that matter), as I have mentioned above. In the following passage, however, which ends the commentary on the last two verses[183] of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Helārāja takes a further and decisive step:

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[178] The YS-*Bhāṣya* comments: *prātibhaṃ nāma tārakaṃ tadvivekajasya jñānasya pūrvarūpam. yathodaye prabhā bhāskarasya. tena vā sarvam eva jānāti yogī prātibhasya jñānasyotpattāv iti.*

[179] The term *prātibha* recurs several times in this section but, oddly, it is hardly found elsewhere in the TĀ.

[180] TĀ 13.131b: *madhyatīvrāt punaḥ sarvam ajñānaṃ vinivartate.*

[181] TĀ 13.132: *svayam eva yato vetti bandhamokṣatayātmatām | tat prātibhaṃ mahājñānaṃ śāstrācāryānapekṣi yat ‖.*

[182] TĀ 13.146: *itthaṃ prātibhavijñānaṃ kiṃ kiṃ kasya na sādhayet | yat prātibhād vā sarvaṃ cety ūce śeṣamahāmuniḥ ‖.* In his commentary Jayaratha remarks: *atraiva yad ityādipramāṇanirdeśaḥ. ūce iti pātañjalasūtreṣu.*

[183] VP 3.2.17-18: *ātmā paraḥ priyo dveṣyo vaktā vācyaṃ prayojanam | viruddhāni yathaikasya svapne rūpāṇi cetasaḥ ‖ ajanmani tathā nitye paurvāparyavivarjite | tattve janmādirūpatvaṃ viruddham upalabhyate ‖.* "Just

But for those who know the absolute reality, since the supreme Brahman, whose nature is consciousness and bliss, is free from birth and death, undivided, immutable, this whole world, consisting in the unfolding of material forms and actions, is unreal, whether in a state of wakefulness, sleep, etc. On the plane of absolute reality, though, it is established that there is nothing but the commonality of the connecting consciousness (*anvayicit*). By saying *viruddham upalabhyate,* [Bhartṛhari] admits that contradiction exists in [the state of] nescience. For it is [in] the very nature of nescience that, even though it is inexplicable, it leads to the visibility [of the phenomenal reality], [for] if it were explained, it would be nothing but knowledge.[184] Therefore, the power of Brahman to manifest the unreal proliferation [of the world], [a power] which has been established to be without beginning, having produced both the cognised object and the cognising subject in conformity with itself, unfolds the drama of the world. Therefore, those who see the true reality dismiss this [power] that is fine as long as it is not [critically] examined.[185]

An analysis of this passage and of its relation to the rest of the *Dravyasamuddeśa* would be beyond the scope of this paper. I will just draw attention to the final line, where Helārāja states that "the power of Brahman to manifest the unreal proliferation [of the world] [...] unfolds the drama of the world." The use of the phrase *jagannāṭyam ātanoti*, with its unmistakable śaiva connotations, is

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as the self and the other, what is loved and what is hated, the speaker, the spoken and the purpose, are mutually contradictory natures [appearing] in the dreams of a single conscious mind, in the same way the fact of having the nature of [a being] subject to birth etc. is perceived as contradictory with regard to that reality that is unborn, eternal, and devoid of sequence."

[184] Cf. the following passage in Maṇḍana Miśra's Bsi, p. 10: *anupapadyamānārthaiva hi māyā, upapadyamānārthatve yathārthabhāvān na māyā syāt...* "For illusion (*māyā*) has an object that is impossible to explain (*anupapadyamāna*): if it had an object that were possible to explain (*upapadyamāna*), it would not be an illusion since it would conform to its object..." I thank I. Ratié for bringing it to my attention.

[185] PrPr 1, p. 121, ll. 10-16: *paramārthadṛśāṃ tu jananamaraṇarahite 'pravibhakte kūṭasthe parasmin brahmaṇi cidānandarūpe sarvam eva jagaj jāgratsvapnādyavasthāgataṃ mūrtikriyāvivartarūpam asatyam. anvayicitsāmānyamātraṃ tu paramārtha iti siddham. viruddham upalabhyate iti vadann avidyāyāṃ virodham abhyupaiti. etad eva hy avidyāyāḥ svarūpaṃ yad anupapadyamānam apy ābhāsopagamaṃ nayati, upapannatve vidyaiva syāt. tasmād asatyaprapañcaprakāśanaśaktir brahmaṇo 'nādisiddhā grāhyagrāhakayugalaṃ svānurūpam uparacayya jagannāṭyam ātanotīty avicāritaramaṇīyām imām apanayanti tattvadṛśaḥ.*

meant as a subtle clue, I think, suggesting that *brahman* may be seen as just another name of Śiva.

10. CONCLUSION

Much work remains to be done on Helārāja. From the main passage I have discussed here, Helārāja emerges as a refined, learned intellectual with a wide-ranging philosophical background. It is tempting, as suggested by SUBRAMANIA IYER 1969 (pp. 39-40), to identify him with the *bhūtirājatanaya* whom Abhinavagupta mentions more than once among his teachers, for example in the TĀ, and who may not be the same as Bhaṭṭendurāja, or simply Indurāja, also the son of a Bhūtirāja, who was the teacher of Abhinavagupta on Alaṃkāraśāstra (PANDEY 1963, pp. 142-143). The PrPr on VP 3.1.46 itself offers at least one – admittedly tenuous – trace that points in that direction, namely the attention that both Helārāja and Abhinavagupta pay to YS 3.17 (see § 4.3 above).

But even if Helārāja never was one of Abhinavagupta's teachers,[186] I think it very likely that his commentaries on Bhartṛhari's VP, probably composed in the first half of the 10th c. CE, reflected and facilitated the change in attitude towards Bhartṛhari that is first attested in Utpaladeva's work. It seems to me that Helārāja's effort aims to reclaim Bhartṛhari's philosophical legacy, showing that the latter's views on language and cognition are firmly rooted in the brahmanical tradition (perhaps partly as a reaction against the Buddhists's partial appropriation of some of Bhartṛhari's ideas). At the same time Helārāja emphasises that Bhartṛhari's Vedāntic monism – despite its atheism – stands apart from other Vedāntic trends that were gaining ground at the time because of its dynamic understanding of the relation between *brahman* and the world.[187] This may explain his critique of Mīmāṃsā, particularly conspicuous in the passage I have examined here. And, as the opportunity arises, Helārāja is also clearly eager to suggest that Bhartṛhari's vision is not only compatible with a theistic philosophical approach, but possibly can only be fully defended if it is embedded in a theistic interpretive frame. From this perspective, his work would have

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[186] It may well prove impossible to ascertain the identity of Bhūtirāja's son.

[187] However, one important part in my future research on Helārāja's work will certainly be the investigation of possible connections with those currents of theistic Vedānta that emerged roughly at the same time (end of the first millennium CE), and which I have deliberately left aside in the present paper.

certainly influenced Abhinavagupta's philosophy, even if only indirectly.

On the other hand, it is difficult to pinpoint Helārāja's religious affiliation with any degree of certainty. The recurring references to God as Īśvara, or Maheśvara, or Parameśvara, in the PrPr on VP 3.1.46, might be explained by the use of the same terms in the Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika sources that he quotes, but they strongly suggest that he was a śaiva, and this seems to be confirmed by the final lines of his commentary on the *Dravyasamuddeśa* (see § 9 above). However, nothing in these passages indicates that Helārāja was a Tantric devotee, although this could possibly be explained as the caution or even the reluctance of the commentator lest he should force a patently unjustified interpretation on the *mūla* text.

Militating against my hypothesis that Helārāja may have played an important role in the formation of Pratyabhijñā as a philosophical system is the fact that, as far as I know, no quotation or even direct mention of Helārāja has surfaced in Abhinavagupta's extensive oeuvre or generally the works of later śaiva authors and, vice versa, that so far no reference to early non-dualist śaiva texts has been found in the PrPr. He also seems to be scarcely mentioned by other authors in general, with the exception of Bhoja (see RAGHA-VAN 1976, pp. 106f.). One could imagine that Helārāja was something of an outsider, an isolated intellectual unattached to any particular philosophical school or system and with his own unique religious vision, perhaps a form of non-Tantric śaiva monism, which might partly help to explain his scarce fortune.

However, the fact that so far little attention has been paid to Helārāja's work except as a key to understanding Bhartṛhari's philosophy could equally be responsible for the seemingly almost total oblivion of his name and, even more, his contribution. Only a systematic search of the considerable but not unwieldy bulk of texts involved will be able to confirm or disprove this dearth of cross-references, a search I am planning to carry out in the future.

In parallel, the scarce historical evidence on Helārāja's life and date needs to be re-examined critically and, if possible, expanded. And further research into the innumerable philosophical topics raised in his extensive commentary on the VP will certainly help to clarify his place in the philosophical debates of mediaeval Brahmanism and the history of Pratyabhijñā.

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YS-*Bhāṣya*
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Kashmiri Brahmins under the Kārkoṭa, Utpala and Lohara Dynasties, 625-1151 CE[*]

MICHAEL WITZEL

After the legends told in the *Nīlamata Purāṇa* of Kashmir and in the ahistorical early books of Kalhaṇa's *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (1150 CE, henceforth RT), "real" Kashmirian history starts with the Kārkoṭa dynasty of Kashmir (625-855 CE) – that is, if Kalhaṇa's calculation mistake of +25 years is corrected.[1]

The difference between Kalhaṇa's dates for the Kārkoṭa dynasty and that of Chinese travelers is due to the confusion between Laukika Samvat and Kali Samvat, both of which were used in medieval Kashmir. The beginning of Laukika Samvat equals Kali Samvat 25 (expired).[2] This discrepancy extends throughout Kalhaṇa's dates of the Kārkoṭa reign.[3] Apart from this problem, his dates are correct, down to the calendar day, for the period after 625 CE. The Kashmirian dynasties of the period treated in this paper thus are:

Kārkoṭa	625- 855 CE	RT IV
Utpala	855-939	RT V
Utpala interregnum	939-1003	RT VI
1st Lohara	1003-1101	RT VII

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[1] See WITZEL 1990. This mistake is due to Kalhaṇa's reliance on a Vaṃśāvalī, that he took for a list in Laukika Samvat, which was calculated in Kali Samvat.

[2] Stein mentions the time difference, but did not recognize the reason for this confusion in Kārkoṭa dates. In STEIN 1900, vol. I, p. 69, he speculates about an "error in the record of several reigns attributed to this dynasty."

[3] See STEIN 1900, vol. I, p. 96 (§ 91) on Cippaṇajayāpīḍa.

2nd Lohara   1001-1151   RT VIII

A skeleton overview of the fate of the Kashmirian Brahmins during the time of these dynasties is provided by Kalhaṇa's RT. It was written by him prior to 1070 Śaka = 1147 CE; the introduction was composed in 1148/1149, and the text was completed in 1150/1151. The time discrepancy between composition and final version is due to political reasons: Kalhaṇa's concern for his personal safety under a dynasty that he criticized.[4]

The most important factual data regarding Brahmins are those listed by him of land donations, *agrahāra*s. Here a list of those donations during the Kārkoṭa (625 CE-) and the following dynasties is given, neglecting a number of legendary donations mentioned since the beginning of Kaliyuga in RT I-III. Kalhaṇa provides the following list, until his time (1149/1150 CE):[5]

- 4.5: Durlabhavardhana, the first king of the Kārkoṭa dynasty (circa 625-637), gave the Village of Candragrāma Pāreviśoka-Koṭa (East of the Viśau river) and other places to the Brahmins;

- 4.9: several *agrahāra*s founded by Hanumant, son of Ūḍa (Oḍā, Aiḍa?), minister of king Durlabha-Pratāpāditya (circa 637-687);

- 4.12: Noṇa from the Rauhītaka country built the Noṇamaṭha for Brahmins born in Rauhītaka (modern Rohtak in Haryāṇa, or perhaps in the Multan area, see Stein ad loc.);[6]

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[4] He thus quickly wrote a new version of book VIII, one that favored the current king Jayasiṃha; the older version has been discovered by Hultzsch in a Kashmiri manuscript now in Berlin (as explained in KÖLVER 1971, pp. 79ff.) – Stein had an inkling of this state of affairs when he commented on the (unusual) deficiencies in RT VIII, see his Introduction, pp. 43f. However, Hultzsch came to the conclusion (p. 206) that the archetype perhaps represents the earlier version and the two additional manuscripts L and M (with 161 new verses), a later one; for trenchant arguments against this interpretation see KÖLVER 1971. For the Hultzsch data see now OBROCK ED. 2013, pp. 179-248; also cf. now on RT COX ED. 2013.

[5] The numerous donations to various temples and Buddhist *vihāra*s are not mentioned here. The king reigning immediately before the Kārkoṭas, Bālāditya, is mentioned at 3.481 with a donation at Bheḍava (modern Biḍar, in Bring Pargana) in Maḍavarājya (modern Maraz).

[6] The name Nona occurs a few times in subsequent centuries, such as that of a Brahmin at RT 8.1328.

- 4.639: Jayāpīḍa (776/777-807/808) did not confiscate certain *agrahāra*s (at Tūlamūlya?) on the Candrabhāga (modern Tulamul, on a branch of the Sind river);

- 5.23: Khādhūyā, Hastikarṇa (modern Vāgahōm in Dachünpor Pargaṇ, on the Vitastā), under king Avantivarman, 855/856-883);

- 5.24: Pañcahastā (modern Pānzath, in Divasar Pargaṇa);

- 5.170: king Śaṅkaravarman (883-902) took back some *agrahāra*s;

- 5.397: <the village Helu given to a low caste man, Raṅga, by king Cakravarman, 936-937>;

- 5.403: Brahmins accepted *agrahāra*s from king Cakravarman;

- 5.442: Brahmins accepted *agrahāra*s from king Unmattāvanti (937-939);

- 6.87: king Yaśaskara (939-948 CE) built a *maṭha* for students from Āryadeśa;

- 6.89: 55 *agrahāra*s given by king Yaśaskara;

- 6.300: *maṭha* for persons from Madhyadeśa, Lāṭa and Suḍotra (Saurāṣṭra??) by Diḍḍā, grandmother of king Nandigupta (972-973 CE) (this is the modern Didmar);

- 6.304: *maṭha* for foreign Brahmins built by Nandigupta;

- 6.336: Brahmins holding the chief *agrahāra*s held a fast (prāyopaveśa)[7] under Queen Diḍḍā (980/981-1003);

- 7.182: Āśācandra-agrahāra by queen Sūryamatī, queen of king Ananta (1028-1063), who built a *maṭha* with an *agrahāra* in the name of her brother Kallana (Āśācandra); another *maṭha* was built in the name of her brother Sillana, and Vijayeśvara *maṭha* in the name of her husband;

- 7.184: 108 *agrahāra*s by queen Sūryamatī;

- 7.185: in the name of king Ananta, queen Sūryamatī established *agrahāra*s at Amareśvara;

- 7.608: *agrahāra*s built by king Kalaśa (1063-1089);

[7] STEIN 1900, vol. I, pp. 36ff, refers to these fasts and Kalhaṇa's contempt for the *purohita*s who held them. "The solemn fasts or Prāyopaveśas to which they were apt to resort in critical circumstances, were evidently powerful means of coercion which weak rulers had reason to dread." Cf. now KÖLVER 1971, pp. 161ff., esp. p. 167, on suicide.

- 8.898: Akṣosuva plundered by Tilaka, the commander-in-chief, under king Bhikṣācara (1120-1121);
- 8.899-908: Brahmins holding *agrahāra*s and *pariṣādya*s held a fast in the Gokula.

Kalhaṇa has numerous references to various kinds of donations given under his contemporary king, Jayadeva (1128-1149). They include also those by his queens and officials, and gifts to Brahmins (*agrahāra*), temples, *maṭha*s and Buddhist *vihāra*s (traditionally, the latter frequently by queens): 8.3316-3370.

- 8.2408: numerous *agrahāra*s in Purāṇādhiṣṭhāna (Pandreṭhān) and Pravarapura (Srinagar), given for the upkeep of *maṭha*s built there;
- 8.2444: Brahmins from the Indus and Drāviḍa regions were settled;
- 8.2419: *maṭha*s and *agrahāra*s established by minister Dhanya;
- 8.2420: *maṭha*s and *agrahāra*s established by minister Udaya;
- 8.3355: *agrahāra*s granted by Sumanas, younger brother of Rilhaṇa, a minister of king Sussala, under the reign of king Jayasiṃha.

In India, such land grants were usually documented on copper plates. However, such copper plates have not been found so far in Kashmir. The reason might be that they were often issued on birchbark. This is proved by the story in Jonarāja's *Rājataraṅgiṇī* of the forging of a document in the time of Zain ul Abidin.[8] (Similarly, in Nepal, land sales, mortgages etc. were documented on palm leaves.)[9] On the other hand, Kalhaṇa mentions (1.15) that the study of grants and inscriptions made him "overcome the trouble arising from many errors" (STEIN, see his note).

These notes of Kalhaṇa, which end in circa 1149/1150 CE, can be divided into several classes.

General grants by kings are numerous: here belong 3.481, 5.23-24, 5.403, 5.442, 5.448, 6.89, 7.608, 8.2408. The Brahmins thus settled and richly endowed, quickly gained considerable power. This has been described and characterized by Kalhaṇa and summ-

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[8]   See now SLAJE 2004, pp. 15ff.

[9]   See KÖLVER AND ŚĀKYA 1985.

ed up by M.A. Stein.[10] Its effects can be seen at 6.336, 8.899, 8.908 where the Brahmins holding such grants organize a fast to put pressure on the king. Gandhi's "Satyāgraha" and some others of his methods have their predecessors... This kind of fast was often held at or in the Gokula, apparently a *maṭha*-like place where the Brahmins always assembled to discuss important religious and political issues.

Grants were also made by queens (7.182, 7.184-185) or by ministers (4.9, 8.2419, 8.2420, 8.335) throughout the period described by Kalhaṇa. Another case is of special interest: Noṇa from the Rauhītaka country built the Noṇamaṭha for Brahmins born in Rauhītaka (4.12). Stein identifies this country either with Multan or with modern Rohtak in Haryāṇa, which had been known since Vedic times as Rohītakakula. It is remarkable that a foreigner took the interest and was wealthy enough to execute a donation of this kind in another country. His action points to the close links between the two countries at a comparatively early period (circa 625-660 CE). This is not the only grant made on behalf of non-Kashmiris: there are those (6.87) for students (from Uttar Pradesh), and at 6.300 for Uttar Pradesh, Lāṭa (Southern Gujarat)[11] and Suḍotra (Saurāṣṭra?) people, or at 6.304, a more generally defined grant "for foreign Brahmins."

In spite of the general generosity of the kings, which usually was motivated by acute political interests, there also loomed a threat of confiscation of *agrahāra* land by certain kings (4.395 4.639, 5.170, cf. 6.175, 7.1091 etc.) and their generals. This contradicts the general rule that such donations are made "as long as the sun and moon last."

One the other hand, the usual inclusion of this phrase, in conjunction with the admonishment to future kings not to encroach on the grant is, taken by itself, evidence enough that such actions took place more or less regularly, particularly by new dynasties who redistributed older *agrahāra*s to Brahmins of their choice.

Examples of such threats in the RT are: 4.639 by Jayāpīḍa, 5.170 by Śaṅkaravarman. He resumed villages belonging to tem-

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[10]   STEIN 1900, vol. I ad RT 2.132.

[11]   NAUDOU 1980, p. 56, n. 57 doubts that this is in southern Gujarat and thinks of a nearby (Khaśa) kingdom, Viṣalāṭā; however see above on king Bhoja, and cf. RT 8.1074.

ples (see below). Again, *agrahāra*s were actually plundered, against the common practice, by a king's general (8.898).

Kalhaṇa's knowledge about details on all these *agrahāra*s surprises. Apart from legendary information (in the entries before 625 CE) he must have gained definite data from copper plate and stone inscriptions recording such donations. In one case, this is clear: RT 1.344 (STEIN 1900, vol. I, Introduction, p. 26; cf. RT 5.397 on *praśasti*s, and 5.397 on granting a village). However, there also is direct mentioning of such inscriptions in Jonarāja's RT: an order of the king is incised on a copper plate (886), *tāmrapāttra,* next to birch bark documents (882), and in Śrīvara's RT (1.7.3). Copper plates are still mentioned by Akbar's historians as having been found in the ruins of the temples**.**

BUDDHIST ACCOUNTS

Since most of the Sanskrit literary texts of Kashmir were written by Hindus and stress the Hindu aspects of Kashmiri life, it is useful to turn, briefly, to the Buddhist accounts.

Early information is provided by the Chinese pilgrims whose accounts were translated in the 1800s, about the state of affairs in the 5th and the following centuries; they include: 404-424 CE Che-mong,[12] 420- Fa-yong (Fa-Hian, Faxian),[13] 518 Sung-Yun and Hwei Sang,[14] 631-633 Hsuan-tsang[15] (Xuan Zang), 673-685 I-tsing,[16] 759-763 Wu k'ung[17] (Ou khong, Wukong 751-790),[18] 720

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[12] He crossed the Pamirs with a Kashmiri monk and stayed in Kashmir for a long time before visiting the holy places of India.

[13] See BEAL 1884 pp. 1ff. He crossed over the Himalayas and Pamirs, with 20 monks, from Kashgar to the Gilgit Valley, stayed for one year, and then returned to China by sea. See also HU-VON HINÜBER 2016.

[14] See BEAL 1884, pp. 55ff.

[15] He stayed in Kashmir from May 631 to April 633; On Hsuan Tsang and other early Chinese travellers see BEAL 1884, 1908 and 1911. See also NAUDOU 1980, pp. 39ff.

[16] TAKAKUSU 1896; further: CHAVANNES 1894.

[17] LÉVI AND CHAVANNES 1895; cf. STEIN 1896 and 1900; his stay in Kashmir, 759-763 according to NAUDOU 1980, p. 56.

[18] LÉVI AND CHAVANNES 1895, pp. 350ff.

Ambassador Ou-li-to,[19] 726 Huei-ch'ao[20] (Korean: Hyecho) (751-790), 747 Kao Sien-che (another Korean).

They report that in Kashmir there were *deva* and Buddhist temples. The Kashmiris cared more for the *deva* temples in Hsuan Tsang's time, which may point to the strong influence of the newly established Kārkoṭa dynasty and their restoration of Hinduism[21] after a period of strong Buddhist influence in the Valley. However, even at the time of Kalhaṇa (1150 CE), Buddhism flourished in the Valley.[22] The *Nīlamata* gives a detailed description of the festivities occurring at Buddha's birthday; according to M.A. Stein it is even retained today in the Brahmins' calendars. About a hundred years before Kalhaṇa, Kṣemendra still found it interesting to write a Sanskrit gist of the Avadāna stories (*Bauddhāvadānakalpalatā*). Even the late, post-Kalhaṇa *Rājataraṅgiṇī* of Jonarāja (circa 1459)[23] still mentions:

> The good country of Kashmira is adorned by the Vedas, [...] by the followers of Śiva and Viṣṇu, by the worshippers of the sun, by the Buddhists with their paintings, and Vihāra and Maṭhas.[24]

Due to the strong influence of Kashmir on early Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan texts contain a lot of data on Kashmiri Buddhist monks and scholars, whose works were translated into Tibetan and many of whom actually traveled to Tibet, but hardly any information on non-Buddhist Kashmiri Brahmins.

J. Naudou's book[25] offers many pertinent details and discussions. This includes a few accounts of conversion to Buddhism. According to Taranātha, Dharmakīrti was converted to Buddhism

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[19]   T'ang Shu, transl. NAUDOU 1980, p. 50: story of Mahāpadma (mohopotomo).

[20]   Transl. in FUCHS 1939; cf. also PELLIOT 1908, pp. 511-512; OTANI 1934, pp. 143-160.

[21]   See STEIN 1900 ad 1.179f. – a passage directed against the influence of the Buddhists: "When customs [...] had broken down [...] the Nāgas [...] sent down excessive snow to cause distress to the Bauddhas [...] every year [...]." The connection between snow and ice will be explored in a long paper on the 600 Kashmirian Nāgas. Cf. *Nīlamata* LR vv. 217ff., 465ff.

[22]   See STEIN 1900's summary on Buddhism in Kashmir, vol. I, pp. 8ff. See also SLAJE forthcoming.

[23]   See now SLAJE 2014.

[24]   However in a post-Jonarāja appendix (H) in KAUL 1966, p. 425, verse B 473. The idea goes back at least to Kṣemendra's *Lokaprakāśa,* no 139.

[25]   NAUDOU 1980.

by three Kashmiri Brahmins: Vidyāsiṃha, Devasīmha, Devavidyā-kara (Naudou 1980, p. 65). Śaṅkarānanda, a logician, called a *paramōpasaka mahāpaṇḍita brāhmaṇa,* is said to have been converted to Buddhism (ibid., p. 126).[26] Ratnavajra converted a Śaiva Brahmin, called the "red *ācārya*" (or Guhyaprajña; Naudou 1980, pp.169 and 172). A Brahmin called Śrībhadra or Sūryaketu was the teacher of Sajjana, grandson of Ratnavajra (Naudou 1980, p. 188). Somanātha (or Candranātha) of the early 11th century, was converted by his mother. He studied together with Sonasati, Lakṣmīkara, Dānaśrī/Danaśīla, Candrarāhula (Naudou 1980, p. 198).

Brahmins in Sanskrit Texts

Returning now to the notes on Brahmins in Sanskrit texts, we have to take into account a large number of texts with smaller or larger data sets on Brahmins. They cannot be dealt with here in any detail. However, there are but a few texts that may be as old or nearly as old as the *Nīlamata Purāṇa*[27] (circa 8th century), which basically is a Māhātmya of the Kashmir Valley. As such it contains materials on the sacred places but also incidental notices on groups of Brahmins, such as, surprisingly, the Taittirīya Yajurvedins[28] and the Pāñcarātrins.[29]

The Taittirīya school of the Black Yajurveda is found after the Vedic period, predominantly in South India, where according to the adage "every house cat knows the Yajurveda." Their appearance in Kashmir (and in Nepal)[30] during this early period surprises; however, it is another indication of early relations between South India and the Himalayas (see below). The Pāñcarātrins may be mentioned as they played an important role in the formation of the imperial Kashmir state under the late Kārkoṭas and early Utpala dynasties.[31] This included the composition of the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* and the influence on the ritual of Rājābhiṣeka, the royal consecration.[32]

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[26] Much discussed, see now Eltschinger 2015.

[27] See *Nīlamata* LR and SR; see now Ikari ed. 1994.

[28] *Nīlamata* LR 1202 = SR 1157.

[29] See *Nīlamata* LR, vol. I, p. 156, v. 420.

[30] See Witzel 1980.

[31] Note the military expansion especially under Lalitāditya and Jayāpīḍa.

[32] However, Inden et al. 2000, especially the second essay (Inden 2000),

An important secular text from this period is that of the poet Dāmodaragupta; he was a minister of Jayāpīḍa (779-813 = rev. 804-839) and composed the *Kuṭṭanīmata* (mentioned in RT 4.496).[33] This may be an unlikely text to look for information on Brahmins as it deals with the "advice of a courtesan." However the Kashmiris always had a foible for texts dealing with the red light district.[34] "Although there is no direct reference to Kashmir, the poem gives a fairly accurate account of contemporary Kashmiri life."[35]

The more or less contemporary *Nyāyamañjarī* (henceforth NM) of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (late 9th century) contains little of interest in this regard, however, it furnishes quite a lot of details on the Vedic and philosophical texts actually studied in Kashmir at the time. Occasionally, it also provides a sidelight on the actual religious conditions, such as on the commotion created by the arrival of a new Tantric sect, that of the Nīlāmbaras. Their story is further elaborated in Jayanta's philosophical, allegoric drama, the *Āgamaḍambara*, which indicates Jayanta's involvement in the political discussion of the time:[36] being "non-traditional" they were exiled from Kashmir

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claims a "dialogical" reading of texts – notably the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* as a Kashmirian Pāñcarātra text, composed by a "complex author" – that is "a world conquering monarch [with Candrāpīḍa and Muktāpīḍa as co-authors] and members of his court as well as adepts of the disciplinary order of Pāñcarātra Vaiṣṇavas." By his "intertextual reading" Inden sees the *Nīlamata*, the text preceding the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, as "a dialectical reworking of an earlier Śaiva vision of Kashmir, which in turn reworked a still older Buddhist vision." Cf. now SANDERSON 2007, p. 207. The rules for the royal *abhiṣeka* in *Nīlamata* (LR 854-866) concur with those of the Nepalese Rājyābhiṣeka, the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* and the late *Agni Purāṇa*, see WITZEL 1987, and now CHAULAGAIN 2013.

[33] See SHASTRI 1975; cf. RT 4.498, where the text is mentioned by name.

[34] Such as the 5th century *Pādatāḍitaka* by Śyāmilaka, and Dāmodaragupta's *Kuṭṭanīmata*, Kṣemendra's *Samayamātṛkā* (1050 CE), *Deśopadeśa*, *Narmamāla* etc.

[35] SHASTRI 1975, p. 41. This is to be contrasted with what is specifically said about the main location of the story, Benares, and also Pāṭaliputra, Mount Abu. See now the transl. in DEZSŐ AND GOODALL 2012.

[36] WEZLER 1976; see however GRANOFF 1986-1992, esp. pp. 296-298. King Śaṅkaravarman (883-902 CE) installed a council deliberating the question; this is mentioned in NM itself (p. 363, transl. in BHATTACHARYA 1978 p. 562); it put a stop to the practices of the Nīlāmbaras. Jayanta has a long discussion on the validity of the Āgamas and Tantras (NM, transl. in BHATTACHARYA 1978, pp. 544-563. See now DEZSŐ 2015, Introduction.

by order of the king. Jayanta's son Abhinanda, however, describes him as a scholar of Veda and Vedānta, which is not unusual as people have multiple interests and "identities."[37]

More detailed information on the Brahmins of Kashmir is given in the somewhat later works of Albīrūnī, Bilhaṇa and Kalhaṇa. Albīrūnī, a Khvarezmian Muslim, provides a lot of detailed information in his *Tarīkh al Hind* (henceforth *India*) that was written in Arabic in 1030 CE. Not unlike present day anthropological field workers, he gained his information from local Panjabi and Kashmiri collaborators, and from various other sources, be it learned Brahmins or books, often acquired with difficulty.

Bilhaṇa (flourished circa 1050-1100 CE)[38] gives an account of the life of the Cālukya king Vikramāṅka or Vikramāditya VI (reigned until 1126 CE). Bilhaṇa was his court poet for some time, and wrote the *Vikramāṅkadevacarita*, an account of his life and deeds. In the last quarter of canto 18, Bilhaṇa describes his travels outside Kashmir, and towards the end his wish to return to Kashmir to spend his old age in Śaiva meditation. This includes a detailed description of his homeland, his village (Khonamuṣa near Srinagar), and an account of his family.

Kalhaṇa's RT was completed in 1149/1151.[39] The evidence from this text must be evaluated according to (1) his report of distant and more recent historical facts, (2) what he has to say about his own time, including references to earlier times expressed by contemporaneous similes.

Details

In the *Kuṭṭanīmata*, the Brahmins play a conspicuous role. They adhere to the six duties: study, teaching, performing sacrifices for themselves, officiating for others, making gifts, and accepting gifts. Albirunī reports:

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[37] Or as the late Robert Levy once told me (circa 1980) when asking the same question to a Bhaktapur (Nepal) resident, he quickly listed his multiple identities in Nepalese, Newar, *varṇa*, and caste society, his occupation and the various religio-cultural organizations (such as *sanā* Guṭhī) he was (or had to be) a member of.

[38] For Bilhaṇa, see Solf 1886; cf. Misra 1976, p. 115.

[39] See above, n. 4.

> He must continuously read, perform the sacrifices, take care of the fire which he lights, offer before it, worship it, and preserve it from being extinguished, that he may be burned by it after his death. It is called *homa*. (*India* II, 133)

The Brahmins receive the traditional designations *vipra, dvija, dvi-janman, agrajanman, bhūmideva, vasudhādeva*; their names end in *-sena*, *-svāmin*; and they have these titles: *-dīkṣita* (one initiated into the solemn Vedic sacrifices such as the Soma ritual), *-miśra, -bhaṭṭa*, (originally a Veda teacher), or *-bhāva* (a Śaiva teacher).[40] Albirunī, however, thinks that a brahmin is called in various ways:

> When he is busy with the service of one fire, he is called *iṣṭin*, if he serves three fires, he is called *agnihotrin*, if he besides offers an offering to the fire, he is called *dīkṣita*.

As for Veda learning, he reports that the Veda was allowed to be learnt only by the Brahmins[41] and Kṣatriyas (I, 104, 125). The latter, however, do not teach it (II, 125, 136). It was learnt[42] by rote and recited by heart by the Brahmins (I, 125) after having undergone initiation. Dāmodaragupta's descriptions are, again, largely traditional.[43] Only some Brahmins were skilled reciters of the Veda (414, 422).[44]

Similarly, Bilhaṇa's ancestors are described as follows: Mukti-kalaśa was "the abode of the four beloved Vedas" (v. 76). His son Rājakalaśa and Rājakalaśa's son Jyeṣṭhakalaśa also were learnt in

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[40] Bhaṭṭa also occurs in compounds indicating their sons: *bhaṭṭa-putra, bhaṭṭa-suta, bhaṭṭa-taneya, bhaṭṭa-dāyada*.

[41] He also says that the study period extends until the 25th year for a young Brahmin (II 131), which again reminds of Kashmiri conceptions.

[42] He expressively mentions the girdle (= *mekhalā*) next to two kinds of *yajño-pavīta*, details that might point to Kashmiri informants, who followed prescriptions of the *Kāṭhaka Gṛhya Sūtra* II, 130. (The *mekhalā* still is worn today, also in Kerala.)

[43] As all Vaidika families (420), his protagonist Purandhara studied with his teacher, wearing the deer skin and the (typical Kashmiri) girdle (*mekhalikā*) during his brahmacārin vow (197). When its breaks it is replaced (198). A Veda student is called *vaṭuka* (198). He cuts firewood for his teacher (414ff.) and *samidh*s – chores that Vaidika Brahmins learn early in their childhood (400, cf. 200). Pupils have to serve their teacher (421, 436), with whom they usually reside (433).

[44] The incompatibility of Buddhism with Vedic *śākhā*s is seen at 266: *abhimata-sugatāvasthitir abhinandita-caraṇa-yugalaracanā ca*.

the Vedas. Bilhaṇa describes himself as having studied the Vedas and its Aṅgas, among other topics.[45]

We learn much more about the actual Vedic texts studied in Kashmir at the time of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa due to his numerous quotations contained in his NM. They include texts from all the four Vedas. The Ṛgveda was studied in the Śākala version, but in a slightly different sub-recension, that included a special recension of the Ṛgvedakhilas.

The Yajurveda of Kashmir is represented by the Kaṭha School, which still possessed, at the time, fragments of its *Śatādhyāya-Brāhmaṇa*, the *Śrautasūtra* and other now lost texts. The *Gṛhyasūtra*, under the name of *Kaṭha-* or *Laugākṣi-Sūtra*, has been the mainstay of Kashmiri ritual until today. (It has also influenced Śaiva ritual). There are several commentaries and numerous Paddhatis of this text. The Sāmaveda seems to have followed the usual Kauthuma tradition, traditionally linked with the Kaṭhas.[46]

The Atharvaveda was still very well known at the time, not in the Śaunaka Vulgate form but in the Paippalāda version. Apparently it still was recited with *svara*s at the time. Some of its later texts were also studied. The Atharvavedins were proud to have a special initiation; only someone having undergone it, was allowed to study their texts.

The only two passages in the RT, as far as I see, which refer to Vedic learning – though in rather conventional terms – are the interesting stanza 5.159: "In [charge of] these two temples of the lord of Gaurī, he placed the Brahman Nāyaka, who was versed in the four Vedas, and who was like a familiar dwelling-place to Sarasvatī" (see below); also, for a passing remark on Veda recitation see 8.2518.

Dāmodaragupta's *Kuṭṭanīmata* describes the further life of a Brahmin: after completing his studies, its protagonist Purandhara settled down as a householder and performed sacrifices (193) – for

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[45] For other *Kalaśa*s, see RT 7.24 Rājakalaśa, 7.888 Praśastakalaśa, 7.1050 Kalaśarāja, 7.1286ff. King Kalaśa (1063-1089 CE, 7.232ff.); Tilakakalaśa (NAUDOU 1980, pp. 232-233, 240) Alaṅkārakalaśa (mid-12th century, reportedly a descendant of the grammarian Trilocana, NAUDOU 1980, pp. 240f.); for still another one of circa 800 CE, see http://east.uni-hd.de/buddh/ind/25/.

[46] According to grammarians: e.g. Kaṭha-Kauthuma (Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya* 2.4.3).

which one has to be married.[47] The solemn *śrauta* rituals[48] include the recitation of Vedic mantras and the use of sacrificial posts (*kratuyūpa*, 180). Vedic texts are popularly studied (419) and include many *vrata*s (419); Manu is an author of the past (719).[49]

Veda recitation is mentioned by Kalhaṇa at RT 8.2518.

Bilhaṇa[50] too mentions the traditional Vedic and other rituals, e.g. at Kāṣṭhāla, which is "resonant with the exposition of the Śāstras" (25); the heads of its inhabitants are "grey by the smoke of the fire in which sacrifices are performed in the evening and in the morning," referring to Agnihotra or *sāndhya* type *homa*s (25). His home village of Khonamuṣa is described as "having many sacrificial posts" (71). His family was "renowned and [...] inclined to Vedic studies (or meditation on Brahman)." They also were eager sacrificers whose "column of sacrificial smoke was filling the sky." (74)

Among his ancestors, Muktikalaśa's family is described as "perspiring [...] from the constant practice of Agnihotra sacrifices." Rājakalaśa was learned in the Vedas and a great sacrificer; his son Jyeṣṭhakalaśa also was "preoccupied in the performance of religious ceremonies" (80).

Among the rites of passage, marriage is mentioned in the *Kuṭṭa-nīmata* as *pariṇāya* (792) and *pāṇigraha* (167).[51] In connection with the funeral rituals, Agni is called *hutavahana* (489), *hutāśana* (491), *bhagavat* (489); the pyre of wood for cremation is mentioned at 491, 489. The *śrāddha* rituals are mentioned in connection with the prescription of securing rhinoceros meat, skin and horns (198). Purification with earth and water is mentioned by Kalhaṇa at 6.69.

The *Kuṭṭanīmata* already mentions the *deśaguṇa* of Kashmir of allowing to eat meat;[52] we find *māṃsarasa* (sauce) and also fish

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[47] They also include *japa*, and the customary rites for the ancestors (197).

[48] For details on Vedic sacrifices see SHASTRI 1975, p. 85; Kalhaṇa mentions a "drinker of Soma" which, however, occurs in a simile (5.393).

[49] An interesting passage (*Kuṭṭanīmata* 14) describes the annotation of a metrical text with marks indicating long and short syllables: *chandaḥ prastāravidhau guravo yasyām anārjava-sthitayaḥ*, see A.M. SHASTRI 1975, p. 176.

[50] The translations quoted of Bilhaṇa's work are from BANERJI AND GUPTA 1965.

[51] For example, Kalhaṇa ahistorically mentions a *jātakarma* for Gonanda II's son, soon after the beginning of Kaliyuga (1.759).

[52] The custom still continues, as I witnessed in 1979. I also still saw meat used in

consumption. Kṣemendra (circa 1000-1070) describes, in his caricature work *Deśopadeśa*, how a Bengalī student, "a black skeleton monkeying about," is gradually enticed to eat meat and then becomes so fat that he takes away all too much room in front of his teacher to the detriment of his fellow students.

Wine, however, is not drunk by Brahmins, which is surprising in view of its frequent mentioning in the RT and in *Nīlamata*. It is to be consumed, according to *Nīlamata*, "by those who are wine drinkers" on the day of the first snow fall, while it remains unclear how far Brahmins were wine drinkers (*Kuṭṭanīmata* 14; contrast 395, 392, 351). Kṣemendra's *Deśopadeśa* describes, in a humorous way, the excesses of a Śaiva teacher (*śaivaguru*), who regularly gets drunk at nightly Tantric *kaula* sessions.[53] But this refers to the ritual consumption of alcohol.

The Kashmiris of this early period regarded leaving their country as polluting, and necessitating *prāyaścitta*s; they were actually carried out until at least the early 20th century when someone returned from outside the Valley.[54]

Tantric ritual makes its appearance already in the early parts of the RT, probably by retrofitting, see for example the *mātṛkacakra* and *devīcakra*, allegedly present right from early times of Kashmiri history.[55] Another Tantric ritual is the *samayācāra* (7.279-280). Kalhaṇa, just as Kṣemendra, and much earlier, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, does not always speak favorably of Tantric adepts.

Kalhaṇa, however, respectfully mentions Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, the expounder of Śiva Sūtras.[56] But he derides the false *guru*s (7.278ff., 7.295ff., 7.523, 7.712); this is echoed by Kṣemendra in his *Narmamālā*, 8.11-13 where he describes, with many *śleṣa*s, the drunken excesses of a Śaiva Tantric (*kaula*), who nevertheless, next morning after a bath, walks innocently as a *bhaṭṭo 'nyabhaṭṭeṣu*.

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*śrāddha*s.

[53]   Kṣemendra's *Narmamālā* 8.13 on *kaula* drinking and other excesses, cf. 3.81, and BALDISSERA 2005, pp. 130ff., with a detailed discussion of the *guru*'s and others' behaviors (esp. pp. 94f., 116f.).

[54]   STEIN 1900, n. ad 4.189. For purification with earth and water see RT 6.69.

[55]   The first ones were founded by the wife of Jalauka(s), the alleged son of Aśoka.

[56]   Cf. NAUDOU 1980, p. 119.

IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION

A typical feature of medieval state policies has been the strategy of inviting Brahmins from other, often very distant areas, so as to create a counterweight against the dominance of local Brahmins.[57] There is a record in the RT of an early invitation to Kashmir of a large number of Gandhāra Brahmins by a Hun king around 515 CE. However, mass immigration is not mentioned under the Kārkoṭas and their successors.

Individual immigration however, continued. This coincided with the stabilization of Hindu rule under the Kārkoṭas and the emergence of Kashmir as a cultural and scholarly center; similar developments are known from other outlying Indian areas. Rather, some new *maṭha*s and *agrahāra*s, mentioned by Kalhaṇa, seem to be meant for the temporary accommodation of foreigners during pilgrimages and periods of study.[58] The "Bengali student" in Kashmir has been well described, as a caricature, by Kṣemendra in his *Deśopadeśa*.[59] The popularity of Kashmir for Hindu studies is also indirectly testified by Albīrūnī when he says that Hindu learning had retreated, in his time and no doubt due to the two dozen incursions of his master, Muhammad of Ghazni, to Benares and Kashmir.

Immigration into Kashmir was usually well remembered by the descendants of the newcomers, and was present also in the general historical awareness of learned Kashmiris. A few better attested examples include the following.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (late 9th century) remembered his Bengali (*gauḍa*) ancestors of several centuries ago. His son Abhinanda(-paṇḍita) gives the lineage in his *Kādambarīkathāsāra*.[60] His ancestor Śakti, six generations before him, had immigrated to Darvābhisāra,

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[57] See WITZEL 1986.

[58] And by foreigners, such as the Malwa king Bhoja, who commissioned a building at Kapaṭeśvara (7.190-193).

[59] Similar color-based racist attitude at RT 4.329, and against "red-faced" Tibetans, 4.168.

[60] Jayanta's father was Śrīcandra, belonging to the Bhāradvājagotra. The complete family line of descent is given by Jayanta's son Abhinanda in his *Kādambarīkathāsāra* 5-13 as: Śakti-Mitra-Śaktisvāmin-Kalyāṇasvāmin-(Kānta)(Śrī-)Candra-Jayanta "Vṛttikāra"; cf. STEIN 1900, 8.1861; BÜHLER 1873, pp. 102-106; further, introduction to the NM edition; NAGARAJAN 1970, p. 204, n. 1; BHATTACHARYA 1978, p. xxxiii; cf. JHA 1995. See now GRAHELI 2015, pp. 3ff.

the hill country south of Kashmir. According to family tradition, Śakti's grandson Śaktisvāmin was minister under the Kārkoṭa king Candrāpīḍa (r. 711-720 CE) while Jayanta wrote his *Āgamaḍambara* under the king Śaṅkaravarman (883-902).

Abhinavagupta's family, too, immigrated from Kanauj[61] under king Muktāpīḍa-Lalitāditya and settled in Paravarapura (Srinagar). He gives his ancestors as: Varāhagupta and Narahiṃhagupta (or Cukhulaka). His mother Vimalalakā and his father died when he was very young. His spiritual lineage and *guruparaṃparā* is given in *Tantrāloka* (37.37-64) and at the end of *Dhvanyāloka*.[62]

Abhinava's student Kṣemendra (circa 990-1070) and his son Somendra give their genealogy as:[63] Narendra-Bhogendra-Sindhu-Prakāśendra-Kṣemendra (brother: Cakrapāla)-Somendra. Kṣemendra's father was rich and a patron of Brahmins. His ancestor Narendra was a minister under king Jayāpīḍa.

Bilhaṇa's family belonged to the Kauśika gotra and had supposedly been brought from Madhyadeśa by the early, legendary king Gopāditya (RT 1.339). He lived in the late 11th/early 12th century, as is known from his stay at the court of Vikramāditya (ruled until 1126 CE; his son from 1126-1138).

Bilhaṇa left Kashmir under king Kalaśa (1063-1089, RT 7.935-937). He gives a detailed description of Khonamuṣa,[64] his home village near the capital of Pravarapura (*Vikramāṅkadevacarita* 18, 70-71)[65] which is described, still by Bühler in 1875, as producing saffron and grapes (72).

Immigration to Kashmir is also known to Albīrūnī[66] (1030 CE); in fact it continued down to the Afghan period (1756-1819, from Panjab) to Sikh times (1819-1846), and to some extent also in the time of the Dogra rulers (1846-1947).

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[61] *Tantrāloka* 37.37-39 and passim to 37.64.

[62] See NAGARAJAN 1970, p. 47; INGALLS 1990, pp. 30ff. and 726; cf. also NAUDOU 1980, p. 120.

[63] See SŪRYAKĀNTA 1954, pp. 6ff. His *Bṛhatkathāmañjarī* was composed in 1039 CE, the *Avadānakalpalatā* in 1052, and the *Aucityavicāracarcā* in 1066.

[64] Modern Khunmoh, 3 miles northwest of Pampar. For other (substrate) names in *-muṣa*, see RT 8.1011, 1133 *Manīmuṣa, Rāmuṣa* 8.2813; see discussion in WITZEL 1999.

[65] See transl. in BANERJI AND GUPTA 1965.

[66] See SACHAU 1910, vol. I, p. 22 and 173: Benares and Kashmir.

Thus, even around 1100 CE, one still remembered (or told legends about) the origin, several hundred years ago, of one's family. Under king Jayadeva (1122-1149) Brahmins from the Indus and Drāviḍa regions were settled (RT 8.244).

Emigration of Kashmiri Brahmins was not rare either at any stage in their history. However, we only have clear indications from the Middle Ages and from more recent times.[67] Exceptionally, we even hear of a reason, when Kalhaṇa reports that the Brahmins were threatened by king Jayāpīḍa (RT 4.631ff.) so that some of them emigrated, also due to his heavy taxation; those who remained behind complained loudly about their fate or committed suicide by fasting to death and by drowning (4.639). They also composed quite involved Sanskrit verses secretly criticizing the king under the mum of grammatical discussion (4.635-637).

At 6.45, a Brahmin says "after wandering about abroad, I have returned to my country on hearing of its good government," that is under Yaśaskara 939-948 CE. At RT 8.2227f., Vijayarāja, a descendent of the famous Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa, "being in great straits, was preparing to go abroad," which clearly shows the economic motive of emigration.

From outside the Valley evidence for Kashmiri emigration comes from the inscriptions at the Tiruvalleśvara temple, South of Madurai in Tamil Nadu, made already under the Pallavas.[68]

This movement was probably connected with the spread of Śaivism and the interrelations of Śaiva centers in the various parts of the subcontinent. It is notable, for example that the ritual handbook of the Śaivas, the *Karmakāṇḍakramāvalī*, is used both in Tamil Nadu and in Kashmir. Its author, Somaśambhu, is believed by some to have been a Kashmirian. The text is also thought to have been imported from South India in the second half of the 12th century. The earliest manuscript of this text, however, comes from Nepal.[69] This is not entirely surprising, for Nepal too has been a strong Śaiva center and its main Śiva shrine, Paśupatinātha, has

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[67] For the last circa 300 years, see SENDER 1988.

[68] SWAMINATHAN 1990; cf. KULKE ET AL. 1982.

[69] See BRUNNER-LACHAUX 1963-1998, vol. IV, p. liii: the earliest dated one (N_4) is dated 1151 CE, written in "Pāla script," however: the NGMCP catalog lists it as written in NS 279 = 1159 CE, Kesar Library no. 539, that is, only shortly after the time of the author; a slightly later one, NS 345, Kesar 370. See http://catalogue.ngmcp.uni-ham burg.de/.

been in existence since Licchavi times (circa 300-750 CE). Indeed, we find a Śaivaguru "*kāśmiradeśād āgataḥ*" in the colophon of a manuscript from Nepal dated 1184 CE.[70] In addition, Raniero Gnoli and then Alexis Sanderson have discovered quite a number of Kashmirian Śaiva texts in the Nepal Archives which were believed lost in Kashmir.[71]

Occasionally, we actually hear of a Kashmiri emigrant who had found success outside his homeland. A well known case it that of the poet Bilhaṇa, who lived around 1100 CE. He had travelled widely in Northern and Western India before finding a position with Vikramāditya, the Cālukya ruler of Kalyāṇa (died 1126 CE). A later successful emigrant who gained a high position at a foreign court was Soṭhala, the son of Bhāskara. He was the chief of the royal chancellary (*śrīkaraṇādhipā*) under the kings Jaitrapāla and Bhīllana of the Yādava dynasty at Devagiri (Daulatabad), at circa 1200 CE.

CONTACTS WITH THE REST OF INDIA AND STREAMS OF TRADITION

Other evidence for the emigration of Kashmiri Brahmins, or perhaps rather for intensive cultural relations,[72] can be seen in the several links established by exchanges of manuscripts. One stream of traditions seems to connect Kashmir and Gujarat, and then further down on the coast, even up to Kerala.

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[70] See REGMI 1955-1956, vol. I, p. 192; cf. WITZEL 1976.

[71] The relationship with South India was kept up even under the Vijayanagara kings: an inscription made by one of the Vijayanagara generals states that he settled 60 Kashmirian Brahmins in his territory. Under the Sultans and under the Afghan occupation of Kashmir (1752-1812), large groups of Brahmins left the country for good and settled in towns all over Northern India, from Lahore to Lucknow and Benares.

[72] Other sources for close cultural contacts with countries South of Kashmir include the reference (as mentioned) to a building donated by the Malwa king Bhoja at the sacred Pāpasūdana spring of Kapaṭeśvara (7.190-193). He also employed Padmarāja, a betel merchant, to regularly send him the water of this spring to his residence at Dhāra in Malwa (ibid.). This took place early in the 11ᵗʰ century. Earlier, as Kalhaṇa specifies, Kayya, the king of Lāṭa (S. Gujarat, 4.209), built the Viṣṇu Shrine of Kayyasvāmin (under Lalitāpīḍa, 783-795/808-817 CE). Under Nandigupta (972-973) a *maṭha* for people from Madhyadeśa, Lāṭa and Saudotra was built.

More than a hundred years ago G. Bühler[73] has already pointed out the use in Gujarati manuscripts of a verse written by an otherwise little known Kashmiri poet, Amṛtadatta, who lived under one of the early Muslim kings, Śāhāb ud-Dīn (1354-1373 CE).[74]

There also is the much earlier evidence gained from a study of the manuscript traditions of texts[75] such as the *Pāḍatāḍitaka*.[76] This is an early (5th century) classical Sanskrit text by the Kashmiri poet Śyāmilaka that is available in manuscripts in Malayalam script. However, as de Vreese has shown, the mistakes in the Malayalam manuscripts go back to misreadings of Śāradā script[77] (directly, or via Gujarat?).

As mentioned, South Indian Taittirīya Brahmins appear in Kashmir (and in Nepal)[78] around 700 CE, which is another indication of early relations between the extreme South and the Himalayas (see above). This has continued until today: the priests of the Paśupatināth temple in Kathmandu used to come from Kerala but were exchanged by Bhaṭṭas from Gokarṇa a few hundred years ago.[79]

Further evidence comes from Nepal,[80] where a Sanskrit version of the famous, lost *Bṛhatkathā* in Paiśācī, otherwise known in various versions from Kashmir,[81] has been written: Budhasvāmin's *Bṛhatkathāślokasaṃgraha*.

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[73]   See KNAUER 1897, pp. ixf.

[74]   There is, however, some uncertainty on the date of Amṛtadatta. He could have lived before 1178.

[75]   See MEYER 1903; a Newari manuscript is dated NS 292 = 1172 CE. Cf. also the *Caurapañcāśikā* by Bilhaṇa, see SOLF 1886; cf. MISRA 1976, p. 115.

[76]   Ed. and transl. in SCHOKKER 1966-1976.

[77]   See DE VREESE 1971 on such misreadings. Such cases are not isolated. See the fate of the manuscripts in KUIPER 1987: Gujarati Nāgarī → Grantha → Devanāgari; cf. also WITZEL 2014a, 2014b.

[78]   See WITZEL 1980.

[79]   See MICHAELS 1994, and WITZEL 1976.

[80]   For the following section see details in WITZEL 1996.

[81]   Such as Kṣemendra's *Bṛhatkathāmañjari* (1037 CE) written while having access to the original in Paiśācī; further in retellings such as the *Pañcatantra*, *Hitopadeśa*, cf. also the *Tantrākhyāyikā, Kathāsaritsāgara* and now Salman Rushdie's *Haroon's Tales*. For the history of these texts see now NELSON 1978; TSUCHIDA 2002.

Again, in Nepal many important Kashmiri Śaiva texts have been discovered, and we also find such early copies of Kashmiri texts such as the *Somaśambhu Paddhati*[82] (late 11th century) and Dāmodaragupta's *Kuṭṭanīmata* (NS 292 = 1172 CE)[83] or the *Śāradā* manuscript of the *Kubjikāmata Tantra*;[84] Others include an early manuscript of the north Indian *Kṛtyakalpataru* with Śāradā annotations.[85] A Śāradā manuscript exists of an early version of the *Ādi Purāṇa* that is different from the *Brahma Purāṇa*.[86] The text is closely linked to the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* (of Kashmir) and to the *Kṛtyakalpataru* (of 12th century, Kanauj): it contains a description of a *pūjā* only found in Kashmir, and it mentions wine drinking on the first day of snow, both highly unusual for a writer at Kanauj.

Another case which I can only report from hearsay concerns a manuscript written on birch bark that was kept at the National Archives office in the Singha Durbar Palace of Kathmandu but was burnt in the summer of 1973 in the great Darbar fire, a day before I could see it.[87] Finally, consider the manuscripts of the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, which is very well informed about 9th-century Nepali and Bengali dynasties but was found in Kerala in an old manuscript.[88]

Such "streams of tradition," frequently linking distant areas of the subcontinent, have been little studied so far but deserve much more attention in order to establish important traits of the cultural history of India.[89]

SCHOLARS

Under the Kārkoṭa and Utpala dynasties Kashmir saw a remarkable flowering of scholarship, which in part was due to the political stabilization, even an unprecedented expansion into north India under the kings Lalitāditya-Muktāpīḍa and Jayāpīḍa, and obviously

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[82]   BRUNNER-LACHAUX 1963-1998.

[83]   MEYER 1903, see n. 76.

[84]   VAN KOOIJ 1985, pp. 881ff.

[85]   Discussion in WITZEL 1996.

[86]   See IKARI ED. 1994.

[87]   See description in WITZEL 1996.

[88]   Also, a Pāli manuscript in Gupta characters (National Archives, Kathmandu), edited by Oskar von Hinüber. See VON HINÜBER 1991, p. 48.

[89]   See WITZEL 2014a, 2014b.

the resources poured into cultural undertakings by the two dynasties.

The *Kuṭṭanīmata* (circa 779-813 CE) says that that one traveled for the sake of study,[90] and that both Pāṭaliputra and Kashmir were centers of learning,[91] while Benares was less so. However Albīrūnī, just two hundred years later (1030 CE), attests, instead, the prominence of Benares and Kashmir. In his time, "Hindu sciences have retired from those parts of the country conquered by us [the Muslims] and have fled to places which our hand cannot yet reach, to Kashmir, Benares and other places" (*India* I. 22).

Among the early scholars etc. mentioned by Kalhaṇa we find these poets and scholars:[92]

- 1.176: Candrācārya and others brought the *Mahābhāṣya* to Kashmir;[93]

- 1.177: Nagārjuna who already had become a "Bodhisattva" by the time of Kalhaṇa;

- 2.16: Kavi Candaka who composed a play;

- 4.144: Vākpatirāja, poet of Yaśovarman, Bhavabhūti, and other poets;

- 4.245: Muktāpīḍa brought wise men form various countries;

- 4.210: Buddhist scholar Sarvajñamitra (NAUDOU 1980, p. 73).

Jayāpīḍa:

- 4.488f.: restored study of *Mahābhāṣya*; grammarian Kṣīra;

- 4.493: brought scholars from various lands;

- 4.495: Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa, as *sabhāpati* (cf. 8.2227-2228);

- 4.496: Dāmodaragupta, author of *Kuṭṭanīmata*;

- 4.497: poets Manoratha, Śaṅkhadanta, Caṭaka, Saṃdhimat.

Ajitāpīḍa:

- 4.705: poet Śaṅkuka, his poem: *Bhuvanābhyudaya*.

Avantivarman:

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[90] See SHASTRI 1975, pp. 172ff.

[91] See SHASTRI 1975, p. 172.

[92] Cf. also STEIN 1900, p. 11.

[93] Could this not just refer to the famous grammarian Candra, author of the *Candravyākaraṇa*? See also NAUDOU 1980, p. 48. On the reimport of the *Mahābhāṣya* see now the curious paper by AKLUJKAR 2008. Cf. BRONKHORST 2016.

- 5.28-29: Rāmaṭa, a grammarian, reciter at temple;
- 5.32f.: Śūra, minister of Avantivarman, furthered learning;
- 5.34: Muktākaṇa, Śivasvāmin, Ānandavardhana (author of *Dhvanyāloka*, cf. 8.1832), Ratnākara (author of *Haravijaya*);
- 5.66 Bhaṭṭa Kallata.

Śaṅkaravarman:

- 5.179: Nāyaka, learned in four Vedas (later reported a Alaṃkāra author?);
- 5.204: Bhallaṭa, Lavaṭa (poets).

Kalaśa:

- 7.258: reference to king Bhoja (of Dhāra) and contemporaneous poets.

Harṣa:

- 7.935: Bilhaṇa left under king Kalaśa, *vidyāpati* of king Parmāḍi of Karṇāṭa;
- 8. 2376ff., 2387ff.: under king Jayasiṃha (1128-1149), scholars and various Brahmins were supported.

From Bilhaṇa's description (*Vikramāṅkadevacarita*, canto 18)[94] of the capital of Kashmir, Pravarapura, and the surrounding villages we hear that Kashmir indeed was a center of learning: "In every house Sanskrit and Prakrit words sound charming like the mother tongue even of women" (6); "the unparalleled glory of the educational institution is cause for fame" (21); there is praise of theater performances (29). Kashmir is the home of Brahmins "of high scintillating spirit" (3). They live (e.g.) at Kāṣṭhāla which is "resonant with the exposition of the Śāstras" (25). One of Bilhaṇa's ancestors built "houses for the exposition (of Śāstras)." Another one, Jyeṣṭhakalaśa, wrote "a commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* applauded by all" and consequently his estate "was always adorned by pupils" (79) (transl. BANERJI AND GUPTA 1965).

Bilhaṇa describes himself, not without pride, as one "in whose mouth lived the goddess of speech with the tinkle of her anklets inaudible ever since his *upanayana*" (81). He studied the Vedas, and the Aṅga, grammar, in the tradition of Patañjali (82). His eldest brother Iṣṭarāma and his younger brother Ānanda are described as poets, too (84-85). In vv. 86ff. Bilhaṇa describes his travels to Ma-

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94   For an edition, translation and discussion see n. 70, and BRONNER 2010.

thurā, Kānyakubja, Vārāṇasi, Ḍāhala (where he defeated the poet Gaṅgādhara), to Dhāra (unfortunately, he laments, after the death of king Bhoja), and to Somanātha (he did not like Gujarat), after which he "slowly proceeded in the southern direction" to king Vikramāṅka's court.

Maṅkha[95] (circa 1100-1150 CE), in his *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita*,[96] gives a detailed description of a *Sabhā* in the house of his brother Alaṃkāra (v. 15) that was assembled to discuss his work; it was attended by 33 local scholars, including poets and scholars such as grammarians, poeticians, philosophers, as well as two foreign ambassadors, etc. (25.25ff.). The list includes: Nandana, a Brahmavādin (vs. 25), Ruyya(ka), Maṅkha's guru (30, 135), Ramyadeva, a Vaidika and Vedāntin (31-33), Loṣṭadeva, a multilingual poet (36), Laṅkaka/Alaṃkāra, minister of king Jayasiṃha, Patañjali scholar and poet (36-47), Śrīgarbha, a poet and Mīmāṃsaka (48-50) Maṇḍana, descendant of Śrīgarbha, and friend of Maṅkha, learned in all 14 śāstras (51-53), Śrīkaṇṭha, brother of Śrīgarbha (54), Garga, a poet (55-60), Laṅkaka (59), Devadhara (57-59, 62), Alaṃkāra, minister of king Jayasiṃha of Kashmir (60-61), Devadhara (62), Nāga, a grammarian and specialist in alaṃkāraśāstra (62-64), Tutātita, a learned poet (65-60), Trailokya, a Mīmāṃsaka and Tārkika (66), Dāmodara, an official (67-68), Ṣaṣṭha, a learned scholar (69-70), Jinduka, a Mīmāṃsaka (71-72), Jalhaṇa, a poet, minister of the neighboring Rājapurī kingdom (73-75), Govinda, a poet-historian (76-77), Alakadatta, teacher of Kalyāṇa (= Kalhaṇa, author of the RT) (78-80), the poets Bhuḍḍa and Śrīvatsa (81-82), Ānanda, a Tārkika (Naiyāyika) (83-84), Padmarāja, a poet (86), Gunna, a Mīmāṃsaka (87-88), Lakṣmīdeva, a Vaidika (trivedin: pāṭhabodhi), Sāmavedin and Vedāntin (89-91), Janakarāja, a grammarian and Vaidika (92-93), Prakaṭa, a Śaiva philosopher (95), Ānandavardhana, son of the poet Śambhu, a medical doctor (vaidya) (96-97), Suhala, ambassador of king Govindacandra of Kānyakubja (100-102), Jogarāja, a teacher of poetry (106-107), Tejakaṇṭha, ambassador of king Aparāditya of Koṅkaṇa (110-111), Vāgīśvara, a poet (127), Paṭu, a learned poet (129-131), and Maṅkhaka himself (140).[97]

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[95] See *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita*, cf. MANDAL 1991 and ZACHARIAE 1897.

[96] Details about his family are given at 3.63ff. See now SLAJE 2015, pp. 13ff.

[97] Cf. NAGARAJAN 1970, pp. 242f., based on BÜHLER 1877.

HIGH POSITIONS

Leaving aside scholars, such as those mentioned earlier, a few paragraphs can be added about the social status of medieval Brahmins and their livelihood.

It is Kalhaṇa who provides many more, tenable materials since he is, unlike Dāmodaragupta in his *Kuṭṭanīmata*, interested in recording historical events.

Some of the Brahmins received high positions in government: Mitraśarman was the chief minister (*sarvādhikāra*) of Lalitāditya, and Devaśarman, his grandson, that of Jayāpīḍa, while Bhaṭṭa Phālguṇa was the chief minister of the powerful queen Diddā (who ran Kashmir for 50 years circa 950-1003), first for her infant son, and finally in her own name).[98] Others were chief justices: *rāja-sthāna*(*-adhikāra*); see also the list of participants in Maṅkha's Sabhā (above).

We do not hear about Buddhist officials in these records, but even the early Muslim king Zain ul Abidin (1420-1470) still had a Buddhist minister, Tilakācārya, (*Rājataraṅgiṇī* of Jonarāja, who died 1459, vv. 823ff.). This is the last time we hear about a (prominent) Buddhist in Kashmir in Brahmin writing.[99]

Brahmins also served in the military: Bujaṅga, son of a Brahmin Samānta, was a commander in Saṅgrāmarāja's army. Ajaka, a brahmin minister of king Salhaṇa, died in a battle, as well as the Brahmin soldiers Lavarāja and Yāśorāja (RT 8.1345). Other Brahmin soldiers, some killed in battles, occur at RT 8.1013, 1173 (killed by impaling!), 1868 (n.), 3018, cf. 8.2060. Campaka, Kalhaṇa's father, was a commander of forts under king Harṣa (RT 7.1177). Kalhaṇa says that it was only in such peaceful times as that of Yaśaskara that Brahmins laid down their arms.

SOCIAL POSITION OF BRAHMINS

Normally – as everywhere in India – Brahmins were not to be killed, as Jonarāja's *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (vv. 99ff.) tells referring to an incident in king Saṅgrāma's time (1236-1252): the sons of one Kalhaṇa where were thus spared by Saṅgrāma but as they later murdered

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[98] Even the official coins have the inscription *di-kṣe* (cf. RT 6.177)*,* referring to queen Diddā and her first husband Kṣemagupta (RT 6.177ff.).

[99] See now SLAJE 2006-2007. See however Śrīvara's RT 1.5.41, 1.5.62.

the king, they were nevertheless executed by Saṅgrāma's son, king Rāmadeva (1252-1286); Brahmins were killed (RT 8.2060), and Brahmin soldiers regularly died in battle (see above).

Some of the Brahmins function as royal priests, for example, ahistorically (by retrofitting)[100] at the *jātakarma* and coronation and of the legendary king Gonanda II (RT 1.75). They provide the water for inauguration (5.463), the *abhiṣeka* of Varṇaṭa, the successor of Yaśaskara (6.90-91); or, the local Brahmins of Hiraṇya-pura assembled and quickly consecrated Uccala as king (7.1385). *Purohita*s with great endowments nevertheless were at the mercy of the landholding gentry, the Ḍāmaras.[101]

Other high government offices held by Brahmins include: Keśava, a Brahmin from Trigarta (Jammu) became a minister under king Ananta (1028-1063 CE, RT 7.204).

However, the relationship between Brahmins and the king has always been ambiguous. As mentioned, the Brahmins take action when they feel threatened or disturbed by royal politics: thus, the *pāriṣādya* and *purohita*s try to destroy Tuṅga by a fast (7.13ff.) and they often resort to fasts (*prayogopaveśana*).[102] At 6.85 the king bestows the royal insignia on a Brahmin (to keep their purity).

Land holding Brahmins and temple priests were organized in *parṣad*s,[103] they and other *pāriṣadya*s of temples met, with music, in the *Gokula* for 5-6 days to elect the new king in 939 CE, after the end of the Utpala dynasty. This continued in Kalhaṇa's time,[104] and *parṣad*s actualy existed even in Stein's time;[105] such priests are called *thānapati*.[106]

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[100] Kalhaṇa merely fills in cultural details from his own period for a legendary king of the prehistorical period.

[101] STEIN 1900, vol. I, Introduction, p. 19.

[102] STEIN 1900 (vol. I, p. 19): "Kalhaṇa does not hide his contempt for this priestly class whose ignorance was equal to its arrogance, and bitterly condemns their baneful interference in affairs of state. In the humorous descriptions he gives of several great Purohita assemblies he freely ridicules their combined self-assertion and cowardice and shows scant respect for their sacred character (compare regarding Purohitas and their 'Prāyas' 5.465ff., 7.13ff., 8.901ff., 939ff.). [...] Various references show that whatever respect traditional notions demanded for the 'gods on earth' in abstracto, Kalhaṇa was not prepared to extend it to their claims as a political 'factor.'"

[103] RT 5.171, 5.461-477.

[104] See RT 8.900 on the Gokula and a *parṣad*.

[105] STEIN 1900, vol. I, p. 67, n. ad 2.132, for example at Śārikā Devī on Hari

But in spite of the power of their assemblies and that which some Brahmins held individually, the opposite happens under a strong king. Brahmins were suppressed, for example, under king Tarāpīḍa (4.122) and subsequently killed him by magic. They are again threatened by Jayāpīḍa (4.631ff.) so that some emigrate; and again by Śaṅkaravarman (889-902 CE) who resumed villages belonging to temples, however, not without compensation (*pratikara*); he also reduced the *parṣad*'s allowances (5.170-171) and took over the direct management of the respective villages.

At the village level, the official (*sakandaka*) frequently was a Brahmin. However, the *sakandaka* was always appointed next to the *grāmakāyastha*, the official scribe. The *kāyastha*s suppressed the local population and have aptly been described by Kṣemendra in his *Deśopadeśa* as virtual devils with ink-pots. (cf. RT 5.175-181, 8.87-91).

Bilhaṇa mentions several of the Brahmins' land grants, e.g., at the confluence of the holy rivers, Vitastā and Sindhu,[107] there were landgrants made by Haladhara, a minister of king Ananta, (*Vikramāṅkadevacarita*, canto 18, v. 19; cf. RT 7.214); at Candrasīma, next to the temple built by king Saṃgrāmarāja on the banks of the Jhelum, there were land grants made by king Ananta (v. 24). Others were made at Vijayakṣetra (v. 39), a place already mentioned, for an earlier period, by Kalhaṇa. Anantadeva's wife Subhaṭā "proclaimed the free acceptance of land by Brāhmaṇas" (v. 45).

Bilhaṇa also mentions a foundation made by Brahmins themselves, namely his ancestor Muktikalaśa, who is described as "munificent and powerful" (77) and as having built "houses for the exposition (of Śāstras)."

Another possibility for Brahmins to gain income was to carry out rituals. According to Jonarāja's *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, king Siṃhadeva (1286-1301) performed an elaborate bathing ceremony of Vijayeśvara with the enormous expense of one lakh of gold *niṣka*s, under the guidance of the king's preceptor Śaṅkarasvāmin (v. 133), who then received the equally enormous income of 18 *maṭha*s from the king.

(recte: Hörī] Parvata.

[106] In detail Stein 1900 ad 2.182: cf. also on the corporations (*parṣad*) at pilgrimages places and their role in Kashmiri politics, and on *pāriṣadya*s, 5.171; 2.132.

[107] This is a river in the Kashmir Valley, not the Indus river.

King Uccala (1101-1111) gave away thousands of cows, horses, gold, and other gifts to Brahmins who officiated at *śrāddha*s and at propitiatory rites in connection with bad omens, eclipse, comets, etc. (RT 8.76).

Kalhaṇa also mentions "learned *purohita*s" under king Yaśaskara and an astrologer, Rāmaṭa, working as a reciter (*vyākhyātṛ* 5.28-29) at a temple, who is also reported to be a grammarian (!). They could even gain income, as some still did in the early 1990s, from selling *pūjā* articles at temples (5.168).

Under king Jayasiṃha (1128-1149) various Brahmins were supported for their rituals and solemn sacrifices (RT 8. 2376ff., 2387ff.).

ESTEEM

In general, Kalhaṇa holds high regard for his fellow Brahmins, as Stein underlines; Kalhaṇa praises (4.631ff.) their courage against the king; similarly, at 5.16f. a brahmin addresses the king unceremoniously; at 5.48ff. the Brahmins show their need for money or land by some very meager offering they make to the gods; at 6.2ff. the Brahmins who had elected Yaśaskara are kept away from him immediately after his taking office.

His reign is described as ideal, with the following interesting details (6.9-13): Brahmins did not carry arms and only studied; Brahmin *guru*s did not drink spirits while chanting; ascetics did not get children, wives and crops; ignorant *guru*s did not perform the *matsyāpūpa* sacrifices; and they did not, by texts of their own composition, revise traditional doctrines. Housewives did not figure as divinities at the (Tantric) *gurudīkṣā*; and finally, minister, *purohita*, ambassador, judge and clerk were not without learning.

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In sum, the major texts used here (RT, *Kuṭṭanīmata*, Albīrūnī's *India*, Bilhaṇa's *Vikramāṅkadevacarita*, Maṅkha's *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* etc.) provide a mass of details on medieval Kashmiri Brahmins. The amount of information could still be substantially enlarged by using overlooked or stray references in other texts.[108]

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[108] Much legendary information is contained in books such as WALI AND WALI 1916; KAUL 1924; KILAM 1955; SENDER 1988; cf. also MADAN 1965.

As the many references to individual authors mentioned in this paper indicate it would be a useful collaborative undertaking to produce a prosopography for Kashmiri authors, their works, and their contemporaries.[109]

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[109] Preferably in a WIKI-like website. I have drawn up a skeleton list, which I could share on request. (witzel@fas.harvard.edu).

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Transmission of the
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
and *Prasannapadā*
to Tibet from Kashmir

CHIZUKO YOSHIMIZU

INTRODUCTION

From the end of the tenth century up to the twelfth century, Tibetans revived Buddhist traditions that had deteriorated after the collapse of the ancient dynasty in Central Tibet by reintroducing scriptures, teachings, and monastic rules from their neighboring areas such as Northeast India, where the great Buddhist monasteries Nālandā and Vikramaśīla were located, Nepal, Kashmir, East Tibet, and Central Asia. Kashmir in particular was the favorite destination of Tibetan Buddhists. A considerable number of Buddhist exoteric as well as esoteric texts were introduced to Tibet from Kashmir by Tibetan translators and their Indian collaborators during this period called the "later diffusion" (*phyi dar*). The main sources of information about their translation activities before 2006 were later Tibetan historical literature and the colophons attached to Tibetan translations of canonical texts (*bka' 'gyur, bstan 'gyur*). Jean Naudou's illuminating book, *Les bouddhistes kaśmīriens au Moyen Âge* (Paris 1968),[1] was the most significant study based on these reference sources. He described the development of Buddhism in Kashmir and its impact on Tibetan Buddhism from the seventh to the fourteenth century. In particular, Tibetan history books such as the history of Buddhism (*Bu ston chos 'byung*) by Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364) from the fourteenth century, and 'Gos gZhon nu dpal's (1392-1481) "Blue Annals" (*Deb ther sngon po*) from the fifteenth century have contributed a great deal to the knowledge of the later diffusion. They were, however, not composed by a person directly involved in translation projects of

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[1] The English version, *Buddhists of Kaśmīr*, was published in 1980.

that period. A Buddhist history of old tradition (*rNying ma'i chos 'byung*) from the twelfth century provides only brief sketches of the early Tibetan translators and their translations.[2] Information in translation colophons of canonical texts was mostly added by later revisers of the translations or editors of each single version of canons.

Since the publication of newly discovered manuscripts from the tenth to thirteenth century begun in 2006 in China, a large number of textual witnesses that were once presumed to be lost have become available.[3] Today, voices of the time are made heard. Consulting some of these new materials, the present paper will examine how the most fundamental Madhyamaka treatises, i.e., Nāgārjuna's (second c.) *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (henceforth MMK) and Candrakīrti's (seventh c.) commentary on it named *Prasannapadā* (henceforth PsP), were studied, translated, and transmitted from Kashmir to Tibet or from teacher to student.

Nāgārjuna's masterpiece, the MMK, was translated into Tibetan from Sanskrit by the first quarter of the ninth century at the command of a Tibetan ruler. The translators were the Tibetan *lo tsā ba* Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan and the Indian *paṇḍita* Jñānagarbha.[4] Towards the end of the eleventh century, this translation was revised by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055?-1145?)[5] and his Indian collaborator Mahāsumati in Kashmir before it was further revised by Pa

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[2] This text was published in faximile edition in Meisezahl 1985. The author is Nyang ral Nyi ma 'od zer who lived either in 1124-1192 or 1136-1204 (see Meisezahl 1985, p. 9).

[3] *bKa' gdams gsung 'bum*, vols. I-XXX (2006), vols. XXXI-LX (2007) and vols. LXI-XC (2009). *Bod kyi lo rgyus*, vols. I-XXX (2010), vols. XXXI-LX (2011).

[4] This translator Jñānagarbha is supposed to have translated Śāntarakṣita's *Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā* together with Ye shes sde. Therefore, as D. Seyfort Ruegg has pointed out (Seyfort Ruegg 1981, p. 69, n. 224), it is unlikely that he is the same Jñānagarbha as the author of the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* and its autocommentary (*vṛtti*).

[5] Regarding his dates, see van der Kuijp 1985, p. 4, Vose 2009, p. 190, n. 20, Yoshimizu and Nemoto 2013, p. viii, n. 15 and p. xii, n. 30. 1055 was given for his birth date by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson 'grus (1648-1721) in his *bsTan rtsis re mig tu bkod pa* 2a, which was composed in 1716, and Sum pa mkhan po (1704-1788) in his *dPag bsam ljon bzang*, part III, p. 9, l. 2. Because it coincides with Atiśa's possible reincarnation (i.e., Atiśa died in 1054), van der Kuijp has cast doubt on it. His birth could be later than 1055.

tshab and Kanakavarman in lHa sa in the first half of the twelfth century. Pa tshab made these revisions of Klu'i rgyal mtshan's earlier translation in accordance with the *kārikā*s cited in the PsP.[6] Pa tshab also translated the PsP with Mahāsumati in Kashmir and revised it with Kanakavarman in lHa sa.[7] Several Tibetan history books have reported that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags resided in Kashmir for 23 years,[8] presumably from 1077 to 1100.[9] He was a contemporary of another well-known Tibetan translator who stayed in Kashmir from 1076 to ca. 1092, rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109?). Ngog is also considered to have stayed in the same place as Pa tshab,[10] although there is no evidence that the two Tibetan translators knew each other.

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[6] MMK D19a3-6, P22a7-22b: *dbang phyug dam pa'i mnga' bdag rgyal po chen po dpal lha btsan po'i bka' lung gis │ rgya gar gyi mkhan po chen po dbu ma pa │ dznyā na garbha dang │ zhu chen gyi lo tstshā ba dge slong cog ro klu'i rgyal mtshan gyis bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa │ 'di la rab tu byed pa nyi shu rtsa bdun │ shlauka bzhi brgya bzhi bcu rtsa dgu yod │ bam po ni phyed dang gnyis su byas so ‖ slad kyis kha che'i grong khyer dpe med kyi dbung │ gtsug lag khang rin chen sbas pa'i dbus su │ kha che'i mkhan po ha su ma ti dang │ bod kyi sgra bsgyur gyi lo tstshā ba pa tshab nyi ma grags kyis mi'i bdag po 'phags pa lha'i sku ring la 'grel pa tshig gsal ba dang bstun nas bcos so ‖ ‖*slad kyis ra sa 'phrul snang gi gtsug lag khang du │ rgya gar gyi mkhan po ka na ka dang │ lo tstsha ba de nyid kyis hu chen bgyis pa'o ‖. *P omits the last sentence (*...*).

[7] PsP D200a5ff., P225b4ff. (cited and translated in LANG 1990, p. 134, SEYFORT RUEGG 2000, p. 45, and YOSHIMIZU 2005, p. 132, n. 19): *kha che'i grong khyer dpe med kyi dbus ‖ rin chen sbas pa'i gtsug lag khang gi 'dabs su ‖ rgya gar gyi mkhan po rtog ge ba chen po ‖ ma hā su ma ti'i zhal snga nas dang │ bod kyi lo tsā ba pa tshab nyi ma grags kyis kha che'i dpe dang mthun pa ltar bsgyur ‖ phyis ra sa ra mo che'i gtsug lag khang du kha che'i mkhan po ka na ka bar ma* (P: *ka na ka va rba*) *dang │ bod kyi lo tsā ba de nyid kyis nyi 'og shar phyogs kyi dpe dang gtugs shing legs par bcos te gtan la phab pa'o ‖.*

[8] See *rNying ma'i chos 'byung* (MEISEZAHL 1985, Text 512a3f., Tafel 343.1), *Bu ston chos 'byung* 138b3 and *Deb ther sngon po*, *cha* 7b4 (BA 342).

[9] LANG 1990 (p. 134) has inferred that he returned to Tibet by 1101, for the colophons of translations on which Pa tshab worked indicate that they were done during the reign of the Kashmiri King Harṣa (1089-1101). Cf. n. 13 below.

[10] rNgog translated or revised numerous texts in *grong khyer dpe med* (*Anupamapura*), Kashmir, where Pa tshab also worked, including the *Ratnagotravibhāga, Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā, Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra, Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, Anyāpohaprakaraṇa,* and *Anyāpohasiddhi* (see KRAMER 2007, pp. 61-67).

Neither Pa tshab nor his disciple left a biographical account of his activities in Kashmir.[11] Among newly discovered manuscripts, however, were three exegetical works attributed to Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, which are included in the eleventh volume of the *bKa' gdams gsung 'bum*: 1) "Commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Prajñā-nā-ma-Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* [entitled] the lamp that reveals the treatise" (*dBu ma rtsa ba'i shes rab kyi ti ka bstan bcos sgron ma gsal bar byed pa* 1a-52b); 2) "Pa tshab's instruction on the relation between the chapters" [of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*] (*Le 'brel pa tshab kyi man ngag* 53a-54b); and 3) "explanation of difficult points in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*" (*Tshig gsal ba'i dka' ba bshad pa* 55a-88a). The first and last one are to be regarded as the first commentarial works on the MMK and PsP respectively written in the Tibetan language.[12] They primarily provide explanations of the root texts, but they also contain some information about the transmission of the MMK and PsP, as will be seen below. The present paper is my first study of these three texts by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags. Because I focus on the historical background of his compositions, I will not deal with the content of his philosophical discussion.

1. TRANSMISSION OF THE MMK
AND PSP TO PA TSHAB NYI MA GRAGS
FROM KASHMIRI PAṆḌITAS

It is known from the colophons of the bsTan 'gyur versions of the MMK and PsP that the *paṇḍita-lo tsā ba* team, Mahāsumati-Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, worked on the revision of the MMK and the translation of the PsP during the reign of King Harṣa (1089-1101)[13]

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[11]   Pa tshab's short biography is included in *Deb ther sngon po, cha* 7b4-8a2 (BA 341f.). rNgog Blo ldan shes rab's biography by Gro lung pa Blo gros 'byung gnas (late eleventh to early twelfth centuries) does not provide much information about his stay in Kashmir. Cf. DRAM DUL 2004 and KRAMER 2007.

[12]   For the outlines of the three texts, see DREYFUS AND TSERING 2010.

[13]   King Harṣa is said to have been enthroned in 1089 and killed in 1101 in the age of forty-two years and eight months (RT 7.828-829, 1717). His name appears in the colophons of the Tibetan MMK cited above and the MA and MABh translated by Pa tshab and Tilakakalaśa (D219a5ff., D348a5ff.) as *'phags pa'i lha* (*Āryadeva). NAUDOU 1968, pp. 168-170, identifies him as Harṣa. The colophon of the Tibetan version of Dharmottara's *Paralokasiddhi* (D249a7f., P267b5f., cf. MEJOR 1991, p. 195), which was translated by Pa tshab and *Bhavyarāja (sKal ldan rgyal po), has recorded a king's name *śrī ha*

at *Rin chen sbas pa'i gtsug lag khang* (*Ratnagupta monastery) in *grong khyer dpe med* (*Anupamapura), which appears to be modern-day Srinagar.[14] 'Gos gZhon nu dpal cites later Tibetans' claims that their Madhyamaka lineage goes back to Indian masters including the Kashmiri Ratnavajra, Parahitabhadra, and Mahāsumati.[15] Although Ratnavajra's involvement in the Madhyamaka tradition is unclear, he is said to have been from a family of scholars with his grandson being the brahmin Sajjana and his great-grandson being the brahmin Sūkṣmajana with whom Pa tshab translated Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* and its *ṭīkā* by Candrakīrti at the *Ratnagupta monastery.[16] Ratnavajra's fame is based on his career in the Vikramaśīla monastery and his mastery of the tantric doctrines and practices.[17] Ratnavajra's student as well as Mahāsumati's teacher Parahitabhadra was known among later Tibetans as a great logician who collaborated with rNgog Blo ldan shes rab in translating, for example of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti.[18] Although Parahitabhadra left a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Śūnyatāsaptati*, there has been no evidence suggesting his further commitments to the transmission of Madhyamaka doctrines.[19] But at present, there is one small hint in Zhang Thang sag pa's commentary on the PsP. Zhang Thang sag pa is supposed to have been a direct disciple of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags.[20] Zhang him-

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ri śa de ba (P) or śrī ha ri sha de (D).

[14] NAUDOU 1968, pp. 168, 185 (1980, pp. 208ff.) has discussed the identification of these places.

[15] *Deb ther sngon po, cha* 8b3f., BA 344 (cited in YOSHIMIZU AND NEMOTO 2013, p. x, n. 24), where 'Gos cites Thang sag seminary's allegation of their lineage.

[16] CŚ D18a6f., P20a8: *kha che'i grong khyer dpe med kyi dbus* (D *dbung*) │ (D omits │) *rin chen sbas pa'i kun dga' ra bar │ rgya gar gyi mkhan po su smma dzā na* (D *su smra dzā na*) *dang │ bod kyi lo tsā ba* (D *lo tstshā ba*) *pa tshab nyi ma grags kyis bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o* ║. Cf. CŚṬ P273b3-6, D239a5f. Cf. also LANG 1990, p. 133, 140, n. 20 and DIETZ 1984, p. 61, 273. Sajjana worked with rNgog Blo ldan shes rab.

[17] See NAUDOU 1968, pp. 139ff.

[18] See KRAMER 2007, pp. 61-67.

[19] Parahitabhadra is also known as the author of the *Sūtrālaṃkārādiślokadvaya-vyākhyāna* (*mDo sde rgyan gyi tshigs su bcad pa dang po gnyis kyi bshad pa*, D4029, P5530), i.e., the commentary on the first two verses of the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra*.

[20] For Zhang Thang sag pa 'Byung gnas ye shes *alias* Ye shes 'byung gnas, see YOSHIMIZU 2005 and YOSHIMIZU AND NEMOTO 2013, Introduction. It is most likely that he learned the PsP directly from his teacher Pa tshab (see YOSHI-

self or a scribe noted in the margin of the manuscript (*dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 21a5) the name Parahita and identifies him as a follower of Bhāviveka (sixth c.).[21] If it was Zhang who inserted this note, Zhang possibly received this information from his teacher Pa tshab Nyi ma grags. Assuming that Parahita truly supported Bhāviveka's Madhyamaka thought, his student Mahāsumati took a different position.

Parahitabhadra's student Mahāsumati is also known as a great logician (**mahātārkika, rtog ge ba chen po*) according to the colophon of the PsP. The colophon of the MMK records his name as Hasumati.[22] This shortened name is often used by later Tibetans, although the way of abbreviation can hardly be explained.[23] Zhang Thang sag pa uses the even shorter version "Ha su," referring to a Kashmiri scholar who could be Hasumati.[24] Neither his own work nor any other translation work that bears his name survived. This scholar, however, played an important role in the transmission of the MMK and PsP: the colophon of Pa tshab's commentary on the MMK (i.e., *dBu ma rtsa ba'i shes rab kyi ti ka*) says: "This is a record of the explanation of *paṇḍita* Hasumati."[25] Although the colophon does not mention who recorded it, one may well assume that the person who received the explanation from Hasumati and wrote it down in the Tibetan language was Hasumati's student Pa tshab Nyi ma grags. Therefore, I have no reason to question his author-

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MIZU forthcoming).

21 *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 21a5 (YOSHIMIZU AND NEMOTO 2013, p. 93, n. 1), where it is spelled *pha ra he ta* and said: *rgol ba 'di ni legs kyi phyogs pa* (a marginal note below the line shows that it is *pha ra he ta*) *zhig gam yang na gud na gnas pa zhig gis rgol ba'o* ‖. The name *pha ra he ta* seems to have been mentioned as a representative of Bhāviveka's party, whom Pa tshab directly or indirectly knew.

22 See n. 6 above.

23 'Gos gZhon nu dpal also recorded his name as Hasumati (*Deb ther sngon po, cha* 8b4, BA 344). In some *gSan yig* literatures, the name Hasumati appears in the lineage of the Madhyamaka tradition (e.g., *gSan yig*s of Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po [see VAN DER KUIJP 1985, appendix]). Cf. also SEYFORT RUEGG 2000, p. 9, n. 10.

24 *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 24a2 (YOSHIMIZU AND NEMOTO 2013, p. 107, l. 3). Cf. also YOSHIMIZU forthcoming.

25 *dBu ma rtsa ba'i shes rab kyi ri ka* 55b22 (132): *dbu' ma rtsa ba'i shes rab kyi ti ga | bstan bcos sgron ma gsal bar byed pa zhes bya ba | pan ḍi ta ha su mati'i bshad lugs bris pa rdzogs sho* ‖.

ship of this work as claimed by a later compiler of manuscripts.[26] This commentary on the MMK does seem to have been composed on the basis of oral instructions of an Indian scholar, because the author frequently uses expressions derived from Sanskrit without translating them into Tibetan.[27] He also often names Indian Madhyamaka masters Buddhapālita and Bhāviveka in Sanskrit, unlike bsTan 'gyur texts and later Tibetan literature, where they are generally named in Tibetan, Sangs rgyas bskyang and Legs ldan 'byed. Moreover, he calls Bhāviveka not "Bhāviveka" but "Bhavyakīrti" or its Tibetan rendering "sKal ldan grags pa." As is well known, the name of this sixth-century Madhyamaka master has been transmitted in various ways: Bhāviveka, Bhāvaviveka, or Bhavya in Sanskrit; sNang bral, sKal ldan, Bhavya snang bral, Legs ldan, or Legs ldan 'byed in Tibetan.[28] However, to my knowledge, "Bhavyakīrti" does not occur anywhere else to refer to this Madhyamaka master.[29] "Bhavyakīrti" is rather known as the author of tantric works such as the commentary on tantric Nāgārjuna's *Pañcakrama*.[30] I tentatively assume that Hasumati identified or confused the name of the tantric "Bhavyakīrti" with the Madhyamaka Bhāviveka, and used it when he was teaching Pa tshab. Pa tshab wrote it down as his teacher said in Sanskrit and rendered it "sKal ldan grags pa"; afterwards, he replaced it with "Legs ldan 'byed" for some reason, because he uses the latter in his later work on the PsP. Whether this change was a result of their reference to the manuscripts of the PsP is unclear, for "Legs ldan 'byed" does not exactly correspond to the Sanskrit Bhāviveka either. "Legs ldan

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[26] The name Pa tshab as the author of this work was most presumably added by a compiler of the manuscripts on the front page. The authorship is discussed in detail by DREYFUS AND TSERING 2010, whose conclusion is that the work was composed by Pa tshab or a person very close to him.

[27] E.g., *buta* (for the Sanskrit *Buddha*; Tibetan *sangs rgyas), bode* (for the Sanskrit *bodhisattva*; Tibetan *byang chub sems dpa'*), and *ede* (for the Sanskrit *ādi*; Tibetan *la sogs pa*). DREYFUS AND TSERING 2010, p. 398, n. 19, have also conjectured that *ede* is used for *la sogs pa*. They have used the archaic spellings of the manuscripts to date them to the twelfth century (ibid., p. 391).

[28] See EJIMA 1990 and SEYFORT RUEGG 1990.

[29] The Manuscripts of the PsP, which EJIMA 1990 and MACDONALD 2015, vol. I, p. 2, n. 4.) have investigated, record his name as either Bhāviveka or Bhāvaviveka.

[30] He is the author of the *Śrī-cakrasaṃvarasya pañjikā sūramanojñā* (P2121), *Pradīpoddyotanābhisaṃdhi-prakāśikā-nāma-vyākhyā-ṭīkā* (P2658) and *Pañcakramapañjikā* (P2696).

'byed" is considered to be a rendering of Bhavyaviveka. "sNang bral" instead matches Bhāviveka.[31]

In this commentary on the MMK, Pa tshab frequently adduces the name Bhavyakīrti, instead of Bhāviveka, in the first chapter as a critic of Buddhapālita as well as Candrakīrti's opponent. This is because Pa tshab discusses at length the Bhāviveka-Candrakīrti conflict in the first chapter, following Candrakīrti's PsP. This fact suggests that Mahāsumati and Pa tshab were commenting on the MMK with reference to Candrakīrti's interpretation. At the very beginning, Pa tshab describes the Indian commentarial tradition on the MMK as follows:

> In this regard, [it is] generally [known that] there are many commentaries on the MMK. Among them, there are four in Tibet (*bod*?). These are the four: first, Buddhapālita composed [a commentary], interpreting this [MMK] as [teaching] *prasaṅga*. Although the *Akutobhayā* is known to have been composed by Nāgārjuna himself, some others (*pa ra*, Skt. *pare*?) say that it is not so. On the basis of Buddhapālita's commentary, Bhavyakīrti composed the *Prajñāpradīpa* and thereby refuted the former's *prasaṅga* and interpreted [the MMK] as [teaching] independent [inference] (*rang rgyud, svatantr[ānumāna]*). Later than the [*Prajñāpradīpa*], Candrakīrti refuted the independent [inference], defended Buddhapālita, and interpreted [the MMK] as [teaching] *prasaṅga*.[32]

Here, Pa tshab clearly distinguishes between the Buddhapālita-Candrakīrti's *prasaṅga* line and Bhāviveka's *svatantra* line with regard to their interpretation of Nāgārjuna's *kārikā*s. For him, the question is whether Nāgārjuna's teachings should be interpreted as entailing a reasoning of either *prasaṅga* or formal inferential proof.[33] Within the Indian Buddhist tradition, Nāgārjuna's MMK

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[31]   The early Tibetan translator Ye shes sde (ninth c.) used both "sNang bral" and "sKal ldan," the latter of which is adopted in *Mahāvyutpatti* 3495 for Bhavya, as indicated in EJIMA 1990, p. 102.

[32]   *dBu ma rtsa ba'i shes rab kyi ti ka* 3b6-9 (38): *de la spyir dbu ma'i rtsa ba la 'grel ba mang po* (3b7) *yod pa las bzhi bod* (?) *la yod de | bu ta bha li tas dang por mdzad de thal 'gyur da* (read *du*) *bkral | rga la 'jigs myed klu grub nyid kyis mdzad par grags na yang pa ra na re men* (3b8) *zer bu ta ba li ta'i gting la bha phya kir tis shes rab sgron ma mdzad pas sngar kyi thal 'gyur sun phyung nas rang rgyud du bkral | de'i phyis zla grags kyis rang rgyud sun phyung* (3b9) *nas bu ta pa li gzhung bskyangs te thal 'gyur du bkal* (read *bkral*) *ba dang bzhi'o ‖.*

[33]   Cf. also *dBu ma rtsa ba'i shes rab kyi ti ka* 6a6ff. (39): *rang bzhin med par bsgrub pa la dngos po yod par smra ba rnams kyis brtsad pa dgod pa dang |*

seems to have been studied with the aid of a specific commentary. If Mahāsumati's teacher Parahitabhadra was, as mentioned above, a follower of Bhāviveka's view, this means that he preferred to understand the MMK resorting to Bhāviveka's commentary, the *Prajñāpradīpa*. In contrast, Mahāsumati and Pa tshab studied and retranslated the MMK relying on Candrakīrti's PsP, which resulted in their revision of the earlier translation of the MMK.

Akira Saito (SAITO 1987, pp. 238f., SAITO 1995, p. 95) has revealed that Jñānagarbha and Klu'i rgyal mtshan translated Nāgārjuna's root text referring to Avalokitavrata's (ca. 650-750) subcommentary on Bhāviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*. They first translated Avalokitavrata's text that includes Nāgārjuna's *kārikā*s and Bhāviveka's interpretation, and then, Nāgārjuna's and Bhāviveka's texts. Finally, this team translated two more commentaries, the *Akutobhayā* and Buddhapālita's commentary. This procedure of their translation work shows the translators' preference to read the MMK based on Bhāviveka-Avalokitavrata's commentaries, presumably because they are more elaborate than the *Akutobhayā* and Buddhapālita's commentary. They supposedly did not use Candrakīrti's PsP. According to Saito, they translated several *kārikā*s following Avalokitavrata's explanation, while the *Akutobhayā* and Buddhapālita give a different explanation. Hence, Mahāsumati and Pa tshab must have found it necessary to revise the translation of *kārikā*s in correspondence with Candrakīrti's interpretation.[34] How seriously they intended to eliminate Bhāviveka's influence from the Tibetan version of the MMK is unclear. But in my view, their retranslation of the MMK based on the PsP brought for Tibetans a shift in authority from Bhāviveka to Candrakīrti for the study of the MMK .

To sum up, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags introduced this new version of the MMK together with his translation of the PsP in Tibet. He also composed a commentary on the MMK based on Candrakīrti's

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brtsad pa de'i lan rang rgyud du smra ba'i dbu ma bas gdab cing (6a7) *rang rgyud kyi 'dod pa brjod pa dang | rang rgyud pa'i bsam pa blangs te zla grags nyid kyis sun dbyung ba dang | klu grub kyi dgongs pa thal 'gyur smra ba'i dbu ma nyid du zla grags rang gi* (6a8) *bdod* (read *'dod*) *pa brjod pa'o ‖*. Referring to this passage, it may be possible to say that Pa tshab made a distinction between the two divisions of the Madhyamaka tradition, i.e., *rang rgyud pa* and *thal 'gyur ba*. They are the two types of Mādhyamikas who interpret Nāgārjuna's intention as teaching independent inference or *prasaṅga* argument.

34   According to SAITO 1987 and 1990, they emended some of them, while retained others unchanged due to their misreading of the PsP or for other reasons.

PsP presumably during or shortly after his stay in Kashmir, in which he embedded his teacher Mahāsumati's explanations. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags thus created a new MMK tradition for Tibetans, which follows the line of Candrakīrti.

2. REWORKING OF THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE MMK AND PsP IN TIBET

Around 1100, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags came back to Tibet. He continued his translation work and revised earlier translations of his own or others with Indian *paṇḍita*s who accompanied him to Central Tibet.[35] Among them, Kanakavarman assisted Pa tshab in revising the translations of the MMK and PsP in lHa sa, at the 'Phrul snang and Ra mo che temples respectively, presumably because they gained the second manuscript of the PsP from the "eastern borderland" (*nyi 'og shar phyogs*).[36] There is textual evidence of the existence of this second manuscript. Pa tshab's *Explanation of difficult points in the PsP* (i.e., *Tshig gsal ba'i dka' ba bshad pa*) includes the following information about two manuscripts of the PsP:

> Because the Kashmiri text (*kha che'i dpe*) lacks the expression "its purpose" (*de'i dgos pa, *tatprayojana*), the answer of this [inquiry of what is the purpose of the purpose of the treatise] is not explicit in the body of the text either. Because the Indian text (*rgya dpe*) has this, an answer to the [inquiry] is also implicitly given.[37]

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[35] For Pa tshab's activities after his return to Central Tibet, see, in addition to *Deb ther sngon po, cha* 7b4-8a2, SEYFORT RUEGG 2000, pp. 45f. and VOSE 2009, p. 50. With Kanakavarman also Pa tshab revised the earlier translations of the MA, MABh, *Ratnāvalī*, and with Muditaśrī he retranslated Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*. For his revision of the MA, cf. further TAUSCHER 1983.

[36] UEBACH 1987 (p. 95, n. 424) has indicated that *nyi 'og* is the term of literature in translation and corresponds to the Sanskrit *aparānta*, which means "am Rand befindlich" in old Tibetan historiography. I follow Seyfort Ruegg's translation "borderland" (SEYFORT RUEGG 2000, p. 45). Pa tshab and Kanakavarman also retranslated the MA and MABh relying on a new Sanskrit manuscript from *nyi 'og shar phyogs* (see the colophon to the MA and MABh, D219a5ff. and D348a5ff.). The geographical location of this *nyi 'og shar phyogs* is, however, uncertain. Cf. MACDONALD 2015, vol. I, p. 16, n. 37.

[37] *Tshig gsal ba'i dka' ba bshad pa* 56b6f. (140): *kha che'i dpe la de'i dgos pa ces bya ba med pas de'i lan yang dkyus las mi gsal la | rgya dpe la yod pas de'i lan yang shugs las 'debs so |.* Cf. also 61b8, where "a certain Kashmiri manuscript" is mentioned: *don kyi ngag zhes pa ni 'phags pa'i ngag ces kha che'i*

Here it is apparent that the author referred to two manuscripts from Kashmir and India. The Tibetan expression *rgya dpe* is often used for "original Sanskrit text" in contrast to "Tibetan text,"[38] but here it could refer to a Sanskrit manuscript from India compared to that from Kashmir (*kha che'i dpe*). Moreover, it is most likely identical with the manuscript from the "eastern borderland" (*nyi 'og shar phyogs*) mentioned above. The "eastern borderland" could be the border area between Tibet and East India or Bengal.[39] Although there is doubt about Pa tshab's authorship of this *Explanation of difficult points* because his name is merely inserted to the colophon in small letters,[40] I consider this work as his own composition. Who else but the translator, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, was in a position to see the two manuscripts and indicate a minor difference between them? It is also evident that Pa tshab composed this work in Tibet after he and Kanakavarman had gained the second Sanskrit manuscript from India.

In the passage cited above, Pa tshab is pointing out a difference between the two manuscripts concerning the Sanskrit sentence, *tasya kāni saṃbandhābhidheyaprayojanāni* (PsP LVP, p. 2, l. 5ff., MACDONALD 2015, vol. I, p. 116), which asks about relation, subject matter, and purpose of the MMK. The Indian manuscript Pa tshab used adds to this compound *tatprayojana* in the sense of the

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dpe kha cig las grags so ‖ yang na don gyi ngag ni ngag gcig la don mang po 'dus pa la bya'o ‖.

38 For instance, it appears in Zhang Thang sag pa's *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 5b1, 10a2, 10a4, 10a5 (YOSHIMIZU AND NEMOTO 2013, pp. 23, 45). It also appears in the colophon of the Tibetan version of the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* translated by rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (see KRAMER 2007, p. 57 and n. 56). For his translation of some Indian texts, rNgog used a manuscript from Magadha called *yul dbus kyi dpe* (KRAMER 2007, pp. 58, 67, nos. 27, 32 and 48).

39 In Tibetan literature, the expression "east" (*shar phyogs*) often intends East India, for instance, the expression "three [from] the East" (*shar gsum*) refers to three teachers or works from East India or Bengal.

40 *Tshig gsal ba'i dka' ba bshad pa* 88a9f. (203) cited below in n. 47. As seen there, this work had wrongly been attributed to Candrakīrti. The compiler or writer of the manuscript may have inserted Pa tshab's name, as DREYFUS AND TSERING 2010, p. 392 have speculated. Cf. also *dBu ma rtsa ba'i shes rab kyi ti ka* 1a (29), where, after the title, "here is the commentary on the Madhyamaka composed by the teacher Candrakīrti" (*slob dpon zla grags pas mdzad pa'i dbu ma'i 'grel pa zhes bya ba bzhugs so*), the compiler of the manuscript noted, "this is not composed by the teacher Candrakīrti but composed by the translator Pa tshab" (*'di slob dpon zla grags kyis mdzad pa min par pa tshab lo tsas mdzad yin 'dug*).

purpose of the purpose (*prayojanasya prayojana*), as some current-
ly available manuscripts attest the reading *saṃbandhābhidheya-
prayojanatatprayojanāni*.[41] In the above passage, Pa tshab seems to
make good use of both manuscripts by interpreting the purpose of
the purpose as not explicit but implicit in the text. Candrakīrti does
not explicitly state the purpose of the purpose, so that the Kashmiri
manuscript does not have it, whereas the Indian manuscript has it
suggesting that Candrakīrti implies it. The second purpose must be
implicit, because the fact is that he explicitly states one purpose
alone, as will be seen below. This is Pa tshab's interpretation of
why one manuscript has *tatprayojana* and another does not have it.
Interestingly, however, Pa tshab implants in his own translation a
different interpretation: what is implicit is the direct purpose of the
treatise, whereas the purpose of the purpose is explicit. Pa tshab's
solution is as follows: "What are relation, subject matter and the
purpose of the purpose of [this treatise]?" ('*brel pa dang brjod bya
dang dgos pa'i dgos pa gang yin*).[42] This Tibetan sentence includes
prayojanaprayojana (i.e., *prayojanasya prayojana*), but, unlike the
Sanskrit *saṃbandhābhidheyaprayojanatatprayojanāni,* it omits the
first *prayojana* as an independent item. Pa tshab's intent here is, in
my reading, that Candrakīrti explicitly states the *prayojanaprayo-
jana* in his text, because Candrakīrti solely speaks of *nirvāṇa* as a
purpose of the treatise (PsP LVP, p. 4, l. 1: *nirvāṇaṃ śāstrasya
prayojanaṃ nirdiṣṭaṃ*), and because *nirvāṇa* is the final purpose of
all other purposes, which must be the purpose of the purpose. The
direct purpose of the treatise is implicit in the text. According to Pa
tshab, it is "the purpose to make others understand [dependent ori-
gination (*pratītyasamutpāda*)]."[43] Pa tshab's student Zhang Thang
sag pa follows his teacher in interpreting the text in a way to say

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[41] See TANJI 1988, p. 91, n. 13 and DE JONG 1978, p. 28, 2.6. As de Jong has indi-
cated, "the purpose of the purpose" probably has been introduced by later
scholars, who were familiar to setting forth the question about the four topics,
saṃbandha, abhidheya, prayojana and *prayojanaprayojana*, not the first three
only. According to MACDONALD 2015, vol. I, p. 116, n. 10, the Potala manu-
script (Ms Q) reads *saṃbandhābhidheyaprayojanaprayojanāni*, while nine of
the paper manuscripts attest *saṃbandhābhidheyaprayojanatatprayojanāni*. Cf.
further ibid., vol. II, p. 10, n. 31.

[42] PsP D2a1f., P2a6f.

[43] *Tshig gsal ba'i dka' ba bshad pa* 56b16 (140): *dgos pa ni gzhan gyis khong du
chud par bya ba'i phir ro* ‖.

that Candrakīrti presents the ultimate purpose rather than the purpose of the words (*sgra'i dgos pa*) of the treatise.[44]

This provides a good example of Pa tshab's emendation of his own earlier translation as a result of comparing the two manuscripts. Supposedly, he had first translated the sentence as having the three elements, i.e., *'brel pa, brjod bya* and *dgos pa* (**sambandhābhidheyaprayojanāni*) in accordance with the Kashmiri manuscript. He later replaced *dgos pa* (*prayojana*) with *dgos pa'i dgos pa* (**prayojanasya prayojana*), having looked at the manuscript from India. This is a well considered translation, for it entails both *prayojana* and *prayojanaprayojana*, and yet suggests that Candrakīrti explicitly states the final purpose alone, that is, *nirvāṇa*.

Pa tshab conducted the retranslation work of the PsP with the aid of Kanakavarman.[45] This scholar was probably engaged in teaching activities with Pa tshab, for Pa tshab's disciple Zhang Thang sag pa seems to have learned the MMK and PsP not only from Pa tshab but also from Kanakavarman. As I have previously discussed, Zhang cites the opinions of a *lo tsā ba* and a *paṇḍita* several times in his commentary on the PsP, who were to be identified as Pa tshab and Kanakavarman respectively.[46]

There is some information about Pa tshab's composition of the *Explanation of difficult points in the PsP*: this composition took place under a *paṇḍita*'s guidance. The colophon of this text says that it was composed on the basis of the instructions of the teacher *tshong dpon paṇḍita*.[47] Who is this enigmatic figure, *bla ma tshong*

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[44] *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 4a3 (YOSHIIMIZU AND NEMOTO 2013, p. 17): *dgos pa ni sgra'i dgos pa ma yin gyi nying dgos bla med kyi byang chub thob pa'o* ‖.

[45] Kanakavarman had a long career as a translator. He collaborated with Rin chen bzang po (958-1055) in the translation of the *Sarvadurgatipariśodhana-pretahomavidhi*. He is also known for his translation with Mar thung Dad pa'i shes rab of Dignāga's (fifth c.) masterpieces of logic, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and its *vṛtti*. Cf. NAUDOU 1968, pp. 184f. Although Naudou identifies Kanakavarman as Kashmiri, Pa tshab is said to have met him at Vajrāsana (*rdo rje gdan*) of Bodhgayā and invited him to Tibet from there by an anonymous author in his composition based on the summary of Madhyamaka meanings in the way of inquiries and answers between Pa tshab lo tsā ba and Zhang Sha ra ba (*pa tshab lo tsa ba dang zhang sha ra ba gnyis kyi dri ba dri len gyi tshul du dbu ma'i don mdor bsdus pa*, manuscript 42a2-8). I am indebted to Leonard van der Kuijp for providing me with the pdf of the manuscript.

[46] YOSHIMIZU forthcoming.

[47] *Tshig gsal ba'i dka' ba bshad pa* 88a9f. (203): *slob dpon zla ba grags pa'i zhal snga nas kyis sbyar pa | tshig gsal ba'i dka' ba bshad pa | bla ma tshong*

dpon pan ḍi ta? The Tibetan word *tshong dpon* means "chief of traders" or "merchant," whose Sanskrit equivalent is *śreṣṭhin* or *vaṇij.* This term can also be understood to mean "distinguished man." Although it is hard to judge by this name even whether he is Indian or Tibetan, it seems natural to guess that this *paṇḍita* – from whom Pa tshab received oral instructions – was one of the Indian scholars who resided in Tibet while Pa tshab was working on the retranslation of the PsP. It could have been Pa tshab's collaborator, Kanakavarman.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To summarize the transmission process of the MMK and PsP to Tibet from Kashmir and their dissemination into the Tibetan Buddhist scholastic circle through Pa tshab Nyi ma grags and his collaborators, the following phases may be assumed:

1. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags studied the MMK and PsP in Kashmir during his 23-year stay. He translated the PsP into the Tibetan language with the aid of the Kashmiri scholar Mahāsumati, using a Sanskrit manuscript accessible there. They also revised Klu'i rgyal mtshan's earlier translation of the MMK in accordance with the citations and interpretations of the MMK in the PsP. Since the earlier translation was based on Bhāviveka-Avalokitavrata's interpretation, their revision work of the MMK introduced a shift in authority for studying the MMK from Bhāviveka to Candrakīrti.

2. Pa tshab himself composed a commentary on the MMK relying on Mahāsumati's lectures who explained the MMK based on Candrakīrti's interpretation.

3. Pa tshab revised his translations of the PsP and the MMK with Kanakavarman in Tibet, referring to the second Sanskrit manuscript from a "borderland" of India.

4. Pa tshab composed a commentarial work to explain difficult points in the PsP on the basis of *Tshong dpon paṇḍita*'s guidance. Pa tshab himself left instructions on the relation between the chapters of the MMK for educational purposes (*Le 'brel pa tshab kyi man ngag*).[48]

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dpon pan ḍi ta'i (88a10) *gtam ngag la brten* [insertion: *pa tsab kyis*] *sbyar ba'o* ‖.

[48] This short work seems to have been composed in order to help students me-

Thanks to the discovery of Pa tshab's works, there are now textual witnesses to confirm that these events actually took place in Kashmir and Tibet from the end of the eleventh century to the middle of the twelfth century. They undoubtedly are of particular significance for the history of the Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka tradition because they reoriented the understanding of the MMK to Candrakīrti's interpretation.

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Abhinavagupta is undoubtedly the most famous Kashmirian medieval intellectual: his decisive contributions to Indian aesthetics, Śaiva theology and metaphysics, and to the philosophy of the subtle and original Pratyabhijñā system are well known. Yet so far his works have often been studied without fully taking into account the specific context in which they are embedded – an intellectual background that is not less exceptional than Abhinavagupta himself. While providing fresh interpretations of some of the great Śaiva polymath's works, the nineteen essays gathered here attempt to map out for the first time the extraordinary cultural effervescence that took place in the little kingdom of Kashmir around Abhinavagupta's time.

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